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Abstract 
 
Suffering, Tragedy, Vulnerability 
A Triangulated Examination of the Divine–Human Relationship 
in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Rowan Williams, and Sarah Coakley 
 
Boram Cha 
 
 
The present thesis puts the trinitarianism, christology, and anthropology of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s 
kenotic theology, Rowan Williams’s tragic theology, and Sarah Coakley’s ascetic theology into 
critical and triangulated conversation: in order to argue that suffering and death is ontologized at the 
same level as love and life in God in the kenotic trinitarianism of Balthasar; that the tragic is given an 
ontological value in the tragic imagination of Williams; and that vulnerability is essentialized in the 
ascetic spirituality of Coakley. I will argue that, on the whole, their arguments tend to put a positive 
light on the darkness of suffering as that which proves to be christologically meaningful, and portray 
the divine–human relationship competitively in a shared proclivity for emphasizing Jesus’s cry of 
dereliction on the cross (“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”). 
A concern that moves the tripartite chapters forwards is to examine how these three respected 
thinkers are inclined more or less to conceive the divine–human encounter and the God–world 
relation competitively, and to show how that unfortunate conception serves to sacralize suffering, 
tragedy, and vulnerability in their accounts of divine–human relationship. In this context, I will 
consent to Coakley’s critique that the classical understanding of non-competitive divine–human 
relation is undermined in Balthasar’s kenotic theo-dramatics; and I will argue that although a non-
competitive account is formally affirmed and espoused by Williams as well as Coakley, it is 
effectively operative neither in Williams’s tragic imagination nor in Coakley’s kneeling practice. 
What a non-competitive account of divine–human relations means is gradually fleshed out, with 
recurrent references to Kathryn Tanner, over the course of the thesis. It is given fuller expression in 
the final chapter’s examination of the coincidence of divine–human goodness implied in the doctrine 
of creation ex nihilo, albeit without intending to delve into specialist knowledge.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The present thesis puts the trinitarianism, christology, and anthropology of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s 
kenotic theology, Rowan Williams’s tragic theology, and Sarah Coakley’s ascetic theology into 
critical and triangulated conversation: in order to argue that suffering and death is ontologized at the 
same level as love and life in God in the kenotic trinitarianism of Balthasar; that the tragic is given an 
ontological value in the tragic imagination of Williams; and that vulnerability is essentialized in the 
ascetic spirituality of Coakley. I will argue that, on the whole, their arguments tend to put a positive 
light on the darkness of suffering as that which proves to be christologically meaningful, and portray 
the divine–human relationship competitively in a shared proclivity for emphasizing Jesus’s cry of 
dereliction on the cross (“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”). 
A concern that moves the tripartite chapters forwards is to examine how these three respected 
thinkers are inclined more or less to conceive the divine–human encounter and the God–world 
relation competitively, and to show how that unfortunate conception serves to sacralize suffering, 
tragedy, and vulnerability in their accounts of divine–human relationship. In this context, I will 
consent to Coakley’s critique that the classical understanding of non-competitive divine–human 
relation is undermined in Balthasar’s kenotic theo-dramatics; and I will argue that although a non-
competitive account is formally affirmed and espoused by Williams as well as Coakley in principle, it 
is effectively operative neither in Williams’s tragic imagination nor in Coakley’s kneeling theology in 
practice. What a non-competitive account of divine–human relations means is gradually fleshed out, 
with recurrent references to Kathryn Tanner, over the course of the thesis. It is given fuller expression 
in the final chapter’s examination of the coincidence of divine–human goodness implied in the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, albeit without intending to delve into specialist knowledge. Alongside 
creation ex nihilo, the classical ideas of divine immutability, evil as the privation of good, and the 
non-reciprocal relationship of God and the world function as points of reference throughout the thesis 
for critically examining the theologies of the scholar-priest trio. And I will show at relevant points 
how the trio more or less inherits the post-Holocaust trend to regard Jesus’s cry of dereliction as a 
focal point of theological constructions of Christian life, the life of Christ, and the life of the Trinity in 
one way or another. 
 
The first chapter on Hans Urs von Balthasar begins with a critical engagement of one of the most 
controverted issues in the recent Anglo–European scene of systematic theology: whether suffering 
and death is real in the Trinity. It has been widely appreciated that Balthasar’s theology successfully 
redefines and complexifies divine immutability first by expelling a unilateral and static Being, and 
then by reconceiving intra-trinitarian life as a dynamic event of kenotic love in which the triune God, 
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as a genuine “theo-dramatic” actor, grounds, receives, and redeems the tragedy of human suffering, 
sin, and evil. In recent years, however, there have been several accounts that attempt to counter that 
appreciative acknowledgement. While engaging with the appreciations, I will subscribe and attempt to 
make a contribution to the critiques. 
In order to do so, I will devote a good amount of this chapter to critical examination of 
Balthasar’s notions of “super-temporal” suffering, death, and wound in God. I will pay particular 
attention to the Johannine – in both senses of the Gospel of John and the Revelation of John – kenotic 
image of the “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world,” which Balthasar heavily draws 
upon to visualize the notions of the historical suffering, death, and wound of Christ eternalized into 
the Trinity. I will argue that God is portrayed as a mythic deity which is characterized by an eternal 
event of the negation of negativity of death into life in Balthasar’s trinitarian–christological doctrine of 
God. 
In the last section of this chapter, no less significantly, I will seek to argue, first, that 
Balthasar’s locating of sin and evil of the world within the Trinity is at odds with the classical 
teachings of the “unreal” relation of the world to God and evil as privation of good; second, that his 
theodicean attempt to explain and make sense of the origin and destination of sin and evil is contrary 
to Rowan Williams’s deliberate emphasis on the recognition of sheer particularity, temporality, and 
inexplicability of human tragedy; and, third, that Balthasar assumes that any kind of suffering can be 
distilled into a christological meaningfulness; this assumption does injustice to the irreducible 
particularity and diversity of  human suffering and puts a divinely positive light on the darkness of 
suffering; this Balthasarian tendency thus ends up mollifying the tragic reality of human suffering, sin, 
and evil, rather than taking it most seriously, as Balthasar claims to do. 
In the process of the examination and argumentation in this chapter, I will try to set out a 
ground for triangulating the complicated relations of the trio. I will first introduce and subscribe to 
Coakley’s fundamental critique, on the ground of classical theistic commitment to non-competitive 
relation of God and the world, that Balthasar gives competitive accounts of divine–human otherness 
and difference in his kenotic theo-dramatics. While Williams shares with Coakley the emphasis on 
that traditional idea of non-competition, however, he refrains from any noticeable critique of 
Balthasar and rather endeavours to exonerate him, with high appreciation of his theology of otherness 
and difference, from a critique that he incorporates suffering into the life of God. However, 
Williams’s fundamental positions—his commitments to the classical ideas of non-contrastive divine 
transcendence–immanence, the non-competitive divine–human relation, God as the source of being 
and goodness, evil as nonsubstance, and his resistance against any kind of diminishing or evading 
tragic particularity by explaining and making sense of suffering, primarily by eternalizing suffering 
vis-à-vis God—do not accord, at significant levels, with Balthasar’s theo-dramatic understandings of 
the divine actor, the location of sin and evil at the heart of God, and eternalized suffering in God. 
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Those discrepancies between Williams’s own theological convictions and his appreciation of 
Balthasar will further stand out in the second chapter, throughout which Balthasar’s substantial 
resonances with and influences on Williams’s tragic reading of the Gospel of John are highlighted. In 
the Introduction I will initially review some of the lines of the debate over whether Williams’s 
emphasis on the tragic ends up ontologizing the tragic. In the first section I will seek to show that a 
theme of tragic irony in the Gospel of John plays a long-lasting role in constructing Williams’s tragic 
imagination, which is connected to his consistent emphasis on the difficult pattern of human learning 
and transformation through failure and complicity, which is developed in the critical engagement with 
Donald Mackinnon and Gillian Rose. I will seek then to argue in the second section that his 
understanding of the Johannine irony falls short of its comic aspects, which would otherwise enable 
him to pay due regard to salient aspects of John’s narratives and characters of Samarians, Mary 
Magdalene, and the Beloved Disciple, who do not necessarily learn and grow from suffering tragic 
failure and its consequent devastating catastrophes. I will conclude that, at the level of how Williams 
really reads the text, his emphasis on the tragic tips over into giving an ontological value to the tragic 
by significantly compromising and undermining his fundamental commitments to the classical ideas 
of non-competitive divine–human relation and evil as privation of good. 
In the last section of this chapter the theological problems associated with Jesus’s cry of 
dereliction and abandonment are raised. Williams and Balthasar are interwoven in the process of 
examining the cry of dereliction. I will attempt to show that Williams, following the lead of Balthasar, 
finishes up undercutting Johannine christology by associating it with the cry of dereliction which is in 
fact redacted in the Gospel of John to Jesus’s cry of accomplishment. And I will strive to argue that in 
both Williams and Balthasar, the dubious Johannine appropriation of dereliction gives rise to an 
extreme paradox of abandonment and unity, dereliction and love that throws an abusive shadow over 
christology and the Christian life. Moreover, I will contend that Williams’s attempt to maximize his 
tragic imagination by associating the cry of dereliction with the divine identity comes close to 
suggesting a mythic image of God onto which the human tragic predicament of self-interest and its 
corrective ethics of self-dispossession is projected, and thereby close to ontologizing the tragic in the 
Trinity. To conclude, in the hope of making a contribution to the debate over whether Rowan 
Williams manages to underscore the tragic reality of the world without ontologically radicalizing it, I 
will claim that he is inclined to ontologize the tragic in relation both to creation and the Trinity. 
 
The third chapter on Sarah Coakley will begin by recalling her charges against Balthasar’s theo-
dramatics for assuming a competitive account of the God–world relation, and for incorporating 
vulnerability into the divine life of the Trinity. What I shall do in the final chapter may look like 
handing the issues of competition and vulnerability back to Coakley. In order to do so, I will make 
critical engagements first with the paradox of human vulnerability and divine 
omnipotence/empowerment—human vulnerability to divine omnipotence paradoxically produces 
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divine empowerment—and then with the translation of created dependence on God into ascetical 
vulnerability to God. 
First of all, as preliminary tasks, I will situate her theological appropriation of vulnerability 
first in wider contemporary academia and then in a theological scene. I will briefly point out markedly 
differing, yet oft-conflated, conceptualizations of vulnerability between Judith Butler and Sarah 
Coakley. And I make clear that Coakley’s paradox of power-in-vulnerability aims to save the virtue of 
vulnerability from, on the one hand, feminism’s repugnancy to vulnerability and, on the other, 
Balthasar’s trinitarian glamorization of vulnerability at the same time. 
After having clarified Coakley’s conceptualization of vulnerability, in the first section I will 
seek critically to examine the formulation of the paradox of human vulnerability and divine 
omnipotence/empowerment by means of John Barclay’s understanding of divine grace in Philippians 
2. To elaborate, Coakley establishes, heavily drawing upon the Christ Hymn in Philippians 2, a 
spiritual paradox of human prayerful vulnerability to divine power and its production of divine 
empowerment. In other words, this paradox is patterned upon the chronology of suffering 
vulnerability to God and gaining empowerment by God in which suffering vulnerability is given 
priority and productivity. According to Barclay, however, the divine gift of grace empowers human 
agency prior to any human good will and act, and it is the prior empowerment of the divine gift that 
is productive of human transformation and growth in Paul’s theology of gift. No less importantly, I 
will also strive to argue that Coakley’s paradox of vulnerable human receptivity to gentle divine 
power is inclined to create a competitive account of divine–human relation as if the more vulnerable 
we are to God, the more gentle God is to us. 
In the next three sections, I will delve more into the theological rationales of why Coakley 
translates created dependency on God into ascetic vulnerability to God in the first place, the trail-
blazing question which Linn Tonstad has raised. I will attempt to show that, in order to figure out 
what created dependence on God means, Coakley (doubtfully) dispenses with the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo and instead (strangely) taps into the ascetical darkness of dereliction, most notably 
articulated by John of the Cross. I will try to show first that this “ascetical turn” from creation to 
dereliction gives a suggestive account for her translation of created dependence on God into dark 
vulnerability to God, which essentializes human vulnerability because it is directed to God; and 
second, that the absence of creation ex nihilo results in the significant lack of the ontological element 
of divine and created goodness in her ascetic theology. That is, the translation of dependence on God 
into vulnerability to God fails to acknowledge the divine goodness as the source of empowering 
created goodness in human agency. It leads me to argue that creation ex nihilo offers a more robust 
ground for accounting for created dependency on God because the coincidence and resonance of 
divine gift and human reception in terms of goodness holds intact a non-competitive divine–human 
relation, which Coakley enthusiastically signs up for. In doing so, I hope to show that a non-
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competitive divine–human relation is consistently affirmed, yet significantly downplayed in the 
kneeling theology of Sarah Coakley. 
Finally, I will present David Burrell’s exposition of John of the Cross as a counterexample of 
a creation-centred interpretation of John of the Cross against Coakley’s dereliction-centred account, 
which has a great affinity with Rowan Williams’s interpretation. This case study may show that, at 
least, a kneeling theology does not necessarily emphasize the fertility of suffering tormented darkness. 
 
Having said that, I would like to admit the limitation of this thesis: it does not exhaustively cover the 
breadth and depth of the thoughts of all three thinkers in their entirety, though it does reach its word 
limit. This limitation of course leads to the possibility of my oversight of some potentially relevant 
point or some significant shifts over the course of the development of ideas that should ideally, if time 
and word count permitted, be taken into consideration. 
Where the trio’s heavy reliance upon biblical expositions force me to draw upon some New 
Testament scholarship—the Revelation of John (in Balthasar), the Gospel of John (in Balthasar and 
Williams), and Philippians and Romans (in Coakley)—I intend neither to make a contribution to 
biblical scholarship nor exhaustively to engage with the fields of biblical scholarship. 
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Chapter 1. Kenosis and Suffering in the Kenotic Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
 
 
 
Introduction: The Event of Love in God as Balthasar’s Middle Way 
 
Hans Urs von Balthasar presents his “theo-drama” as a delicate task to steer a middle course between 
the traditional idea of divine immutability and the modern conception of a suffering God. He begins 
with the identification of the two extremes to be avoided. According to Balthasar, the divine actor in 
the theo-drama is neither to remain a spectator as in philosophy nor to be part of the world stage as in 
mythology. A God in accordance with biblical witness and theological integrity avoids both the 
philosophical and mythological misconceptions: 
 
Man’s “concepts of God” always swing between two extremes. At one extreme, there is 
the mythological view in which God (or the gods) is embroiled in the world drama, 
which, with its own laws of operation, thus constitutes a third level of reality above God 
and man; at the other extreme, God is seen as dwelling in philosophical sublimity above 
the vicissitudes of the world, which prevent him from entering the dramatic action. On 
the basis of biblical revelation, we can say right at the outset that God has involved 
himself with the creation of the world, particularly in the creation of finite free beings, 
without thereby succumbing to some superordinate fate. Thus the God of theo-dramatic 
action is neither “mutable” (as in the mythological view) nor “immutable” (in the terms 
of philosophy).1 
 
Balthasar matches the two extreme ends of philosophy and mythology with, respectively, the 
theologies of Karl Rahner and Jürgen Moltmann in terms of the relation of the Trinity and the world. 
He maintains that “a way must be found to see the immanent Trinity as the ground of the world 
process (including the crucifixion) in such a way that it is neither a formal process of self-
communication in God, as in Rahner, nor entangled in the world process, as in Moltmann.”2 
Balthasar seeks to “avoid the two opposed and incompatible extremes”3 by establishing a 
trinitarian theology which does not “regard the Trinity one-sidedly as the ‘play’ of an absolute 
‘blessedness’ that abstracts from concrete pain and lacks the ‘“seriousness’ of separation and death.”4  
 
1 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume 2: Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. 
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 9 (henceforth abbreviated as TD 2). 
2 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume 4: The Action, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 322–23 (henceforth abbreviated as TD 4). 
3 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. Aidan Nichols (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1990), viii (henceforth abbreviated as MP). See also TD 4, 319–28; and Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: 
Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume 3: The Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1992), 506–9 (henceforth abbreviated as TD 3). 
4 TD 4, 325. 
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There is only one way to approach the trinitarian life in God. . . . We must feel our way 
back into the mystery of the absolute, employing a negative theology that excludes from 
God all intramundane experience and suffering, while at the same time presupposing 
that the possibility of such experience and suffering—up to and including its 
christological and trinitarian implications—is grounded in God. To think in such a way 
is to walk on a knife edge: it avoids all the fashionable talk of “the pain of God” and yet 
is bound to say that something happens in God that not only justifies the possibility and 
actual occurrence of all suffering in the world but also justifies God’s sharing in the 
latter, in which he goes to the length of vicariously taking on man’s God-lessness.5 
 
The “possibility” or potentiality of the occurrence of suffering in the world, for Balthasar, is grounded 
in the Trinity. But to locate the possibility of suffering in God does not fall into an error of making 
God caught up with the world, unlike a mythological conception of divine mutability, and rather 
enables us to conceive of a genuine way of divine involvement with the world, unlike a purely 
philosophical notion of divine immutability. 
Such a trinitarian theology is established, first and foremost, by affirming its intrinsic relation 
to the Son’s separation and death on the cross. For Balthasar, “the only way . . . is that which relates 
the event of the Kenosis of the Son of God to what one can, by analogy, designate as the eternal 
‘event’ of the divine processions.”6 In other words, the temporal event of kenosis on the cross has to 
do with the eternal event of kenosis in the Trinity: the kenosis in salvation history by the economic 
Trinity is the “expression” and “manifestation” of the kenosis in the divine processions within the 
immanent Trinity; and the latter grounds, encompasses, and transcends the former—the latter enables, 
embraces, and outstrips; makes it possible, assumes, and surpasses; and undergirds, includes, and 
overcomes the former. 
What undergirds this argument is that for Balthasar himself and his proponents, his 
trinitarian–christological doctrine of God, without introducing a change into God, speaks of an “event 
of love” that grounds (gift) earthly tragedy, receives (reception) it into, and redeems (redemption) it in 
God. For instance, Paul Fiddes encapsulates this position as follows: “If God is open ‘in advance’ to 
receiving the impact of human sinning then there is no question of change in the strict sense; God is, 
as it were, immutably ready to receive new experiences, even the experience of estrangement and 
desolation.”7 Steffen Lösel also summarizes using cruciform–trinitarian terms: “The divine Son’s 
death on the cross of Golgotha is anticipated and surpassed by an eternal death of Father and Son in 
the Holy Spirit—a death enacted out of mutual love. Hence, the Son’s death on the cross does not 
constitute a transformation for God which would be imposed upon God from contingent, historical 
 
5 TD 4, 324. 
6 MP, viii. 
7 Paul S. Fiddes, “Salvation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. Kathryn Tanner, John Webster, and 
Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 176–96 (180). 
 8 
events.”8 The event of overcoming tragedy in Balthasar’s God, therefore, not only safeguards divine 
immutability but also proves eternally “enriching” as “an ever-more increasing event of Trinitarian 
exchanges.”9 Jennifer Newsome Martin, one of my primary interlocuters in this chapter, who gives 
one of the most recent and sophisticated appreciative accounts of Balthasar, encapsulates how 
Balthasar successfully envisages the event of divine love without compromising divine immutability. 
 
Though Balthasar wants to claim some kind of event in God, he does not wish to 
suggest that there was a substantial change in God as such. In sum, Balthasar wishes to 
retain the traditional language of immutability, but also to complexify it with a 
Trinitarian and kenotic inflection borrowed directly from Bulgakov.10 
 
Because both Bulgakov and Balthasar hold that this eternal self-donation is essential to 
the life of the Trinity, it becomes a defensible premise that the Incarnation and death of 
Christ on the cross do not represent a change in God from earth to heaven, time to 
eternity, but is rather a continuation of the substantial modality of self-giving love at the 
core of divine being, which is ordered toward human salvation.11 
 
For Balthasar, as Mark McIntosh notes, “the divine reliability, or . . . the divine immutability, is 
grounded . . . in the activity of the trinitarian processions of self-giving love.”12 And the trinitarian 
event of love in God defines how the event of love in the world should be in that it makes “all 
modalities of love [in the world] even the modality of suffering-separation and self-destitution 
motivated and anchored in the love exchange of the Trinitarian persons in the one God.”13 The 
suffering of Christ on the cross is a “modality” of the Son’s eternal love towards the Father which has 
eternally, in advance of all temporality, contained risk, suffering, and even death. Hence, the fact that 
God is “affected” by the suffering of Christ does not introduce something new and represent a 
“change” in God. 
 
8 Steffen Lösel, “Unapocalyptic Theology: History and Eschatology in Balthasar’s Theo-Drama,” Modern Theology 
17, no. 2 (April 2001): 201–25 (201–2). 
9 Guy Mansini, “Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the Trinity,” The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly 
Review 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 499–519 (508). I regret that my attention was attracted to the following relevant 
articles with the themes of divine “enrichment” and divine “reception” in Balthasar after I had finalized the main 
body of this chapter: Joshua R. Brotherton, “Trinitarian Suffering and Divine Receptivity after Balthasar,” The 
Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 82, no. 2 (April 2018): 189–234; Paul O’Callaghan, “Can God be Enriched? On 
the Metaphysical Underpinnings of von Balthasar’s Theology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 84, no. 2 (May 2019): 175–94; 
and Jacob Lett, “Divine Roominess: Spatial and Music Analogies in Hans Urs von Balthasar and Robert Jenson,” 
Pro Ecclesia: A Journal of Catholic and Evangelical Theology 28, no. 3 (August 2019). 
10 Jennifer Newsome Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Critical Appropriation of Russian Religious Thought (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 185. 
11 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 190; italics mine. 
12  Mark McIntosh, “von Balthasar,” in The Blackwell Companion of Modern Theology, ed. Gareth Jones (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), 388–402 (396). 
13 Matthew Lewis Sutton, “Does God Suffer? Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theology of Holy Saturday,” in On 
Suffering: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue on Narrative and Suffering, ed. Nate Hinerman and Matthew Lewis Sutton (Oxford: 
Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2012), 172–83 (178–79). 
 9 
For Balthasar and his proponents, it redefines and revises what the classical idea of divine 
immutability means in a sophisticated way by putting a remarkably relevant spin on the idea, without 
introducing an improper change in God. And it is believed to make a distinctive contribution to the 
development of the traditional idea rather than undercut the tradition. Balthasar insists that the intra-
trinitarian modality of love guarantees God’s immutability and eternal blessedness simultaneously 
with an economic reception of sin and evil into God. 
 
We shall never know how to express the abyss-like depths of the Father’s self-giving, 
that Father who, in an eternal “super-kenosis”, makes himself “destitute” of all that he is 
and can be so as to bring forth a consubstantial divinity, the Son. Everything that can be 
thought and imagined where God is concerned is, in advance, included and transcended 
in this self-destitution which constitutes the person of the Father, and, at the same time, 
those of the Son and the Spirit. God as the “gulf” (Eckhart: Un-Grund) of absolute Love 
contains in advance, eternally, all the modalities of love, of compassion, and even of a 
“separation” motivated by love and founded on the infinite distinction between the 
hypostases—modalities which may manifest themselves in the course of a history of 
salvation involving sinful humankind. God, then, has no need to ‘change’ when he 
makes a reality of the wonders of his charity.14 
 
Thus, Balthasar intends to make plain that “we are not saying that the eternal separation in God is, in 
itself, ‘tragic’ or that the Spirit’s bridging of the distinction is the sublation of tragedy, that is, 
‘comedy’.”15 The eternal event or modality of love within the Trinity eternally manages to prevent 
itself from becoming a mythological dynamic of tragedy and comedy happening on the same plane 
and thereby proves its (not “absolute,” but still) “eternal blessedness,” namely, “the all-embracing 
reality within which ‘tragedy’ is played out.”16 Balthasar’s theo-dramatic interplay of God and the 
world proves itself as successfully envisaging a God who grounds, receives, and outstrips the entirety 
of historical tragedy of suffering and death without losing divine blessedness. 
The whole claim suggests that God is an event of love that justifies, grounds, embraces (by 
super-suffering and super-death in the Trinity), and transcends, outstrips, overcomes (by the unity, 
love, and life of the Trinity) the reality of tragedy¾suffering, sin, and evil¾in the finite, fallen world. 
It exhibits a serious soteriological concern in an intrinsically interconnected language of trinitarianism 
and christology with an equally heavy concern for theodicy to account for the origin and destination 
of suffering and evil. And it is not allowed merely to say that the event of love is in God alongside 
something other than love, for God is not a “structured” being. Rather, as Balthasar himself stresses, 
God is the event of love that grounds, receives, and redeems human tragedy. I aim to elaborate in 
 
14 MP, viii–ix; italics mine. 
15 TD 4, 327 
16 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume 5: The Last Act, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 246 (henceforth abbreviated as TD 5). He warns his readers that he oversteps 
here “the limit of what we mean by ‘tragedy’” and that it sounds “baffling . . . to the finite mind.” 
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what follows how this kind of conceptualization of God may claim to preserve divine immutability in 
a highly revised sense at the cost of mutating God into a mythological deity. 
 
The Threefold Movement of the Theo-Dramatic Kenosis of God 
 
In order to engage critically with Balthasar’s new way of conceiving of God in relation to the 
suffering of the world, I would like briefly to illustrate the three facets of the kenotic movement: 
procession, creation, and mission. He here and there articulates an entire picture of the threefold mode 
of divine kenosis at a single stroke throughout his trilogy. Balthasar heavily draws on Sergei 
Bulgakov’s conception of divine kenosis, divesting his “fundamental conviction of its sophiological 
presuppositions,”17 in negotiating a middle course and presenting a new way of interweaving the 
Trinity and the cross. A comprehensive passage helps his readers to gain a helpful outline to show 
what the whole flow of “the primal divine drama”18 looks like. 
 
The ultimate presupposition of the Kenosis is the “selflessness” of the Persons (when 
considered as pure relationships) in the inner-Trinitarian life of love. There is, next, a 
fundamental Kenosis given with the creation as such, since God from all eternity takes 
on responsibility for its flourishing (not least in regard to human freedom), and in his 
providence, foreseeing sin, includes the Cross (as foundation of the creation) in his 
“account”. “The Cross of Christ is inscribed in the creation of the world since its basis 
was laid.” Finally, in the actual world, marked as it is by sin, “his redemptive Passion 
begins with his Incarnation itself. And since the will to undertake the redemptive 
Kenosis is itself indivisibly trinitarian.” God the Father and the Holy Spirit are for 
Bulgakov involved in the Kenosis in the most serious sense: the Father as he who sends 
and abandons, the Spirit as he who unites only through separation and absence. All this 
is true of the “economic Trinity” who, according to Bulgakov, must be distinguished 
from the “immanent” Trinity.19 
 
Balthasar intends to build a complete picture of the immanent life (procession) and the economic life 
(creation and mission) of the Trinity, upon the notion of kenosis. I will outline its threefold aspect of 
procession, creation, and mission but in the order of procession, mission, and creation for making 
clear a crucial trinitarian–christological (procession–mission) link. 
 
 
17 MP, 35; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume 7: Theology: The New 
Covenant, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 213 (henceforth abbreviated as GL 7). 
18 TD 4, 325. 
19 MP, 35. See also GL 7, 213–14; TD 4, 323, 325–26; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory, 
Volume 2: Truth of God, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 177–78 (henceforth 
abbreviated as TL 2). 
 11 
Trinitarian Kenosis: The Procession of the Son 
For Balthasar, the first kenosis occurs in the divine procession of the Son from the Father’s self-
donative life. The “Ur-Kenosis” as the Father’s generation of the Son is, as Martin highlights, “a 
fundamental organizing principle of his entire theological work.”20 “A first, intra-Trinitarian kenosis” 
is “none other than God’s positive ‘self-expropriation’ in the act of handing over the entire divine 
being in the processions.”21 The place of the Father’s “self-emptying is precisely the place of his 
holiest divinity, of love’s highest freedom.”22 For Balthasar, it is important to acknowledge that an 
eternal, absolute, infinite difference or distance between the Father and the Son is essential to the ur-
kenotic procession. 
 
The Father’s self-utterance in the generation of the Son is an initial “kenosis” within the 
Godhead that underpins all subsequent kenosis. . . . He is this movement of self-giving 
that holds nothing back. This divine act that brings forth the Son, that is, the second way 
of participating in (and of being) the identical Godhead, involves the positing of an 
absolute, infinite “distance”.23 
 
The Father gives himself to the Son, the uncreated, consubstantial Other, in the receptivity of the Son. 
“The Father strips himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it over to the Son.”24 The 
“original self-surrender” of the Father’s handing himself over to the Son creates “an absolute, infinite 
“distance”” between the One and the Other; thus the Son is “the infinitely Other” of the Father. By his 
own ecstatic act, the Father “must go to the very extreme of self-lessness”; thus, there is a sacred void 
of God-lessness, “a unique and incomprehensible ‘separation’ of God from himself” in-between the 
Father and the Son.25 
Balthasar emphatically notes that “this first kenosis expands to a kenosis involving the whole 
Trinity.”26 In the loving response to the Father’s loving kenotic act to give the Son “the gift of 
consubstantial divinity”27 the Son empties himself in filial thanksgiving to the Father. “The Son’s 
answer to the gift of Godhead (of equal substance with the Father) can only be eternal thanksgiving to 
the Father, the Source—a thanksgiving as selfless and unreserved as the Father’s original self-
surrender.”28 And the trinitarian theology of eternal difference concomitantly defines the role of the 
 
20 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 176. 
21 TL 2, 177–78. 
22 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe according to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian E. Daley (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 259. 
23 TD 4, 323. 
24 TD 4, 323. 
25 TD 4, 325. 
26 TD 4, 331. 
27 TD 4, 326. 
28 TD 4, 324. 
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Spirit. It is the Spirit as “the free, superabundant love” who unifies the infinite distance or separation. 
The Spirit bonds the Father and the Son as a superabundant love and an “intradivine liberality.”29 The 
Spirit as “the essence of love . . . maintains the infinite difference between them, seals it and, since he 
is the one Spirit of them both, bridges it.”30 Thereby, “the Christian God, in his identity, is able to be 
the ‘One’, the ‘Other’ and the ‘Unifying’” 31¾in the intra-trinitarian life, the Father, the One, 
generates the Son, the Other, by his free love; the Son as the Other who proceeds from the Father is 
the image of the Father; and the Spirit as a freely unifying and identifying love bonds the One and the 
Other. “Within God’s identity, there is an Other, who at the same time is the image of the Father and 
thus archetype of all that can be created, and there is a Spirit, who is the free, superabundant love of 
the ‘One’ and of the ‘Other’.”32 In the inner life of the triune God, “each hypostasis is itself insofar as 
it ‘lets’ the others ‘be’ in equal concreteness.”33 
 
The Son could not be consubstantial with the Father except by self-expropriation; and 
the “We”, that is, the Spirit, must also be God if he is to be the “personal” seal of that 
self-expropriation that is identical in Father and Son. For the Spirit does not want 
anything “for himself” but, as his revelation in the world shows, wants simply to be the 
pure manifestation and communication of the love between Father and Son.34 
 
The supreme love and freedom and the infinite distance are interrelated in the intra-divine life. “The 
immanent Trinity must be understood to be that eternal, absolute self-surrender whereby God is seen 
to be, in himself, absolute love.”35 Divine love grounded on absolute freedom only makes sense on the 
premise of incomprehensible distance. “Love, which is the highest level of union, only takes root in 
the growing independence of the lovers.”36 The gift of the Father’s self-giving is truly grounded in 
divine freedom and love. This kenotic love is the principle of the self-emptying or self-ecstatic act. 
The Father manifests his own self-fulfilment and self-realization of divinity through his selfless 
emptying and surrendering in the innermost sense of the kenotic act. 
 
It is the supreme expression of the limitless plenitude of the divine being, a plenitude 
that could never be exhausted by one hypostasis but that requires the reciprocal ecstasy 
of the “Persons” in order to unfold itself as absolute love and, in doing so, as absolute 
truth.37 
 
29 TL 2, 181. 
30 TD 4, 324. 
31 TD 3, 531. 
32 TL 2, 180–81. 
33 TD 5, 75.  
34 TD 4, 331. See also TD 2, 256. 
35 TD 4, 323. 
36 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 64. 
37 TL 2, 179–80. 
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The divine love and truth of the Trinity hinges on the reciprocal ecstasy of the three persons, and the 
mutual ecstatic act of kenosis pivots on the primal kenosis of the Father. Therefore, Balthasar writes, 
after all, “division in God can ‘essentially be nothing other than absolute relation’”38 rather than an 
estrangement or alienation of God from God. Hence, the distance in the inner life of God is always 
distance-in-relation. The infinite difference is always “equi-primordially unity and nonunity.”39 One 
might summarize, “Trinity is the mystery of infinite nearness and infinite distance.”40  
 
Redemptive Kenosis: The Mission of the Son 
The understanding of the person of Jesus as being sent (missio) by the Father in the Gospel of John 
sets the scene for the second phase of the threefold kenosis and for Balthasar’s mission christology. 
This redemptive kenosis as the mission of Jesus comprises his incarnation, life, death, and 
resurrection. Christ’s mission is an economic extension of his filial kenotic obedience to the primal 
self-emptying love of the Father in the immanent Trinity: “the Son’s mission is the economic form of 
his eternal procession from the Father.”41 As Martin rightly articulates, the “principle, namely that the 
mode of self-emptying present in Christ’s incarnation and death on the cross is expressive of the 
mutual self-emptying of the persons of the immanent Trinity, is at the center, not the periphery, of 
Balthasar’s theocentric, Trinitarian eschatology.”42 
The Trinity and the cross are intrinsically and profoundly connected with each other in 
Balthasar’s theology.43 One would say that “to render the history of redemption transparent in relation 
to this primal process [of the intra-trinitarian kenosis] is probably the deepest concern of the whole 
Balthasar’s theology.”44 As discussed, the self-emptying love between the Father and the Son posits 
“an absolute, infinite distance” between them and even “a unique and incomprehensible ‘separation’ 
of God from himself.”45 This inner-trinitarian infinite distance corresponds to and resonates with the 
 
38 TL 2, 185. 
39 TL 2, 185. 
40 John O’Donnell, Hans Urs Von Balthasar (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), 108. 
41 TD 3, 201.  
42 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 175. 
43 Entoni Šeperić makes an interesting observation on Balthasar’s logic of the immanent and economic lives of the 
Trinity: “Every single element and every action on the side of the incarnate Son must also correspond—like a finely 
tuned instrument—to elements and movements in the dynamics of the immanent Trinity, so that the death of the 
Son, so to say, becomes a model of the super-death in the Trinity. Of course, as soon as you allowed for the inner 
dictates of an intra-systemic logical coherence of a theological method to play the tune, then one inference calls for 
another, and very soon this super-death demands a sort of super-kenosis within the Trinity, allows for postulation of 
some super-time within the Trinity, etc.” Entoni Šeperić, “Theological Discourse in the Vicious Circle of Apathy,” 
in Theology—Descent into the Vicious Circles of Death on the Fortieth Anniversary of Jürgen Moltmann’s The Crucified God, ed. 
Zoran Grozdanov, foreword by Miroslav Volf (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2016), 87–116 (101). 
44 Medard Kehl, “Introduction,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Credo: Meditations on the Apostles’ Creed, trans. David 
Kipp (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 7–24 (9). 
45 TD 4, 325. 
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dreadful distance on the cross between the crucified Son and the Father abandoning his Son (which is 
in fact absent in the Gospel of John). In other words, the event of the kenotic love in the immanent 
Trinity undergirds the kenotic action of Christ on the cross, and the infinite distance in the trinitarian 
kenotic life makes possible the separation of the Son from the Father on the cross. And the inner-
trinitarian distance is fully revealed only from the incarnate Son’s forsakenness and abandonment by 
the Father. 
 
All external scenes of Jesus’ life and sufferings are to be understood as a direct 
revelation of the interior life and intentions of God. This is the fundamental meaning of 
biblical symbolism and allegory, . . . All of this [silence, mocking, nailing, piercing of 
Jesus around crucifixion] is a direct portrayal and exegesis of God (John 1:18).46  
 
“No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made 
him known” (John 1.18). In accordance with his Johannine conviction, all the ghastly appearances of 
Jesus’s suffering exhibit an unobscured transparency in relation to the eternal life of God. All the 
gruesome “external” particularities associated with the crucifixion of Jesus is somehow internal or 
transparent, if not internalized into, to the life of the immanent Trinity. All the horrendous 
particularities of the evil violence that inflicted his suffering and death are to be understood as “a 
direct revelation of the interior life and intentions of God,” as “a direct portrayal and exegesis of 
God.”47  
To lay a christological foundation for the ultimate reconciliation between God and the world, 
Balthasar attempts to delve into the further implications of the kenotic incarnation of Christ. For 
Balthasar, “to ‘take on manhood’ means in fact to assume its concrete destiny with all that entails—
suffering, death, hell—in solidarity with every human being.”48 “The Son of God took human nature 
in its fallen condition, and with it, therefore, the worm in its entrails—mortality, fallenness, self-
estrangement, death—which sin introduced into the world.”49 What is of particular importance in his 
own account of penal substitution is that he goes so far as to claim that the sublime kenotic act of 
Christ on the cross is profoundly involved in the overwhelming actuality of sin¾the Son’s cry of 
dereliction and abandonment by the Father.50 As Matthew Levering aptly indicates, “Balthasar’s ideas 
 
46  Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat: Aphorisms, trans. by Erasmo Leiva–Merikakis (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1995), 58. 
47 Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat, 58; italics mine. 
48 MP, 20. 
49 MP, 22. 
50 Bruce McCormack complains that Balthasar’s idea of God-abandonment falls short of the Spirit abandoning 
the Son. “Von Balthasar does not say anything about the Spirit’s role in this drama. In fact, even when he speaks of 
the handing-over as a Trinitarian event, his focus is entirely upon the Father and the Son; the Father hands over the 
Son and the Son hands himself over. No mention is made of the Spirit. But it would seem to me that no death in 
God-abandonment can occur unless the Son is finally abandoned by both Father and Spirit.” Bruce L. McCormack, 
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about Trinitarian diastasis, inner-Trinitarian faith, and Trinitarian metaphysics depend largely upon 
his interpretation of Christ’s consciousness on the Cross. Were this thread withdrawn from his 
theology, much else would have to be revised.”51 
It should be noted that for Balthasar the suffering and death of Jesus does not terminate in the 
physical realm but reaches out beyond it to his spiritual realm. In other words, the suffering of Jesus’s 
crucifixion represents the entirety of death in the sense that he suffers in terms of body and spirit. And 
it is Jesus’s cry of dereliction and abandonment that lays bare his spiritual death. His suffering and 
death cover a spiritual realm precisely because the incarnate Son of the Father is forsaken and 
abandoned in the world by the very Father who sent (missio) him to the world. The incarnate Son’s 
self-surrender caused for himself a plunge into the total devastation of Godlessness in the 
unbridgeable distance between himself and the Father. “Jesus does not only accept the (to be sure, 
accursed) mortal destiny of Adam. He also, quite expressly, carries the sin of the human race and, 
with those sins, the ‘second death’ of God-abandonment.” 52  He suffers “the second death” as 
forsakenness, abandonment, and dereliction by his own Father: the anxiety of total helplessness, terror 
of being cut off from the divine origin, and the agony of utter absence of power to recover the 
desperate tragedy. 
The abandonment of the Son by the Father nearly always accompanies Balthasar’s reference 
to the cross event of Jesus. He even consistently conveys the impression that the suffering and death 
of Jesus has much more to do with his dereliction and forsakenness by God than with the sinful 
exercise of imperial, religious power. And that God-forsakenness of the Son is grounded in and made 
possible by the eternal forsakenness of the pre-existent Son in the inner life of the Trinity. It means 
that the dreadful distance between the Father and the crucified Son on the cross has an intrinsic 
connection to the eternal, absolute distance between the divine persons within the immanent Trinity. 
“Without this personal distance in the circumincessio of the Persons it would be impossible to 
understand either the creature’s distance from God or the Son’s ‘economic’ distance from the 
Father—a distance that goes to the limit of forsakenness.”53 In Balthasar’s trinitarian–christological 
logic, as eternal trinitarian vulnerability does not introduce a change in receiving temporal 
vulnerability, Christ’s separation from the Father is, as Fiddes notes, “grounded in the infinite 
differences between the triune persons and their eternal self-emptying. If the life of relations in the 
Trinity already has this gulf of love at its heart, we can begin to understand how God allows death 
itself to enter that space. In free will, God allows God’s own otherness to become a painful 
 
“‘With Loud Cries and Tears’: The Humanity of the Son in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews 
and Christian Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 37–68 (55). 
51  Matthew Levering, “Balthasar on Christ’s Consciousness on the Cross,” The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly 
Review 65, no. 4 (October 2001): 567–81 (580). 
52 MP, 90. 
53 TD 5, 98. 
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alienation.”54 It is the divine and eternal distance between the Father and the Son in the triune life that 
corresponds to, grounds, and makes possible the unfathomable distance between Jesus and the Father 
in the event of suffering and death. The horrendous separation of Christ from God is intrinsically 
trinitarian.  
 
Now having provided a basic summary of the contents of the primordial intra-trinitarian kenosis of 
procession and of the christological kenosis of mission in Balthasar’s theology, there is an opportunity 
to highlight one particular aspect of it. That is to say, he intends to redefine the divine nature as unity 
and love in the way of dialectical dynamics rather than in a sublimely abstract way. As Cyrus Olsen 
notes, “the characterization of the unity of divine nature as ‘diastasis’ indicates von Balthasar’s 
attempt to preserve ‘unity’, usually understood in static terms, while preserving ‘difference’, usually 
understood in dynamic terms.”55 This dialectical movement of unity in separation in God stands on a 
twofold premise. To unite “otherness” and “unity” in the Godhead is possible precisely because the 
Christian God is triune. The Father’s begetting of the Son as the infinite, absolute, eternal “other” is 
concurrent with the Spirit’s unifying love. Hence, as Gerard O’Hanlon, among many others, claims, 
“If God were simply one he would become ensnared in the world-process through the incarnation and 
cross. But because God is triune, with both poles of difference and unity guaranteed by the Holy 
Spirit, the difference between Father and Son can accommodate all created differences including that 
extreme distance shown on the cross which becomes a revelation of the closest togetherness of Father 
and Son.”56 In other words, the dialectical movement of unity-in-separation in the inner life of God is 
possible because the distance and separation between the Father and the Son is always surpassed and 
transcended by the unifying love of the Spirit as the incarnate Son’s diremption from the Father is 
overcome by the resurrection in the economic life of God. As Aristotle Papanikolaou elucidates, in 
Balthasar 
 
“Otherness” is constituted in and through “distance”, which is the precondition for real 
communion. It is only in communion that the “other” is constituted. . . . It is also the 
point of true trinitarian revelation, insofar as the Resurrection reveals that even such an 
extreme distance between the Father and Son can never result in a separation.57 
 
It is clear that Balthasar does not shy away from placing infinite distance within the inner life of the 
Trinity. Suffering and death, while eternally present in the Trinity, is always surpassed by the 
resurrection, as the infinite distance eternally present is always unified in the Trinity by the love of the 
 
54 Fiddes, “Salvation,” 187. 
55 Cyrus Olsen, “Exitus–Reditus in H.U. von Balthasar,” The Heythrop Journal 52, no. 4 (July 2011): 643–58 (653). 
56 Gerard F. O’Hanlon, The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 27. 
57 Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist Theologies in 
Conversation,” Modern Theology 19, no. 1 (January 2003): 41–65 (51). 
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Spirit. For Balthasar, the infinite distance is affirmed as a precondition of a profound manifestation of 
divine unity and love. Accordingly, the dialectical event of “unity-in-distance in God” is expanded 
into an event of “love-in-suffering in God” and even an event of “life-in-death in God.” As a result, he 
conceives of God as being-in-becoming in, I will argue, an eternal event of negation of negativity in 
the divine life—the eternal purgation of distance, suffering, and death into unity, love, and life. 
 
Creative Kenosis: The Creation of the World 
The kenotic movements of the inner life of the triune God progress to the world. The creation of the 
world is the economic kenotic act which follows the processive kenosis in the immanent Trinity. The 
“primal kenosis makes possible all other kenotic movements of God into the world; they are simply 
its consequences.”58 The triune God creates a reality outside and becomes correlated with it in an 
overflowing and radiating love. As Papanikolaou articulates, “Creation as the ‘other’ is a product of 
and intended for the loving communion with God. The ‘otherness’ of creation for Balthasar is not 
creation in itself, but the unique presence of created beings constituted in loving communion with 
God.”59 In the creative kenotic act of God, the world is created under “the archetype of all that can be 
created,”60 that is, the Son who is the uncreated, consubstantial other of the Father in the infinite 
distance of love between them. The world is a created other, which mirrors “the archetypal otherness 
within God.” 61  “The infinite distance between the world and God is grounded in the other, 
prototypical distance between God and God.”62 In other words, in the gift of creation, the world is 
created as a contingent, subsequent “other” in the trinitarian image of the archetypal Other, and 
reflects the otherness-in-sameness, distance-in-relation, and hiatus-in-love in the likeness of the triune 
God. 
 
In the trinitarian dogma, God is one, good, true and beautiful because he is essentially 
Love, and Love supposes the one, the other, and their unity. And if it is necessary to 
suppose the Other, the Word, the Son, in God, then the otherness of the creation is not a 
fall, a disgrace, but an image of God, even as it is not God.63 
 
The creation of the world as a contingent other of God resulted from the non-necessary, creative, 
loving act of God, which is in a series of the divine kenosis based on absolute love and freedom. As a 
result of such creation, the world retains a relationship of distance-in-communion with God. Graham 
Ward appreciatively maintains that in the thought of Balthasar distance and space is good in that it 
 
58 TD 4, 331. 
59 Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse,” 51. 
60 TL 2, 181. 
61 TL 2, 181. 
62 TL 2, 266. 
63 Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 118.  
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intensifies desire and power for communion and unity: “hiatus fosters desire by opening the space for 
creativity, the stage for action, the yearning for unity; it fosters a spiritual dunamis, a theological 
kinesis, which is kenotic. There cannot be true kenosis without hiatus, without true difference.”64 
 
I have dealt so far with the threefold kenotic event in both the immanent and economic Trinity. In 
short, the processive kenosis is the Father’s self-emptying in the generation of the Son within the 
immanent Trinity. It undergirds all subsequent kenosis because it is the primal kenosis which 
establishes the divine prototype of the possibility of all kenotic events. The creative and the 
redemptive kenosis correspond, respectively, to the kenotic acts of creation and salvation of the world 
within the economic Trinity. Now in what follows I would like to embark on critical engagements 
with Balthasar’s expositions of the threefold kenotic event of the Trinity. 
 
 
The God–World Relation in Theo-Drama 
 
Divine Immutability and Scripture 
First of all, it is helpful to examine one of his critical points of departure towards a middle way of 
kenotic trinitarianism. This initial examination may throw a critical light on the extent to which the 
starting point of his theology is justified. 
As noted in the beginning, Balthasar is convinced that the idea of divine immutability, if 
philosophically confined, makes God indifferent to the world and hinders God from involving himself 
with the world. Divine immutability “prevent[s] him from entering the dramatic action,”65 thereby 
disallowing a genuine theo-dramatic action of God. Thus, Balthasar believes, “the God of theo-
dramatic action” is not “‘immutable’ (in the terms of philosophy).”66 As Jennifer Martin rightly 
observes, for Balthasar, the philosophical idea of divine immutability does not account for “the 
biblical record.”67 This construal functions as one of the explicit motivating factors in constructing his 
own distinctive interconnection of the Trinity and the cross. A strictly philosophical idea of God’s 
immutability is, for Balthasar, “denied, or so it seemed, by numerous Old Testament passages,”68 and 
in “the theo-drama into which the world and God have their ultimate input. . . . God cannot function 
 
64 Graham Ward, “Kenosis: Death, Discourse and Resurrection,” in Balthasar at the End of Modernity, ed. Lucy 
Gardner et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 15–68 (44). 
65 TD 2, 9. 
66 TD 2, 9. 
67 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 184.  
68 MP, vii. Abraham Joshua Heschel may be one of the most prominent thinkers who promotes a dichotomy 
between the divine Pathos of a covenantal God proclaimed by the Hebrew prophets and the indifferent divinity of a 
sublime Being speculated by the Greek philosophers. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2001; originally published 1962), esp. 288–93, 333. 
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here as a mere Spectator, allegedly immutable and not susceptible to influence.”69 Balthasar therefore 
embarks on revising the traditional idea of divine immutability into an idea of the theo-dramatic 
God’s immutability that does justice to the biblical descriptions of God and thereby does not evoke an 
abstracted image of God “dwelling in philosophical sublimity above the vicissitudes of the world.”70 
Balthasar seems to allude here to one of the fashionable suspicions in post-Holocaust 
theology that the idea of divine immutability is not compatible with the biblical witness but rather 
influenced by ancient Hellenistic philosophy in the early stage of theological development. This claim 
is, however, not without critical reappraisals, although it has been quite prevalent and influential. A 
brief survey of the critiques, I believe, may call into question the point of departure of Balthasar 
towards the quest for a middle way. For instance, Frances Young points out, “It is often supposed that 
Hebraic understanding lost out in the assimilation of the Bible to Greek philosophy, but increasingly 
this seems to be a false estimate of what was going on in the formation of Christian doctrine.”71 Lewis 
Ayres also takes a dim view of the tendency to regard classical theology as indebted to “Greek 
metaphysics” and, subsequently, as the “‘Platonizing’ of Christianity.” According to Ayres, the 
tendency is built on a false dichotomy between “‘dynamic’” biblical themes and “‘static’ ontological 
categories,”72 which is certainly discernible in Balthasar. Paul Gavrilyuk carries out an extensive 
research on this suspicious trend. “Contrary to a widespread misconception,” he articulates, “there 
was nothing in the Hellenistic world amounting to a universally endorsed ‘axiom of divine 
impassibility’.”73 Rather, he maintains, “the ontological distinction between the creator and creation,” 
which implies divine immutability and impassibility, is “the scriptural vision” rather than a thought of 
Hellenistic philosophy. 74  Gavrilyuk even suggests that “The Theory of Theology’s Fall into 
Hellenistic Philosophy must be once and for all buried with honours, as one of the most enduring and 
illuminating mistakes among the interpretations of the development of Christian doctrine.”75 Similarly, 
 
69 TD 4, 318 
70 TD 2, 9. 
71 Frances M. Young, “‘Creatio ex Nihilo’: A Context for the Emergence of the Christian Doctrine of Creation” 
(1991), in Exegesis and Theology in Early Christianity (London: Routledge, 2016), 139–51 (139). It is worth noting that 
the ideas of divine impassibility and divine creation ex nihilo are intrinsically related to each other in the sense that 
both stress an ontological difference between creator and creature. By the same reason, as the idea of divine 
impassibility has been challenged as formulated in reaction to Hellenistic philosophy, the same charge has been 
made to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Sarah Coakley doubts that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is substantially 
grounded in “Scripture alone” and so dispenses with the doctrine in pursuit of a Christian understanding of created 
dependence on divine power. I will deal with Coakley’s hasty evaluation of and unfortunate departure from the 
tradition of creation ex nihilo in detail in “Creation ex Nihilo and Scripture” in the third chapter. 
72 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 388–90. 
73 Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 172. 
74 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 159. See also Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “God’s Participation in Human 
Suffering in the Early Christian Theology of Martyrdom,” in “Godhead Here in Hiding”: Incarnation and the History of 
Human Suffering, ed. Terrence Merrigan and Frederik Glorieux (Leuven: Peters, 2012), 297–305 (297). 
75 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 46. 
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Gilles Emery makes clear that those who succumb to this dubious trend such as Balthasar cannot 
avoid breaking up with tradition: “If one abandons the affirmation of divine immutability and 
impassability” in line with “widespread intellectual discomfort with the traditional doctrine of divine 
immutability, . . . a rupture with tradition is inevitable.”76 Emery’s statement may undermine Gerard 
O’Hanlon’s favourable evaluation that Balthasar blazed the trail for speaking of God without losing 
the respect for “the classical tradition” as well as the sensitivity to “the modern Zeitgeist.”77 
Interestingly, Rowan Williams, one of those who are most notably appreciative of the 
theology of Balthasar, is intent on noting that it is erroneous to assume that the ancient ideas of 
unchangeability, invulnerability, impassibility, and immutability as the divine attributes, “so very 
unpopular today,”78 are, as some contemporary theologians suggest, the consequences of “a radical 
departure from a scriptural God”79 and “the triumph of classical philosophy over the Bible.”80 Rather, 
Williams argues, the classical ideas are created by interweaving “a radically unchallengeable, 
unchangeable and invulnerable reality behind all appearances” with “the narratives of a God 
independent, free and engaged with human history” in the encounter between ancient philosophy and 
the Hebrew Bible.81 In other words, the classical ideas of divine immutability and impassibility are the 
products of the philosophical reformulation of God as “the source of law and covenant” in the Bible 
into “the source . . . of the meanings that are to be ascribed to, or perceived in, every action and 
relation.”82 Williams therefore highlights that the traditional ideas manifest the most profound truth of 
God: “God is the action that makes and sustains everything” or “the act and energy that keeps it in 
being.”83  
 
76 Gilles Emery, “The Immutability of the God of Love and the Problem of Language concerning the ‘Suffering 
God’,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 27–76 (34–36). The issue of Balthasar’s rupture from tradition has been 
discussed with regard to his understanding of Thomas Aquinas. “Once the doctrines of divine immutability and 
impassibility have been jettisoned, it is no wonder that the only way to read Aquinas is as unbiblical and un-christian, 
or as offering only the Aristotelian or Parmenidean God.” Fergus Kerr, “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” in 
Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, ed. Fergus Kerr (London: SCM, 2003), 27–40 (39). See also 
Fergus Kerr, “Thomas Aquinas: Conflicting Interpretations in Recent Anglophone Literature,” in Aquinas as 
Authority: A Collection of Studies Presented at the Second Conference of the Thomas Insituut te Utrecht, December 14–16, 2000, ed. 
Paul van Geest, Harm J.M.J. Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 165–86 (169); and footnote 161 in the 
present chapter. 
77 Gerard F. O’Hanlon, “A Response to Kevin Duffy on von Balthasar and the Immutability of God,” Irish 
Theological Quarterly 78, no. 2 (May 2013): 179–84 (179–80). 
78 Rowan Williams, “God,” in Fields of Faith: Theology and Religious Studies for the Twenty-First Century, ed. David F. 
Ford, Ben Quash, and Janet Martin Soskice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75–89 (79). 
79 Williams, “God,” 79. 
80 Rowan Williams, “Early Christianity & Today: Some Shared Questions” (The Sir Thomas Gresham Annual 
Lecture and 2008 Gresham Special Lecture, St. Paul’s Cathedral, London, June 4, 2008).  
http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/early-christianity-today-some-shared-questions. 
81 Williams, “Early Christianity & Today.” 
82 Williams, “God,” 79. 
83 Rowan Williams, “Christology,” in The Vocation of Anglican Theology, ed. Ralph McMichael (London: SCM, 2014), 
77–110 (83). 
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Seen in this light, Balthasar’s quest for a theo-dramatic conception of God may falter from the 
outset upon an unnecessary and untenable dichotomy between scriptural images of God’s 
involvement with the world and classical ideas of God’s immutability from the world. This critical 
question may encourage a rethinking of Balthasar’s theo-dramatic doctrine of God from the starting 
point, taking on board the following advice: “future discussion of impassibility must go beyond any 
simplistic contrast between Greek metaphysical notions and biblical categories.”84  
 
The Contrast between Divine Transcendence and Immanence 
The above critical examination leads us to the closely related, subsequent examination as to how 
Balthasar understands the relation of divine transcendence and immanence with respect to divine–
human interaction. Balthasar is deeply troubled by thinking that such an immutably transcendent God 
is detached from, indifferent to, and uninvolved in the suffering of the world and thus falls short of 
taking worldly pain and suffering seriously. In other words, he is inclined to construe divine 
transcendence and immanence in a contrastive way: the more God transcends the world, the less God 
is immanent. As Herbert McCabe makes plain what “the involvement of God” is, however, “it does 
not follow that, if God is not affected by, say, human suffering, he is indifferent to it.”85 According to 
the traditional doctrine of creation, divine involvement with the world is not to be construed as 
mutually exclusive from divine immutability against the world. In a critical assessment of Balthasar’s 
theological assumption, Thomas Weinandy shows the relevance of a non-contrastive account: “God’s 
immutability and impassibility do not make him less loving toward humankind, but actually guarantee 
that his love contains all its various attributes fully and perfectly in act.”86 In other words, “God both 
transcends the created order and is present to and immanently acts within the created order.”87 The 
radical transcendence of God guarantees rather than undermines profound divine immanence. If 
absolutely transcendent, and hence immutable and invulnerable, God is able to be radically immanent 
in the mutability and vulnerability of the created world. In this regard, the idea of divine immutability 
is a non-contrastive expression of the divine–human relation—the “real” relation of God to the world 
and the “unreal” relation of the world to God. In other words, the divine giving of the gift of every 
goodness to the world remains unscathed by the finitude and sinfulness of the world because of the 
ontological difference between God and what is not God. The non-contrastive account of divine 
transcendence and immanence stands out in bold relief in particular from the perspective of the 
creator–creature relation as divine gift and human dependence in terms of goodness. God is a 
 
84 James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White, “Introduction: Divine Impassibility in Contemporary Theology,” 
in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, 1–26 (6–7). 
85 Herbert McCabe, “The Involvement of God” (1985), in God Matters (London: Continuum, 2005; originally 
published 1987), 39–51 (45). 
86 Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 163, n. 31. 
87 Thomas G. Weinandy, “Does God Suffer?,” Ars Disputandi 2, no. 1 (2002): 1–13 (5). 
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transcendent giver, the source of every gift of goodness to the created world; the creator who is, from 
the beginning, all the way down, immanent in the world by creating, sustaining, and fulfilling the 
created world.88 
Rowan Williams, again, in accordance with his compatibilist view of scriptural imagination 
and philosophical formulation in relation to the doctrine of God, underscores that the transcendent 
attributes of God as the ultimate source do not point to detachment or disengagement of God from the 
world, “a God uninvolved in creation’s life—as the polemic of revisionist theologies so often 
suggests.”89 On the contrary, they give a ground for the free and loving, unchanging and unswerving 
gift of divine grace towards the world. “For the early Christians, … God was, indeed, wholly 
independent of the world, and therefore free of any conditioning, pressure or manipulation, and also, 
for that very reason, free to engage with what was created.”90 In other words, God’s transcendence 
purports to celebrate “the primacy of God’s action”91 towards the world, that is to say, “the primacy of 
liberty and of love, love which, because it is free, is capable of engaging with what is completely 
different from itself,”92 and to safeguard it against having recourse to and being exploited by the 
world. Frances Young also notes that this is what “the patristic theology of God’s involvement in 
suffering” quite clearly shows. She notes that the traditional idea of God’s apatheia purports to uphold 
the changelessness of the goodness of God: “When the Fathers used it [apatheia] to affirm God’s 
transcendent otherness, it was always held as consonant with the affirmation of God’s goodness, 
justice, love, and providential care—indeed, guaranteed the constancy of these.”93 
Williams shows a similar concern in his understanding of evil as nothing and God as not a 
thing. While evil has no ontological value, God is not one of the created beings on the same 
ontological level who shares space or place with fellow created agents in the finite world. It requires 
us to disqualify a spatializing language of both God and evil and to use “‘de-spatializing’ talk about 
 
88  Ian McFarland notes that creation ex nihilo accounts for the Thomistic account of non-contrastive divine 
transcendence and immanence: “The logic of creation from nothing dictates that although creatures are by 
definition (namely, as entities that are from God but not God) other than God, God is ‘Not other’ than creatures.” 
Ian A. McFarland, “The Gift of the Non aliud: Creation from Nothing as a Metaphysics of Abundance,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 21, no. 1 (January 2019): 44–58 (47). For the same insight of Nicholas of Cusa’s non aliud, 
see Rowan Williams, Christ: The Heart of Creation (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018), xiv. The relation of the 
creator’s gift and its reception by the creature will be discussed in detail in “Created Dependence on God: From the 
View of Creation ex nihilo” in the last chapter of this thesis. 
89 Williams, “God,” 82. 
90 Williams, “Early Christianity & Today.” 
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92 Williams, “Early Christianity & Today.” 
93 Frances M. Young, “Apathōs Epathen: Patristic Reflection on God’s Suffering, and the Cross,” in Within the Love 
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Oxford University Press, 2014), 79–94 (89). 
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both God and evil.”94 God is not one of the competitive inhabitants contending for space with spatial 
beings in the finite world; the absolute transcendence of God as self-subsistent and infinite Being is 
involved with the contingent and finite beings in a non-competitive manner, in divine gratuity, 
plenitude, and initiative; God is so “miraculously generous in creation and salvation”95 that created 
agents work out with the “overflowing fullness”96 of God in the process of time and space; God is 
fundamentally understood as outpouring gratuity and infinite generosity, as “the noncompetitive other 
whose freedom makes us free.”97 
To sum up, absolute divine transcendence upholds rather than undercuts radical divine 
immanence, and corresponds to rather than is discrepant from scriptural images of God. And these 
insights call into question the fundamental assumptions of Balthasar’s theo-dramatics such as a 
dichotomy between bible and philosophy and a contrastive account of divine transcendence and 
immanence. 
 
Kenosis, Otherness, and Competition: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley 
What is to be particularly emphasized here is that Balthasar’s contrastive account of divine 
transcendence and immanence carries a further significant theological, spiritual implication: it may 
give rise to a subsequent competitive account of the God–world or the divine–human relation. This 
competitive connotation comes into view in Balthasar’s kenosis-centred account of the divine–human 
relation: the kenotic gift of God to the world is given as always entailing the dispossession and 
diminishment of God’s freedom. Viewed from the perspective of non-competitive relation of God and 
the world, apart from, yet closely related to, the debate over divine immutability vis-à-vis the world in 
Balthasar’s theology, his kenotic account of theo-dramatic otherness and difference between God and 
the world assumes a competition. This charge is levelled by Sarah Coakley. 
 Before expanding on Coakley’s critique of Balthasar’s competitive account of kenotic 
relation of God and the world, it is worth first noting that it is widely acknowledged that the 
contemporary retrieval of the non-contrastive account of the creator’s transcendence and immanence, 
and the concomitant non-competitive account of creator and creature, is primarily indebted to the 
works of Kathryn Tanner.98  
 
94 Rowan Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” in On Augustine (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016), 79–105 (101). 
An earlier version of this essay appears in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert 
Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000), 105–22. 
95 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 102. 
96 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 102. 
97 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 102. 
98 Especially, Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988); and Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001). Tanner’s 
retrieval may be considered as one of the most ground-breaking theological insights in the late twentieth century in 
that it gives enormous “clarity” and “precision,” in Rowan Williams’s words, to the subject of the creator–creature 
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A non-competitive relation between creatures and God means that the creature does not 
decrease so that God may increase. The glorification of God does not come at the 
expense of creatures. The more full the creature is with gifts the more the creature 
should look in gratitude to the fullness of the gift-giver. The fuller the giver the greater 
the bounty to others.99 
 
According to Tanner, God is “the giver of all good gifts, their fount, luminous source, fecund treasury 
and store house. Like an ‘overflowing radiance,’ God ‘sends forth upon all things . . . the rays of its 
undivided Goodness’; ‘the divine Goodness . . . maintains . . . and protects and feasts them with its 
good things’.”100 The non-competitive relation makes sense and comes into play “only if God is the 
fecund provider of all that the creature is in itself; the creature in its giftedness, in its goodness, does 
not compete with God’s gift-fullness and goodness because God is the giver of all that the creature is 
for the good.”101 Only on this assumption is it possible to say that “the creature does not decrease so 
that God may increase.”102 Therefore, otherness and difference between God and the world does not 
stand over against each other: God non-competitively relates to the world.103 
 
Now let me expand on the concepts of otherness and difference in Balthasar. In evaluating Balthasar’s 
theology of difference and otherness, Williams situates it in the intellectual context of “all the 
fascination in postmodernity with difference.”104 And he highly appreciates Balthasar’s theology for 
proposing a new way of theology to the twentieth century intellectual scene. For it goes beyond “the 
twin threats” of the Hegelian model of “an eternal return to the same,” on the one hand, and Derridean 
model of the “absolutizing of the other” to seek “a rhetoric of unconditional difference, an 
unspeakable otherness,” on the other.105 Williams wants to keep his fingers crossed that Balthasar’s 
idea of trinitarian identity-in-otherness can negotiate a way beyond “the sterile opposition of 
undifferentiated presence/identity on the one hand and unthinkable différance on the other,”106 beyond 
“the threatened stand-off between a philosophy of unproblematic identity and an anti-metaphysics” of 
 
relation, which is the most fundamental theological subject, and subsequently serves to remove unnecessary 
misunderstanding and complexity. Moreover, Williams expresses his indebtedness to Kathryn Tanner for helping 
him more clearly to recognize how a non-competitive relation of divine agency and human agency accounts for the 
hypostatic union of Christ. 
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“the sacred unsayable other”107 (although it would fail if his trinitarian relational distinctions turn out 
to be “a system of co-ordination and subordination,” particularly in terms of sexual difference108). 
Balthasar is, hence, for Williams, an extraordinary theologian who has something to say to the 
“cultural cul-de-sac and stand-offs”109 of the contemporary intellectual scene. 
In contrast to Williams, however, Coakley has a fundamental reservation about Balthasar’s 
accounts of the otherness and difference within God as well as between God and the world. She 
critically attends to the idea of divine kenosis in Balthasar’s trinitarian theology. She argues that the 
notion of divine kenosis itself in Balthasar may be called into question due to its competitive 
connotation. Upon the foundation of the classical theistic view of non-competitive divine–human 
relation, she gives a contrasting view, first of all, of the notion of kenosis from Balthasar. Although 
both alike heavily draw upon the Christ Hymn of Philippians 2:6–11, which is the biblical text that 
most explicitly introduces the idea of kenosis, in constructing their own model of kenotic theology, 
they actually have contrasting views on its exegesis. 
It is well known that the Christ Hymn is, according to Markus Bockmuehl, “one of the most 
over-interpreted texts of the New Testament.”110 “Perhaps no other Pauline pericope has been the 
subject of such sustained critical attention over the past thirty years of New Testament study.”111 
However, the famous text raises “crucial difficulties”: “Does the hymn intend a moral imitatio Christi, 
or not? Does it predicate the pre-existence of Christ, or not? Which of more than twenty possible 
approaches offers the correct meaning of άρπαγμός [“as something to be exploited” (NRSV) in 
Philippians 2:6]?” 112  Balthasar and Coakley differ markedly in their exegesis of Philippians 2. 
Balthasar claims that “the subject of the kenosis that is described there [in Phil 2:6–11], is not the Son 
who has already become man, but the pre-existent Son.”113 It is thus “the kenosis of God . . . as is 
clearly said at Phil 2.7”;114 for Balthasar, therefore, it is exegetically necessary to go on to speak of an 
intra-trinitarian kenosis. 
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In contrast to Balthasar, Coakley aligns herself, in line with James Dunn,115 with the view that 
“Philippians 2 is not talking about Christ’s divine pre-existence”116 but about the self-sacrifice of the 
incarnate Son on the cross. She thus concurs with the view of seeing kenosis as “Jesus’ ‘self-sacrifice’ 
en route to the cross” while recoiling from seeing it as “an actual loss of divine power.”117 In other 
words, she speaks of “nonkenotic divinity, kenotic humanity”118 rather than “kenotic divinity, thereby, 
kenotic humanity” as does Balthasar. The difference in conceiving of kenosis between these two 
kenotic theologians are not, as Papanikolaou claims, “negligible,”119 but crucial.120 
This initial exegetical difference leads her to raise crucial critiques of his conception of divine 
kenosis. She observes that Balthasar consequently allows for the idea of kenosis to reach out to define 
the relations of the triune persons within the Godhead beyond the incarnation of the Son. 
 
For Balthasar, . . . the idea of kenotic self-surrender is too pervasive and important a 
characteristic of divine love to circumscribe its significance in christology alone; it is 
eternally true of the perichoretic and reciprocal interrelations of the persons of the 
Trinity, not something newly impressed on the divine by the events of the incarnation. 
And thus it colors all the divine acts ad extra.121 
 
She views that in Balthasar, the eternal kenotic distance and separation between the Father and the 
Son in “the mutual disposition of self-giving within the Godhead”122 establishes “a dialectical break in 
the divine life,”123 partly due to “the postmodern obsession with ‘difference’, with acknowledging 
radical otherness even within God.”124 She thus sees his kenotic theology as a “theology of hiatus,”125 
 
115 James D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, 
2nd ed. (London: SCM, 1989; first edition 1980), 98–128. See also Simon J. Gathercole, “New Testament 
Christology in Recent British Scholarship: A Sketch of Distinctives and Debates,” in Jesus and Paul: Global Perspectives 
in Honor of James D. G. Dunn for His 70th Birthday, ed. B. J. Oropeza, C. K. Robertson, and Douglas C. Mohrmann 
(London: T&T Clark, 2009), 102–13 (105–6). 
116 Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” in The Work of Love: Creation as 
Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 192–210 (194). In this article, Coakley attempts 
to show how the conception of trinitarian kenosis falls victim to a competitive understanding of divine and human 
agency, and proposes a christological understanding of kenosis, which is dealt with in “Kenōsis and Subversion: On 
the Repression of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist Writing” (1996), in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy 
and Gender (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 3–39. 
117 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 194. 
118 Anna Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and Christ’s Self-Giving (New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 32. 
119 Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse,” 46. Jennifer Martin contends that a merely christological account 
of  kenosis like Coakley’s needs to adopt “a specifically Balthasarian brand of  kenosis” in order to exhaust the 
benefits of  trinitarian kenotic relationality for theological anthropology. Jennifer Newsome Martin, “The ‘Whence’ 
and the ‘Whither’ of Balthasar’s Gendered Theology: Rehabilitating Kenosis for Feminist Theology,” Modern 
Theology 13, no. 2 (2014): 211–34 (233–34).  
120 Tina Beattie rightly acknowledges the difference between them. Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism: Theology and 
Theory (London: Routledge, 2006), 182; 161–62. 
121 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 199. 
122 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 199. 
123 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 200. 
124 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 200. 
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and observes that he posits “the dialectical gap in the divine” or “fracture or ‘hiatus’ within the 
divine”126 “only as bridgeable by the Holy Spirit.”127 And so “it is left to the Spirit to span the 
‘unimaginable gulf’ between despair and hope in the Son’s diremption from the Father in the cross. 
That is why an understanding of kenosis focused on Christ’s death must necessarily be conceived 
trinitarianly for Balthasar.”128 And she has a misgiving about this starting point of his theo-dramatic 
theology, such as hiatus, distance, space, room, break, or fracture, in order to speak of genuine unity 
and love. We should hesitate to follow the process of his trinitarian otherness in its very first phase, 
according to Coakley, because making space, giving up for the other in order to make a relation, 
connotes a competitive account of otherness. She throws a question of what kind of “other” is 
established in this competitive account of making other. “It is, arguably, in the dialectical break 
between ‘God’ and ‘God’, between divine absence and divine presence, that ‘kenotic’ space is made 
for the recognition of the ‘other’ as other. But who is this ‘other’, precisely?”129 “Why is it important 
to leave such ‘room’?”130 
I want to concur with Coakley by observing that Balthasar’s account of intra-divine kenosis is 
permeated with the competitive language of “making room,” such as “the Son’s humility, which 
makes room for, and expresses, the whole sublimity of the Father’s love.”131 In other words, his 
theology of intra-divine distance and fracture comes very close to suggesting a competitive 
conceptualization of the “other.” And I also would like to note that the same holds true for his 
description of the christological kenosis of mission, on the ground that the immanent trinitarian drama 
of “procession” corresponds to the christological drama of “mission.” For Balthasar, Christ’s filial 
exercise of “the freedom of love” for the Father’s will entails “the lack of freedom (obedience)” to do 
“my own will” (“not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me”: John 6:38); “the obedient 
making way of the Son for the Father”132 stands over against the Father’s will “throughout”133 the 
earthly mission of the Son; in other words, the more the Father’s will comes up, the more the Son’s 
will goes down; the more the Son’s will governs, the more the Father’s will resigns. For Balthasar, an 
absolute obedience of the Son to the Father in John’s Gospel entails “renunciation of acting in his 
[Christ’s] own power”134 or his “absolute powerlessness.”135 The kenotic self-renunciation of Christ, 
 
125 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 199. 
126 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 208. 
127 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 209. 
128 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 200. 
129 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 208. 
130 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 200. 
131 TD 4, 450 
132 GL 7, 248. 
133 GL 7, 323. 
134 GL 7, 244. 
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“total renunciation of his own will” in the Gospel of John, for Balthasar, ends up suggesting a 
competitive understanding of the relation of the Father’s will and the Son’s will.136 
Finally, the same competitive account holds true for the final phase of kenosis, kenosis as 
creation. Coakley observes that many contemporary proponents of trinitarian kenosis in line with 
Balthasar’s kenotic theology err in claiming that God empties divine freedom or loses divine power so 
that human freedom can be exercised by taking over the space from which God has already 
withdrawn for us: the more diminishment occurs on the divine side, the more enrichment happens on 
the human side. This is a competitive or incompatibilist view of the divine–human relation which 
means that the divine and the world compete with each other for a space on the same plane. 
What is of particular importance for Coakley is that “the strong commitment to an 
‘incompatibilist’ view of freedom . . . combined with the ‘competitive’ view of divine–human 
relations”137 such as Balthasar’s, carries a significant problem for accounts of gender. The picture of 
(divine) emptying and (human) occupying gives an assumed significance to the “libertarian” notion of 
freedom as “an act of total independence from restriction, conditioning, or the admission of 
dependence,”138 to “freedom from constraint, relationship, dependence.”139 In other words, in this 
framework of divine and human agency, divine freedom is assumed to be an impediment to human 
freedom, and human freedom  is to be self-dependent and free from the divine impediment and 
restrictions entailed by such dependence. This notion of libertarian freedom, which was developed 
particularly in Enlightenment philosophy and is permeated with secular ideas of freedom,140 carries 
 
135 GL 7, 245. 
136 GL 7, 323. Stephen Holmes extensively deals with the monothelite controversy around Luke 22:24 (“Father, if 
you are willing, remove this cup from me; yet not my will but yours be done”) and John 6:38 in the following articles: 
Stephen R. Holmes, “Christology, Scripture, Divine Action and Hermeneutics,” in Christology and Scripture: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Andrew T. Lincoln and Angus Paddison (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 156–70; and 
“Three Versus One? Some Problems of Social Trinitarianism,” Journal of Reformed Theology 3 (2009): 77–89. He argues 
that nearly all modern commentators (mis)read Luke 22:24 along with John 6:38 as though they should suggest that 
“there is a single will in Jesus Christ, which will is being brought into conformity to the will of the Father” 
(“Christology, Scripture, Divine Action and Hermeneutics,” 161). Holmes discerns a similar way of reading in the 
contemporary social trinitarian theologians who say that “the incarnate Son acknowledges the presence and reality 
of his own desire and volition, but chooses to accede instead to the volition of the Father” (“Three Versus One?,” 
88). This reading seems very similar to Balthasar’s reading of John 6:38 mentioned above. Holmes claims that the 
Church Fathers who “endlessly discussed” (“Three Versus One?,” 88) this issue do not support this reading; rather, 
they are in common with the argument that in Christ there are “two wills, divine and human, and so of two actions, 
divine and human, that stand in perfect conformity” (“Christology, Scripture, Divine Action and Hermeneutics,” 
166). It is worth noting that, in my view, this patristic view carries non-competitive connotations of the relation of 
Christ’s divinity and humanity. 
137 Sarah Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake? Three Kenotic Models in Patristic Exegesis,” in Exploring 
Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 247–64 
(264). 
138 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 205. 
139 Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?,” 264. See also Sarah Coakley, “Feminism and Analytic Philosophy 
of Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 494–525 (516–17). 
140 Christopher Insole traces this pervasive modern philosophical as well as theological trend of a competitive 
account of divine and human agency back to Kant’s rejection of pre-modern or Aquinas’s “concurrence” account of 
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“overtones of a valorized ‘masculinism’”141 in the sense that it deeply reminds of “the male child’s 
repudiation of the power of the mother, . . . an intrinsically ‘male’ fantasy—a rejection and repression 
of the maternal,”142 and a “rejection of the mother (and everything she symbolizes: dependency, 
relationship, affectivity, bodiliness, emergent sexuality).”143 What underlies this conceptualization of 
competitive relation is “a normative ‘masculine’ self who gains independence by setting himself apart 
from that which gave him life and indeed continues to sustain him”144 and thereby pursues “the 
possession of ‘libertarian’ freedom, that is, a sovereign self-possession and autonomy that is capable 
of rising above the weaknesses and distractions of human desires and human tragedy.”145 To conclude 
Coakley’s critique, Balthasar’s dramatic divine–human interplay ends up suggesting that because the 
created freedom only acts within “the ‘space’ granted to humans by God to exercise freedom,”146 the 
creator’s freedom is involved competitively with the creature’s freedom.  
I find Coakley’s critiques tenable. Balthasar highlights that “selflessness of the divine persons, 
as of pure relations in the love within the Godhead, as the basis of everything” is “the basis of a first 
form of kenosis, that lies in creation (especially in the creation of man who is free), for the creator 
here gives up a part of his freedom to the creature, in the act of creating.”147 To put it differently, for 
Balthasar, God should empty his freedom in order to create free beings. If one should empty its own 
territory or “make space” in order to relate to and give benefit to another, it implies that they compete 
for space on the same layer with each other. As Gilles Emery points out in relation to the kenotic 
theology of Balthasar, however, “the creation is not a ‘restriction’ of God who would limit himself or 
give place to the creature through effacing himself (kenosis).”148 
 
divine action and human freedom derived from creation ex nihilo, the rejection of which serves to give birth to his 
late critical philosophy. “God does not act, but withdraws so as to allow us to act without ‘interference.’ . . . In this 
sense, divine and human action are a zero-sum game: the more divine action there is, the less space there is for 
humans. . . . Strikingly, this is a premise shared by both atheists and many contemporary believers, and cuts across 
ecumenical and confessional lines. . . . the view that when humans act God must withdraw is also Kant’s view. . . . 
In fact, Kant’s thinking this might well be a large part of why it is such a widespread cultural assumption, given the 
pervasiveness of Kant’s influence on how we think about freedom.” Christopher J. Insole, The Intolerable God: Kant’s 
Theological Journey (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 120. 
141 Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?,” 264. 
142 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 205. 
143 Sarah Coakley, “Analytic Philosophy of Religion in Feminist Perspective: Some Questions” (1997), in Powers 
and Submissions, 98–105 (100). 
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To conclude, Balthasar’s spatializing language of “making room” runs the risk of speaking of 
the threefold kenosis—the intra-trinitarian Father–Son relation, the relation of the Father and the 
incarnate Son, and the divine–human relationship—as competitive.149 
 
 
The Suffering and Death of Christ in the Trinity 
 
I have attempted to argue above that Balthasar is inclined to understand divine involvement with the 
world as contrastive with divine transcendence, and to think that the divine kenotic relation with the 
world entails the divine making room for the world to occupy, which implies a competitive relation of 
God and the world. And I have added that a competitively kenotic account of divine creation is related 
to kenotic relations such as the trinitarian personal relations (procession) as well as the incarnate 
Son’s relation to the Father (mission). Now I will examine how Balthasar’s conceptualizations of 
super-temporal suffering, death, and sacrifice are defended and contested, and then attempt to 
subscribe and contribute to critiques by arguing that his christological–trinitarianism proposes little 
ontological difference between the historical death of Christ and eternal death in God. 
 
Suffering and Death Latent and Implicit in God 
It may be relevant to begin my argument by noting Coakley’s further evaluation of Balthasar’s 
trinitarian–christological relation of kenosis. She levels against the post-Holocaust theologies of 
Balthasar, Barth, and Moltmann the charge that they “incorporate ‘vulnerability’ into the trinitarian 
understanding of God.”150 According to her criticism, the (male) post-war theologians err on the side 
of “a new valorization of Christic ‘vulnerability’, an admission of divine self-limitation and exposure 
in the face of human cruelty.”151 “Rather than deflecting human weakness, this trend has embraced 
 
149 It is very interesting and important to notice, however, that Coakley as well as Williams make frequent and 
significant references to the competitive language of human “making room” and “granting space” for God. On either 
side, it implies competition insofar as “room” or “space” must be made in order for a relation to take “place.” I will 
indicate this implication in the thoughts of Williams and Coakley in “Ontologizing the Tragic” in the second chapter 
and, more critically, in “The Competition between Divine Coerciveness and Human Vulnerability” in the third 
chapter. 
150 Sarah Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” in Powers and Submissions, xii–xx (xix). Coakley has moved 
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combines Western substitutionary soteriology, the Lutheran theologia crucis, the Augustinian representation of the 
Spirit as the “bond of love,” and Hegelian dialectics. Sarah Coakley, “Why Three? Some Further Reflections on the 
Doctrine of the Trinity,” in The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in Honour of Maurice Wiles, ed. Sarah 
Coakley and David A. Pailin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 29−56 (34−35). In this essay, as an 
alternative to this type of approach, Coakley proposes a Pauline, incorporative, Spirit-prioritizing model of the 
Trinity. I will treat it in “Ascetic Cruciformity to the Suffering of Christ in Romans 8” in the last chapter of the 
present thesis. 
151 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xiv. 
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it—even into the trinitarian heart of God. Submission has become paradoxically identified with divine 
‘power’.”152 To put it differently, Balthasar construes kenosis as reaching out to the divine realm in 
which there is a hiatus and fracture engendered within kenotic trinitarian relations into which human 
weakness, vulnerability, and suffering is incorporated. Thereby, Coakley argues, Balthasar ends up 
establishing “a pedestalized place of suffering”153 in a trinitarian–christological manner.154 
Most of Balthasar’s proponents would stand in opposition to Coakley. Rowan Williams has 
long been intent on exonerating Balthasar from his charge that Moltmann propounds a dubious idea 
that “God undertakes an identification with suffering humanity in order to be more adequately 
divine.”155 While Williams looks with deep suspicion at Moltmann’s idea of a suffering God, he 
repeatedly tries to make clear that Balthasar’s theology of the triune life of God differs from a 
suffering God who is caught up with the world process. Williams urges us to make a nuanced 
distinction between Moltmann and Balthasar in that he believes Balthasar rightly shows a God who 
freely and “triumphantly” embraces what is not divine; Balthasar’s trinitarianism is not compatible 
with “some kind of privileging of human vulnerability over impassibility, as if, pace the German 
Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann, God can only become truly or fully God by incorporating 
human suffering into divine activity.”156 For Williams, it is clear that Balthasar does not fall into the 
trap of the entanglement of God with human vulnerability and suffering. Many of the supporters for 
Balthasar share Williams’s claim in the pursuit of salvaging Balthasar from the accusation of 
introducing suffering into God. For instance, Thomas Dalzell asserts that “Balthasar does not 
reconcile worldly suffering and trinitarian love by divinizing the tragic and introducing it into God’s 
immanent life. In fact, that is the very thing he rejects in Moltmann.”157 
An argument that plays a pivotal role in defending Balthasar is that the salvation history 
unfolded in the economic life of the Trinity is “latent” in the immanent life of the Trinity. In other 
words, the sanguine sacrifice of Christ’s crucifixion is “implicit,” not ontologically real, in the Trinity. 
This argument is well explained in a passage where Williams favourably encapsulates Jennifer 
Martin’s supportive account of the Bulgakovian–Balthasarian speculation about kenotic trinitarianism: 
 
It is not that there is a heavenly sacrificial economy which can be uncovered by 
speculation but that the irreducibly human suffering of Christ is to be understood as the 
transcription in the finite order of what eternal gift means: “the economic is latent in 
the immanent” (191), but this is decisively different from saying that the immanent is 
 
152 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xiv–xv. 
153 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xx. 
154 Coakley refers to Mysterium Paschale and First Glance at Adrienne von Speyr. 
155 Rowan Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, ed. Edward 
T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37–50 (39). 
156 Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” 37. 
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 32 
simply a version of the economic, or that the suffering of Christ effects a change in 
God, or is felt in God as strictly divine suffering. Moltmann’s account of the cross and 
the Trinity is not at all what Balthasar intends to affirm.158 
 
In other words, the divine life of the Trinity exhibits the divine economy of perfect gift, and the 
suffering and death of Christ is a sacrificial manifestation of the divine economy of gift in the finitude 
of this world. The sacrificial suffering of Christ does not eternally transpire in the trinitarian economy 
of gift but is latent. The suffering of Jesus’s crucifixion is the economic manifestation in the sinful 
world of the eternal kenosis of the Trinity’s immanent life, and this trinitarian relation does not 
suggest the placement of divine suffering in the intra-trinitarian life.159 
Francesca Murphy seems to be in line with Williams. According to Murphy, Balthasar’s 
controverted language of “there is something in God that can develop into suffering” bears witness to 
a “positive analogy” of suffering or tragedy for God but at the same time to a “negation” of the 
analogy; it is because that language only means that the eternal love in the Trinity is “analogous” to 
“suffering”; that “there is something in God that can develop into suffering” means that the trinitarian 
love is “reciprocal.” “The persons of the Trinity ‘suffer’ one another in the sense that each ‘lets the 
other be’”; yet, she claims, “there is here no glorification of eternal, tragic suffering within God.” The 
suffering and tragedy associated with creation and salvation history is “implicit” in the eternal relation 
of love between the divine persons. For Murphy, “the creative and historical missions of Son and 
Spirit are eternally ‘latent’ in their divine processions.”160 She seeks to articulate how these are “latent” 
and “implicit” by means of Thomas Aquinas.161 
 
 
158 Rowan Williams, review of Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Critical Appropriation of Russian Religious Thought, by 
Jennifer Newsome Martin, Modern Theology 33, no. 4 (October 2017): 689–91 (690; italics mine). 
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instance, Simon Oliver states, owing to D. C. Schindler: “Crucially, in maintaining that Christ’s kenosis on the cross 
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God. Rather, within a sinful world, the cross is the way in which eternal love manifests itself. It is the way in which 
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Simon Oliver, “Trinity, Motion and Creation ex nihilo,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. David Burrell et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133–51 (143, n. 35). 
160 All the quotations in this paragraph come from Francesca Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 329. 
161  Murphy’s attempt to put Balthasar in amity with Thomas seems at odds with the general view of their 
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divergence.” Matthew Levering, “The Paschal Mystery and Sapiential Theology of the Trinity,” in Scripture and 
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Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The 
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properly. . . . Balthasar chooses Barth over Aquinas.” Kerr, “The Varieties of Interpreting Aquinas,” 32. See also 
Kerr, “Thomas Aquinas: Conflicting Interpretations in Recent Anglophone Literature,” 169; and footnote 76 in the 
present chapter. 
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For von Balthasar, as for Thomas, the ratio or pattern of the eternal processions of Son 
and Spirit contain in themselves the ratio or patterns of creation. They are analogous to 
them. The ratio of human tragedy is the “risk” which the Father takes in giving the 
whole of himself away in begetting the Son. . . . Like Thomas, von Balthasar treats the 
rationes or patterns of the divine processions—the begetting of the Son and the 
breathing of the Spirit—as the rationes or patterns of creation and salvation history.162 
 
That is, the pattern of suffering and tragedy in the finite world is “latent” and “implicit” in the “risk” 
run within the divine relations. 
Yet Murphy seems to fail to raise a question as to whether it is licit to posit a reality of “risk” 
(in the Father’s love) and a possibility of unreciprocatedness (in the Son’s response). To put it 
differently, to speak of a trinitarian “risk” cannot avoid assuming an incorporation of finitude and 
sinfulness into the immanent life of God in the first place. And the transgression of finitude and 
sinfulness into the Trinity is reinforced by speaking of forming and maintaining the trinitarian “risk” 
as “suffering.” It is thus reasonable to pose the question, following Linn Tonstad, “Why would we 
assume that the need to sacrifice oneself for an other, generated by the injustices and limitations of 
human existence, applies to the relation between God and God?”163 Celia Deane–Drummond also 
indicates that the Father’s primal generation of the Son does not need to imply “a drastic 
separation”164 where the Father’s freedom runs the “risk” of the Son’s ungratefulness. She argues that 
Balthasar “has introduced unnecessary complications on the premise that God has to experience in 
Godself something like human experiences of sin, suffering and death”165  as a consequence of 
envisaging the trinitarian relation only within a risk of misrecognition, a seed of tragedy. If there is no 
rivalry and hostility between the divine persons in the first place, it is hardly legitimate to write as 
though the triune love within the Godhead runs the risk of rejection in eternity.166 
 
This is also the case with sacrifice and death in the Trinity. Balthasar cites Adrienne von Speyr: 
 
“If death is understood to mean the sacrifice of life, then the original image of that 
sacrifice is in God as the gift of life flowing between Father and Son in the Spirit. . . . In 
the world, death is a limitation, a conclusion, an end. In God, death is always the 
beginning of new life.”167 
 
162 Murphy, God is Not a Story, 329. 
163 Tonstad, God and Difference, 38; Linn Marie Tonstad, “Sexual Difference and Trinitarian Death: Cross, Kenosis, 
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Trinitarian Metaphysics of Self-Dispossession and the Human Ethics of Self-Dispossession” in the next chapter. 
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“Life is only genuinely alive insofar as it . . . grows beyond itself, lets go of itself. It is 
rich only insofar as it can be poor, insofar as it loves. . . . Death will not allow itself to 
be pushed to the very end of life; it belongs right at the center, not in mere knowledge, 
but in action. Death characterizes our breakthrough into a life that is ever greater. It is 
through this positive death that we amass life.” This is based on a trinitarian prototype: 
“. . . God is love, . . . the absolute unity of riches and poverty, . . . life and death.” 
Absolute love is only realized where there is this surrender of what is one’s own, where 
this separation is taken seriously. . . . Only in this context can true love, and its 
suffering, prove fruitful.168 
 
Insofar as death means “the sacrifice of life” or, as we shall see soon, “the good death,” “the original 
image” or “prototype” of sacrificial death lies in God; it is the sacrificial death in God that makes 
concretely possible the good death of Jesus as a manifestation of love. 
Balthasar does not recoil from claiming that “the original image” of “the sacrifice of life” is in 
God. “In the Christian context,” he maintains, “sacrifice, suffering, the Cross and death are only the 
reflection of tremendous realities in the Father, in heaven, in eternal life.”169 The “original image” of 
“the sacrifice of life” that is in God corresponds to what he calls “super-death” in God that grounds 
every “good death” in the world. Balthasar gives an account of “super-death” in association with 
“good death” or “sacrifice of life” which is perfectly embodied in the death of Jesus and which his 
followers are called to imitate. 
 
In giving himself, the Father does not give something (or even everything) that he has 
but all that he is—for in God there is only being, not having. . . . This total self-giving, 
to which the Son and the Spirit respond by an equal self-giving, is a kind of “death”, a 
first, radical “kenosis”, as one might say. It is a kind of “super-death” that is a 
component of all love and that forms the basis in creation for all instances of “the good 
death”, from self-forgetfulness in favor of the beloved right up to that highest love by 
which a man “gives his life for his friends”.170 
 
In other words, “the good death” means the “love” at the cost of “death,” self-negating and self-
sacrificial love for the other up to the point of death; and it is “super-death” or eternal good death in 
the Trinity, that constitutes the foundation of love up to death in the finite world—the “best death,” 
namely, the highest embodiment and greatest manifestation of super-death.171 
 
168 TD 5, 84–85, quoting Ferdinand Ulrich, Leben in der Einheit von Leben und Tod (Frankfurt: Knecht, 1973); italics 
mine. 
169 TD 5, 511. 
170 TD 5, 84. 
171 Antonio López takes a minimal position as to the construal of the super-death in God in support for Balthasar. 
He interprets it as an eternal foundation in God for “the readiness to die, which always takes place within the 
horizon of the resurrection and thus of eternal life (Jn 10:17),” which grounds and makes possible the good death of 
Jesus as well as his followers’ rather than as introducing “negativity in the absolute.” In other words, the super-death 
in God must not be construed “literally” or “ontologically” but as a “sacrificial readiness to die,” as “something in 
God that can develop into suffering” should be understood as a “relational risk to unreciprocation.” Antonio López, 
“Eternal Happening: God as an Event of Love,” Communio 32 (Summer 2005): 214–45 (239, n. 65). What I will 
argue in what follows is counter to his position.  
 35 
If an “original image” of separation, suffering, and death in God are merely “latent” and 
“implicit” without any ontological value as Martin, Williams, and Murphy contend, how can that be a 
“prototype” that grounds and makes possible human suffering and death? It seems that a divine 
prototype of sacrifice lies at the heart of God as at least something beyond merely being latent or 
implicit, if not the ontologically most profound prototype and original image; or that the divine love 
proves its fruitfulness through suffering in the Godhead. 
What should be pointed out is that the relationship of the best death of Christ and the super-
death in the Trinity is accounted for in terms of the immanent–economic forms of the Trinity, of the 
eternal being and historical act of the Trinity, or of the trinitarian–christological relation, which an 
analogical dissimilarity is hardly squeezed in between. In the trinitarian relations ad intra and ad 
extra, the primordial super-death within the Trinity functions at an ontological level that is 
intrinsically related to the reality of Jesus’s death on the cross, rather than, as Jennifer Martin argues, 
at an “analogical but non-ontological”172 level. Therefore, it would be reasonable to interpret the 
super-death in God, in accordance with Linn Tonstad, as “the introduction of the possibility and even, 
 
172 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 218. There has been an important debate over whether the characteristic of 
theological terms such as (absolute, eternal, infinite) distance and suffering in the Trinity is analogical or 
metaphorical in Balthasar’s theology. As O’Hanlon states, it may be “where von Balthasar’s claim will stand or fall.” 
O’Hanlon, “A Response to Kevin Duffy on von Balthasar and the Immutability of God,” 182. A prevalent position 
of some early supporters seems that those negative modalities of God are spoken of not in an analogical sense but 
in a metaphorical sense. For instance, O’Hanlon contends in the above-mentioned essay that Balthasar “is 
hesitant . . . to ascribe analogical status to divine suffering” (183). Blankenhorn demurs O’Hanlon’s position: “Is the 
attribution of suffering to God simply metaphorical language used to bring out the intensity of divine love? Such is 
the interpretation of Gerard O’Hanlon and Thomas Dalzell. But Balthasar himself does not describe God’s 
suffering as metaphorical.” Bernhard Blankenhorn, “Balthasar’s Method of Divine Naming,” Nova et Vetera 1:2 
(2003): 245–68 (257). Blankenhorn continues to argue, together with some other critical commentators, that 
Balthasar “posits suffering as a properly analogous divine attribute” (258). Kevin Duffy elaborates on this critique in 
“Change, Suffering, and Surprise in God: Von Balthasar’s Use of Metaphor,” Irish Theological Quarterly 76, no. 4 
(November 2011): 370–87. Beáta Tóth has a similar misgiving about Balthasar’s account of temporality and super-
temporality in “Eternity in Time—Time in Eternity: Temporality and the Human Self in the Eschaton,” Irish 
Theological 84, no. 4 (September 2019): 373–391. It is also worth noting that Rowan Williams repeatedly underlines 
that the “literal” (not “rhetorical”) use of terms relating to the pain and suffering of God, which has been 
fashionable in post-war theologies, is unacceptable because it ontologizes and mystifies suffering and does not make 
sense of God as the source of being. 
It is interesting to see that some recent supporters are inclined to withdraw their early defence and to concede an 
analogical trait of Balthasar’s terms, yet still seek to support Balthasar by denying that they are spoken of at the 
ontological level. In tune with the early defence of Balthasar, for instance, Michele Schumacher argues that the ever-
greater difference or dissimilarity between God and the world in the Fourth Lateran Council holds true for the 
relationship between kenotic suffering in God and the kenotic suffering of Christ in the thought of Balthasar. Thus, 
“something like suffering in God” does not mean a lack, but rather expresses “the infinite superabundance of divine 
love” which embraces all worldly suffering. Michele M. Schumacher, A Trinitarian Anthropology: Adrienne von Speyr & 
Hans Urs von Balthasar in Dialogue with Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2014), 344. 
According to Martin, more clearly, the absolute, infinite, eternal distance is, as above, “analogical but non-
ontological” and thus “ought not be taken over-literally in a manner that would compromise the unity of the divine 
nature; rather, Balthasar’s understanding of inter-Trinitarian distance is the condition of the possibility for love.” 
Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 218. Martin’s defence deserves critique: If an absolute distance in the Godhead is 
analogical to real distance in the world, how can it be not ontological at all? How can a “non-ontologically” “eternal,” 
“infinite,” “absolute” distance in the Godhead “ground” and “make possible” the distance of the world? What is the 
difference between taking them “over-literally,” which is illicit, and “literally,” which is acceptable? 
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as it were, pre-reality of death into God,” and thereby “‘something like’ death and sacrifice belongs to 
the very being of God.”173 This argument will be substantiated in “The Temporal Wound of Christ 
and the Eternal Wound in the Trinity” in the present chapter. 
 
Christ Suffering “Passibly” in the Divine Nature 
The eternal distance, suffering, and death in God is intrinsically related to Jesus’s suffering on the 
cross. “With respect to traditional divine immutability,” as Martin mentions, “Balthasar resists the 
claim that the Incarnation of the second hypostasis did not in any way affect the immanent Trinity (or, 
for that matter, the divine nature of Christ).”174 Likewise, Gerard O’Hanlon helpfully articulates how 
and why Balthasar seeks to revise the Chalcedonian christology and thereby the idea of divine 
immutability. 
 
From his repeated emphasis on the ontological, personal identity of the Logos as the 
subject who unites the two distinct natures in Christ, he will refuse to limit the change 
and suffering which Christ experiences to his human nature alone. This is the advance 
on Chalcedon and its traditional interpretation which Balthasar proposes. The tendency 
to consider the human nature of Christ as an instrumentum conjunctum which does not 
affect the divine person he sees as Nestorian in character. And so he is anxious to insist 
on a more than merely logical communicatio idiomatum, to accept that the formula “one 
of the Trinity has suffered” does indeed mean that God has “suffered”, albeit 
mysteriously.175 
 
Like O’Hanlon, Cyril O’Regan rightly articulates how Balthasar complexifies the idea of divine 
impassibility from the perspective of the “enhypostatic” suffering of Christ: 
 
One implication to which Balthasar draws attention as having particular pertinence to 
the issue of divine passibility is that suffering in Christ is not without remainder a 
function of Christ’s human nature. Or more technically speaking, Christ’s suffering is 
enhypostatic. . . . [The] recognition of the enhypostatic character of suffering would put 
a block on complacent assertions of divine impassibility, which sometimes function 
within a metaphysical economy in which impassibility is simply the binary opposite of 
passibility, the content of which is provided by the observation of the world of 
change.176 
 
173 Tonstad, “Sexual Difference and Trinitarian Death,” 604. 
174 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 185. 
175 O’Hanlon, Immutability of God, 43.  
176 Cyril O’Regan, The Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s Response to Philosophical Modernity, Volume 1: Hegel 
(Chestnut Ridge, NY: Crossroad, 2014), 306–7, quoted in Rodney Howsare, “Why Hegel? A Reading of Cyril 
O’Regan’s The Anatomy of Misremembering, Volume 1,” Nova et Vetera 14, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 983–92 (991–92). 
Kilby sheds light on how divine impassibility is uttered without being “the binary opposite of passibility.” She 
argues, “to maintain that God is impassive and beyond change is, arguably, to maintain that certain categories 
cannot be used to speak of God at all, rather than to paint a kind of picture of what God is like. It is a grammatical 
rather than a descriptive affirmation. And it would therefore be equally inappropriate, from such a traditional 
position, to describe God as static as it would be to describe God as moved. If this is right then contemporary 
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The suffering of the Son incarnate is not confined in his human nature but affects his divine nature; it 
is “enhypostatic.” 
O’Hanlon’s and O’Regan’s readings are authorized by Balthasar’s interpretation of the 
convoluted twelfth anathema of Cyril of Alexandria, Balthasar quotes, “If any one does not confess 
that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh and in the flesh tasted death 
and became the first-born from among the dead . . . [Balthasar omits: although He is as God Life and 
lifegiving] anathema sit.” He interprets Cyril’s anathema as follows: 
 
If it is possible for one Person in God to accept suffering, to the extent of God-
forsakenness, and to deem it his own, then evidently it is not something foreign to God, 
something that does not affect him. It must be something profoundly appropriate to his 
divine Person, for—to say it once again—his being sent (missio) by the Father is a 
modality of his proceeding (processio) from the Father.177 
 
Christ’s suffering of crucifixion to the degree of dereliction, namely, a total death of Christ in the 
realm of body and spirit, for Balthasar, is not something disparate and alien to God but, contrastively, 
“profoundly appropriate to his divine Person” which is essentially associated with the divine life of 
the Trinity. It is worth noting that his commitment to Christ’s suffering in his divine nature is closely 
related to his overarching emphasis on the Son’s alienation from and abandonment by God as the 
second death in spirit which corresponds to the eternal, infinite distance between the Father and the 
Son in the Trinity. 
 
Although a detailed examination on the history of dispute over the controverted anathema is beyond 
the scope of this present chapter, however, it is worth noting that many patristic studies may make one 
hesitate to concur with Balthasar’s interpretation of Cyril who goes so far as to deem suffering as 
“something profoundly appropriate” to God beyond the suffering of the Son in his flesh as an 
incarnate existence. As Donald Fairbairn articulates in relation to the anathema, according to Cyril of 
Alexandria, “the Word suffered impassibly” and it means that “He dies ‘according to the flesh,’ in his 
humanity, rather than in his divine nature per se.”178 If this is the case, it could be said that Balthasar 
 
theologians are not so much affirming what earlier theologians rejected, as breaking a grammatical rule to which 
earlier theologians believed they were constrained to adhere.” Karen E. Kilby, “Evil and the Limits of Theology,” 
New Blackfriars 84, no. 983 (January 2003): 13–29 (28–29, n. 18). Kathryn Tanner also makes clear that the 
“grammatical” feature of divine immutability and impassibility is ascribed to divine transcendence itself: “Divine 
transcendence is not a doctrinal affirmation in any ordinary sense but a grammatical remark about theological 
language: it signals a general linguistic disturbance, the failure of all predicative attribution, in language about God. 
Following one common way of making this point, one could say that God is not a kind of thing: God is beyond 
every genus. For that reason, talk about God systematically violates the usual canons of sense making.” Kathryn 
Tanner, “Creation Ex Nihilo as Mixed Metaphor,” Modern Theology 29, no. 2 (April 2013): 138–55 (138). 
177 TD 3, 226. 
178  Donald Fairbairn, “Cyril of Alexandria,” in The T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, ed. Adam J. Johnson 
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 457–60 (459). See also Brian E. Daley, “The Word and His Flesh: Human 
Weakness and the Identity of Jesus in Greek Patristic Christology,” in Suffering and Evil in Early Christian Thought, ed. 
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intends, as O’Hanlon has mentioned, to correct the “Nestorian in character,” yet ends up straining to 
breaking point the theology of Cyril which was in fact developed over the dispute with Nestorius.179 
Let me elaborate upon contemporary research on the christology of Cyril. According to Paul 
Gavrilyuk, for Cyril it is “theologically legitimate” to say that “God was crucified . . . as long as it 
was added that the subject was God-in-the-flesh, and not God outside of the framework of the 
incarnation.”180 In other words, the Word “was unable to experience suffering in his ‘naked divinity’, 
but only in and through the flesh,”181 only within the confines of the incarnation. Thomas Weinandy 
also contends that it is a misreading to deem Cyril’s anathema as asserting that Jesus suffers in his 
divine nature. “For Cyril what is truly at issue is not that the Son of God suffers as God in a divine 
manner, but that the Son of God suffers as man in a human manner. . . . The person of the Son, within 
his existence as God, is impassible. Within his existence as man, the Son is passible. While not fully 
comprehensible, this is the rational, intelligible, and coherent logic that the mystery of the Incarnation 
demands.”182 Seen in the light of Cyril’s incarnational soteriology, Balthasar’s vision of the mysterium 
Paschale seems to lie upon “the false premise that the Son of God must suffer within his divine nature 
in order for the suffering to be theologically and soteriologically significant.”183 
Balthasar’s questionable interpretation of Cyril leads him to speak of the suffering of Christ 
as “something profoundly appropriate to his divine Person.” In doing so, he moves to make suffering 
eternally internal to God. Gavrilyuk outlines the theological consequences of such a predication of 
suffering to the divine nature: “If divine identity was somehow defined by the event of crucifixion in 
 
Nonna Verna Harrison and David G. Hunter (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 171–90; J. Waren Smith, 
“Suffering Impassibly: Christ’s Passion in Cyril of Alexandria,” in Suffering and Evil in Early Christian Thought, 191–212. 
179 If Kallistos Ware rightly evaluates the christology of Sergei Bulgakov, Balthasar should have admitted that he 
goes beyond Cyril of Alexandria. “Here Bulgakov goes beyond Cyril of Alexandria, who states . . . that Christ 
suffered only in his human and not in his divine nature. Yet according to the definition of faith endorsed by the 
Council of Chalcedon, the two natures of Christ are united ‘without division and without separation.’ This means, 
Bulgakov argues, that the suffering of Christ in his human nature must inevitably have implications also for his 
divine nature.” Kallistos Ware, “‘The Impassible Suffers’,” in Suffering and Evil in Early Christian Thought, 213–33 (227).  
180  Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “Theopatheia: Nestorius’s Main Charge against Cyril of Alexandria,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 56, no. 2 (2003): 190–207 (201). 
181 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 171. 
182 Thomas G. Weinandy, “Cyril and the Mystery of the Incarnation,” in The Theology of St Cyril of Alexandria: A 
Critical Appreciation, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 23–54 (49–50). 
See also Weinandy, “The Incarnation—The Impassible Suffers,” in Does God Suffer?, 172–213. John McGuckin also 
makes the incarnation-centred soteriology of Cyril clear: “In all incarnational language Cyril says . . . suffering, death, 
sorrow, and suchlike, are inapplicable to ‘God-in-himself’, but no longer inapplicable to God-made-man, in so far as 
he has appropriated, along with a human body, all that goes to make up a human life, that is soul, intellect, emotion, 
fragility, even mortality.” John A. McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy; Its History, Theology, 
and Texts (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 191. Kathryn Tanner also proposes a soteriology of the incarnation on the basis of 
Cyril of Alexandria: “The saving power of the cross is a product of the incarnation, as its effects are actualized over 
time in and through Jesus’ actual dying. . . . The cross saves because in it sin and death have been assumed by the 
one, the Word, who cannot be conquered by them. . . . The cross is a sacrifice but only in the same sense that Jesus’ 
whole life is a sacrifice of love. Following Cyril of Alexandria, the sacrifice here is a sacrifice of incarnation.” Tanner, 
Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 28–29. 
183 Weinandy, “Cyril and the Mystery of the Incarnation,” 50. 
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such a way as to suggest that it was God’s very nature to suffer in human fashion, then the assumption 
of the flesh would become quite unnecessary. For in this case the flesh would merely duplicate in its 
imperfect way the suffering that the Word had already undergone in his own nature.”184 In other 
words, the claim that the divine nature is affected by the human event backfires into undermining the 
salvific significance of the incarnation by making it somewhat redundant or superfluous. The 
soteriological import of the incarnation is profoundly undercut by internalizing suffering into God and 
thereby eternalizing and divinizing it. 
One may wonder here if Balthasar has a proclivity, without doing justice to soteriological 
significance of the incarnation, for transposing questions traditionally answered within a 
christological framework into a trinitarian one. For instance, the trinitarian reception of all historical 
tragedy of suffering into the eternal distance within God guarantees the redemptive and salvific 
efficacy of his theo-dramatic doctrine of the Trinity. This aspect of trinitarian reception takes over the 
role of a patristic christological–soteriological formulation, “that which is not assumed is not healed.” 
The patristic principle of orthodox christology argues that the eternal Son of God saves and deifies 
fallen, sinful humanity by assuming it into his divine nature through the incarnation.185 In other words, 
it mainly concerns the salvific efficacy of the incarnation—as discussed in Cyril of Alexandria’s 
christology—which does not require speculations of the divine suffering of Christ, not to mention 
trinitarian suffering. This soteriological principle of the incarnation is, according to David Bentley 
Hart, “the essence of the miracle of the incarnation, for patristic theology as a whole, and indeed is the 
good news Christians proclaim.” 186  Unlike this patristic emphasis on the incarnation, Balthasar 
intends to deal with the problem of humanity’s salvation within a set of highly speculative trinitarian 
claims without pondering upon the soteriological meaningfulness of the incarnation.187 And it may 
cause “unnecessary complications”188 of trinitarian suffering and death. What I now intend to do in 
what follows is to shed light on his trinitarian thought by closely examining the crucial trinitarian–
christological image of “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world.” 
 
184 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 174–75. 
185 For an extensively detailed survey and analysis of the patristic principle, see Norman Russell, The Doctrine of 
Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Thomas G. Weinandy, In the 
Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993); and Benjamin Myers, “The 
Patristic Atonement Model,” in Locating Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred 
Sanders (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2015), 71–87 (74–76). See also Stephen R. Holmes, 
“Asymmetrical Assumption: Why Lutheran Christology Does Not Lead to Kenoticism or Divine Passibility,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology, 72, no. 4 (2019): 357–74. 
186 David Bentley Hart, “No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility” (2002), in The Hidden and the Manifest: 
Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2017), 45–69 (66). 
187 This observation might have something to do with Holmes’s critical remark that “social trinitarianism uses the 
doctrine of the Trinity to answer questions the fathers answered by Christology” (“Three Versus One?,” 88). It is interesting to 
see that Jeffrey Dukeman considers Balthasar as a “significant” social trinitarian theologian who “represents a 
hierarchical social trinitarian trajectory” whereas Miroslav Volf represents an egalitarian type of social trinitarianism 
in Mutual Hierarchy: A New Approach to Social Trinitarianism (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2019), xiii–xiv. 
188 Deane–Drummond, “The Breadth of Glory,” 51. 
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Visualizing Eternal Suffering and Death of God: “The Lamb Slain” 
 
“The Lamb Slain” as a Pivotal Johannine Image  
I have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that in order both to bypass a mythological idea of 
God (a God mired in the world) and a philosophical idea of God (a God sublimely hovering over the 
world), Balthasar presents an idea of God who is eternally vulnerable to, and in advance of, the sin 
and evil of the world, an idea which he believes does not introduce an ontological change in God. 
What most vividly visualizes Balthasar’s idea of an eternally vulnerable triune God without 
recourse to the introduction of change is the christological–soteriological image of a sacrificial Lamb 
in eternity, “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world,” which resonates with, corresponds to, 
and is expressed by an earthly sacrificial death in Christ. As Michele Schumacher clearly states, by 
the image of “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world,” Balthasar intends to show that “the 
kenotic or self-emptying love of God is logically prior to sin, God having already reckoned with 
misdirected created freedom in his plan of redemption before the creation of the world.”189 The Lamb 
of God is slain “before the foundation of the world,” before the beginning of finitude such as 
temporality; Christ is crucified in eternity; there is no before and after in the vulnerability, suffering, 
and death of Christ; in other words, Christ’s historical suffering eternally transpires, before the 
beginning of the world, within the absolute distance between the Father and the Son in the intra-
divine life. The eternal woundedness or vulnerability is not a temporal event in the aftermath of 
Jesus’s historical crucifixion, but eternally intrinsic to God. 
The image of the Lamb slain in timelessness is never a peripheral image but a regulating 
symbol that “provide[s] a vantage point from which to survey the form and content of the 
theodramatic action”190 in Balthasar’s theology. The image of the glorified Lamb slain represents a 
profound depth of God’s theo-dramatic relation to the world. It is indeed that, for Balthasar, “the 
Lamb is God’s mode of involvement in, and commitment to, the world.”191 The theodramatic relation 
of God to the world which is limned by the image of the Lamb slain is, for him, as Martin 
encapsulates, “a relation of beautiful, gracious, perfectly sacrificial love”192 for the world. 
In doing so, according to Martin, Balthasar “nearly fully appropriates Bulgakov’s apocalyptic 
and kenotic theology of the Lamb as though slain,”193 “functioning as shorthand for the kenotic 
 
189  Michele M. Schumacher, “The Concept of Representation in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 
Theological Studies 60, no. 1 (1999): 53–71 (56). 
190 TD 4, 45. 
191 TD 4, 52. See also TD 5, 151, 246.  
192 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 179. 
193 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 100. Sergius Bulgakov prefigures Balthasar’s trinitarianism of the Lamb slain: 
“The Son, the Lamb of God, is pre-eternally ‘sacrificed’ in the creation of the world. . . . This pre-eternal sacrifice is 
the foundation of the cross of Golgotha.” Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2008), 129, 338. Jürgen Moltmann and Karl Barth also offer similar theological exegeses to Balthasar of 
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Trinitarianism at the heart of their shared dramatic soteriology.”194 The image profoundly represents 
what the trinitarian kenotic love for the world really is in a way markedly different from an image of a 
static, immutable, impassible, unaffected, thereby undramatic God, without making God mired in 
temporal process. In this regard, the image of the Lamb slain “before the foundation of the world” is a 
symbol on which the theological project of Balthasar’s via media195 between a theology dominated by 
sublime philosophical concepts and a theology permeated with mythological images very much 
depends. 
According to Balthasar, the theological combination of the Lamb in the Gospel of John and 
the Revelation of John, namely, “the Johannine theology of the ‘Lamb of God’ (Jn 1.29, 36): the 
Lamb, ‘slain before the foundation of the world’ (Rev 13.8),” indicates that “the Cross of Christ is 
inscribed in the creation of the world from the beginning.”196And he intends to develop a theological 
understanding of a unified Johannine vision of suffering as glorification in relation to crucifixion in 
the Gospel of John as well as the Lamb slain in the Apocalypse of John. As Martin accurately 
articulates, Balthasar intends to “privilege textually the Gospel of John and the Apocalypse”197 in his 
theological enterprise. “An attraction to the Johannine—characterized broadly as that which is 
visionary, mystical, Trinitarian, and paschal” 198 —permeates Balthasar’s trinitarian–christological 
theology. The definitively Johannine—in both the Fourth Gospel and the Revelation—image of the 
Lamb slain “provides an iconic shorthand of the enduring gift of love that is at the same time a freely 
kenotic gifting of the Father and a freely kenotic being given by the Son, a being given that is pure 
self-abandonment, the hypostatic figuration of kenosis itself.”199  
 
The Twofold “Johannine” Image 
I would like to address some preliminary questions about Balthasar’s theological exegesis of the 
 
“the Lamb slain” in the Book of Revelation. “The cross is at the centre of the Trinity. This is brought out by 
tradition, when it takes up the Book of Revelation’s image of ‘the Lamb who was slain from the foundation of the 
world’ (Rev. 5.12). Before the world was, the sacrifice was already in God. No Trinity is conceivable without the 
Lamb, without the sacrifice of love, without the crucified Son. For he is the slaughtered Lamb glorified in eternity.” 
Jürgen Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1981), 83. “The 
rejection which all men incurred, the wrath of God under which all men lie, the death which all men must die, God 
in His love for men transfers from all eternity to Him in whom He loves and elects them, and whom He elects at 
their head and in their place. God from all eternity ordains this obedient One in order that He might bear the 
suffering which the disobedient have deserved and which for the sake of God’s righteousness must necessarily be 
borne. . . . For this reason, He is the Lamb slain, and the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. For this 
reason, the crucified Jesus is the ‘image of the invisible God.’” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume 2: The Doctrine of 
God, Part 2, trans. G. W. Bromiley et al. (London: T&T Clark International, 1957), 123. 
194 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 207. 
195 MP, 34. 
196 GL 7, 214. 
197 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 162. 
198 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 162. 
199 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 179. See also GL 7, 208, 226, 511. 
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Lamb slain. I will first pose a question about the legitimacy of his admixture of the Gospel of John 
and the Revelation of John as the same Johannine literature. And then I will question both his 
assumed interpretation of Revelation 13.8, “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world,” and 
his kenotic understanding of the Gospel of John. I hope that these questions serve more clearly to 
show Balthasar’s theological tendency towards ennobling suffering. 
Balthasar seems to assume both the Fourth Gospel and the Revelation are written by the same 
John. And he thinks that the Johannine admixture consolidates a vision of glorified death in the 
Gospel of John and an image of the Lamb slain which visualizes the suffering of Christ’s love as the 
centre of Johannine mission christology. He believes that the two Johannine texts bear strong witness 
to his Christian commitment to a kenotic paradox of simultaneity of suffering and glory¾humiliation 
as glorification, powerlessness as powerfulness, poverty as fullness. Martin presumes Balthasar’s 
Johannine admixture of the Gospel and Revelation, and then appreciates the kenotic paradox of the 
simultaneity of suffering as glorification. However, while it is understandable to see a coincidence of 
the image of the paschal Lamb in the Gospel and in Revelation, any similarities are not enough to 
prove identity of authorship, at least not according to the basic consensus of contemporary biblical 
scholarship on the difference between John the Evangelist and John of Patmos. To quote some recent 
remarks on Johannine literature: “As was already recognized in the third century CE, Revelation does 
not share the same distinctive style, vocabulary, and theological outlook as the Gospel and Letters [of 
John].”200 The Revelation of John rather shows “a very different understanding of the end of time and 
the role of Jesus Christ than the Gospel and Letters of John”; it is “thus usually regarded as coming 
from a different author and situation and is interpreted as something quite distinct from the Gospel 
and Letters.”201 From this understanding of the marked difference between the Gospel of John and the 
Revelation of John, the admixed Johannine image of the Lamb slain should be called into question. 
 
The Revelation of John: Slain “before the Foundation of the World” 
I would like to express a reservation about the phrase, “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the 
world.” It seems that some biblical scholars accept the translation, “the Lamb slain before the 
foundation of the world.” This translation has theological support: “The Cross was no afterthought, 
but was predetermined before all ages in the comprehensive and loving purpose of God, and that same 
Lamb who was slain has invaded and conquered history.” 202  This is in line with some other 
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scholars. 203  Yet this interpretation resembles Balthasar’s theological exegesis only at first sight. 
Balthasar means much more by “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world” than simply that 
the redemptive purpose of God through the cross is eternally present in God. He rather intends to 
envisage the reality of the super-historical wound, suffering, and death “on God’s throne”204 or at the 
heart of the intra-divine life. 
No less significantly, it should be noted that while “the ‘Lamb slain before the foundation of 
the world’ (Apocalypse 13, 8)”205 may be found in older translations, it is now repudiated by many 
biblical scholars who prefer to interpret it as “written from the foundation of the world in the book of 
life of the Lamb.”206 The reasons why this interpretation is preferred is that theologically, it more 
comfortably tallies with the historical particularity of Jesus’s crucifixion; and exegetically, with the 
similar Revelation 17:8. Peter Williamson maintains: “Since we know that the death of Jesus occurred 
once for all at a particular time and place (see Heb 9:26; 10:10), the translation of the NABRE [New 
American Bible Revised Edition] and most other modern versions is preferable. This interpretation is 
confirmed by Rev 17:8, which speaks of names written in the book of life from the foundation of the 
world without any suggestion that the Lamb was slaughtered at that time.” 207  In an extensive 
commentary on Revelation 13:8, David Aune also avers that “it is logically and theologically 
impossible to make sense of the statement that the Lamb ‘was slaughtered before the creation of the 
world’.”208 Seen in this light, it seems that one of the most significant symbols in Balthasar’s theo-
dramatics is built upon a quite disputed and fragile exegetical foundation in the first place. 
 
The Gospel of John: Kenotic Paradox of Mission Christology 
Now I would like to pay critical attention to the kenotic paradox that Balthasar makes of the mission 
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and cross christology of the Fourth Gospel¾the kenotic paradox of suffering as glorification in the 
Gospel of John. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the missio, the being sent of the Son, characterizes John’s 
christology: “In the Gospel of John, the Father’s act of sending is a distinct mark of Jesus’ Sonship; 
he is not just the Son—he is the sent Son. The Johannine notion of believing means believing in Jesus 
as uniquely sent by God.”209 As Martin rightly observes, “There is indeed an operative Johannine 
hermeneutic across the board”210 in Balthasar’s theology, and, in particular, he is a truly “Johannine 
theologian”211 charged with a “deeply Johannine disposition—especially with respect to the missio 
Christology of the Son’s ‘coming-from-God’ as One Sent by the Father.”212 For him, the idea of 
mission is not only “most definitely present”213 and “adequately rooted in the Synoptics,”214 but also 
most notably “at the center of John’s Christology and expresses both the trinitarian and the 
soteriological dimensions of the mind of Jesus.”215 It also provides the point of connection between 
the earthly mission of Jesus in the Gospels and the christological hymns in the Letters, particularly the 
Christ Hymn in the Letter to the Philippians. The mission christology is, indeed, as Karen Kilby 
observes, “something Balthasar takes to stand out particularly clearly in the Gospel of John, but also 
to be attested in the synoptic gospels and indeed throughout the New Testament.”216 Most of all, it 
constitutes the centre of Balthasar’s christological reflections in that “it alone can illuminate the 
paradox of Jesus’ simultaneous sublimity and lowliness,” 217  a truly Johannine paradox of “the 
simultaneity of poverty and glory.”218 “The pairing in the Gospel of John of suffering with exaltation, 
death with resurrection,”219 eventually is placed as a fulcrum of Balthasar’s mission christology. 
Let me expound on this crucial theme. Balthasar notes that the simultaneity of humiliation 
and glorification that underlies Johannine christology is expressive of the mutual love between the 
Father and the Son pre-existent and incarnate. This intra-trinitarian love is defined as self-gift, but he 
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goes so far as to highlight that the love of self-gift should be understood as always self-giving up or 
away,220 that is, self-renouncing and self-negating obedience, which is dramatically embodied in the 
absolute obedience of Jesus’s crucifixion. Christ’s embodiment of the trinitarian love of self-gift is a 
christological and, indeed, trinitarian paradox of powerlessness and powerfulness: “the proclamation 
of the absolute power of God in the absolute powerlessness of the crucified.”221 The truly kenotic 
paradox that demonstrates “the embodiment and summing up of the entire lifework of Jesus”222 is 
constituted by “the unity of omnipotence and powerlessness: omnipotence, since he can give all; 
powerlessness, since nothing is as truly powerful as the gift.”223 And we are called to participate in the 
christological paradox of kenotic obedience through practising the “incomparable self-abandonment” 
of the cross, namely, “the full significance of the requirements Jesus makes of hatred of self, or denial 
of self, of the abandoning of all things, of the daily bearing of the cross, and of the losing of one’s soul 
in order to gain it.” 224  The “absolute self-giving is beyond ‘power’ [divine omnipotence] and 
‘powerlessness’ [Christ’s impotence on the cross]: its ability to ‘let be’ embraces both. . . . In this way 
it is quite possible to reconcile God’s unchangeability and God’s involvement in history.”225 In other 
words, the simultaneity of omnipotence and impotence, for Balthasar, plays a decisive role in proving 
that his theological project of via media is tenable. 
Such a christology characterized with the paradox of loss and gain, powerlessness and 
omnipotence is one of the most profound themes that penetrates Balthasar’s christological 
hermeneutic of the whole New Testament. For Balthasar, what is “common to the whole New 
Testament” is that “the ‘majesty’ and ‘ruling authority’ of the Father takes effect in the ‘lowliness’ of 
the obedient and serving Son.”226 What is disclosed in the Synoptics and the Letters is that Christ 
“manifests the glory of divine power in lowliness, defencelessness and a self-surrender that goes to 
the lengths of the eucharistic Cross.”227 It reveals a kenotic movement or pattern of death through 
resurrection, powerfulness through powerlessness, glorification through humiliation, and vindication 
through dereliction, that is, “the dynamic transition whereby the former makes way for the latter.”228 
For Balthasar, it is the liturgical hymn of “kenosis¾as the surrender of the ‘form of God’”229—in 
Philippians that encapsulates the kenotic paradox of suffering and glory. He regularly underscores that 
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the kenotic paradox of impotence and omnipotence, the paradox of “his humiliation, but also already 
the glorious exaltation which followed this,”230 is constitutive of the New Testament “as a whole.” 
What should be noted is that he emphasizes that the Gospel of John narrates how the Pauline kenotic 
love of the Son for the Father is unfolded through the humiliation and glorification of the Son sent by 
the Father. The Pauline christology of kenosis seamlessly accords with and is even “further 
developed”231 in the Gospel of John. 
Why is it the case, for Balthasar, that the idea of Christ’s kenotic action is advanced in the 
Fourth Gospel? This paradox of kenotic transition gains its fulfilled narrative in the Fourth Gospel, for 
the timeline of suffering and glory is wholly collapsed into a unified event of crucifixion: “in John the 
raising up upon the Cross and the raising up into glory are one single event, just as for Paul no one is 
raised up apart from the one who was crucified.”232 Balthasar is intent on claiming that John is 
“indeed materially identical with the ‘kenosis’ mentioned in the Philippians hymn”;233 furthermore, it 
is in the “specifically Johannine” passion narrative that “the kenosis has reached its fulfilment.”234 
Balthasar maintains (in the final volume on the glory of the Lord) that “the final interpretation of doxa 
[δόξα; glory] in the New Testament”235 is given in the Gospel of John. In other words, “the kabod-
momentum of the Cross of Jesus,” namely, “kabod-glory, the entire horizon of the meaning of the 
cipher δόξα in the New Testament,”236 is fulfilled in “the Johannine interpretation of the entire event 
of the Incarnation as the trinitarian δόξα that surpasses and rounds off all splendour.”237 For Balthasar, 
as Martin accurately summarizes, “the kenoticism of the cross opens up upon and is itself a kind of 
glory; this union of suffering and exaltation is, of course, deeply Johannine.”238 His own version of 
Johannine theology is kenotic at its heart. “The Johannine principle that suffering and glory are of a 
piece, forming a single reality,”239 brings to perfection the passion narratives of “the kenotic self-
sacrifice of the death of Christ.”240 “This Johannine register undergirds all of Balthasar’s theology, 
including its cosmic scope.”241 The kenotic pattern of suffering as glorification “provides the ballast 
for this Johannine theologian.”242 
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One of the governing tenets of Balthasar’s theology is a kenotic paradox of unity through 
abandonment, intimacy through alienation, joy through pain, delight through sorrow, life through 
death, glorification through humiliation, love through suffering, illumination through darkness, 
powerfulness through powerlessness, and so on. For Balthasar, Jesus is paradoxically glorified and 
exalted through the descent into the moment of death as humiliation and lowliness. The kenotically 
paradoxical chronology of suffering and glory reaches its culmination in the Gospel of John in that it 
is “the Passion that John sees simultaneously as the glorification.” 243  Balthasar is consistent in 
contending that “it is precisely the ‘powerfulness’ in the doxa of God that shines forth from the 
complete powerlessness.”244 As Martin reminds her readers here and there, “the Johannine character 
of the synonymity of poverty and glory,”245 of seeing suffering and glory as “a single reality,”246 plays 
an overarching role in formulating his christology and trinitarianism, and thus his conception of the 
Christian life. Balthasar is convinced that the Johannine expression of the cross as glorification 
achieves the highest formulation of the kenotic paradox of suffering and glory—Jesus is paradoxically 
glorified and exalted through the kenotic descent into the moment of death as humiliation and 
lowliness within the framework of the kenotic paradox of gain, vindication, affirmation, recovery, 
possession, and powerfulness in and through loss, denial, emptying, negation, abasement, 
dispossession, relinquishment, diminishment, and powerlessness. Balthasar regularly draws upon a 
kenotic paradox of omnipotence and impotence which is interpreted as a manifestation of genuine 
power and joy at the voluntary lowliness of absolute powerlessness and agony.247 
Despite a highly debated issue over whether “a theology of the cross can be assigned also to 
the Gospel of John,”248 given its pervading theme of “glory,” it may be acceptable to claim that the 
Fourth Gospel contains a theology of the cross “as the foundation and center of a theological system, 
giving it its narrative and substantive shape.”249 It may seem at first not entirely fair to take exception 
to Balthasar’s Johannine paradox of suffering and glory as a culmination of kenosis. Yet one cannot 
avoid raising a significant question about his heavy consolidation of the idea of kenosis and Johannine 
christology and his subsequent understanding of Johannine christology as a culmination of kenotic 
paradox of suffering and glory. The Johannine narration of cross as glorification requires a careful 
discernment that would otherwise fall prey to glorifying death itself. Balthasar seems to falter upon 
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his interpretations of Johannine christology in terms of kenosis and hence of “crucifixion as 
glorification” as the most heightened form of kenotic paradox, for kenosis cannot account for the 
Johannine portrayal of the passion of Jesus. 
First of all, it is crucial to acknowledge that the association itself of Johannine christology and 
Pauline kenotic christology seems untenable when it is taken into consideration that, according to 
many Johannine scholars, the idea of kenosis does not throw into relief or even have any place at all 
in the Fourth Gospel. For instance, Gordon Fee discerningly points out, “In John the ‘kenotic’ 
dimension of Jesus’ earthly life is generally missing.”250 Indeed, “because John’s emphasis is laid on 
revelation and redemption through Jesus, the Son of God, he intentionally highlights the reality of the 
divine in the earthly Jesus, . . . the eternal Son as the one who revealed the Father most truly and 
perfectly.”251 It is thus important to give enough heed to the Johannine distinctiveness that the divine 
light and glory underlie and undergird Jesus’s incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and ascension in 
Johannine mission christology. “In the Fourth Gospel,” Sandra Schneiders perceptively comments, 
“Jesus’ death is not presented, as it is in the Synoptics, as a kenosis, the nadir of his earthly life, a 
human condemnation from which God vindicated him through resurrection.”252 In other words, one 
may need a perspective that is not necessarily limited in a kenotic paradox when contemplating the 
Johannine passion narrative. Seen in this light, it is reasonable to say that Balthasar may put a 
questionable kenotic spin on the interpretation of Johannine christology. 
Let me elaborate upon the misunderstanding of Johannine theology of cross as kenosis. It is in 
fact frequently warned against by some prominent Johannine scholars. For instance, John Ashton 
discerningly points out that the Fourth Evangelist “fails to exploit the notion of crucifixion in a 
Pauline or Marcan fashion”253 in which the suffering of crucifixion is narrated as a prerequisite to the 
resurrection and the glorification which follows from the utmost depth of suffering and abandonment. 
Francis Moloney also articulates how the Johannine logic of death and glorification markedly differs 
from the cry of dereliction in Mark and the kenotic movement in Paul. 
 
In the Gospel of Mark … He is arrested, tried and hammered to a cross from which he 
cries out: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me” (15:34). . . . It is not until 
after he has been ignominiously done to death that things begin to happen. . . . [In the 
Christ Hymn in the Philippians] he comes to his lowest moment. . . . It is as a 
consequence of this humility and humiliation that God highly exalted him. . . . For both 
Mark and Paul the experience of the Cross is the lowest moment in Jesus’ human 
experience, and his exaltation is the consequence (διὸ καί . . .) of this unconditional 
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commitment to the will of God. This is not the case in the Fourth Gospel. From its 
earliest pages Jesus begins to speak of his oncoming death as a “lifting up,” an 
exaltation.254 
 
Unlike Philippians 2:9, where the ὕψωσις [being exalted] is the result (διὸ καί ) of 
Jesus’ death on the cross (v. 8c), for John, Jesus’ ὕψωσις takes place on the cross. . . . It 
is a crucial part of the Gospel’s theological understanding of the death of Jesus as a 
physical “lifting up” that is also his “exaltation.”255 
 
For Moloney, the Johannine logic of death as glorification, in stark contrast to Mark and Paul, does 
not exhibit any kenotic movement from powerlessness to powerfulness, abandonment to unity, 
lowliness to exaltation, humiliation to glorification, and so forth. The Fourth Evangelist does not 
narrate glorification and exaltation as a result and consequence of obedient suffering and death in a 
kenotic pattern. 
Ernst Käsemann also makes clear that glorification is not described as a fruit of obedience in 
the Fourth Evangelist’s christology, but that glory underlies obedience throughout from the outset. 
 
In John, the obedience of the earthly Jesus is not, as in Phil. 2.9, rewarded with his 
exaltation, but rather is finished and brought to a close by his return to the Father. 
Obedience is the form and concretion of Jesus’ glory during the period of his 
incarnation.256 
 
Jesus’ death, in the Fourth Gospel as in Phil. 2.6ff., is the completion of his incarnation. 
But in distinction from Phil. 2.9, the exaltation in John does not appear as a divine 
reward for the earthly obedience rendered, and one should avoid contrasting earthly 
obedience with exaltation. . . . The glory of Jesus is not the result of his obedience, so 
that, as in other New Testament writings, his glory could be defined from the 
perspective of his obedience. On the contrary, obedience is the result of Jesus’ glory and 
the attestation of his glory in the situation of the earthly conflict.257 
 
“In John,” for Käsemann, as Paul Anderson encapsulates, “there is no movement from humiliation to 
exaltation, as eschatology has ceded place to protology; that which was from the beginning is revealed 
in the cosmic mission of Jesus as the Christ.”258 “The combination of humiliation and glory is,” 
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therefore, for Käsemann, “not paradoxical as such.”259 It would be thus erroneous to claim that in the 
Fourth Gospel there is a kenotic movement of glorification through humiliation and even a 
culmination and fulfilment of such a kenotic paradox. The Fourth Gospel lacks the kenotic “paradox, 
that the power of the resurrection can be experienced only in the shadow of the cross, and that the 
reality of the resurrection now implies a position under the cross.”260 Accordingly, this non-kenotic 
understanding of Johannine christology of mission and cross accounts for the theological rationale of 
the Johannine absence of Jesus’s cry of dereliction, the lack of Jesus’s agony and anguish of the 
abandonment, one of the most dominant themes undergirding the whole structure of Balthasar’s 
theology (which will be critically discussed together with Rowan Williams’s great reliance upon it in 
the next chapter). John’s passion narrative leaves little or no room for an agonized, humiliated, broken 
cry of abandonment that is said tragically and paradoxically to prove his unity with the Father. 
His crucifixion is, some argue, ironically, rather than paradoxically, a triumph. In other words, 
cross as glorification in John is thus to be understood in terms of subtle irony rather than kenotic 
paradox (the meaning of Johannine—tragic and comic—irony will be fleshed out in the next chapter).  
 
John, then, subverts the meaning of the cross from being a symbol of defeat, shame and 
death to becoming a symbol of victory, glorification and life.261 
 
In the arrest, the trial, and the crucifixion itself Jesus seizes his death in kingly 
command over all who pretend to capture him and judge him. Rather than cry out for a 
God who has forsaken, the crucified Jesus in John is already on his way to the Father. 
Thus the scandalous irony of history is itself ironized.262 
 
The tragic irony that Jesus is rejected to death by his own people is re-ironized into triumph. The via 
to humiliation of the cross is ironically subverted into the via to glorification.  
John Ashton’s statements help us to see how ironic subversion markedly differs from the 
kenotic paradox. According to Ashton, the Fourth Evangelist teaches us that “the Christian believer is 
not expected to see the crucifixion as a kind of exaltation or glorification but to see past the physical 
reality of Jesus’ death to its true significance: the reascent of the Son of Man to his true home in 
heaven.”263 And this non-kenotic Johannine theology of the cross, for Ashton, offers a broader picture 
of Johannine mission christology: 
 
Jesus enters the world with a mission from the Father and leaves it when his mission is 
completed. By an extraordinary involution his mission is simply to reveal to mankind 
his origin and his destiny, his entry and his departure. From this perspective the true 
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significance of his death has nothing to do with the manner of it. No doubt one could 
say of him that “nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it”, but this is only 
because it satisfactorily rounds off his mission, allowing him to say, for the first and 
only time: “It is accomplished.” . . . The notion of death is always present; nevertheless 
the pain and the shame of Jesus’ actual death have been filtered out of the term itself—
much as in the English vulgarism “pass away”. Jesus has not gone “the way of all flesh” 
in the traditional Jewish understanding of the term: there is no trace in the Fourth 
Gospel of any “descent into hell”.264 
 
The careful distinction of ironic subversion and kenotic paradox in understanding the Gospel of John 
not only accounts for why it lacks the cry of dereliction and redacts it into the cry of triumph (which 
will be revisited in “The Cry of Accomplishment in the Gospel of John” in the next chapter) but also 
prevents us from falling into Balthasar’s tendency towards seeing “cross as glorification” as 
glorifying the cross in terms of kenotic paradox. In an integrative study of Johannine studies over 
forty years, for instance, Williams Loader aptly notes a modern tendency to read John’s Gospel in 
“the Pauline sense of the cross as the paradox of glory in suffering,”265 which clearly underlies 
Balthasar’s christology. “The common misinterpretation which applies exaltation and glorification to 
the cross” in reading John’s passion story, Loader continues, misleads into thinking that 
 
the crucifixion itself is interpreted as a great Pauline paradox of glorification and 
exaltation. The result is startling, provocative and immensely challenging: glory in 
shame, exaltation in humiliation.266 
 
In other words, a kenotic misreading of the Johannine cross as glorification is prone to ending up 
glorifying suffering and death. It may account for the critique that “Balthasar and those who follow 
him often talk as though the cross is in itself beautiful.”267 To interpret the Gospel of John in terms of 
the culmination of kenotic paradox is not only untenable but is also prone to intensify a propensity for 
sacralizing and glamorizing suffering. 
 
The Temporal Wound of Christ and the Eternal Wound in the Trinity  
Now I would like to draw attention to more theological aspects of the Lamb slain which touch on the 
heart of Balthasar’s christological trinitarianism—yet these assume a dubious identification of the 
authorship of two Johannine texts, a questionable translation of “the Lamb slain before the foundation 
of the world,” and a suspicious elevation of the Gospel of John as a fulfilment of kenotic paradox 
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which it lacks. I hope that this investigation sheds new light on the issue of super-temporal suffering 
and death in the Trinity. 
The image of the Lamb slain plays a profound role as a governing symbol that offers a 
“vantage point” regarding Balthasar’s theo-dramatization of God–world interplay precisely because 
the Lamb as slain “before the foundation of the world” exhibits “the eternal aspect of the historic and 
bloody sacrifice of the Cross.”268 The historical suffering and death of Christ is exalted or glorified in 
the divine realm of super-temporality as the temporal passion of Christ is exalted and glorified in the 
eternal life of God in a Johannine—in both the Fourth Evangelist and the Revelationist—sense. 
 
He who really was “dead”, yet now lives “for evermore” (Rev 1:18), takes his pierced 
heart with him to heaven; on God’s throne he is “the Lamb as it were slain”. . . .  Here 
[John 17:17–19], just as in the image of the Lamb who, in the midst of the heavenly 
glory, is “slain”, we find that the aspect of the Passion’s “exaltation” is coextensive with 
the disciples’ suffering (and hence with all world history), which can only be explained 
by the fact that the Passion is, in its internal dimensions, supratemporal and thereby can 
indwell all moments of historical time. . . . Supratemporal suffering is within the realm 
of him who has been taken up into the divine super-time (“all-time”).269 
 
The temporal wound of Christ is transfigured into a supratemporal wound of Christ enthroned in the 
divine realm. The exaltation of Christ attributes eternity to Christ’s suffering, and that supratemporal 
suffering in God receives all temporal suffering into its eternally open wound. It is “the eternal 
contents of the providence that governs the world”270 that the Lamb slain “in timelessness,”271 namely, 
“the ‘Lamb slain before the foundation of the world’ upon the throne of God (Rev 5.6, 9, 12; 
13.8),”272 unveils. Balthasar intends to identify “an enduring supratemporal condition of the ‘Lamb’ 
as . . . a condition of the Son’s existence co-extensive with all creation and thus affecting, in some 
manner, his divine being.”273 In other words, the mutually affectable relation of divine and human 
agency in theo-drama, the theo-dramatic assertion of Christ’s suffering in his divine nature, and the 
salvific efficacy to encompass the entirety of suffering of the temporal world in his soteriology—all 
the three crucial trinitarian–christological–soteriological concepts are captured in the supra-historical 
existence of the Lamb slain. Hans Küng encapsulates what Balthasar envisions from the image of the 
Lamb slain in eternity as follows: 
 
268 MP, 34. 
269 TD 5, 151; italics mine. It should be noted that there is not “something like” suffering in God here but only 
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an eternalization of the historical event of the crucifixion, not only into the future, but 
also back into the past, to the dawn of creation and even into the eternal divine being of 
God, as described within the framework of trinitarian speculation.274 
 
“The image of the Lamb who, in the midst of the heavenly glory, is slain”275, for Balthasar, eternally 
manifests the kenotic paradox of suffering and death as glory and exaltation which lies at the centre of 
the Johannine truth of the unreserved kenotic self-surrender of Christ to open up the whole sublimity 
of the Father’s love.276 It is a wound at the pierced heart of the Lamb slain that lays bare the eternal 
truth of the Son’s relational love for the world. 
It is of great importance that the wound is eternally open or unhealed; the wound “remains 
always open” 277  in the inner life of the Trinity. Christ’s “mortal wounds are eternally open”278, 
diametrically opposed to “the pseudo-miracle of the healing of the beast’s mortal wound”279  [in 
Revelation]. The infinite distance in the mode of super-suffering and super-death eternally remains 
open to receive (divine reception) the historical suffering and death in the entirety for a redemptive 
purpose. The eternal openness of the glorified wound of the Lamb slain offers a vivid picture of how 
the super-suffering in the Trinity encompasses the totality of historical wounds. In other words, the 
eternally open wound of the Lamb slain manifests “a totally unexpected picture of God’s internal, 
trinitarian defenselessness” 280  and “the truth of the defenseless nature of the divine, trinitarian 
love.”281 Balthasar eloquently portrays that “the eternal love pours out its blood from wounds which 
transcend all inner worldly hurts.”282 The suffering of Christ is eternalized so as to bear and redeem 
the entirety of historical suffering. Therefore, for Balthasar, the eternal suffering and death of Jesus 
with an eternally open wound accounts for the redemptive efficacy of the super-temporal suffering of 
the exalted Christ in the divine realm. Balthasar’s soteriology is underpinned by the transfiguration of 
Christ’s suffering and death into the eternal Trinity. 
It should be here noted that although Balthasar’s proponents wish to salvage him from an 
identification with Moltmann, nonetheless, it is hard to find any clue in Balthasar’s theological 
speculations about “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world” to suggest an ontological 
difference between the historical wound and suffering of the Lamb slain in history and the eternal 
wound and suffering of the Lamb slain exalted into the eternal divine life; between the temporal death 
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of the economic life of the Trinity and the eternal death of the immanent life of the Trinity; between 
the death ad extra and the death ad intra. Rather, the wound, suffering, and death in eternity are that 
which is elevated, heightened, exalted, glorified, and divinized out of the temporal realm. Both are, at 
least, ontologically univocal (rather than merely latent or implicit in a metaphorical or analogical 
language). It thus seems that the temporal wound, suffering, and death eternalized into the Trinity are 
present, as the divine receptivity and assumption of the entire temporal tragedy, at the trinitarianly 
equal ontological level to, not ontologically inferior to, the eternal unity, love, and life, as the divine 
redemption of what is received and assumed.283 
This critical evaluation calls into question the contention that “for Balthasar it is the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity that—by positing eternal differentiation within the divine life—allows for this 
‘tragic’ rupture to occur without entailing a kind of tragic division within God that would have 
somehow to be overcome, a collapse of divine integrity into contradiction and opposition.”284 Rowan 
Williams presumes that the suffering and death in God is latent and implicit. But, as I have discussed 
so far, the prototype and original image of wound, suffering, and sacrifice in the Trinity is not 
ontologically null and invalid, merely implicit and latent. The temporal tragic wound, suffering, and 
death is divinized and eternalized in “the same alignment”285 as the eternally blessed unity, love, and 
life of the Trinity. The eternal event of the negation of tragedy in God thus occurs collinearly with the 
unity, love, and life of God. The God of Balthasar is eternal Becoming from “the ever-dying God” 
into “the ever-living God,”286 an eternal event of repetition that eternally negates the negativity of 
separation into unity, pain into joy, suffering into love, death into life, darkness into light, and tragedy 
into comedy. “God is love . . . , the absolute unity of . . . life and death.”287 It is a God who is 
conceived of mythologically.288  
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Sin and Evil in Relation to God: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley 
 
Locating Sin and Evil in God: The “Real” Relation of the World to God 
I have discussed above the dimensions of suffering and death which are particularly associated with a 
trinitarian–christological–soteriological interconnection in Balthasar’s thought. There is, at least, one 
more dimension of suffering which is to be taken into consideration: a dimension of suffering which 
is related to a trinitarian–hamartiological–soteriological interconnection.  
It is worth remembering that the infinite trinitarian separation between the Father and the Son 
is not only associated with the suffering and abandonment of Jesus in salvation history but also, 
through his suffering which encompasses the entirety of temporal human suffering and sin, with all 
the fallen and sinful reality of the world; that is, it is not only that “all the contingent ‘abasements’ of 
God in the economy of salvation are forever included and outstripped in the eternal event of Love”289 
but also that the infinite difference in the Trinity grounds, receives, and redeems the suffering and 
death, sin and evil of the created world; the eternal hiatus within the Trinity “grounds and surpasses 
all we mean by separation, pain, and alienation in the world and all we can envisage in terms of 
loving self-giving, interpersonal relationship, and blessedness.”290  
For Balthasar, there is nothing outside of the intra-trinitarian life. “Since the world cannot 
have any other locus but within the distinction between the Hypostases (there is nothing outside 
God . . .), the problems associated with it—its sinful alienation from God—can only be solved at this 
locus.”291 The original locus of temporal suffering and death thus also could be traced in the triune life, 
namely, in the eternal suffering and death in the Godhead. “He posits an ‘infinite distance’ between 
the Father and the Son as the ground for the possibility of creation, a distance that also allows for the 
possibility for sin. Searching for the source of suffering, he finds it in God’s own self.”292 The eternal 
suffering and death is the “prototype” of suffering and death which gives the possibility of occurrence 
to the historical suffering and death in its entirety (divine gift), receives the reality and pain of the 
earthly suffering and death back into the heart of the Trinity (divine reception), and then redeems 
them within the Trinity by surpassing and outstripping them (divine redemption). 
Particularly, by divine reception, the divine actor, who is not “a mere Spectator,” is genuinely 
involved with the suffering of the world; he compassionately embraces the pain of the creatures into 
his heart and eternally remembers it. And God heals and redeems all the received separation, suffering, 
and death of sin and evil by purging, overcoming, and transcending them through the unity, love, and 
life of the Trinity and the resurrection life of the exalted Son. In other words, the separation of the 
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world is embraced into the eternal distance within the Trinity and overcome by the absolute unity 
within the Trinity; sin and evil are encompassed into the infinite distance within the triune relations 
and outstripped by the eternal life of the Trinity. As Papanikolaou articulates, “The infinite distance 
between the Father and the Son in the kenotic event of love is always an infinite nearness that is able 
to contain and overcome within itself the ‘separation’ caused by sinful humanity.”293 
  
It is the “drama” of the emptying of the Father’s heart, in the generation of the Son, that 
contains and surpasses all possible drama between God and a [sic] world. For any world 
only has its place within that distinction between Father and Son that is maintained and 
bridged by the Holy Spirit. The drama of the Trinity lasts forever: . . . Everything 
temporal takes place within the embrace of the eternal action and as its consequence 
(hence opera trinitatis ad extra communia).294 
 
The earthly reality of something bad in the world finds its original place at the heart of the Trinity. 
The absolute, infinite, eternal distance in the Godhead encompasses all kinds of—and its entire range 
and degree of—temporal distance and separation possible within the world of finitude and sinfulness; 
the eternal distance within the Trinity grounds, contains, and transcends “the distance of sin.”295 In 
other words, the eternal distance embraces and outstrips every kind of worldly distance and 
diremption of finitude and sinfulness that is made by every sort of violence, oppression, brutality, 
invasion, and terror; every kind of darkness, pain, suffering, and death, remembered and forgotten, of 
victims, survivors, and perpetrators in the world at all times and places. The trinitarian distance 
thereby grounds and enables sin, suffering, and death, all of which have to do with evil somehow; 
contains and embraces them; and then overcomes and transcends them. It seems that Balthasar 
proposes a trinitarian etiology of sin and evil. 
Considered in this light, it is quite clear that Balthasar’s transcendent location of sin and evil 
seems markedly to differ from the patristic commitments to evil as the privation or absence of good, 
as “nonbeing in the sense of being the corruption, perversion, and destruction of the good”;296 the 
“unreal” relation of the world to God; and God as good per se, which does not require locating a locus 
of sin and evil in the eternal life of God at all.297  As Rowan Williams avers, according to the 
Augustinian understanding of evil, evil is “no-thing.” 298  Evil is the privation or lack of good, 
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constituted by “imperfect, corrupt or nonsensical pictures of the divine.”299 It is “a privation of—the 
harmonious outworking of finite agency united with infinite creativity.”300 David Bentley Hart also 
highlights that the God who creates the world as good ex nihilo is the God who is the source of 
goodness, thus casting evil as the privatio boni: “Evil possesses no proper substance or nature of its 
own, [existing] only as a privatio boni. . . . All suffering, sadness, and death . . . is the consequence of 
the depravities of rational creatures, not of God’s intentions.”301 In the tradition of evil as privatio 
boni, thus, “suffering, death, and evil in themselves have any ultimate value or spiritual meaning at all. 
They are cosmic contingencies, ontological shadows, intrinsically devoid of substance or purpose.”302 
As Herbert McCabe avers, “in sin . . . there is no manifestation of God’s goodness at all.”303 God is 
being and goodness itself, and evil is nonsubstance, destitute of any substance of goodness. In 
accordance with the doctrines of God as the source and giver of every goodness and evil as the 
privation of good, God has a “real” relation to the world, but not vice versa. There is “the non-
reciprocity of the creator–creature relation, which is not real on the side of the creator”304; God creates 
and sustains what is not God by giving the gift of every goodness but is not ontologically affected by 
the virtual reality of sin and evil of what is not God. “God is implicated neither as substance nor as 
direct cause in the existence or effects of evil.”305 The non-reciprocity of God and the world does not 
represent a God who is unsympathetic and uninvolved with the word but rather provides “the ground 
of the creatures’ worth”306 because of the unaffected superabundance of divine gift. In other words, 
“because of (not in spite of) the non-reciprocal character of the relation of creator and creature, the 
creature has integrity.”307 
Seen in this light, the classical doctrines of God the Good and evil as privation of good do not 
quite accord with an attempt to place in God an origin and destination of sin and evil. In contrast to 
the classical commitments, according to Balthasar’s middle way, the tragic reality of the world has a 
“real” relation with God in that God is affected by the sinful and evil occurrences of the world. The 
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“real” reciprocity between God and the world in “non-unilateral” theo-dramatic “interplay” and 
mutual “input” shows, Balthasar claims, how God seriously considers and is genuinely involved in the 
tragic reality of suffering and evil.308 As Balthasar makes clear,  
 
there must be an interplay, in the liberation of man, between the gratia sola, on the one 
hand, and man’s creaturely freedom, on the other—a freedom that has not been 
eradicated by sin. . . . This is the theo-drama into which the world and God have their 
ultimate input; here absolute freedom enters into created freedom, interacts with created 
freedom and acts as created freedom. God cannot function here as a mere Spectator, 
allegedly immutable and not susceptible to influence.309 
 
For Balthasar, as Jennifer Martin notes, “in order to be sufficiently dramatic, there must be the 
possibility for a genuine interplay between the freedom of God and that of human beings.”310  
Guy Mansini rightly observes that Balthasar is eager to accept the creature’s finite freedom 
seriously and thus wants to address “a question regarding finite freedom in a world created by 
absolute freedom. In such a world, is finite freedom really real? And does it count for anything if it 
has no impact on absolute freedom?”311 “If creation is really to count and add something to God, if 
created freedom is to be in real dialogue with God, if the event of the Cross is really to matter to the 
interior life of God,”312 for Balthasar, there must be a “real” interplay between God and the world in 
which the theo-dramatic interplay affects the interior life of God. 
The outcome of the “real” interplay, though it sounds attractive, is that, as Kilby evaluates, 
“Balthasar quite explicitly rejects the possibility of a conceiving of God in a purely positive way.”313 
The divine actor is to be conceived of as acting in a “real” interplay with created beings so that the 
radical ontological difference between creator and creature is fundamentally obscured. Here the 
fundamental commitment of classical theism to the “unreal” relation of God to the world is 
compromised at the root level. If the relation of created beings to God is understood as “real,” God is 
envisaged as being on a similar, not unfathomably “ever-greatly” dissimilar, ontological horizon with 
the created world. Once God is conceived like this, it seems then inevitably to follow that the idea of 
divine immutability comes to be construed as referring to a God who is improperly indifferent, 
unsympathetic, uninvolved with the world which has the commensurable ontological value with God, 
namely, an illegitimately sublime God who remains aloof without running the dramatic risk of change 
and suffering. 
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Explaining Sin and Evil: A Theodicean Approach 
I have just discussed that Balthasar stays away from the classical commitments to sin and evil as non-
substance and to the non-reciprocity of God and the world. In doing so, he does not only place the 
origin and destination of sin and evil in the inner life of the Trinity but also gives a theodicean 
account at the most profound trinitarian level in order to make sense and explain how the reality of 
suffering and evil can be accounted for by the trinitarian relations of God.314 I would like to put his 
theodicean account of sin and evil under the critical reflection of Rowan Williams’s acute recognition 
of the tragic reality of human suffering and his subsequent disapproval of explanatory, theodicized, 
and eternalized attitudes on suffering. Williams offers an acute recognition of how the human tragedy 
of suffering should be theologically spoken in a non-encompassing manner, which is, in my view, 
ironically enough, remarkably at odds with Balthasar’s tendency to locate sin and evil at the heart of 
God. 
Williams underlines here and there that “the task of attention to perspectives that remain 
irreducibly different”315 in relation to human suffering and tragedy does not necessarily end up with a 
postmodern stand-off such as a Derridean void of difference and otherness as unspeakability and 
silence. The tragic reality of the finite, fallen human world replete with “irreducibly different” 
suffering should be reckoned with, mourned, and lived by the suffering particulars’ self-narration and 
attentiveness to others’ narration, namely, the process of “listening,” the “converse, exchange, 
sociality” of “biography” and “testimony”; the journey with others which entails “a self-dispossession 
and recovery of the self through the other.”316 
From this understanding of the humility and possibility of communication of sheer difference 
of human suffering, Williams, ironically, provides a perceptive recognition of how a Balthasarian 
kind of fundamental, ultimate explanation of the locus—origin and destination—of sin and evil may, 
in effect, end up undermining the seriousness of the tragic reality of this finite, sinful world which it 
claims to take seriously by its attempt to make sense and explain it. For Williams, an all-
encompassing style of theological discourse on suffering is no less than the domestication of suffering 
and thus an unqualified dismissal of tragedy. He has long argued that, echoing Donald MacKinnon, to 
attempt to acquire a comprehensive explanation of the irreducible particularity of suffering is to seize 
God’s point of view. “If the world is our creation, or even if the world is masterable as a system of 
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necessities, the idea of irreparable and uncontrollable loss ceases to make sense: there are no 
tragedies.”317 But we are not the ones who create the world: “We do not and cannot know how our 
choices affect our world, and we cannot keep ourselves or others safe from the contingencies of the 
world or the results of our actions; we are equally liable (like Job’s friends) to refuse to know our 
ignorance.”318 “We do not know what we can or cannot bear until we have risked the impossible and 
intolerable in our own lives.”319 We do not know the loss and calamity that our tragic failure might 
cost ourselves and the world outside. This not-knowing of loss gives rise to another not-knowing of 
cost that we are confronted with. “There is an ultimate costliness which, of ourselves, we cannot 
bear.”320 The tragic not-knowing eventually leads to the Christic risk-taking life without calculating 
the cost of loss, Williams’s most venerated, encouraged form of life to be lived out. The loss and cost 
is that which we cannot make sense, explain, and calculate but only take on and reckon with. 
Williams thus insists that “we cannot think away particulars into comprehensive explanatory 
systems; the world is such that attention to particularity is demanded of us.”321 “All explanation of 
suffering,” therefore, according to Williams, “is an attempt to forget it as suffering, and so a quest for 
untruthfulness.”322 Such an attempt to explain suffering itself is hence another tragic failure not to 
accept our limitedness, and an “evasion of the world”323 by the “evasions of the temporal”324 that is 
nothing less than “evasion of the tragic.”325  An attempt to portray the picture of a God who is 
expected to function to give “the possibility of exhaustive explanation and justification” of the world 
as a whole, “so to provide for us an ideal locus standi, a perspective transcending or reconciling 
discontinuity into system, is clearly an idol.”326 He therefore acquaints us with “the knowledge of 
suffering as without explanation” 327  and suggests that “a good theology and a candid religious 
philosophy” 328  relies first and foremost on acknowledging the unexplainable knowledge of 
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318 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 119. See also Rowan Williams, “Afterword: Knowing the Unknowable,” in 
Knowing the Unknowable: Science and Religions on God and the Universe, ed. John Bowker (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 
257–62. 
319 Rowan Williams, “To Give and Not to Count the Cost” (1977), in Holy Living: The Christian Tradition for Today 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 7–12 (9). 
320 Williams, “To Give and Not to Count the Cost,” 11. 
321 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 155. 
322 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 155. 
323 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 155. 
324 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 161. 
325 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 162. 
326 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 155–56. 
327 Williams, “Redeeming Sorrows,” 272. 
328 Williams, “Redeeming Sorrows,” 271. 
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suffering.329 He consistently places a great stress on the historical particularity and its subsequent 
sheer diversity of suffering which is at odds with Balthasar’s strong direction towards eternalizing 
suffering and locating the origin and destination of sin and evil at the heart of God. Such Williamsian 
attitude obliges us to be faithful to speaking attentively to, listening to, and conversing with fellow 
sufferers rather than sympathetic to a theodicean resolution. In other words, it leads us to a 
“conversational solidarity” with fellow human sufferers without submitting to “absolute otherness” 
and thereby renouncing the possibility of understanding the “other” or having recourse to an 
“explanation” of suffering. 
In accordance with his attentiveness to the irreducibility of particular suffering, furthermore, 
Williams is also very much concerned about a modern tendency towards making the historical cross 
event of Jesus into a super-temporal event. He questions “How can the specific agony of Jesus be 
God’s doorway into all human suffering without losing its historical distinctness?”330  To super-
temporalize the death of Jesus, for Williams, cannot avoid eroding the historical particularity of the 
cross event “by weakening the force of the recognition that Jesus’ suffering is humanly inflicted.”331 
In reliance on such truthful insights of Williams, Balthasar’s trinitarian explanation of the whence and 
whither of sin and evil vis-à-vis God is in effect tantamount to evading the tragic reality of suffering, 
or perhaps comes close to suggesting that God becomes an “endlessly resourceful manager of 
suffering and change”332 rather than the God who confronts suffering with the profound “‘seriousness’ 
 
329 Karen Kilby notes that there is “a systematic inexplicability” of evil in the theology of Thomas Aquinas: “Evil 
is a privation of good, but it is difficult to work out within these schemes where the privation as such comes from.” 
The inexplicability, for Kilby, can be construed as “deliberate and up-front” rather than regrettable inability 
“because the thing in question is inexplicable.” Kilby, “Evil and the Limits of Theology,” 25. Kathryn Tanner’s 
approach to sin and evil comes into line with Kilby’s: “To say that sin is an exception to the premise of God as 
creator is therefore to say that sin is ultimately without explanation: . . . if a good God is the ultimate explanatory 
principle . . . , is not this inexplicable character of the coming to be of sin what one should expect.” Kathryn Tanner, 
“Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator,” in The God who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, 
ed. Thomas F. Tracy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 111–36 (133). 
  It is important to note that Dionysius is in line with Augustine and Thomas as regards the inexplicability 
of evil. Eric Perl encapsulates the Dionysian understanding of evil as “causeless non-being” as follows: “Dionysius’s 
inability, or rather refusal, to assign a cause to evil, then, marks not the failure but the success of his treatment of the 
problem. To explain evil, to attribute a cause to it, would necessarily be to explain it away, to deny that evil is 
genuinely evil at all. For to explain something is to show how it is in some way good. . . .  Only by not explaining evil, 
by insisting rather on its radical causelessness, its unintelligibility, can we take evil seriously as evil. This is why most 
“theodicies” fail precisely insofar as they succeed. To the extent that they satisfactorily account for or make sense of 
evil, they tacitly or expressly deny that it is evil and show that it is in fact good. Dionysius’ treatment of evil, on the 
other hand, succeeds by failing, recognizing that the sheer negativity that is evil must be uncaused and hence 
inexplicable, for otherwise it would not be negativity and would not be evil.” Perl continues to remark that a 
theodicy fails because by rationalizing and justifying evil, it takes away our proper affection at evil—outrage—from 
us. Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2007), 63–64. See also Christian Schäfer, Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: An Introduction to the Structure 
and the Content of the Treatise On The Divine Names (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 137–53. 
330 Rowan Williams, “Incarnation and the Renewal of Community” (1989), in On Christian Theology, 225–38 (235). 
331 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 160–61. 
332 Williams, “God,” 76. 
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of separation and death,”333 as he claims to do.334 And his explanation, even in a trinitarian manner, 
of sin and evil makes sin and evil something divine and good, something positive and meaningful 
rather than something inexplicably negative and insubstantial. One may be then inclined to concur 
with Karen Kilby who highlights that for Balthasar, “ultimately suffering and loss are given a positive 
valuation: they are eternalized, and take on an ultimate ontological status.”335 
 
Finding Divine Meaning in Every Suffering 
The aforementioned critical reflection of Balthasar’s theodicean account of suffering may draw our 
attention to an early reservation about Balthasar made by Johann Baptist Metz. Metz is discerningly 
critical of a group of post-war theologians such as Balthasar—in company with Barth, Jüngel, 
Bonhoeffer, and Moltmann in the realm of Protestant theology—who developed theologies of “the 
suffering God, suffering between God and God, and suffering in God”336 in order to make God 
genuinely immanent in and intimate with the tragic reality of the world. 
 
What I see in these worthy attempts is too much of a response, soothing the 
eschatological questioning of God. . . . And do not these ways of responding 
underestimate the negative mystery of human suffering that will not allow itself to be 
harmonized under any other name? . . . How is the discourse about a suffering God in 
the end anything more than a sublime duplication of human suffering and human 
powerlessness? How does the discourse about suffering in God or about suffering 
between God and God not lead to an eternalization of suffering? Do not God and 
humanity end up subsumed under a quasimystical universalization of suffering that 
finally cuts off the counterimpulse resisting injustice? . . . Finally, I have always 
wondered whether or not there is in this discourse about a suffering God something like 
a secret aestheticization of suffering at work. A suffering which makes us scream or 
finally leaves us wretchedly silent knows no majesty; it is nothing exalted, nothing 
noble. . . . It is not so much a song of love, but rather much more a frightening symptom 
of no longer being able to love. It is a suffering that leads to nothingness, if it is not a 
suffering unto God.337 
 
 
333 TD 4, 325. 
334 Karen Kilby points out that Balthasar is inclined to overstep the mark of human humility of finitude which has 
“no right to overcome their incomprehension of evil by introducing pain, separation, and death (or something like 
them) into their talk of God, no right to the intellectual resolution that comes from knowing of some happening in 
God that ‘justifies the possibility and actual occurrence of all suffering in the world’ [TD 4, 324].” Kilby, Balthasar, 
120, n. 66. Matthew Levering is sympathetic to Kilby’s concerns. Matthew Levering, The Achievement of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar: An Introduction to His Trilogy, foreword by Cyril O’Regan (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2019), 213–14. 
335 Kilby, Balthasar, 120. 
336 Johann Baptist Metz, “Theology as Theodicy?” (1990), in A Passion for God: The Mystical–Political Dimension of 
Christianity, trans. J. Matthew Ashley (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998), 54–71 (69). 
337 Metz, “Theology as Theodicy?,” 69–70. 
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Here Metz shows very discerning insights into the hitherto fashionable “suffering God” trend. For 
Metz, Balthasar is, “in the realm of Catholic theology, above all,” the theologian who acquires the 
most reconciliatory vision of human suffering by universalizing, eternalizing, and aestheticizing 
suffering. Balthasar’s theologizing of God vis-à-vis suffering is thereby inclined to mystify and 
sacralize the reality of suffering. 
 Balthasar’s tendency of putting a divinely positive meaning to suffering and loss may be 
noticeable in some of his writings. 
 
I think that the proclamation of the Cross can help men accept sufferings that often 
seem intolerable, to accept them, not because a God suffers in solidarity with them—
how would that relieve them?—but because a divine suffering encompasses all these 
sufferings in order to transform them into prayer, into a dialogue in the midst of 
abandonment, thereby conferring on all human tragedies a meaning they would not have 
in themselves, a meaning that is in the end redemptive for the salvation of the world.338 
Christianity is the only world view able to attribute a positive meaning to suffering, all 
suffering. . . . Suffering that is unavoidable, that, humanly speaking, is hopeless, and 
even death itself have a positive meaning. Even suffering, particularly suffering, is a 
precious gift that the one suffering can hand on to others; it helps, it purifies, it atones, it 
communicates divine graces. The sufferings of a mother can bring a wayward son back 
to the right path; the sufferings of someone with cancer or leprosy, if offered to God, 
can be a capital for God to use, bearing fruit in the most unexpected places. Suffering, 
accepted with thankfulness and handed on, participates in the great fruitfulness of 
everything that streams from God’s joy and returns to him by circuitous paths.339 
 
As Riyako Hikota underlines, “his main interest seems to be how we can find meaning in the 
suffering that is already here and inescapable.”340 Balthasar gives the strong impression of rendering 
suffering as divinely positive, ultimately good, and universally meaningful. Every kind of suffering 
can prove itself a “gift” of “grace” that comes into fruition if those who suffer prayerfully capitalize 
upon them with gratitude; this ultimate fruitfulness of suffering participates in the divine fruitfulness 
which is revealed by a paradox of life through death, joy through agony, and love through suffering; 
this is unique in Christianity. Here he seems to come very close to, as Kilby indicates, “a masochistic 
distortion of Christianity.”341 It is not because he relishes suffering for its own sake (nobody does so), 
 
338 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Christ the Redeemer,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar and Adrienne von Speyr, To the 
Heart of the Mystery of Redemption, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), 15–42 (39). 
339 Hans Urs von Balthasar, You Crown the Year with Your Goodness: Sermons through the Liturgical Year (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1989), 30. For a similar kind of critique of one of Balthasar’s biographical notes, see Kilby, Balthasar, 
118–19. 
340  Riyako Cecilia Hikota, And Still We Wait: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theology of Holy Saturday and Christian 
Discipleship (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018), 144. Hikota claims that Balthasar’s primary concern for suffering bears 
little relation to offering “practical solutions” to suffering. She even concedes that Balthasar views political theology 
and feminist concerns with disfavour and that it runs the risk of falling prey to supporting the defence of the status 
quo. However, Hikota believes that in spite of these limits and pitfalls, Balthasar’s theology can satisfy the main 
interest of finding meaning in suffering. 
341 Kilby, Balthasar, 119. This critical remark enables me to concur with those who criticize Balthasar for rendering 
love as tied with suffering in severely unqualified (e.g. self-deprecating, abusive, and masochistic) ways. See Kathryn 
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but because he believes every suffering somehow teleologically arrives at the goodness of meaning in 
christological fashion. 
This critical point is fleshed out in Kevin Taylor’s critiques of how Balthasar wrongly both 
maximizes and minimizes suffering in accentuating a “tragic” aspect of Christianity by seeing Jesus 
as the ultimate and supreme tragic hero. Taylor detects a double misperception of suffering in 
Balthasar’s tragic christology. He argues that, for Balthasar, 
 
All afflictions are, on some level, meaningful, as they participate in and point to Christ’s 
ever greater suffering. This valorizes our losses, making them meaningful above the 
cacophony of the immediate, mundane and quotidian. It also minimizes human 
suffering, since the worst has already come. . . . Suffering is minimized through the 
knowledge that all suffering is ultimately transitory and yet meaningful in its 
participation in Christ’s greater suffering.342 
 
Behind his misapprehension lies a certain problematic assumption of suffering: “he assumes a certain 
static nature to suffering, that it is inherently meaningful and ennobling”—a gravely naïve and 
perilous mistake. Taylor contends that, like Rowan Williams, suffering is, in reality, more diverse, 
mysterious, ambiguous, and opaque than Balthasar envisages. Many modern literatures, which 
Balthasar neglects, bear witness to the alarming diversity of suffering, among which there is a variety 
of suffering that is simply so empty, absurd, and meaningless that “it is difficult to find the telos of 
suffering.”343 This critique leads to his concluding remark: 
 
In the end, Balthasar makes both too much and too little of tragic drama and the tragic 
tradition. By making tragedy so foundational to his understanding of the Cross, he has 
elevated tragic suffering in a peculiar way. Not all suffering can be read in such a 
heightened, meaningful way; not all sufferers are comforted by knowing that Christ is 
the poorer man. On the other hand, he has also minimized the tragic tradition by 
disregarding its complexities and rich variety.344 
 
To put it succinctly, Balthasar’s idea of Christ’s consummation of the tragic does injustice to the 
tragic aspect of human reality by both maximizing and minimizing it: he is too hasty to posit all 
human suffering as destined for a kind of christological meaningfulness, one that undercuts the 
perplexing diversity of human suffering, and which cannot be categorized and relieved this way. 
 
Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 212; Tonstad, God and Difference, 39; 
Blankenhorn, “Balthasar’s Method of Divine Naming,” 253; Jason Fout, Fully Alive: The Glory of God and the Human 
Creature in Karl Barth, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Theological Exegesis of Scripture (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 
2015), 120–43. Anna Mercedes contests a pathological understanding of masochism in relation to Christian 
spirituality. She argues that for “the suffering self,” which emerged in early Christianity against a soul/mind-
prioritized Greco–Roman understanding of the self, a masochistic approach can be “empowering.” Mercedes, 
“Beyond ‘Power-With’: Martyrs and Masochists,” in Power For, 108. 
342 Kevin Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” in Christian Theology and Tragedy: Theologians, 
Tragic Literature and Tragic Theory, ed. Kevin Taylor and Giles Waller (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 133–48 (144).  
343 Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” 146. 
344 Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” 147. 
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Taylor consequently argues against Balthasar’s tendency towards putting a teleologically positive 
light on suffering that “there needs to be a reticence against imposing meaning upon others and their 
diverse experiences, a too quick Christological reading of tragedy’s immense diversities.”345 
 
It is worth, I believe, noting that such a Balthasarian spiritual enthusiasm for anticipating and finding 
meaning in all kinds of suffering by prayer may be discernible in some of the writings of Sarah 
Coakley. In a reflection on Easter in a series of Holy Week meditations, subsuming the non-kenotic 
passion narrative of the Gospel of John to the kenotic paradox of painful loss and joyful gain, she 
acquaints us with the following principle: “You must learn to practise death. . . . What it means is that 
only by handing ourselves over, as Christ was ‘handed over’ by his betrayers in the Passion, into a 
seeming loss of selfhood [our false, conscious, striving self], . . . will we find our true selves, the 
living Christlike selves that God longs us to be in his Son. . . . To be a Christian is to ‘practise death’ 
in this way.”346 In a reflection on Jesus’s cry of accomplishment in the Gospel of John in the same 
series of meditations, she interprets Jesus’s glorious accomplishment on the cross as “the piercing 
light of divine meaning”347 that is already thrown on what follows from the suffering of the cross. 
 
For our own worst experiences of pain, suffering or grief so often have this quality of 
irreducible meaninglessness. If we could fit them mentally into some box bound for 
glory they would not have the power over us that they do. . . . It seems impossible to 
believe that God has allowed me to undergo this agony, loss, burden, illness, to be the 
perfect anvil on which is being hammered out my salvation, my own “glory.” . . . What 
John’s Passion story, rightly understood, is saying . . . is that in the God/Man Jesus, the 
inescapable and meaningless suffering of my particular life [my private grief, my 
unshakable guilt, my rocky marriage, my repetitive stupidity, my addiction, my bad lot of 
fate or genes] intersects with the transcendent power of salvation and is lifted up, 
“handed over,” to be shot through with Christ’s glory. Here, and only here, not in some 
fantasy land, I learn the real way of peace and joy. Here and only here, do I walk the 
way of Jesus, through death to new life.348 
 
Here in Coakley’s reading of John’s passion narrative the suffering and glory of the Johannine Christ 
is intersected with human suffering and glory. And it allows her to read the human reality of suffering 
with irreducible diversity in a “too quick Christological” way. 349  She is not reticent about a 
 
345 Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” 146. 
346 Sarah Coakley, The Cross and the Transformation of Desire: The Drama of Love and Betrayal (Cambridge: Grove Books, 
2014), 26–27. 
347 Coakley, The Cross and the Transformation of Desire, 24. 
348 Coakley, The Cross and the Transformation of Desire, 24–25. 
349 Graham Ward distinguishes a meaningless suffering and a christologically meaningful suffering: “there is a 
suffering which is rendered meaningless because it has no part in redemption. This is a suffering which rejects and 
fights against redemption. It has no truth, no existence in Augustine’s ontology of goodness, because it is 
privative—it deprives and strips creation of its orders of being, its treasures of wisdom. Suffering which is a 
consequence and promulgation of sin can find no place in the plērōma. And only plērōma gives space, provides a 
dwelling. But there is a suffering which is meaningful because it is a continuation, a fleshing out, and a completing 
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teleological kenotic pattern moving from “meaninglessness” to “glory” and says that there is already 
glorious meaning in the meaninglessness of agony and loss. Every kind of suffering is eventually 
christologically recoverable and redeemable; all human sufferings of loss and failure are destined to a 
christologically glorious transformation into rebirth, conversion into recovery, growth into renewal as 
exemplified by the collapsed and rebuilt self-identity of Peter. Yet we, in certain circumstances, do 
not know, and perhaps could not know, even by endless mourning and prayer, what meaning is veiled 
behind my (and your) suffering, or even whether there is any meaning at all. That is, the ungraspable 
diversity of human suffering cannot be completely overlaid with or mysteriously transfigured into a 
christologically redeemable suffering. Such a synchronization of human suffering into a christological 
suffering is thus inclined to oversimplify many different kinds of particular suffering into a possibly 
transformable kind of suffering, concomitantly marginalizing a kind of suffering of which it is 
“difficult to find the telos.”350 No less significantly, a homogenization of human suffering into a 
meaningfully transformable suffering is tantamount to portraying suffering as intelligible and thereby 
as something good. It may then make one anticipate his or her own (and others’) suffering as 
something to be christologically glorified in the end, even in advance of undergoing it in reality. As 
Rowan Williams eloquently articulates, however, 
 
The resolution of the sheer resistant particularity of suffering, past and present, into 
comfortable teleological patterns is bound to blunt the edge of particularity, and so to 
lie; and this lying resolution contains that kind of failure in attention that is itself a 
moral deficiency, a fearful self-protection. It is just this that fuels the fantasy that we 
can choose how the world and myself shall be.351 
 
Williams’s acute recognition of the non-negotiable particularity of suffering makes conspicuous the 
Balthasarian–Coakleyan tendency towards doing injustice to the irreducible particularity and diversity 
of suffering, and simultaneously to christening every kind of suffering. 
Nonetheless, unfortunately, what I will argue in the next chapter where the tragic theology of 
Rowan Williams is treated intimates that Williams himself ends up coming close to synchronizing 
human tragedy into a sort of teleological pattern of maturation from failure to rehabilitation: the 
Petrine pattern of growth upon the tragic moment of failure is essentialized, and the comic moment of 
recovery is made teleological. If this is the case, all three scholars tend to put a positive light on the 
darkness of suffering as that which proves to be teleologically meaningful. 
 
of the suffering of Christ.” Graham Ward, “Suffering and Incarnation,” in Suffering Religion, ed. Robert Gibbs and 
Elliot R. Wolfson (London: Routledge, 2002), 163–80 (173). This essay is a slightly revised version of the original 
essay “Suffering and Incarnation,” in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, edited by Graham Ward (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), 192–208. 
350 Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” 146. 
351 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 155; italics mine. 
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Chapter 2. Tragedy and Dereliction in the Tragic Theology of Rowan Williams 
 
 
 
I have tried to show in the previous chapter that Hans Urs von Balthasar’s crucial tenets—such as his 
theo-dramatic understandings of God as the divine actor, his location of the origin and destination of 
sin and evil in God, and of suffering eternalized in God—are at variance with Rowan Williams’s 
underlying positions—such as the non-contrastive relation of divine transcendence–immanence, the 
non-competitive divine–human relation, God as the source of goodness, evil as an insubstantial 
privation, and the resolute rejection of any attempt to explain suffering and thereby evade its tragic 
particularity, although Williams makes favourable and appreciative evaluations of Balthasar at several 
important points. For instance, recently, he draws upon Balthasar’s trinitarian–christological, tragic 
exegesis of the Gospel of John in order to construct a theological imagination that can bear the weight 
of the tragic sense of human life and maturity. In this chapter I will examine his tragic account of the 
Fourth Gospel in broader contexts of his theological and anthropological understandings. 
This examination comes to engage with the debate over whether Williams manages to 
emphasize the tragic without falling into the error of ontologically radicalizing it both in relation to 
creation and to the Trinity. I will argue in the first two sections that, while he achieves it at the level 
of formal affirmation and intention, at the level of how he reads the Gospel in practice, he is inclined 
to allow an ontological value to the tragic while rendering the created goodness nihil. And I will show 
in the last section that he intends to maximize Christian tragic imagination by associating the cry of 
dereliction with the divine identity so as to create an ethics of unconsoled human self-dispossession 
based on the self-dispossession of the trinitarian desire. I will then argue that the creation of the 
trinitarian ethics of self-dispossession entails mythological projection of human tragic predicament 
onto the divine life and thereby the ontologization of the tragic. In short, I will argue in this chapter 
that Rowan Williams comes close to ontologically radicalizing the tragic vis-à-vis creation and the 
Trinity. 
 
 
Introduction:  Williams and the Tragic 
 
David Bentley Hart diagnoses, “In the Christian West, in recent decades, how well a theologian 
appears to appreciate the ‘tragic depths’ of the story of atonement (or, at least, how grave a 
theologian’s voice becomes at certain appropriate junctures in that story) has become for many an 
index of his ‘seriousness.’ Theology has acquired a taste for tragedy, perhaps commendably at the end 
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of an unbearably tragic century.”1 Rowan Williams has long been acknowledged as a theologian who 
has a propensity “for accommodating a tragic sensibility in Christian theology”2 and cultivating “a 
much stronger feeling for the catastrophe and unavoidable tragedy of human life.”3 Rebekah Howes 
poignantly articulates Williams’s theological ethos and its anthropological significance as follows: 
 
The language of the negative; difficulty, loss, uncertainty, vulnerability, contradiction, 
litter the terrain of Williams’ interventions, writings and speeches. If we mask the 
experience of difficulty, e.g. in a consumer rhetoric of choice or in the fantasies of a 
mended world, we are on dangerous ground. Difficulty is the very substance of our 
making sense of ourselves as subjects in continually risky and unsettling negotiations.4 
 
In his theology, indeed, “conflict and tragedy were at the heart of Christian living and they simply 
could not be avoided.”5 An undertow of giving much weight to suffering and tragedy runs through 
Rowan Williams’s understanding of the Christian life. 
Mike Higton, one of the most sympathetic commentators of Williams’s theological projects, 
indicates that the theology of Williams is “too unrelentingly agonized”6 to “ever relax in the Sabbath 
rest of God’s love.”7 Subsequently, it runs “the risk of muting the note of joy, of thankfulness, of 
release and rescue”8 and “the risk of proposing a kind of spiritual heroism.”9 Benjamin Myers is also 
concerned with Williams’s tragic sense of life. For Myers, Williams’s thought is pervaded with “the 
imperative of patience, of sheer human endurance in the face of meaningless catastrophe. Patience 
beyond hope that is the moral vision of tragedy, and it is a vision that has gripped the theological 
imagination of Rowan Williams.”10 
 
The cost of Williams’ achievement is a sort of pervasive ontological sadness: to see all 
things coloured by a tragedy older than the world. It is no momentary sorrow, but a 
 
1 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 
373. He refers to Balthasar, Eberhard Jüngel, Donald MacKinnon, and Nicholas Lash. He concludes that “simply 
said, tragic theology lacks theological depth” (374). 
2 Ben Quash, “Four Biblical Characters: In Search of a Tragedy,” in Christian Theology and Tragedy, 15–33 (18). 
3 John Milbank, “Extended Interview,” interview by Deryl Davis, Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, February 21, 2003, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2003/02/21/february-21-2003-john-milbank-extended-
interview/12980. 
4 Rebekah Howes, “In the Shadow of Gillian Rose: Truth as Education in the Hegelian Philosophy of Rowan 
Williams,” Political Theology 19, no. 1 (2018): 20–34 (33). 
5 Mark Chapman, “The Evolution of Anglican Theology, 1910–2000,” in The Oxford History of Anglicanism, Volume 
4: Global Western Anglicanism, c.1910–present, ed. Jeremy Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 25–49 (47). 
6 Mike Higton, Difficult Gospel: The Theology of Rowan Williams (London: SCM, 2011), 35. 
7 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 36. 
8 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 35. 
9 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 36. 
10 Benjamin Myers, Christ the Stranger: The Theology of Rowan Williams (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 21. 
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deep conviction that life must always remain unconsoled, the best we can hope for is to 
be stripped bare, exposed, and forgiven under the stark relentless light of reality.11 
 
From this evaluation, he suggests, the theology of Williams can be best understood as “a theology of 
preparation,” which “resembles nothing so much as the forty days of Lent: a theology of slowness and 
discipline, abstinence and privation, the ‘luminous sorrow’ of the great fast.”12 These evaluations of 
his propensity for the tragic suggest that Williams’s thought carries undercurrents and overtones of 
the Gethsemanic, as well as Promethean, mournful endurance of the sorrowful reality of failure, 
suffering, and catastrophe. Despite these critical comments, Higton and Myers want ultimately to give 
the green light to his “difficult Gospel”13 and “Lenten theology”14 in that it serves to transform “the 
poison of a ruthless and decadent self-centredness” predominant in “western societies today,”15 as 
well as the addiction to “saccharine . . . in a culture of quick gratifications.”16 
Some of the more critical theologians level the charge that Williams is inclined to sacralize 
the moment of loss and suffering by conceiving of divine presence as responding to and resonating 
with the tragic moment itself rather than as a ground of hope to heal and mend it. God blends in with 
and is immanent in the tragic horizon of historical conflicts without leaving much to the goodness that 
God has created, achieved, and will complete, the created goodness which has been restored and 
fulfilled. For instance, Matheson Russell offers critical observations on Williams’s thought as the 
essentialization of pain and death and the unintelligibility of eschatological hope. He argues that 
Williams positively renders human—historical, political, ethical, cultural, spiritual—tension and 
conflict as the condition of the self’s transformation on every level and aspect, and exclusively 
construes divine grace as the unceasing movement of self-transformation in the ineluctable tension 
and conflict. For Williams, Russell claims, human tension and conflict is readily accepted as “the 
sphere of divine grace,” and “the divine life pro nobis is entirely equated with self-transcending 
movement.”17 In doing so, “the negation, the diremption, the scattering, the judgment, is itself the 
moment of grace.”18 That is to say, if created strife is inexorably attached to divine grace, created 
finitude and conflict is too readily affirmed as the condition of divine grace, and divine grace is 
deemed as confined in the horizon of the created world. Subsequently, according to Russell, Williams 
makes no room for the eschatological proclamation of the “end to violence, injustice, and death,” of 
 
11 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 116. 
12 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 117. 
13 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 117. 
14 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 36. 
15 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 117. 
16 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 36. 
17 Matheson Russell, “Dispossession and Negotiation: Rowan Williams on Hegel and Political Theology,” in On 
Rowan Williams: Critical Essays, ed. Matheson Russell (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 85–114 (93). 
18 Russell, “Dispossession and Negotiation,” 93. 
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“no more death, no more mourning, crying or pain,” which break through the finite world, while 
adding too much significance to suffering and loss. He therefore concludes that “Williams 
essentializes the moment of negativity, pain, and death, replacing the finality of the cross with an 
endless reiteration of its procedure,” and this unavoidably dark and painful movement of 
transformation leaves the language of “an eschatological rest” and hope unintelligible.19 
 
These critical evaluations may trace back to a debate between Rowan Williams and John Milbank 
over tragedy and peace.20 Milbank highlights that “when we defend pathos we tend to make pity and 
suffering ontologically ultimate.”21 He thus seeks to establish the ontological priority of peace and 
avoid the essentialization of violence and tragedy. “Against Williams’ ‘tragic’ emphasis,” Milbank 
stresses “the ‘absurdity’ of faith, its non-resignation to loss and scarcity.” 22  He indicates that 
Williams’s tragic inclination falls short of the faith grounded in creation’s goodness and ontological 
peace that enables us to refuse to prioritize suffering and loss ontologically. Milbank argues, without 
impatiently overlooking the tragic implication of the created temporal limitedness about which 
Williams is gravely concerned, faith in creation’s goodness and in eschatological restoration cuts 
across the Williamsian character of “taking time” in the entire painstaking process of difficult 
learning: “Faith in creation, in resurrection is,” he insists, “faith in the deeper power of love over the 
apparent power of destruction.”23 For Milbank, therefore, “to surpass the tragic, to make the Christian 
gesture of faith beyond (but not without) renunciation, is not to embark on a premature celebration. 
On the contrary, it is to refuse to cease to suffer, to become resigned to a loss.”24 In short, Milbank has 
misgivings that the capacity for faith in creation, resurrection, and final recovery over the tragic is 
truncated in Williams. 
Williams seeks to defend himself by saying that he opposes the “ontological necessity of the 
tragic” and “eschatological un-mending,” and pays great attention to the tragic dimension of the 
contingent and finite world with an acute vigilance against Milbank’s allegedly untimely, premature 
vision of peace. Williams contends that Milbank’s claim leaves us “with little account of how it is 
 
19 Russell, “Dispossession and Negotiation,” 107. Others lay similar charges that there is a lack of eschatological 
fulfilment breaking through the finite moment of the presence in Williams’s thought. David Brown very briefly 
points out a danger in Williams’s insistence on pertinacious truthfulness and responsibility: “individuals will be 
thereby deprived of all hope.” David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis Explored and Defended (London: SCM, 2011), 
124. And David Newton is also critically aware that Williams “underemphasizes the place of abundance, peace and 
eschatological rest.” David Newton, “The Demanding Call and the Difficult Question: Stanley Hauerwas and 
Rowan Williams in Conversation,” Theology 119, no. 4 (2016): 268–75 (271). 
20 The debate occurred in New Blackfriars 73, no. 861 (June 1992), the special issue dedicated to the first edition of 
John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
21 John Milbank, “The Force of Identity,” in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 194–216 (208). 
22 John Milbank, “Enclaves, or, Where is the Church?,” New Blackfriars 73, no. 861 (June 1992): 341–52 (351). 
23 Milbank, “Enclaves,” 352. 
24 Milbank, “Enclaves,” 352. 
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learned, negotiated, betrayed, inched forward, discerned and risked.”25 The facile priority of peace 
misleads us to turn a blind eye on finitude and fallibility and on its tragic reality of competition and 
rivalry, loss and deficiency, failure and fracture. “We are always already, in history, shaped by 
privation, living at the expense of each other.”26 If the Christian language of peace thus has to do with 
this finite world, we should be “historically aware of how it is constructed in events of determination 
which involve conflict and exclusion of some kind.”27 To speak of the ontological priority of peace 
would otherwise become “vacuous or fictive” or “a return to primordial harmonics, purely innocent 
difference.”28 For Williams, Christian life is, first and foremost, to venture to go on a difficult journey 
of learning in the contingent vulnerability of the created world, which “is surely pregnant with the risk 
of tragedy.”29 Thus, the realization and fulfilment of the good “is necessarily bound up with taking 
time.”30 What is required of us is thus not to celebrate a “timeless model of ecclesial virtue” but to 
cultivate risky attentiveness to “the tragic implications of contingency itself,” which is embedded in 
the difficulty of learning. In particular, the costly attentiveness to difficulty in tragedy, Williams notes, 
is not to make an allusion to “an inevitability, a non-contingency, about evil”31 and “a myth of 
necessary violence.”32 Therefore, for Williams, we must pay heed not to muddle right attention to 
difficult learning with a false attempt to necessitate, sacralize, and perpetuate the tragic. In sum, 
whilst Milbank places a premium upon the priority of ontological peace, Williams highlights that the 
peace is eschatologically suspended and achieved in the tragic reality of history. 
Brett Gray lends credence to Williams against Milbank’s criticism. He contends that in 
Williams’s theology there is indeed “eschatological amelioration of the tragic”33 which forecloses 
“ontological radicalization”34 of the tragic. 
 
He [Williams] seems, in his openness to the tragic, to radicalize the violently conflictual 
in the very way Hart and Milbank feared tragedy might. . . . Williams makes the claim 
that an affirmation of conflict’s inevitability does not translate into conflict’s 
ontological radicalization; it is not a “metaphysical statement about the inevitability of 
mutual exclusion and strife”. “Conflict” . . . is the ineluctable product of the resistances 
the world offers us.35 
 
25 Rowan Williams, “Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision,” New Blackfriars 73, no. 861 (June 
1992): 319–26 (321). 
26 Williams, “Saving Time,” 322. 
27 Williams, “Saving Time,” 322. 
28 Williams, “Saving Time,” 322. 
29 Williams, “Saving Time,” 323. 
30 Williams, “Saving Time,” 323. 
31 Williams, “Saving Time,” 321. 
32 Williams, “Saving Time,” 322. 
33 Brett Gray, Jesus in the Theology of Rowan Williams (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 130. 
34 Gray, Jesus in the Theology of Rowan Williams, 124. 
35 Gray, Jesus in the Theology of Rowan Williams, 124. 
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Gray affirms that Williams manages to make a nuanced difference between the contingent 
inevitability, intractability, or necessity of conflict and the metaphysical necessity or ontological 
radicalization of conflict. 
Gray’s defence of Williams seems legitimate. Williams endeavours to prove that the 
insistence on contingent necessity of the tragic does not fall into a metaphysical inscription of the 
tragic. In other words, the ineluctability of tragic conflict is not intrinsically related to the created 
order and its goodness; tragic failure and suffering occur only as historical particulars. Williams 
claims that he is not saying that “there can be no healing or mending eschatologically, or that conflict 
and exclusion have either a sacred or a necessarily liberative character.”36 He tries to assure his 
readers that he does not intend to insist on “some fundamental metaphysical priority or necessity to 
failure and suffering, . . . the kind of metaphysical inscription of ‘necessary’ guilt, failure, or pain.”37 
Williams maintains that the tragic in the world has to do not with metaphysical, ontological necessity, 
but with contingent necessity, ineluctability, and inevitability. 
What I will argue in what follows is that, however, the fact that Williams asserts this at the 
level of principle and affirmation does not necessarily guarantee that he actually constructs his tragic 
imagination accordingly. I will conclude the current section of this chapter with the argument that his 
tragic imagination ends up coming close to an ontologization of the tragic, at the level of his tragic 
reading of the passion narrative of the Gospel of John, in particular, by compromising his affirmation 
of the classical principles of non-competitive divine–human relation and of evil as the privation of 
good. 
 
 
Johannine Tragic Irony and the Petrine Pattern of Growth  
 
Tragic Irony in the Gospel of John 
In one of his most recent works, The Tragic Imagination (2016), Rowan Williams attempts to 
elucidate his own accounts of how Christian narrative embraces tragic imagination into and sustains it 
at its heart as the hope of recovery and growth.38 He singles out the book of Job among the Hebrew 
 
36 Williams, “Saving Time,” 322. 
37 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 119, 121. 
38 Richard Gaskin, Tragedy and Redress in Western Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2018), 
raises systematic suspicions about the claims that Williams makes in The Tragic Imagination. Gaskin argues that 
Williams proposes contradictory claims. On the one hand, Williams endorses at several points the view that tragedy 
offers its readers “linguistic redress” as an aspect of audience or reader response (not as a character in narratives)—“the 
tragic portrayal of suffering can compensate us, the users of language, for our painful lot in this world: it can give us 
linguistic redress”— but, on the other hand, “officially he is opposed to finding an explanatory and compensatory 
structure in tragedy.” Williams is just content with acknowledging that our coming to be capable of speaking and 
thinking of tragedy merely as a moment of transformative possibility to move us from resignation to recognition; he 
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Scriptures and the Fourth Gospel among the Christian Scriptures in order to prove how tragedy and 
tragic imagination are closely related in Jewish–Christian traditions. He, in tune with Balthasar, 
considers the Gospel of John as a Christian narrative to incorporate the tragic dimensions of human 
and divine realities into its core. In doing so, the tragic irony in John is brought into sharp focus and 
plays a decisive role in constructing Williams’s tragic imagination. 
Such a Christian tragic sensibility has been a dominating tendency from the initial stage of 
William’s theological career. In Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (1982), for example, 
Williams states that “as we learn the truth of its tragic character, we learn also that tragedy is 
interwoven with hope” unless we “treat the resurrection as ‘canceling’ the crucifixion, replacing 
humiliation with ‘glory’.”39 This tendency may trace back to at least his pre-ordinand, doctoral studies 
period. In “The Spirit of the Age to Come” (1974), Williams evinces great enthusiasm to embrace the 
tragic knowledge within the Christian narratives. Such Christianity might be built on “a confrontation 
of ‘the extreme verge’ . . . in full seriousness, with no attempt to minimize the ultimacy, in human 
terms, of tragic frustration and collision.”40 For Williams, the inevitability and ineluctability of the 
tragic conflict is one of the contingent features of the fallen world. And the incarnation of the Son 
falls victim to the unremitting, intractable tragic wounds of the fallen world. 
 
The Incarnation itself is a necessarily tragic event, for God enters into the humanity 
whose mode of being is God-less-ness. “In the original sin of the old Adam, the Spirit 
of God left man and death overtook him. The new Adam took this abandonment upon 
Himself” [Sergei Bulgakov]. If such a picture is a tenable exegesis of the dereliction, if 
the juxtaposition of the Cross and the Trinity is indeed, as I suppose it to be, at the 
centre of Christian belief, then it should be clear that tragedy is inseparable not merely 
from the historical facts of the life and death of Jesus, as Mackinnon has reminded us, 
but from the very fact of the Incarnation.41 
 
For Williams, “the Incarnation itself,” “the very fact of the Incarnation,” is necessarily tragic. The 
tragic condition of the created world is so necessarily antithetical to the incarnation that “the 
Incarnation itself is a necessarily tragic event.” From beginning to end, the reality of Christ is 
embarked on, lived out, and wrapped up as tragic. It may be not irrelevant to note that Williams’s 
death-driven theory of the incarnation is very akin to Balthasar’s claim that the incarnation of the Son 
is bound to his death from the very beginning: “In the Incarnation of the eternal Son, death is already 
 
refuses to recognize that being able to speak and think itself of tragedy, in effect, functions as a compensation and 
consolation. In short, he is actually talking about a linguistic consolation, yet officially denying it. According to Gaskin, 
“The result is obfuscation, for you cannot have it both ways” (268). 
39 Rowan Williams, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel, 2nd ed. (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd: 2002; 
first edition 1982), 35, 92. 
40 Rowan Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” Sobornost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius 
6, no. 9 (Summer 1974): 613–26 (618). In this essay he suggests “an awareness of present reality as divided, 
fragmented, liable to internal struggle and frustration, an awareness, in fact of the tragic” (616), from which the 
cultivation of hope emerges by the work of the Spirit. 
41 Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 619. 
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taken up as the expression of God’s love for the creature.”42 The crucifixion of Jesus is thus intrinsic 
to the purpose of the incarnation of the Son. “The Incarnation has accordingly no other ultimate 
purpose than the Cross. . . . To speak of Incarnation is already to speak of the Cross.”43 
Williams is “convinced” that one is “wrong” if seeking to establish “the incompatibility of 
Christianity with the tragic experience, or ‘tragic knowledge’.”44 He senses a similarly wrong attempt 
in “the perennial tendency to separate and in some way oppose Cross and Resurrection”45 in Christian 
theology. It is the commitment “the Cross reveals to us the tragedy”46 that consistently plays an 
overarching role in constructing his theology throughout his works. He regularly expresses a deep 
concern that “any tendency for the resurrection narratives to become triumphalist vindications of the 
Church’s faith, devoid of their own edge of challenge and disturbance,”47 would give rise to facile 
euphoria, naïve optimism, or complacent triumphalism. He is intent on reacquainting us with the 
meaning of Jesus’s suffering and agony in death in order to overcome such a false triumphalism and 
happy ending, and to challenge us to learn an authentic understanding of the resurrection. Williams 
often summons Jesus’s cry of dereliction in order to legitimize and substantialize his tragic account of 
the cross of Christ. 
The tragic account of the story of Christ is primarily based on his reading of the passion 
narratives of Christ. Particularly crucial is the Gospel of John. He underlines that “the famous ‘irony’ 
of the Fourth Gospel—is not this, especially in the Passion narratives, essentially tragic also?”48 This 
question is deeply reminiscent of Donald MacKinnon’s emphasis on tragic irony in the Gospel of 
John: “John tells the story of Christ’s passion with the fullest possible use of tragic irony; his story 
ends in a cry of triumph, τετέλεσται [‘It is accomplished’]; but it is a triumph purchased at the price of 
 
42 Han Urs Von Balthasar, Epilogue, trans. Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 107. 
43 GL 7, 212. A tragic account of the incarnation with a maximalist spin of death may be challenged before 
rubbing off on other doctrines by a critical insight as summarized by Kathryn Tanner: “Death, in and of itself, is an 
impediment to the mission and not in any obvious way its positive culmination. . . . Rejection and death stand in the 
way of the mission and must be overcome in a resurrected life that moves through and beyond death. . . . The cross 
is simply the culmination of the sinful world’s rejection of Jesus’ mission.” Tanner, “Death and Sacrifice,” in Christ 
the Key, 247–73 (251); this chapter was originally published as “Incarnation, Cross, and Sacrifice: A Feminist-Inspired 
Reappraisal,” Anglican Theological Review 86, no. 1 (2004): 35–56. Edward Schillebeeckx also contends that “in Jesus’ 
death, in and of itself, i.e. in terms of what human beings did to him, there is only negativity. . . . Purely as the death 
of Jesus, this dying cannot have any redemptive or liberating force; on the contrary, death is the enemy of life.” 
Edward Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Volume 10: Church: The Human Story of God (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 125. These critical remarks shed light on how we can rethink the relationship of the 
incarnation or missio, the earthly mission, and the crucifixion of Jesus in the framework of God’s good will and the 
world’s sinful rejection. It may enable us to avoid a pious mistake of dramatically glorifying the crucifixion by 
offering too much recognition to the violent force of the cross into the heart of the missio of Christ—a crucial tenet 
that constitutes a starting point of Balthasar’s christological trinitarianism. 
44 Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 619. 
45 Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 619. 
46 Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 619. 
47 Rowan Williams, Christ on Trial: How the Gospel Unsettles Our Judgement (London: Fount, 2000), 137–38. 
48 Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 618. 
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appalling catastrophe.”49 The Johannine tragic irony makes MacKinnon consider John’s Gospel as the 
most notably tragic Gospel, and the same holds true for Williams.  
It is revealing to see that there is a striking consistency between “The Spirit of the Age to 
Come” (1974) and The Tragic Imagination (2016) in terms of interest in interweaving Christianity 
and tragedy primarily in terms of Johannine tragic irony. It is the purpose of The Tragic Imagination 
“to grant the full weight of its negativity and ask if Christian discourse can sustain that”50 against the 
separation of Christian experience and tragic knowledge. And he draws heavily upon the Fourth 
Gospel, in particular, the theme of tragic irony in order to exemplify the Christian narrative that 
retains a tragic representation at its heart. In “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” he makes a brief 
reference to Johannine irony in the passion narratives, but, in The Tragic Imagination, he expatiates 
on the tragic irony in and beyond the passion narrative of the Fourth Gospel. It is the “irony” of 
John’s Gospel that Williams deploys to substantiate his tragic exegesis. Considered from the strong 
consistency between the two works across over forty years, it seems that the theme of tragic irony in 
the Gospel of John plays a consistent role in constructing his tragic construal of Christian life.  
 
Tragic Irony as Misrecognition and Rejection 
It is commonly acknowledged that “the Gospel of John begins with the irony of nonrecognition.”51 
According to Williams, the Fourth Gospel brings into sharpest focus “a monumental tragic irony in 
the very grammar of this [passion] narrative, which tells of the most dramatic possible schism 
between self and truth, and the maximal degree of misrecognition.”52 He seems right in lending heavy 
weight to the tragic irony in the Fourth Gospel, because irony is not only one of the most crucial 
literary devices but also one of the undergirding theological perspectives in the Gospel of John. As 
George MacRae stresses, “It is in irony that John expresses his own insight into the meaning of Christ 
 
49 Donald MacKinnon, “Order and Evil in the Gospel,” in Borderlands of Theology and Other Essays, ed. George W. 
Roberts and Donovan E. Smucker (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), 90–96 (91). In this article, MacKinnon drops 
a hint of whose theology comes in for his critique of naïvely optimistic theology: “It is fashionable nowadays to speak 
of Christ as victor as if the agony and disillusion, the sheer monstrous reality of physical and spiritual suffering which 
he bore were a mere charade. The idiom of a superficial cosmic optimism, often expressing itself ritually in patterns 
of liturgical symbolism, is currently fashionable, as if a world that knows, as ours does, extremities of terror as well 
as hope, could be consoled by a remote metaphysical chatter” (92; italics mine). 
50  Rowan Williams, “Tragedy and Redemption: A Response to Edith Hall,” Prospect, December 19, 2016, 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/arts-and-books/tragedy-and-redemption-a-response-to-edith-hall-rowan-
williams. Edith Hall criticizes that Williams does not do justice to the sheer varieties and particularities of tragedy. 
“Rowan Williams’s Tragic Mistake: How Can Rowan Williams Reconcile His Christianity with the Greek Tragic 
Vision?,” Prospect, December 2016: 72–74; www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/rowan-williamss-tragic-mistake. 
David Aers and Sarah Beckwith point out that Williams even assumes a “transhistorical tragic imagination.” “The 
Fortunes of Tragedy,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2019): 1–5 (2). They doubt that 
this questionable assumption has something to do with a surprising lack of medieval tragedy in The Tragic Imagination. 
51 Kevin Taylor, Christ the Tragedy of God: A Theological Exploration of Tragedy (London: Routledge, 2019), 139. 
52 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 119. 
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for the world. Indeed . . . in the Fourth Gospel theology is irony.”53 The theme of tragic irony is 
closely associated with the death of Jesus. For instance, as Udo Schnelle notes, in John’s Gospel, “the 
entire narrative is theologically directed toward the passion, a narrative marked by John’s subtle irony: 
The reason why Jesus must die is that he raised someone [Lazarus] from the dead!”54 It is a Johannine 
tragic irony that an action of love gives rise to the passion of death. 
Williams observes that “John’s narrative is systematically underlining the tension between 
what is conventionally claimed as known or knowable and the presence of truth itself.”55 And he pays 
particular attention to tragic irony—misrecognition, misunderstanding, ignorance, refusal, and 
rejection—and its consequential catastrophes such as the death of Jesus and the dissolution of the 
disciples. His attention is substantiated by the observations that “misunderstanding is the trait most 
consistently displayed by Johannine characters” 56  and that “in the Gospel of John, characters 
consistently misunderstand the mission and message (identity, origin) of Jesus. Whereas this is a 
component elsewhere in the Synoptic tradition, it is a driving motif in Fourth Gospel 
characterization.”57 
What makes the irony tragic in the fullest sense is that, as Williams rightly interprets the 
Prologue of the Gospel, Jesus’s own people reject him. It is indeed a tragic irony that his own people 
deny and abandon him: “This agency is unrecognizable to creation in general and to those in 
particular who have been most directly touched by it. ‘He came to that which was his own, but his 
own did not receive him’ (John 1.11)”;58 and “Human action and speaking deny their context and 
foundation, and the source of life (1.4) is inexorably pushed towards death.”59 Paul Duke aptly 
observes that “perhaps the most obvious of John’s ironic incongruities is summarized in 1:11, ‘He 
came to his own and his own received him not.’ The people of God are visited by the Logos of God 
and they spurn him. This tragic irony fans the fiery polemic against ‘the Jews’ which burns 
throughout this Gospel with progressive intensity. Fundamentally, then, there is irony in John’s most 
basic assertion that ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’ (1:14).”60 As Donald MacKinnon 
avers, the Prologue of John’s Gospel, which says that “when that Word so came among his own he 
was rejected, . . . forms the introduction to a book which with good reason has been called the ‘gospel 
 
53 George W. MacRae, “Theology and Irony in the Fourth Gospel” (1973), in The Gospel of John as Literature: An 
Anthology of Twentieth-Century Perspectives, ed. Mark W. G. Stibbe (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 103–13 (105–6). 
54 Schnelle, “Cross and Resurrection in the Gospel of John,” 138. 
55 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 120. 
56  Christopher W. Skinner, “Misunderstanding, Christology, and Johannine Characterization: Reading John’s 
Characters through the Lens of the Prologue,” in Characters and Characterization in the Gospel of John, ed. Christopher W. 
Skinner (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 111-127 (112). 
57 Christopher W. Skinner, “Characters and Characterization in the Gospel of John: Reflections on the Status 
Quaestionis,” in Characters and Characterization in the Gospel of John, xvii–xxxii (xxx). 
58 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 119. 
59 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 120. 
60 Duke, Irony in the Fourth Gospel, 111. 
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of rejection’.” 61  In short, the Fourth Gospel exhibits an interconnected twofold tragedy: the 
unavoidable reality of the tragic denouement of Christ and the inevitable failure of his own people. It 
may be indeed said with safety that John’s narrative embraces an enormous tragic irony as Williams 
observes. 
According to Williams, furthermore, the tragic irony of John’s Gospel does not lie simply in 
people’s ironic rejection of Jesus, but also in the fact that Jesus is the one who provokes the world’s 
misrecognition and its consequent catastrophe:  
 
The Gospel of John is “tragic” not simply in the sense that it tells a story of catastrophe 
(though it does) but that it dramatizes the interwoven contingency and necessity of pain 
or failure in the sharpest way imaginable. The world is such that personalized and 
substantive divine goodness cannot be secure against ignorance and misrecognition; 
worse still, it is the very fact that personalized divine goodness is present that triggers 
misrecognition.62 
 
The tragic irony of John’s Gospel, for Williams, lies in the notion of “misrecognition triggered” and 
“conflict created” by the Son sent by the Father to the world. Williams describes this Johannine tragic 
irony elsewhere as follows: “Jesus’ mission in this Gospel is described very clearly as the process of 
bringing that radical, radiant beauty to light in this world in such a way that only the most resolutely 
self-justifying and the most terminally terrified will want to resist.”63 
It is worth noting that this aspect of Johannine tragic irony—hatred-provoking love, darkness-
kindling light—that Williams is paying particular attention to also plays an important role in 
comprising a tragic element of Balthasar’s Johannine christology. Balthasar writes, “God’s love, 
which sends the Light, the Word, into the world, brings hatred to the surface.”64 As Jennifer Martin 
indicates, Balthasar takes seriously in reading John’s Gospel that “the very presence of Jesus . . . 
provokes forces of evil and opposition to come out into the open.”65 For him, this Johannine tragic 
irony is “the fundamental theodramatic law of world history: the greater the revelation of divine 
(ground-less) love, the more it elicits a groundless (Jn 15:25) hatred from man.”66 
 
The Petrine Pattern of Growth from Failure to Renewal  
Williams is concerned to pay serious attention to the tragic failure of miscomprehension and 
misrecognition such as ignorance, refusal, and rejection of the incarnate truth, and to the cost of the 
 
61 MacKinnon, “Order and Evil in the Gospel,” 90. 
62 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 121. 
63 Rowan Williams, What is Christianity? (London: SPCK, 2015), 27. 
64 TD 5, 202. 
65 Martin, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 169. 
66 TD 4, 338. 
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tragic failure: Peter’s betrayal as an individual failure, the disintegration of the follower’s community 
as a communal failure, and Jesus’s death as the catastrophic cost of the failures. The passion 
narratives of the four Gospels, for Williams, bear considerable witness to the tragic reality of failure 
and the cost of Christian life. Particularly, the passion narrative of John’s Gospel is “a story of 
extreme rupture and dissolution in the common life: Jesus dies abandoned by most of those closest to 
him, the community, the ‘city’ he has created is dissolved by this betrayal, and he dies in agony of 
body and spirit.”67 And only from the patient admittance of failure and loss, its cost and catastrophe, 
its tragic calamity, is it possible to be recreated into Jesus’s resurrection, Peter’s rehabilitation, and the 
disciples’ reintegration. Only the mournful confrontation with the tragic past creates a possibility of 
growth from loss to recovery, and failure to renewal. 
The pattern of growth underlies much of Williams’s works. His tragic imagination of human 
growth and maturation is primarily centred around the tragic failure of the disciples which is most 
dramatically represented by Johannine tragic irony. According to Williams, the narratives of tragic 
failure and cost is most dramatically epitomized, first and foremost, by the failure of Peter, his denial 
and betrayal. “Peter’s exemplary wrongness . . . at the moment of his denial,” for Williams, defines 
“how we think about the hearers and followers of Jesus.”68 He is above all determined to say that 
Peter is “the one who repeatedly misses the point of what is witnessed, the one who most 
unequivocally gets it wrong time after time.”69 And the tragic failure of Peter represents the collapse 
of community, the dissolution of the disciples. The communal identity disintegrates in the face of the 
impending death of the founder. Peter’s failure represents the realized fallibility of all the historical 
disciples in their entirety.  
The possibility of growth, recreation, and reconstruction is also, according to Williams, 
envisaged in synchronization with Peter’s pattern of rehabilitation from failure as emerging only from 
a painstaking reckoning with the tragic. “Peter stands for all the human characters whom Jesus 
confronts—the apostles, the witnesses, the Church, ourselves. He is us; brought to nothing by his 
inability to hear and receive the transfiguring presence of God in the helpless and condemned Jesus, 
but called afresh out of his own chaos to the task of finding words for the mystery.”70 There is no way 
to avoid the pattern of loss and recovery in the light of a universal scriptural witness to Peter’s 
betrayal and the disciples’ dissolution. A self’s confrontation with the past of tragic failure may give 
rise to the restoration of the failed, repentant self. Only embracing past failure with great honesty 
generates authentic self-transformation. 
 
67 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 125. 
68 Rowan Williams, Meeting God in Mark (London: SCM, 2014), 73. 
69 Rowan Williams, “Beginning with the Incarnation” (1989), in On Christian Theology, 79–92 (83). 
70 Williams, Meeting God in Mark, 73–74; italics mine. 
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In this sense, the universal pattern of growth can be called a Petrine pattern that moves from 
tragic failure to comic rehabilitation. Williams’s reading of the passion narratives strongly 
emphasizes Peter’s betrayal and so serves considerably to shape his theology in the framework of his 
tragic imagination. I quote Williams at length: 
 
Being religious in a Christian way is irretrievably bound up with the themes of 
judgement and repentance—or, to put it less negatively, with conversion and 
transformation. There is a basic “shape” to being Christian, determined by the fact that 
its identifying narrative is one of peripeteia, reversal and renewal. If the paschal story 
is, as a matter of bare fact, the bedrock of Christian self-identification, that which is 
drawn upon to explain what the whole project is about, there is no escaping the pattern 
there defined of loss and recovery. Faith begins in a death: the literal death of Jesus for 
sedition and/or blasphemy, which is also the “death” of the bonds between him and his 
followers, and the “death” of whatever hope or faith had become possible in his 
presence prior to Good Friday; so that what becomes possible in his renewed presence 
after Good Friday has the character of a wholly creative, ex nihilo, summons to or 
enabling of, hope and trust and action. To say this, I should add, doesn’t commit us to 
speculation about the psychology of the Eleven on Good Friday or Easter Eve: it merely 
recognizes that the New Testament narrative presents us with Christian faith as that 
which the resurrection creates, in that all the discernible strands of the gospel tradition 
insist upon the dissolution of the apostolic band before the crucifixion, and preserve the 
tradition of Peter’s betrayal [italics mine]. Thus Easter faith is what there is beyond that 
faith and hope that exists prior to or apart from the cross of Jesus; what there is left after 
the judgement implied by the cross upon human imagining of the work of God aside 
from the ex nihilo gift of the risen Christ. In the face of the cross, there is a revelation of 
a fundamental lack of reality in our faith and hope, and we are left with no firm place to 
stand. The “shape” of Christian faith is the anchoring of our confidence beyond what we 
do or possess, in the reality of a God who freely gives to those needy enough to ask; a 
life lived “away” from a centre in our own innate resourcefulness or meaningfulness, 
and so a life equipped for question and provisionality in respect of all our moral or 
spiritual achievement: a life of repentance in hope.71 
 
Williams notes in reading John’s Gospel that Jewish–Christian “traditions involve representations of 
the past as fundamental to their identity.”72 And he writes that “the Gospel of John dramatizes the 
connection between ignorance and refusal of the truth, loss of identity and capacity to speak, 
awareness of unmanageable contingency and the emergent possibility of new speech.”73 Here the past 
first and foremost entails loss as failure. In the above passage, the virtues of faith and hope, which 
point towards positive future possibilities of transformation, recovery, and renewal, are only “created 
out of” loss, judgement, and repentance, out of the complete disintegration of self-identity, out of the 
annihilation of the tragically failed Petrine self, and thus ex nihilo. The faith that the New Testament 
narratives of Christ’s passion–resurrection acquaints us with is, for Williams, reliant upon the reality 
 
71 Williams, “Beginning with the Incarnation,” 83. 
72 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 115. 
73 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 121. 
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of tragic failure. In other words, “the ex nihilo gift of the risen Christ” is the gift of a “new creation” 
ex nihilo because the gift of resurrection only emerges ex loss and failure. 
Medi Volpe helpfully lays the finger on this significant characteristic of Williams’s 
christological–anthropological commitment. She observes, for Williams, the tragic pattern of loss and 
discovery is “impossible to avoid” because it is disclosed in the paschal story, the central narratives of 
the cross and resurrection of Jesus, and of the betrayal and recovery of Peter.74 The pattern of loss and 
recovery has a christological significance, and thereby it is incumbent upon the followers of Christ. 
The way of human pain and growth is placed, for Williams, as a fulcrum of the Christian way of life: 
it is “the pattern of loss and recovery that characterize [sic] Christian life for Williams.”75 The human 
self is genuinely transformed, rediscovered, and expanded by the risky and costly loss and 
disintegration of self. The pattern of loss and recovery as a “theological habitus”76 of Williams thus 
penetrates through his christology and anthropology. And this is profoundly related to his tragic 
imagination because this pattern assumes the ineluctability of failure and loss prior to the possibility 
of growth and maturity. As Volpe clearly articulates, “the theme of tragedy in Williams’ theology 
implies that one suffers concrete loss, which may take the form of bereavement or failure.”77 Indeed, 
Williams’s “understanding of loss [is] central to the transformation of desire at the heart of the 
Christian life.”78 
To elaborate, Williams’s tragic pattern of loss and recovery substantially relies upon his tragic 
account of the failure of Peter, to whom the death of Jesus means a death of what he has accumulated 
in terms of self-identity, a difficult learning of how to “lose what they believe to be crucial to their 
identity.”79 His failure is tantamount to the loss of his Lord, his identity, his community, his belief, 
and his time—past, present, and future. “His” faith begins in such a death, such a loss. Henceforth, the 
resurrection of Jesus is a recovery of what he failed and lost. The death and resurrection of Jesus 
makes a judgement upon his failure and loss and brings about his conversion and transformation. This 
is how Peter (including other Peter-like characters and all congenial readers) lives “a life of 
repentance in hope” in mourning his failure, and how he learns to grow, to become mature, to be 
 
74  Medi Ann Volpe, “‘Taking Time’ and ‘Making Sense’: Rowan Williams on the Habits of Theological 
Imagination,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 3 (July 2013): 345–60 (356). 
75 Medi Ann Volpe, Rethinking Christian Identity: Doctrine and Discipleship (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 136. 
76 Volpe, “‘Taking Time’ and ‘Making Sense’,” 358. 
77 Volpe, Rethinking Christian Identity, 136. 
78 Volpe, Rethinking Christian Identity, 96. 
79 Rowan Williams, “Resurrection and Peace: More on New Testament Ethics” (1989), in On Christian Theology, 
265–75 (269). Alongside “Beginning with the Incarnation,” this essay serves to illustrate a basic framework of 
Williams’s theological tragic imagination. He suggests a way of seeing “the reality and inevitability of conflict” (273) 
as that which we grow through by reckoning with it. 
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transformed in difficulty. As Williams notes in The Wound of Knowledge, healing is presented as 
being achieved only “by anguish, darkness and stripping,” through “deepening our hurt.”80 
If growth is transformation into recovery, and renewal is always engendered on the condition 
of repentance of failure, it is then natural for Christian life to focus on cultivating the practice of 
repentance and mourning involved with self-critique. When Williams construes “theology as a way of 
life,” that life therefore means a life of contrition, repentance, and conversion. “Theology is, thus, 
called to repeated conversion”81 in “the receptive and contemplative dimension.”82 It is a way of life 
with “self-scrutiny, . . . penitence, self-examination, silence and the invitation to shared discernment” 
in “individual self-examination” and “shared reflection” in order to “check and question the 
temptations to self-reliance and complacency.”83 Therefore, “theology is bound up with the practice of 
repentance.”84 Likewise, for Williams, “the basis of dogma”85 is the difficult learning of growth and 
maturation in the unescapable “pattern of loss and recovery”: mourning in the present of our past and 
present tragic failure in anticipation of the possibility of future recovery. 
Williams’s pattern of loss and recovery is also closely related with his doctrines of revelation 
and the Eucharist. For Williams, revelatory value “emerges from a questioning attention to our 
present life in the light of a particular past—a past seen as ‘generative.’”86 Thus, “liberating men and 
women from the dominance of past patterns,”87  “a liberation from servile, distorted, destructive 
patterns in the past, a liberation from anxious dread of God’s judgement”88 arises out of working out 
the past. Revelation has “essentially to do with what is generative in our experience—events or 
transactions in our language that break existing frames of reference and initiate new possibilities of 
life.”89 In other words, the recovery and renewal from loss and failure has a revelatory value.90 
 
80 Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St John of the Cross, 2nd ed. 
(London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1990; first edition 1979), 20–21; italics mine. 
81 Rowan Williams, “Theology as a Way of Life,” in The Practice of the Presence of God: Theology as a Way of Life, ed. 
Martin Laird and Sheelah Treflé Hidden (London: Routledge, 2017), 11–16 (16). 
82 Williams, “Theology as a Way of Life,” 13. 
83 Williams, “Theology as a Way of Life,” 15. 
84 Williams, “Theology as a Way of Life,” 12. 
85 Williams, “Beginning with the Incarnation,” 82. In this essay, Williams claims that repentance, by the judgement 
of Christ, in hope is “the true basis of dogma” (89). It can thus be said that for Williams, a tragic pattern of 
transformation constitutes a basis of Christian dogma. 
86 Rowan Williams, “Trinity and Revelation” (1986), in On Christian Theology, 131–47 (134). Williams is worried that 
“theology . . . is perennially liable to be seduced by the prospect of bypassing how it learns its own language” (131) 
and is thus concerned about the process of revelation in which theology learns the meaning of its language. 
87 Williams, “Trinity and Revelation,” 139. 
88 Williams, “Trinity and Revelation,” 138. 
89 Williams, “Trinity and Revelation,” 134. 
90 Darren Sarisky and Jason Fout, however, raise a question of Williams’s understanding of revelation in “Trinity 
and Revelation.” In particular, they share a criticism that he puts too much emphasis on the human side or 
“subjunctive mode” in the divine–human relationship. Darren Sarisky, Scriptural Interpretation: A Theological Exploration 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 169–70, 236; and Jason Fout, “The Many Moods of Revelation,” in The Vocation of 
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Williams understands the significance of the Eucharistic representation of the passion 
narratives as communal performance of the narratives from the perspective of re-working the self 
from the past. Regarding the passion narratives, he notes that “we are dealing with texts that emerge 
in communities which are in any case acutely aware of working against the background of a past 
which they must reckon with and make sense of.”91 And the communal, dramatic representation of the 
passion narrative contributes to a community’s “constantly re-imagining itself and its past.”92 The 
Eucharist, the communal performance of Christian narrative in parallel with public performance of 
Attic tragedy, is enacted upon Peter’s pattern of growth from failure of misrecognition and denial, 
through remembrance and repentance, transformation and conversion, into restoration and recovery. 
The community of the disciples with renewed memories is invited in the Eucharist to transform 
memory into hope in the renewed encounter with the risen stranger; this also invites the world to the 
same hope of transformation. In order to do this, the restored disciples need to be aware of their 
particular pasts of betraying and of being forgiven so that they are equipped with penitential, vigilant, 
self-critical awareness. 
 
Complicity and Mourning in Time: Donald MacKinnon and Gillian Rose 
Williams’s difficult pattern of growth lies in a chronology that moves from the tragic failure of the 
past, through repentance in the present, to the hope of renewal in the future. He configures the modes 
of time as the mourning of the present in the pattern of past loss and failure, and then future recovery 
and renewal, only in which human flourishing is achieved. The future relies on the present when the 
past is to be reckoned with. The recognition of the past means “the acknowledgement that our present 
possibilities are shaped by our past, that limit remains inescapable.”93 To reckon with the past is to 
come to terms with our collusion to deny and betray Jesus with the disciples at the Last Supper, our 
bitter complicity in the cross, our pain-tortured agony of regret, remorse, self-accusation, and guilt. 
The possibility of renewal in the future, “a future in which the unaltered memory of hurt comes to be 
 
Theology Today: A Festschrift for David Ford, ed. Tom Greggs, Rachel Muers, and Simeon Zahl (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 
2013), 48–60 (55). 
91  Rowan Williams, “The Discipline of Scripture” (1990), in On Christian Theology, 44–59 (53). In this essay, 
Williams privileges a “diachronic” or “dramatic” way of reading Scripture over a “synchronic” way. The latter tends 
to overlook a movement in time and ends up harvesting “premature unities and harmonies” (47), whereas the 
former reads the text as “a sequence of changes, a pattern of transformations” in a “single time-continuum” (45), 
inviting the readers to face tensions between the stories within the text, and thereby encouraging a more difficult 
unity in the text without evading the differences in multiplicity. 
92  Rowan Williams, “Theological Integrity” (1991), in On Christian Theology, 3–15 (7). Williams claims that 
“religious and theological integrity is possible as and when discourse about God declines the attempt to take God’s point of 
view (i.e. a ‘total perspective’)” (6) primarily by practising the dispossession of (Freudian) fantasy. See “The Freudian 
Projection of Self-Interest onto God” and “The Triune Metaphysics of Self-Dispossession and the Human Ethics 
of Self-Dispossession” in the present chapter. 
93 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 165. 
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lived with in unpredictable ways, without wholly destructive consequences”94 is predicated upon the 
present recognition of the past failure of “mistrust and violence” in rejecting the self-identity given by 
God. 
Thus, for Williams, “our being-in-time” is constructed within the framework of present 
mourning and future hope. The time that the death and resurrection of Christ shows is “a time that can 
be seen as given, as an opportunity for growth or healing, since no disaster is finally and decisively 
destructive.”95 Williams states, “the resurrection promise has something to do with the roots of our 
mistrust and violence in our unwillingness or inability to receive our human identity from God as a 
gift, at every juncture in our experience.”96 In line with the death and resurrection of Christ, “the 
theological assurance about the future that is proclaimed in Christian discourse”97 defines Christian 
hope for renewal and growth. Such a Christian hope thus has nothing to do with facile optimism 
ignoring the ineluctably tragic reality: “It is not a conviction that there is or must be a happy ending to 
any particular human story. . . . Rather it is an assurance that time is always there for restoration.”98 
 
Because we assume the analogy between our time and the narrative time of Scripture, 
and Scriptural time moves toward the specific time of renewal and liberation in Jesus, 
we in our own conflicts can maintain hope. We are not spared the cost of conflict or 
promised a final theological resolution; rather we are assured of the possibility of “re-
producing” the meaning that is Christ crucified and risen, . . . Church—not by the effort 
to reconcile at all costs, but by carrying the burdens of conflict.99 
 
As Williams is always determined to stress, there is no “consolation” in the sense that neither 
practical “compensation” nor all-comprehending “explanation” are guaranteed for human being in 
time. But, our time, like Peter, goes from failure and loss to recovery and renewal together with the 
time of Christ from death to resurrection. The future restoration and growth of self-identity emerges 
from our painstaking admittance and mourning of our failure and its cost. The tension between 
mourning and flourishing, the eschatological tension between “not yet” and “already,” or “the broken 
middle” in Gillian Rose’s terms, is not expected to be resolved. It is to be reckoned with. In this sense, 
“memory . . . can be the ground of hope, and there is no authentic hope without memory.”100 
 
94 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 118. 
95 Rowan Williams, “Interiority and Epiphany: A Reading in New Testament Ethics” (1997), in On Christian 
Theology, 239–64 (249). In this essay, Williams conceives interiority as a sense of self not in terms of space, but of 
time. He maintains that, following Augustine, the self is not something hidden, a kernel that is unearthed by peeling 
away external husks; it is rather “an integrity one struggles to bring into existence” (240), something revealed in “the 
ordinary difficulty of conversation and negotiation” (240). A sense of true self arises in a difficult process of 
dialogue and exchange. 
96 Williams, “Resurrection and Peace,” 273. 
97 Williams, “Interiority and Epiphany,” 249. 
98 Williams, “Interiority and Epiphany,” 249. 
99 Williams, “The Discipline of Scripture,” 58. 
100 Williams, Resurrection, 25. 
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Williams proposes that threefold temporal pattern of transformation—particularly mourning our past 
in “the unaltered memory” of our complicity in Jesus’s death—as a point of departure from the 
“unfruitfulness” of Donald MacKinnon’s tragic knowledge. Williams states that a “deep concern not 
to soften or underplay the element of the tragic in human—including Christian—life”101 lies at the 
heart of MacKinnon’s theology: “MacKinnon’s relentless insistence on attention to the costliness of 
historical action and the unconsoled nature of historical pain remains the most disturbing and 
important lesson he has to teach.”102 But Williams complains that MacKinnon’s concern is liable to 
remain merely “passive” so that it does not develop into action, protest, and transformation. His 
accounts of the tragic and its incorporation into the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation is 
nothing other than (with a reference to Karl Marx—perhaps the eleventh thesis in Theses on 
Feuerbach)103 a mere change in “interpretation” rather than a genuine change of the world. He presses 
the charge against MacKinnon that his “interpretation” of “Christ as an exemplar of unresisting 
suffering” and “Christ as the enactment of divine solidarity in suffering” remains a mere change of 
words and falls behind his own expectation that it is “a shocking and unmerciful judgement upon 
human and specially ecclesiastical power relation.”104 Williams poses a telling question: “What does 
this judgement change, other than ways of seeing and speaking?”105 Also, he casts suspicion on “his 
scheme of stressing interpretation at the expense of change.”106 The seemingly robust interpretation of 
Christ in terms of suffering is no more than an interpretative change. Williams eventually avers that 
“any emphasis on the acceptance and interpretative transformation of moral or spiritual defeat is 
dangerously open to an ideological use that amounts to a commendation of passivity. What is absent 
from the ‘tragic’ orientation is a proper seriousness about the imperative to transformative action, and 
thus to protest.”107 In other words, the language of suffering in MacKinnon’s theology does not give 
rise to any potentiality of transformation and rather slips into an adulation of passive powerlessness.108 
 
101  Rowan Williams, “Foreword,” in Kenotic Ecclesiology: Select Writings of Donald M. MacKinnon, ed. John C. 
McDowell, Scott A. Kirkland, and Ashley John Moyse (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2016), ix–xi (x).  
102 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 165. 
103 “‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it.’ . . . Marx wants 
an interpretation of the world which is consciously and purposively linked to, or part of, an attempt to change the 
world.” Gavin Kitching, Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis (London: Routledge, 2015; originally published 1988), 
29. 
104 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 162. 
105 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 162. 
106 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 164. 
107 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 162. 
108 This critique has an affinity with his reservation about the christology of Maurice Wiles. Williams states that 
what “alters the possibilities in a situation” is made possible “by (at least) reconstituting our sense of ourselves, our 
responsibility, our guilt or complicity, our hope.” And the language of Christian doctrine includes resources for self-
critique within itself. Rowan Williams, “Maurice Wiles and Doctrinal Criticism” (1993), in Wrestling with Angels, 275–
99 (288). 
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What then makes it possible, for Williams, to bring about transformation? It is the recognition 
of our own complicity in the tragic suffering and pain of the world. He offers a very lucid example: 
 
How do you learn to confront the fact, say, of racism in British society? Not by 
information, not by words. They produce the kind of pain we cannot handle, and we 
take refuge in ideological denial of the facts of power in Britain. To confront both the 
suffering of the victims of racism and my own de facto involvement in and 
responsibility for this, without fantasizing and self-lacerating guilt, requires specific 
encounter and the possibility of its continuance; not reconciliation, but a kind of 
commitment without evasion. The “reading” of our situation in certain terms rests on 
existing small-scale transformations—and also, of course, assists in the creation of 
further transformation.109 
 
It is through reckoning with our complicity in such suffering and pain that “judgement” comes into 
life as responsibility, and into fruition as change and transformation. The mourning of the present 
towards the reintegration of the future is predicated upon the memory of past complicity. 
The way in which we recognize our own complicity in contemporary “crosses” is effected by 
the acute awareness of our complicity in the “cross” of Jesus, which is exposed in the narrative of 
Jesus’s death. And gravely to perceive what happened between us and Jesus at the last supper and on 
the cross is mediated by encountering the Holy Spirit. Hence what emerges from this is, for Williams, 
“a serious doctrine of the Spirit as the divine condition for truthful ‘coming to judgement’ in the 
Church’s life.”110 Williams calls for attention to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, something he accuses 
MacKinnon and other contemporary theologians of neglecting. 
 
The encounter of the Spirit with Christ is potentially an encounter with our own 
complicity in the cross, and so with the crosses of our own making in the present and 
past; it should, then, if it is what it claims to be, form a central strand in Christian 
protest and the articulation of such protest in transforming action.111 
 
Our encounter with the Spirit is an event that is viewed from the cross and points out the cross. The 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit interlocked with our complicity creates not only the transforming action 
beyond a passive change of mere words, but also, at the same time, generates contrition and humility 
that safeguards the transforming action from degenerating into facile optimism and its authoritarian 
guarantee. To recognize our own failure, complicity in Jesus’s death in encountering the Holy Spirit 
gives birth to the action that can change the world. A radical, exhaustive awareness of the self as 
betrayer and/or crucifier is a prerequisite for transforming the world.112 
 
109 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 164. 
110 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 165. 
111 Williams, “Trinity and Ontology,” 165. 
112 Williams is intent on emphasizing the Spirit’s role to reminding us of our tragic failure. “In John’s Gospel, 
Jesus predicts the coming of the ‘Spirit of Truth’ (14.26, 16.13–15) who will recall the history of Jesus and present it 
afresh to the disciples” (The Tragic Imagination, 121). This retelling of the Spirit is, for Williams, a primordial tragic 
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And it should be noted that Williams maintains, above all, the Fourth Gospel dramatizes such 
a genuine possibility from tragic failure to comic recovery in that it purports “not to reverse this 
history or explain it but to mourn appropriately and in so doing find a place to stand that is not wholly 
paralysed by the memory of atrocity.”113 For Williams, John’s Gospel tells us that to recognize our 
complicity in the crucifixion, our failure of rejecting Jesus, and the atrocity that that failure brings 
about makes it possible for us to be transformed into genuine disciples. He writes: “The inner 
rejection of one’s own identity as God’s creature and the object of God’s love, the violence done to 
human truth within the self, becomes visible and utterable in the form of complicity in rejecting Jesus. 
The inner-readiness to come to judgement and to recognize the possibility of truth and meaning 
becomes visible and utterable in the form of discipleship, abiding in the community created by God’s 
love.”114 He continues to write: “You may recognize your complicity in the rejection of Jesus and at 
the same time accept the possibility of a different role offered by the continuing merciful presence of 
God in the post-Easter Jesus.”115 Through our innermost willingness to judge our innermost failure we 
are drawn together in the community of God’s abiding love and merciful presence. 
 
Our attention is then to be drawn to what brings about the innermost willingness to admit complicity: 
mourning. For Williams, under the influence of Gillian Rose, to weep deeply is the innermost locus 
where comic possibility arises out of facing up to tragic loss.116 Mourning is the lamentation of 
contrition that flows from the innermost depth of our spirit where the terror and fear of our failure and 
limitation resides. Mourning thus has something to do with “the conviction that only in hell could the 
goodness of the good news be heard for what it was.”117 Only through “the descent into the hell” of 
terror and fear of failure is our complicity in the suffering and death of Christ transformed into our 
conformity to the suffering and death of Christ. Awareness and embrace of our complicity and guilt in 
mourning and weeping are represented as assuring a “comic” possibility for the other as well as 
myself, and so the complicity and guilt are transformed into “redeemed complicity” and “charitably 
 
imagination, in that the Spirit recalls the brutal reality of tragic failure and its consequent catastrophe. Eventually, the 
role of the Johannine paraklētos, the Helper, boils down to helping us mourn appropriately without being paralysed 
by the past without consolation. According to a commentary for general readers like myself, however, the Johannine 
Helper is “an advocate and a witness, but also consoles the disciples. He encourages them to remember Jesus’ work 
and leads them into the whole truth.” The Oxford Bible Commentary: The Gospels, ed. John Muddiman and John Barton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 224. One might then wonder if Williams is inclined to leave little room for 
the Spirit’s consolatory presence in his pneumatology. 
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114 Rowan Williams, “The Judgement of the World” (1989), in On Christian Theology, 29–43 (32).  
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 87 
assumed guilt.”118 This is “the importance of the word ‘mourning’: pain can be lamented, perhaps 
even lamented in a way that transforms something in the viewing or hearing subject.”119 
Hinged upon mourning are the possibilities of thinking, speaking, and listening to pain and 
loss, and of recovering and reintegrating individual and communal identity without being utterly 
paralyzed, immobilized, and overwhelmed by tragic catastrophe. The renewal of the failure of our 
misrecognition, the redefinition of the cost of our complicity emerges from the mourning. 
 
Only in the working out of this misrecognition can recognition occur: the narrating of 
the ultimate catastrophe in which truth is displayed as the victim of the world we know 
is the precondition of seeing that the world we know is indeed lethally contingent. It is 
in the light of this revelation that we learn to mourn without reservation, but also to be 
attentive to what is now making it possible to tell the story of catastrophe.120 
 
It is only through seeing our misrecognition and its cost that renewal and growth is made possible, 
and the mediate seeing is practised as repentant mourning. In short, mourning is the only place 
through which comic possibility is produced from tragic imagination. 
Particularly, following the philosophy of Gillian Rose, Williams adopts the difference 
between “aberrated mourning, . . . a mourning that leads to speechlessness and impotence,” and 
“inaugurated mourning, . . . a mourning that is ‘the recovery of strength by moving from refusal of 
loss to acknowledgment and acceptance’.”121 Aberrated mourning is a mourning so “distracted from 
the proper business of mourning” and “fixed in itself and for itself” that it ends up being “a lament for 
the way in which the world crushes meaning.”122 It becomes a helpless place “where existence is itself 
construed as a kind of loss and fall, with grace located in an impossible historical or metaphysical 
elsewhere.”123 Then “if extreme loss is not to be ‘mourned’ in Rose’s sense, what are we to do but 
avert our gaze in one way or another?”124 The possibility of redemptive meaning emerges only from 
the “inaugurated mourning of suffering and loss. It begins in “silence—words give way to a 
speechlessness that may signify dependence or grace”125—and ends up with strength and speech. Only 
this right form of mourning “leaves open the way to forgiveness.”126 The moment of the inaugurated 
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mourning is “a moment in the formation of a genuinely thinking subjectivity.”127 In other words, “a 
self-awareness that is not enslaved to fictions about the self . . . understands the speaking and thinking 
self as what it is that holds the memory of loss and trauma without collapsing.”128 Mourning is a 
truthful way of reckoning with “the broken middle,”129 the memory of our own past failure and its 
cost without being drowned in it. It constitutes one of the most relevant and contributory aspects for 
human transformation and growth in the sense that it offers a truly rigorous moral imperative that is a 
way of reconstructing a truthful self mired neither in melancholia nor in euphoria. 
Mourning has always something to do with “a particular way of repeating the memory of loss 
and anguish,”130 which can be collectively ascribed to “the disciples in the Upper Room at the Last 
Supper (destined collectively and individually to betray Jesus).”131 Williams poignantly expresses our 
collective complicity as follows: 
 
There is therefore no avoiding the fact of our complicity in the death of Jesus. Like the 
apostles we evade and refuse and deny and escape when the cross becomes a serious 
possibility. Terror or involvement, fear or failure—of hurting as well as being hurt—the 
dread of having our powerlessness nakedly spelled out for us: all this is the common 
coin of most of our lives. . . . Only thus can we translate our complicity in the death of 
Christ into a communion in the death of Christ, a baptism into the death of Christ: by 
not refusing, by not escaping, by forgetting our realism and our reasonableness, by 
letting the heart speak freely, by exposing ourselves, by making ourselves vulnerable.132 
 
In appropriate mourning, our collective complicity in Jesus’s death, one of the “false and trivializing 
kinds of solidarity, the collusive togetherness that can be the foundation of corporate violence and 
 
127 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 143. 
128 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 143. 
129 Kate Schick offers a helpful overview of Rose’s vision of the un-mended middle: “Rose is against positive and 
emphatic notions of progress. However, a fragile and aporetic notion of progress does have a clear place in her 
thought: she maintains that we should not give up working towards comprehension of the brokenness in which we 
find ourselves, in the hope that we might learn. This knowledge is not directed towards ‘mending’ the broken 
middle. Although Rose is against tragic resignation that does not engage in the struggle to know or understand, she 
is also against utopian visions of a holy or mended middle. She argues that the middle must always be negotiated—
with fear and trembling, in Kierkegaardian language—and that this requires a continual working through. This 
working through is inaugurated mourning, which struggles both to know and to be known.” Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: 
A Good Enough Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 7–8. 
John Milbank sometimes gives a critical appraisal of Rose’s “broken middle.” The ethics of Rose, according to 
Milbank, appears as a “chastened, tragic, and less jocular gloss, a form of postmodern impossibilism, the new opium 
of the intellectual, . . . a Hegelian variant on hopelessness.” John Milbank, “On the Paraethical: Gillian Rose and 
Political Nihilism,” Telos 173 (2015): 69–86 (78). Clare Greer sums up Milbank’s critique of Rose as follows: “It is 
important to note that . . . in Rose the middle is perpetually broken, and this indicates that the unity proposed in the 
idea of the ‘broken middle’ is an endless deferral.” Clare Greer, “The Problem of the Middle in Gillian Rose’s 
Reading of Hegel: Political Consequences for the Theology of John Milbank,” in After the Postsecular and the 
Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, ed. A. P. Smith and D. Whistler (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 189–208 (206). 
130 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 159. 
131 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 125. 
132 Williams, “To Give and Not to Count the Cost,” 9. 
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expulsion,”133 is transformed into a renewed community. “Mourning, in the form of repentance, is 
tightly interwoven with the process by which solidarity is reconstituted through the dramatic action: 
our solidarity in betrayal with the disciples at the Last Supper becomes a solidarity with those 
reconnected with each other in the post-resurrection encounters like the Emmaus story.”134  The 
collective complicity in the death of cross is transformed into a communal fraternity of renewed 
selves through mourning located in the middle of the Last Supper and Easter. 
The communal performance of the Christian passion narrative is, therefore, “the liturgy of 
mourning.”135 The Eucharist, first and foremost, does and should inculcate our past complicity and 
reacquaint us with our past failure to truthfulness and faithfulness without termination. To celebrate 
the Eucharist means to bring us to the Upper Room or “the charcoal fire in the courtyard of Annas the 
high priest” collectively to mourn our complicity in Jesus’s death, to breathe new life into our 
memory of past infidelity, and to resuscitate, resurrect, and revivify the incalculable atrocity of the 
cost of our past failure. 
 
Not Wiping Away but Weeping Endlessly  
The Petrine pattern of growth means that everyone is invited to mourn his or her own failure in an act 
of mourning that has no end: “We continue to expose ourselves to hearing because we shall never 
have heard enough; having heard, we typically revert to un-hearing and un-seeing, and so must repeat 
the story of divine constancy and human infidelity.”136 Thus, “self-discovery” only emerges from “the 
process of self-criticism and self-questioning.” 137  We weep relentlessly because, invoking Rose, 
“every moment of recognition is also a new moment of salutary error to the extent that it is the taking 
of a position.”138 For Williams, “any hope for healing (not cure) or redemption—not escape from or 
simple cancellation of—tragic brokenness begins in the painful but salutary recognition of our on-
going complicity in its nexus.”139 It can be said that his emphasis on the ascetical practice of endless 
repenting and mourning serves to provide a firm place for establishing a possibly genuine theological 
ethic. 
 
133 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 159. 
134 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 126. 
135 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 159. 
136 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 125. 
137 Rowan Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; first edition 2001), 3–15 (13). 
138 Williams, “Between Politics and Metaphysics,” 61. 
139 Giles Waller, “Felix Culpa? On Rowan Williams’ The Tragic Imagination,” Modern Theology 34, no. 2 (April 2018): 
243–51 (251). 
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Williams concludes a challenging sermon with a declaration of the extreme weight of 
mourning: “He [Christ] will not wipe the tears from our eyes until we have learned to weep.”140 And 
the learning process of mourning is endless. The painstaking journey of difficult learning is and 
should be a labourious process that ceaselessly remains unconsoled. We are to remain unconsoled and 
to mourn endlessly that which would otherwise, for Williams, fall into anti-tragic fantasy of self-
consolation and illusory compensation. Christ does not only wipe the tears from our eyes but also 
makes us tearful and calls us to weep because it holds true that we are always crucifiers vis-à-vis 
Christ the crucified, and the process of learning in the light of our complicity in murdering him never 
ends. It is not that Christ teaches and gives us what he has “already” done for us by the life of his 
resurrection, by the gift of the Spirit, but that he keeps reminding us that the end does “not yet” come. 
Speaking in terms of eschatological tension between “already” and “not yet,” however, it 
seems to me that whereas Williams thinks highly of how we endure and mourn our failure and pain in 
the mode of “not yet,” he touches too lightly on how what Christ has “already” achieved pro nobis 
works in the present realities of our lives, how the eschatological potential of Christ’s achievements 
breaks through and cuts across our present tragic woe and calamity. Christ trickles down with and in 
our tears rather than wipes them away. For Williams, the presence of Christ coincides and resonates 
with the moment of mourning itself rather than mends and ameliorates it.141 In doing so, he gives the 
impression that wiping and consolation is immature whereas only weeping and mourning is mature, 
as if wiping and weeping, and consolation and mourning are not mutually nurturing of human life. 
What Christ had already done for and given to us may enable us not only to learn to continue to weep 
but also to learn to cease to weep, not only to cultivate an authentic attitude to what makes us weep 
but also to contemplate how the eschatological wiping-the-tears is present and thereby ameliorates our 
brokenness. 
And in that regard one might wonder if Williams’s visions of Christ as well as of God which 
echo the tragic horizon of brokenness fail fully to acknowledge the creative initiative and power of 
divine agency which plays a decisive role in restoring and reconstructing a lost, collapsed self-identity 
into a renewed, recreated agency. Williams creates the impression of highlighting that human 
recovery relies originally and primarily upon how a catastrophically failed self reckons with failure 
 
140 Williams, “To Give and Not to Count the Cost,” 12. 
141 Accordingly, as Vincent Lloyd contends, Williams, in his theological appropriation of Gillian Rose, conceives 
of God as only emerging from, being found, in the broken middle: “God does not mend the middle but echoes its 
brokenness. We cannot think or speak about God except as absence, an absence which reminds us of our 
imperfection and encourages us not to give up the work of witness.” In short, for Williams, the difficulty of learning 
and recognition emerges only from reckoning with the broken middle that God echoes rather than ameliorates. Vincent 
Lloyd, “On the Use of Gillian Rose,” The Heythrop Journal 48, no. 5 (September 2007): 697–706 (704). Yet, in Lloyd’s 
view, Williams’s understanding of Rose’s ethics is “incomplete” (698) and “limited” (704) because, for Lloyd, he fails 
to pay due regard to Rose’s ethical attention to the theological virtues of faith and love in the vision of her 
philosophy. “What has happened to Rose’s deep engagement with the theological virtues, particularly with faith and 
love? . . . She says much more practically—about faith and love. Williams has focused his theological recovery of 
Rose on metaphysics and not on ethics, and particularly not on the theological virtues” (705–6) of faith and love. 
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and loss without giving due explanation as to how a tragically devastated self is able to recognize the 
divine gift of renewal and forgiveness in the first place, what difference divine agency makes in 
advance of and for human agency and how divine initiative empowerment enables us to accept divine 
forgiveness and to see a new horizon of relationship.142 A careful reading of the dramatic scene of 
Peter’s rehabilitation in the Gospel of John, however, informs us that Peter in fact seems to be in 
“aberrated mourning” rather than “inaugurated mourning” and that it is the initiative of divine gift that 
actually inaugurates his recovery and reinvigoration. 
 
The Resurrection scene at the Sea of Galilee does what ancient tragedies could not do. It 
forces Peter to confront the Lord, whom he has denied knowing after all of his earlier 
professions of loyalty. Peter’s subsequent rehabilitation and position in the church owe 
nothing to his own character or merits. They are simply and only a gift of the risen 
Lord.143 
 
This non-tragic reading of Petrine renewal and growth gives a good account of the divine–human 
encounter by understanding human transformation with a proper consideration of the priority and 
efficacy of divine agency which empowers human agency and intensifies its effectiveness, the theme 
which I will treat in detail later. In other words, Williams paints too agonized a picture of the Petrine 
pattern of growth, perhaps by paying insufficient attention to the role of divine gift while 
simultaneously making the rehabilitation of a devastated self primarily reliant upon the human act of 
mourning. Moreover, as I will argue in what follows, the difficult pattern of growth that Williams 
describes fails to make room for an un-Petrine pattern of maturation and transformation. 
 
 
Johannine Comic Irony and the Un-Petrine Pattern of Growth 
 
Comic Irony as Recognition and Reception 
I have discussed in the beginning that Williams pays special attention to Johannine tragic irony: the 
people for whom the Son came down to the world fails to recognize and receive him; rather, the more 
love is revealed, the more hatred is provoked. This tragic aspect of irony seems at first exhaustively to 
do justice to what the Johannine irony unfolds unless one pays due regard to other aspects of 
Johannine irony—the comic irony of recognition and reception. In fact, a lot can be said about “the 
abundance of possible comic elements in the Gospel.” 144  I believe that a brief examination of 
 
142 See “The Priority and Efficacy of the Divine Gift in Philippians 2: John Barclay on Pauline Divine Gift” in the 
next chapter. 
143 Pheme Perkins, Peter: Apostle for the Whole Church (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 99.  
144 Jo-Ann A. Brant, “The Fourth Gospel as Narrative and Drama,” in The Oxford Handbook of Johannine Studies, 
186–202 (194). 
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Johannine comic irony raises meaningful questions about, and throws critical light on, Williams’s 
exhaustive attention to the tragic irony of John’s Gospel.  
In one of the most influential works on the theme of irony in John’s Gospel, Paul Duke makes 
a very significant point with regard to this issue, which seems to enable us to see a limit of Williams’s 
“tragic” vision of the Johannine irony.  
 
Jesus’ rejection by his own is not confined to Israel itself, however. More broadly, the 
world was made through him yet does not know him (1:10). More narrowly, Jesus’ own 
brothers do not believe in him (7:5); and his disciples defect (6:66) or deny their 
discipleship (18:17, 25, 27), or satanically turn on him (13:2). So at more than one 
tragic level his own do not receive him. Yet there is an accompanying comedy, for if his 
own reject him, some surprising outsiders come forward to receive him (an irony noted 
in the Synoptics). “The Jews” who have spurned their Christ and consequently their 
heritage are quickly replaced by a willing company of Samaritans, Galileans, and 
Greeks¾many of them women. Jesus loses many of “his own,” but their rejection of 
him ironically opens wide the door for the world to go after him (12:19–23). The 
gathered councils of Israel condemn their one hope to death (11:47–53), and in lifting 
him up to die, draw the scattered children of God to receive him indeed (1:12; 12:32).145 
 
Duke suggests that there is a twofold irony. Just as it is an irony that Jesus’s own people reject Jesus, 
it is also an irony that the most unlikely people receive him. If the former is called a tragic irony of 
rejection, the latter is called a comic irony of reception. The “accompanying” comic irony¾which is 
not followed from loss and failure and its mourning, and thus not captured in the Petrine pattern of 
failure and recovery¾should be brought into focus unless one is inclined to only see the tragic aspect 
of irony. 
Let me elaborate on how the twofold irony of John is narrated in the Gospel of John. A 
geographical symbolism in the Gospel provides evidence in support of the importance of comic irony. 
According to Wayne Meeks, Jerusalem stands for “the place of judgment and rejection,” and Galilee 
and Samaria signify “the places of acceptance and discipleship.”146 The “itinerary” of the Fourth 
Gospel serves to reveal theological purpose. Jesus “stayed” when he was “received” by those who 
became his disciples in Galilee, Transjordan, and Samaria, whilst he was unable to “stay” in Judea 
where he was rejected. Taking into account many different Johannine statements, for Meeks, the 
“‘staying’ with or in the disciples (5:38; 14:17; 15:1–18; I John 2:14; 3:24; 4:12, 15, 16; 2:27; 3:9, 15, 
17; especially John 8:35 and 12:34)” is “hardly an accidental use of language.”147 
 
145 Duke, Irony in the Fourth Gospel, 111–12. 
146 Wayne A. Meeks, “Galilee and Judea in the Fourth Gospel,” Journal of Biblical Literature 85, no. 2 (June 1966): 
159–69 (169). 
147 Meeks, “Galilee and Judea in the Fourth Gospel,” 167–68.  
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Jerome Neyrey aligns himself with this reading. He highlights that Galilee and Judea are 
“code names for welcome or rejection”148 and stand for “binary opposite[s]: ‘love–hate’ or ‘friendly–
hostile’ or ‘remain–not remain.’”149 And he renders this symbolic meaning rather suitably for my 
argument: “It has been observed that while Jesus is described as ‘remaining’ in various towns in 
Galilee and even Samaria, he never ‘remains’ in Jerusalem. . . . Thus, if ‘remaining’ indicates loyalty 
and adherence to Jesus, then the Gospel tells us that this happens in ‘Galilee,’ wherever that might be. 
But it does not happen in ‘“Judea.’ . . . in ‘Galilee’ Jesus is accepted, gains disciples, and remains: in 
‘Judea’ he is harassed, put on trial, and killed. He does not remain in ‘Judea.’”150 
Mary Coloe also substantiates the Johannine geographical symbolism: “Here in Samaria Jesus 
is recognized not simply in terms of Jewish or Samaritan messianic hopes but in terms of his divine 
purpose for all people: ‘God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world 
might be saved through him’ (3.17). The Samaritans come to believe that he is ‘the saviour of the 
world’ (4.42).” 151 Here Coloe makes a significantly important point: “Such faith is the aim of the 
Gospel’s ideological discourse (20.30–31), and such faith is only possible because of the openness, 
theological insight and words of this woman of Samaria (cf. 4.42).”152 In other words, the Fourth 
Evangelist may want to draw the reader’s attention to the ironic faith of outsiders rather than to the 
ironic failure of insiders to whom Williams seems to pay a great deal of attention. 
 
The Un-Petrine Pattern of Growth: Mary Magdalene and the Beloved Disciple 
A pattern of growth that differs markedly from the tragic pattern of Peter’s failure and recovery 
emerges in the Gospel of John from a discussion of the creation of the new family, which includes 
Mary Magdalene and the Beloved Disciple. This observation raises a further question of Williams’s 
tragic imagination. 
According to Williams, recognition and reception are produced and gained (in the future) 
only after repenting and mourning (in the present) the tragic failure of misrecognition and complicity 
(in the past). His pattern of growth indicates that comic recognition and restoration are only achieved 
after working out tragic failure and loss. Human growth is patterned by a painstaking movement from 
failure and loss to renewal and recovery. However, this tragic pattern of growth does not account for 
the pattern of Mary Magdalene and the Beloved Disciple, which communicates little about the time-
sequence from rejection to reception. In John’s narrative, they are not the characters who fail to 
 
148 Jerome H. Neyrey, The Gospel of John in Cultural and Rhetorical Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 81. 
149 Neyrey, The Gospel of John, 66. 
150 Neyrey, The Gospel of John, 66. 
151 Mary L. Coloe, “The Woman of Samaria: Her Characterization, Narrative, and Theological Significance,” in 
Characters and Characterization in the Gospel of John, 182–96 (196). 
152 Coloe, “The Woman of Samaria,” 196. 
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recognize Jesus and come to realize their own blindness to misrecognition only through the 
catastrophic loss and suffering that tragic failure engenders. In order to show that there are some 
salient characters in John’s Gospel who are not necessarily regarded as being caught up with tragic 
complicity in Jesus’s death, it may be helpful to summarize some of the latest scholarship on Mary 
Magdalene and the Beloved Disciple  
First, some Johannine scholars represent the character of Mary Magdalene as an example of 
discipleship in the Fourth Gospel. “A careful investigation into the techniques used to characterize 
MM [Mary Magdalene] in the Fourth Gospel reveals that not only is she a major character (despite 
her late arrival in the narrative), but also a positively paradigmatic one. . . . The reader recognizes 
Mary as one who exhibits attributes that are presented as desirable throughout the narrative. She is a 
proactive character who seeks Jesus. She is obedient to the will of Jesus, and, therefore, God.”153 It 
might therefore be said that “she exemplifies aspects of true discipleship”154 in the Gospel of John. 
It seems that the picture of Mary Magdalene’s discipleship, which exemplifies a crucial strand 
of Johannine discipleship, does not accord well with the tragic pattern of failure and renewal to which 
Williams almost exclusively attends.155  Williams contends that “the Eucharist . . . identifies the 
worshippers with the unfaithful apostles at table with Jesus,”156 and it is bound to confine the meaning 
of Christ’s passion and resurrection only within the boundary of the guilty consciousness of failed 
disciples represented by Peter’s betrayal. It does not make enough room for imagining what Christ’s 
table means to Mary Magdalene in John’s Gospel. It is not the case that the incarnation of divine 
goodness “triggers misrecognition” in Mary or that the recognition of Mary occurs only in the 
working out of her tragic denial or betrayal. The picture of how Mary grows does not necessarily 
match the Petrine pattern of misrecognition and recognition, failure and restoration.157 
 
153 Jaime Clark-Soles, “Mary Magdalene: Beginning at the End,” in Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative 
Approaches to Seventy Figures in John, ed. Steven A. Hunt, D. Francois Tolmie, and Ruben Zimmermann (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 626–40 (638). See also Sandra M. Schneiders, “John 20:11–18: The Encounter of the Easter 
Jesus with Mary Magdalene—A Transformative Feminist Reading,” in “What is John?”: Readers and Readings of the 
Fourth Gospel, ed. Fernando F. Segovia (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 155–68. 
154 Cornelis Bennema, Encountering Jesus: Character Studies in the Gospel of John, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 
2014), 336.  
155 I do not intend to allude to a controversial issue over the rivalry between Peter and Mary Magdalene in terms 
of the paschal privilege or priority, or to mount a feminist critique of a tendency to undervalue the Easter 
appearance to Mary Magdalene. 
156 Williams, “Theological Integrity,” 10. 
157 It is interesting to see that in Resurrection Williams in fact makes a passing reference to the difference of Mary’s 
loss and grief from Peter’s misrecognition and betrayal, which is tragically complicit with the death of Jesus. 
Williams expounds how the strangeness of the crucified and resurrected Christ is differently portrayed in the stories 
of “Peter as a betrayer” as well as “Mary simply as a lost and grieving human being” (xii). He acknowledges that 
“Mary does not belong to the apostolic band who deserted Jesus in his passion” (39), and “the theme of betrayal and 
illusion permeating the Peter stories” (39) is invisible in Mary’s story. She belongs to “only the most basic and naked 
sense of loss, need, void, prior even to the sense of guilt or failure” (39). Joy Ann McDougall appreciates Williams’s 
distinguishing Mary from Peter in her essay “Rising with Mary: Re-visioning a Feminist Theology of the Cross and 
Resurrection,” Theology Today 69, no. 2 (July 2012): 166–76 (174–75). Nonetheless, Williams makes too much of 
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Now I would like to turn my attention to another exceptional character in John’s Gospel, the 
Beloved Disciple, who may hardly prove complicit in Jesus’s death. He plays a crucial role in 
constructing the Fourth Evangelist’s narrative, in particular in the stark contrast with the failure of 
Peter. The contrasts between them are widely acknowledged. For instance, Mark Stibbe maintains that 
“the conduct of the BD [Beloved Disciple] is paradigmatic and exemplary, whilst that of Peter is 
clearly misguided and coloured by pathos.”158 James Resseguie propounds: 
 
Unlike Peter, he does not stumble over Jesus’ word or misinterpret his actions. . . . He 
sees the glory in the flesh and wants the reader also to adopt this point of view. . . . He 
seldom speaks in the narrative in contrast to Peter. . . . Yet his actions speak louder than 
his own (tagged) speech. He faithfully follows and remains with Jesus from beginning 
to end (1:35–40; 21:20–23). He has a special relationship with Jesus that is underscored 
at the beginning and end of the Gospel’s second half (13:23; 21:20). He not only 
follows Jesus into the courtyard also (18:15–16). He is the only male disciple to witness 
Jesus’ death on the cross and the first of a new spiritual family (19:26–27).159  
 
To put it differently, in contrast to Peter, the Beloved Disciple shows great theological integrity of 
action and contemplation, to which Williams often attaches profound significance; he remains faithful 
and loyal to Jesus from the beginning up to the point of his death. He plays a decisive role in 
reconstructing “familia Dei,”160 God’s new family under the feet of Jesus: “As a trustworthy witness 
and interpreter of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus, he is in a position to compensate for 
the loss of the crucified Jesus and to take under his protection the believing followers of Jesus, who 
are symbolized by the Mother of Jesus.”161 
Christopher Skinner highlights that, as “the Johannine disciple par excellence, . . . the 
Beloved Disciple is the ideal character with whom the implied audience should identify and after 
whom the implied audience should pattern its behaviour.”162 The Beloved Disciple, a figure who is 
neglected in Williams’s Johannine exegesis of what Christian life should be, “represents true 
discipleship.”163 As aptly highlighted, 
 
Peter’s tragedy and builds a Christian pattern of maturation upon it while paying little attention to whatever 
significant difference that doing justice to the differing story of Mary could make. 
158 Mark W. G. Stibbe, John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism and the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 99. 
159 James L. Resseguie, “The Beloved Disciple: The Ideal Point of View,” in Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel, 
537–49 (549). 
160 Jean Zumstein, “The Mother of Jesus and the Beloved Disciple: How a New Family is Established Under the 
Cross,” in Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel, 641–45 (642). D. Francois Tolmie sheds light on a missional meaning 
of the new spiritual family in “The Women by the Cross: Creating Contrasts,” in Character Studies in the Fourth Gospel, 
618–25. 
161 Zumstein, “The Mother of Jesus and the Beloved Disciple,” 645.  
162 Skinner, “Misunderstanding, Christology, and Johannine Characterization,” 112, n. 7. 
163 Barnabas Lindars, John (Sheffield: JSOT, 1990), 22–23. I have no intention to engage with controversies as to 
whether the relationship between the Beloved Disciple and Peter exhibits rivalry/cooperation, superiority/inferiority, 
or equality/subordination, and whether it reflects the relationship between the Johannine community and the 
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the tragedy of Peter’s flawed character is highlighted by the Fourth Evangelist. The 
presence of the Beloved Disciple in the Gospel highlights Peter’s failures by 
demonstrating what is possible for a disciple of Jesus.164 
 
The royal lifting up of Jesus on the cross, the foundation of a new family of God, and 
the gift of the Spirit (19:17–37) have been marked by the presence of the Beloved 
Disciple (cf. 19:25–27)—and the absence of Simon Peter!165  
 
Considered in this light, Williams’s tragic imagination seems inclined to make too much of the tragic 
failure of Peter while doing injustice to other equally or more salient narratives without recourse to 
tragic failure in John’s Gospel. And it is worth remembering that it is not the dramatic pattern of Peter 
so much as the life of the Beloved Disciple that the reader of John’s Gospel is invited to be inspired 
by and called to emulate. 
 
To conclude, the Beloved Disciple exemplifies a genuine human encounter with Jesus around the 
cross in the Fourth Gospel, and Mary Magdalene reveals aspects of recognition and faith. And the 
author invites the readers to encounter the contemplative presence and tranquil loyalty of the 
exemplary characters at least as much as the characters with the tragic failure and dramatic 
rehabilitation. Therefore, it is untenable and unconvincing to construe that the divine–human 
encounter and human growth are centred upon tragically triggered misrecognition and painfully 
attained recognition unless one may covertly marginalize the stories of Mary Magdalene and the 
Beloved Disciple and prioritize the story of Peter (as well as his male colleagues and political–
religious oppressors and perpetrators). In other words, it is possible to anticipate a pattern of human 
growth and maturation that is not predicated upon the precondition of the lethal failure and tragic 
breakdown of misrecognition. Otherwise, something tragic becomes essentially constitutive of 
Christian life. 
 
 
Apostolic communities under the Petrine tradition. And what I have argued of the Beloved Disciple does not 
necessarily undervalue the importance of Peter’s dramatic discipleship. I may concur with Bradford Blaine who 
claims that “Peter’s discipleship is noisy and provocative. BD is a more mysterious and ethereal character, subsisting 
quietly on his faith in Jesus and the love of Jesus” (3). “Whereas BD achieves distinction in the Gospel for being a 
recipient of Jesus’ love and for possessing an unimpeachable, if rather meditative, faith, thereby showing the reader 
what a loving relationship with Jesus looks like, Peter demonstrates how discipleship is crafted” (183). Bradford B. 
Blaine, Jr., Peter in the Gospel of John: The Making of an Authentic Disciple (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Markus Bockmuehl also 
emphasizes Peter’s dramatically crafted discipleship and its lasting importance. Markus Bockmuehl, The Remembered 
Peter: In Ancient Reception and Modern Debate (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010). See also Markus Bockmuehl, Simon Peter 
in Scripture and Memory: The New Testament Apostle in the Early Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012). 
164 Perkins, Peter, 99. 
165 Francis J. Moloney, The Resurrection of the Messiah: A Narrative Commentary on the Resurrection Accounts in the Four 
Gospels (New York: Paulist Press, 2013), 122. 
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Ontologizing the Tragic 
Rowan Williams places exhaustive attention on the failure of the tragic characters who build up the 
intensity of tragic catastrophe and thereby leaves little room for the other salient narratives which are 
not characterized by tragic failure. No one is exempted from tragic complicity in the death of Jesus 
and thereby from the pattern of growth from failure to recovery through the responsibly mournful life 
with pangs of guilt. In the theological exposition of John 9, Williams equates “us” with the “religious 
experts” who are fatally oblivious to “mechanisms which allow them to use violence to protect their 
safe and self-justified positions; mechanisms that allow scapegoating, that seek security at the expense 
of others.”166 And, immediately, the evaluation of the religious experts translates into “a vision of 
yourself—a failing, ignorant, frightened self.”167 Williams identifies himself and urges us to identify 
ourselves with no one other than Peter, his accomplices, and the perpetrators. That every single one 
fails and is thus complicit with its catastrophe without exception shows, for Williams, following 
Balthasar, the state of the world as a place not only “radically divided from God by sin”168 but also “a 
‘godless’ space” that “has chosen to shut out divine life, . . . violently closing itself off from the divine 
and thus violently rejecting divine life when it is embodied in the world.”169 
 These sound tragic, but Williams asserts that careful treatment of finitude and sinfulness can 
avoid an ontological radicalization or metaphysical inscription of the tragic. 
 
It is not the finite as such that is “tragic”; finitude as we experience it is alienated from 
its natural orientation. . . . And this alienation has to do with the corruption of our desire 
and the consequent distorting of our knowing (a familiar Augustinian link). In such a 
world, finite agents will experience the difference of God as distance, the otherness of 
God as threat and rivalry. . . . In other words, the “spatialization” of infinite difference is 
the consequence of sin; and this is the condition in the midst of which the divine saviour 
acts and suffers. As the Johannine text suggests, his embodiment of divine grace is 
experienced as the disruption of the ordered religious and political world and rejected as 
such, rejected as precisely a rival claimant to human territory. . . . He embodies the 
difference between Father and Son as it is refracted and distorted through the medium 
of the sinful world. That is to say, in a world like this, the continuity-in-difference of the 
divine life appears under the form of disastrous and painful distance, as the divine Word 
identifies with the alienated state of humanity. The divine continuity-in-difference can 
be uttered in this world only as the narrative of darkness and distance overcome.170 
 
This crucial passage sheds light on how Williams understands what the divine–human relation is like 
in the sinful world and how we are bound to speak of it. And this also gives a hint at the logic by 
 
166 Williams, What is Christianity?, 26. 
167 Williams, What is Christianity?, 27. 
168 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 123. 
169 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 122. 
170  Rowan Williams, “‘Not Cured, Not Forgetful, Not Paralysed’: A Response to Comments on The Tragic 
Imagination,” Modern Theology 34, no. 2 (April 2018): 280–88 (283–84). 
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which he understands and defends the relation of human tragedy in the world and super-tragedy in 
God in the theology of Balthasar. 
Williams believes that he manages to “avoid treating ‘the tragic’ as in itself some kind of 
metaphysical category, or speaking of a tragic world view.” 171 The created finitude as such is not 
tragic, which would be otherwise a metaphysical or ontological inscription of the tragic. The finitude 
as such which still preserves the created goodness sourced from the divine goodness should not be 
identified with sinfulness. Although the sinful, fallen condition of the finite world, a “finite world 
where distorted desire has definitively taken root,”172 is prone to fall into the corruption of desire and 
the distortion of knowledge by failing to recognize the finite’s radical dependence on God, it is the 
sinfulness and fallenness of the finite world, not the finitude as such, that is liable to such a tragic 
failure. It is tragic that created agents sinfully misrecognize the creator–creature difference of gift and 
dependence as a spatialized distance of competition and rivalry that threatens the world of the finite. 
In a sinful world like this, the divine–human relation and salvation history cannot help but be spoken 
of as the negation of negativity, a reversal of competition, yet it does not mean that the life of God as 
such is spoken of as overcoming tragedy. 
However, considered in the light of what I have argued before—his exhaustive attention to 
Johannine tragic irony and the Petrine pattern of growth, and a contrasting inattention to un-Petrine 
narratives—, Williams gives the impression that he fails to retain the precarious difference between 
finitude and sinfulness at the level of how he really reads the Johannine text while seeming to manage 
this at the level of formal affirmation and intention. At the level of affirmation and intention, Williams 
is intent on elaborating the classical theistic commitments to the divine superabundant gift of 
goodness in the relation of absolute non-competition with the finite world, and to insubstantial evil as 
the privation of goodness (both, as I have argued, are obscured and undermined in the theology of 
Balthasar).173 In what follows, however, I will attempt to argue that the repeated affirmations of the 
non-competitive account of the divine–human relation and the understanding of evil as the privation 
of good are dangerously leached away from his reading of the Gospel of John, as tragic imagination 
jostles for the perspective from which the Gospel is to be read.  
 
Let me discuss how Williams conceives of God and evil. As I have already briefly examined in the 
previous chapter, Williams signs up for the traditional understandings of God as the ultimate source of 
good and of evil as privation of good. According to Williams, an Augustinian understanding of God 
and evil disqualifies a spatializing language of both God and evil. It only allows us to use “‘de-
 
171 Williams, “‘Not Cured, Not Forgetful, Not Paralysed’,” 284. 
172 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 112. 
173 See “Sin and Evil in Relation to God: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley” in the previous chapter. 
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spatializing’ talk about both God and evil.”174 God is to be spoken of in “de-spatialized” ways because 
God as Being sustains and benefits all finite beings at a fundamentally different ontological level, 
without sharing and jostling with them for the same space; evil is also to be conceived of in a “de-
spatialized” way because evil has nothing to do with divine goodness and thereby is of no ontological 
value, “no-thing, no-space.”175 
As regards evil as privatio boni, Williams explains the “privation of good” as spatializing the 
non-spatially gratuitous God. In the finite world, if I may repeat, “finite agents will experience the 
difference of God as distance, the otherness of God as threat and rivalry. . . . The ‘spatialization’ of 
infinite difference is the consequence of sin; and this is the condition in the midst of which the divine 
saviour acts and suffers.”176 Williams is keen on pressing home the full force of tragic reality of the 
world as inevitably spatializing God. Indeed, “the world is tragic, in the sense that our fallen 
perceptions of the world are so flawed that we are constantly, and inevitably (since the Fall), involved 
in mistaken and conflicted accounts of our true interests.”177 The world is persistently and inexorably 
deprived of good. Nonetheless, evil has no ontological value at all. Williams insists that such a tragic 
recognition is not tantamount to accepting “a definition of tragic conflict as a necessary feature of 
created order”178 and thereby ontologically radicalizing the tragic. In other words, “this frustration is 
contingent on a history, not intrinsic to the nature of their good.”179 Although created agency is 
encompassed by “unwelcome choices, greater and lesser evils, therefore, we are not encouraged to see 
these choices as intrinsic to our condition.”180 In other words, “it is not a generalized malfunction that 
constitutes evil but the specific departure from harmony”181 with divine grace. The refusal of being 
attentive and accordant to such a non-competitively superabundant God amounts to an evil, yet it is 
“insubstantial” as the “privation of good” without having any ontological value; evil is the loss and 
frustration of our temporal attention and adjustment to the generous gift of God, yet it is the 
insubstantial privatio boni, rather than contingently substantial; evil, therefore, is not allowed to be 
spoken of as participating in the goodness of divine being at all, as having something to do with the 
life of God who created the world ex nihilo; evil shares no ontological value or meaning in relation to 
God the source of being and goodness. 
As regards God, according to Williams, while evil is nothing, God is not a thing which shares 
space or place with created agents in the finite world; it means that God is not one of the competitive 
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inhabitants contending for space with spatial beings in the finite world; God as self-subsistent and 
infinite being is involved with the contingent and finite beings in a non-competitive manner, in divine 
gratuity, plenitude, and initiative; God is so “miraculously generous in creation and in salvation”182 
that created agents are in complete dependence upon the “overflowing fullness”183 of God in the 
process of time and space; God is fundamentally understood as outpouring gratuity and infinite 
generosity, as “the noncompetitive other whose freedom makes us free.”184 
It is worth quoting Williams’s fascinating elaborations on the fundamental importance of the 
non-competitive relation of God and the world at length: 
 
If God is truly the source, the ground and the context of every limited, finite state of 
affairs, if God is the action or agency that makes everything else active, then God 
cannot be spoken of as one item in a list of the forces active in the world. God’s action 
cannot be added to the action of some other agent in order to make a more effective 
force. And this also means that God’s action is never in competition with any particular 
activity inside the universe. . . . divine and created action could never stand alongside 
each other as rivals (so that the more there is of one, the less there would be of the 
other). God makes the world to be itself, to have an integrity and completeness and 
goodness that is—by God’s gift—its own. At the same time, God makes the world to be 
open to a relation with God’s own infinite life that can enlarge and transfigure the 
created order without destroying it. . . . The fullness and flourishing of creation is not 
something that has to be won at the Creator’s expense; the outpouring of God’s life into 
the world to fulfil the world’s potential for joy and reconciliation does not entail an 
amputation of the full reality of the world’s life.185 
 
Williams presses home the full importance of creation up to the point of a universal economy of 
divine life. Williams elucidates elsewhere: 
 
God creates a kind of belonging without analogues in the “natural” world. . . . God has 
chosen to belong with us; and if we refuse to belong with him, he is still to be found 
with us in our self-rejection or self-exclusion, since he cannot define his position as 
another sort of “ordinary” belonging with its conditions and limitations.186 
 
In other words, as Susannah Ticciati clearly outlines, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo that Williams 
elucidates is “a relationship between God and creation in which God is the whole context and 
presupposition of creation, such that creation has no independent standpoint from which it can 
 
182 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 102. 
183 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 102. 
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185 Williams, Christ: The Heart of Creation, xii–xiii. 
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struggle against God, even in its rebellion.”187 Viewed from his classical theistic understanding of 
creation, to be a creature is to be radically dependent on such a creator, and to be attentive to and 
appreciative of the fundamental reality of utter dependence on the exhaustive economy of divine gift. 
Williams makes an important christological point about the embodiment of the non-spatial 
otherness of God, that the non-spatial God is incarnated into the spatial world, and that we can only 
encounter God as an incarnate, spatialized life in the finite world. Here lies a “difficulty of faith” 
which, for Williams, the Gospel of John most clearly shows. 
 
Our selfhood is made real in the face of the other—a divine other whose divine 
otherness is identical in this world with the historical, material givenness of a particular 
life and death. The tough paradox of Johannine faith is that, for the purpose of our 
growth into life, the transcendent reality which does not and cannot occupy a shared 
space with us is only accessible and functional as another portion of the world, a fleshly 
human life. The difficulty of faith is not simply to realize in ourselves a capacity long 
since given but long since overgrown. It is to apprehend the “place” in the historical 
world occupied by this human life as a place where in principle any mortal can stand—
or perhaps to apprehend the place where any mortal stands as capable of being identical 
with the place of Jesus.188 
 
Williams rightly observes that the Johannine theology squares with the classical theistic emphasis on 
God’s benevolent unceasing outpouring of gift to the world. And he is also right to stress that the 
incarnation of the infinite God in the finite world as narrated in the Fourth Gospel mounts a tough 
challenge for us to choose whether we receive it as an ultimate expression of the divine initiative of 
gift-giving in a visible and tangible form, or reject it as an unprecedentedly threatening infiltration 
into our territory. 
What I want to note is, however, that the Johannine theological intention in accordance with 
classical theistic commitment seems too hastily to ossify into a tragic vision of the world. 
 
In classical Christian theology, Jesus’s humanity has its particular, unique historical 
identity simply because it has been taken as the vehicle in history in which the eternal 
outpouring of God’s life is embodied. What makes Jesus who he is is the bestowal of 
divine life in the world. But the world is a world that has chosen to shut out divine life, 
and it is what it is as a “godless” space, violently closing itself off from the divine and 
thus violently rejecting divine life when it is embodied in the world.189 
 
 
187 Susannah Ticciati, “Transforming the Grammar of Human Jealousy: Israel’s Jealousy in Roman 9–11,” in The 
Vocation of Theology Today, 77–91 (85). Here she is referring to Rowan Williams, “On Being Creatures” (1989), in On 
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competitive creator–creature relation, see also Susannah Ticciati, A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of 
Signs (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013), 58–66, in which she highlights the resonance of Williams with Kathryn Tanner’s 
articulation of non-competitively creative divine and human agency. 
188 Rowan Williams, “Anglican Approaches to St. John’s Gospel,” in The Gospel of John and Christian Theology, ed. 
Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 68–81 (80). 
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On the basis of what I have argued about how Williams reads the Gospel of John, there is no one who 
comes to recognize Jesus as the embodiment of the infinite God who is a non-competitively 
outpouring source of life. No one is exonerated from the tragic failure of rejecting the Son of God as a 
competitive rival. He avers that the Fourth Gospel displays “the bare fact that human agency all 
around Jesus is in revolt against the embodiment of life”190 and that “Peter stands for all the human 
characters whom Jesus confronts.”191 In doing so, he comes very close to an Augustinian reservation 
about tragedy, namely, that “it evades the goodness of creation by ontologizing evil as substantively 
real,”192 rather than affirming the goodness as substantial and thereby unmasking evil as insubstantial. 
While a picture of good recognition and reception is given no room in his reading of John, a tragic 
picture of sinful misrecognition and rejection seems to take all over. If the world is conceived of as—
not simply originally sinful but beyond it—entirely rejecting and standing over against God, and 
catastrophically revolting against and antagonistic towards God without remainder, with violence or 
in complicity and collusion with it, it comes very close to making sin and evil somehow substantial 
and making the ontological value of created goodness almost nihil by allowing sinful failure and 
horrendous catastrophe to squeeze out the ontological goodness of creation (if the world cannot be left 
a vacuum). To conclude in connection with the debate over the place of tragedy in the thought of 
Williams, his tragic reading of John’s passion story then comes very close to an “ontological 
radicalization of the tragic.”193  
Such an overwhelmingly tragic picture may create a theory of the resurrection as “new 
creation ex nihilo”—“the ex nihilo gift of the risen Christ”194 is the gift of “new creation” ex nihilo 
because the gift of resurrection only emerges out of complete loss and failure195—yet at the cost of 
sacrificing un-Petrine narratives of comic irony of reception and simultaneously Procrusteanizing the 
unfathomable breadth of encountering Christ’s grace by the tragic wisdoms. The exhaustive 
dominance of the tragically sinful failure of Peter mutes the potentiality of the creation’s goodness 
which life-giving encounter with Christ actualizes in primordial correspondence to the divine 
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goodness.196  There are noteworthy narratives in the Gospel of John in which God is recognized as the 
one who superabundantly gives the gift of life to finite beings and thereby empowers them to be 
dependent on and receptive and to God (yet, alluding to Sarah Coakley, not necessarily to be 
vulnerable and submissive to God).197 
 
 
The Cry of Dereliction and Self-Dispossession 
 
Matthew Bates suggests that for theologians paying great attention to the cry of dereliction, “the 
storm-center of theological interest is the idea that the Father could have temporarily forsaken or 
abandoned the Son, and all the theological possibilities, problems, and implications that this terrifying 
God-abandonment might entail.”198 This is the case in Rowan Williams’s theology as well as in Hans 
Urs von Balthasar’s. The focused attention on the agony of abandonment, “a locus classicus for 
modern Trinitarian theology,”199 plays a crucial role in the theologies of both. Both have a shared 
tendency towards taking Jesus’s cry of dereliction as intelligible and comprehensible and as a solid 
foundation—rather than as an inscrutable conundrum—upon which an entire structure of systematic 
theology can be built and whole narratives of salvation history unfold.200 
 
196 David Hart notes that contemporary tragic theology is “thoroughly unbiblical—worse, it veils the true biblical 
narrative (and its provocations) behind the glamorous but ultimately empty allure of an alien and sacrificial spectacle.” 
Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 374. 
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Strand in Anglican Tradition (Wilton: Morehouse-Barlow, 1988), 63 (Kathryn Tanner alludes to the affinities of this 
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glory and presence, and in affirming that this possibility is the only true and ultimate fulfilment of the deepest 
longing of the human heart and mind, the Anglican spiritual tradition is asserting nothing that is not universally 
Christian.” A. M. Allchin, “Anglican Spirituality,” in The Study of Anglicanism, ed. Stephen Sykes, John Booty, and 
Jonathan Knight, rev. ed. (London: SPCK, 1998; first edition 1988), 351–64 (362). 
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Williams acknowledges that the cry of dereliction is “the theme which other theologians of 
the twentieth century have put very much at the heart of their thought—I think particularly of the 
Roman Catholic Hans Urs von Balthasar here—but it’s a theme which has its roots in quite a lot of 
specifically Russian reflection on the Incarnation and the Trinity, . . . a tradition of reflection on the 
relation between the Cross and the Trinity which is pervasive in Russian thought since the middle of 
the nineteenth century.”201 Balthasar makes the cry of dereliction a pivotal point on which the whole 
biblical statements and its theological reflection hinge: “Scripture clearly says that … God (the Father) 
gave up his Son out of love for the world and that all the Son’s suffering, up to and including his 
being forsaken by God, is to be attributed to this same love. All soteriology must therefore start from 
this point.” 202  And Williams seems to inherit “dereliction theologies” 203  following the lead of 
Balthasar and Russian thought. His tragic imagination is, I will show, intensified by the tragic paradox 
of the Son’s cry of abandonment by the Father: when the incarnate Son was crucified and abandoned 
by his own people, he was even abandoned by his own Father. He has placed great emphasis on 
Jesus’s cry of dereliction from early on in his oeuvre. 
 
Sooner or later, any theology, certainly any Christology, and certainly, I would 
maintain, any theology of the Spirit, must face the problem of the exegesis of Christ’s 
cry of dereliction on the Cross, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”204 
 
we are, in the New Testament, invited to see God manifest in weakness, suffering and 
death is indisputable; what I do not understand is why this should prevent us from 
speaking of the hiddenness of God in Christ. To say that God is revealed in the death of 
Jesus, revealed in his cry of dereliction, revealed in Gethsemane, all this is straining 
language to breaking point; because what we are affirming is that God is revealed by his 
absence, revealed in the condition of ‘Godlessness’. … To say that God is revealed in 
the humanity of Jesus is to say that God is revealed in the Godlessness of man, in the 
hiddenness of God in a world of chaos, anguish and senselessness.205 
 
Williams avers that the doctrines of God, Christ, and the Spirit must deal with Jesus’s cry of 
dereliction. And he seems quite confident to say that there is a single, unified christology of the whole 
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Gospels which comes down to “the hiddenness of God in Christ” in which God is paradoxically 
revealed. He is intent on establishing a paradox that God is revealed in Jesus suffering the loss and 
absence of God. And the paradox of absence and presence, dereliction and revelation is “the 
inescapable element of paradox and strain in our talking about the death of Christ”206 that shatters 
human language about God. And Williams has evinced strong interest in articulating what it means to 
speak of the abandonment of God the Son in relation to God the Father in Balthasar’s trinitarian–
christological theology. 
 
What does it mean to identify, as the definite embodiment of God in human history, 
someone who declares himself abandoned by God? This is the question that motivates 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s entire theological vision; but it is particularly central to what 
he has to say about the trinitarian life of God. Throughout Balthasar’s major writings, 
especially in his trinitarian thinking, there is a consistent stress on the governing priority 
of Jesus’ crucifixion.207 
 
On the basis of what I have shown above, the present section of this chapter will draw attention to 
how Williams maximizes his tragic imagination on the basis of Jesus’s cry of dereliction. After 
showing that Williams’s appropriation of Balthasar’s dereliction theology plays a crucial role in 
envisioning his tragic imagination, I will first argue that the tragic imagination of Williams (as well as 
of Balthasar) fails to prove its credibility in both biblical and theological aspects because his tragic 
imagination that presses home the full force of the cry of dereliction begins with John’s Gospel and 
ends up betraying it by inducing into it the cry of dereliction which it textually and theologically lacks. 
Considering that much has been thought of dereliction and abandonment by Williams as well as 
Balthasar, by the same reason, much will have been unthought. More importantly, I will then seek to 
show that the concept of divine self-dispossession at which Williams’s construal of the cry of 
dereliction finally arrives exhibits a mythic image of God onto which the human predicament of self-
interest and mutual conflict is projected in exchange for laying an intra-trinitarian foundation for a 
robust ethics of self-dispossession. 
 
The Paradox of Dereliction and Intimacy in the Gospel of John 
Williams willingly adopts Kevin Taylor’s definition of Balthasar’s understanding of Jesus as “the 
ultimate tragic hero.”208 According to Williams’s exposition of Balthasar’s tragic exegesis of the 
passion narrative of Jesus, what makes Jesus “the ultimate tragic hero” is his abandonment by his own 
Father. Jesus collides with God the Father, and, furthermore, “a multiple necessity”209 operates within 
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the collision between the historical Jesus and the heavenly Father. In the moment of Jesus’s suffering 
by the world’s violent hostility, “the Father is necessarily absent and impotent, . . . since that suffering 
is precisely the Father’s will.”210 The Father’s divine intervention necessarily means the retraction of 
the soteriological purpose by the Father himself. Thus the incarnate Son also cannot avoid suffering 
death, because his identity is the embodiment of the Father’s will. To put aside the suffering 
necessarily means the denial of his Father’s will, his own mission identity, and his own person. This 
tragic necessity paradoxically discloses a profound truth. Jesus’s voluntary acceptance of suffering 
validates the Father-given identity and his unswervingly loving obedience to the Father’s will. It thus 
means that it is the very cry of abandonment that substantiates the faithfulness to his mission and the 
obedience to the Father’s will. The fact that Jesus cries the abandonment by the Father paradoxically 
reveals the non-abandoned union of the Son with the Father. 
 
When, on the cross, he cries, “Why have you forsaken me?”, he is in effect declaring 
that he himself has not abandoned his mission, not violated the logic of “being God” in 
a world like this; that is why he is there, dying in agony.211 
 
If he has not abandoned his Father and his will is one with the Father’s will, this cry of 
agony is a kind of witness to the unbroken unity of God as Father and God as Jesus 
Christ: only in the particularities of this human catastrophe, the rejection and killing of 
Jesus, can we see how such a union is real.212 
 
For Williams as well as Balthasar, fascinatingly, the cry of abandonment reveals the tragically 
paradoxical truth of unity in that his love up to abandonment in death proves his non-abandonment of 
the Father’s will that ends up with the revelation of union with the Father. “There could, for Balthasar 
(and for any theologian), be no more extreme a statement of the tragic than this.”213 The tragic cry 
unleashes the most possible tragic necessity in the world and, in that regard, reveals the most 
paradoxical divine truth about the Trinity and the cross.214 Williams says that this is the meaning of 
Jesus as “the supreme tragic hero”215 in the trinitarian christology of Balthasar. 
Williams encapsulates that, “for Balthasar, John’s Gospel is the narrative articulation of all 
this”216 (without acknowledging Taylor’s critical evaluations, which are noted in the previous chapter, 
of how Balthasar wrongly both maximizes and minimizes human suffering by, respectively, 
categorizing all kinds of suffering as christologically meaningful but ignoring the irreducible diversity 
and particularity of suffering). As I have already shown in the previous chapter, Balthasar construes 
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the Gospel of John (questionably and dangerously) as a text in which the kenotic paradox of suffering 
and glory, abandonment and unity reaches a culmination. For Williams, in line with Balthasar, “the 
Gospel of John is ‘tragic’”217 due to the tragic irony embedded in the incarnation and mission of Jesus. 
And Williams draws upon Balthasar’s tragic reading of the Gospel of John, “one of the key 
texts for the theology of the Swiss Catholic thinker”218 with the “often stunningly powerful focus on 
the unconsoled dereliction of the crucified.”219 In doing so, he repeatedly pays emphasis on the tragic 
paschal paradox of abandonment and union, dereliction and intimacy, suffering and love; love, 
intimacy, and unity between the Father and the Son (and thereby His adopted children) is always 
manifest as suffering, absence, and abandonment, and the latter paradoxically proves and reveals the 
former in the end. Intimacy and love inexorably leads to abandonment and suffering, and that 
abandonment and suffering verifies and discloses that intimacy and love; intimate and unity in its 
fullest actualization and enjoyment is revealed only as gruesome outburst of otherness and difference. 
The Son’s pain of desertion and abandonment by the Father paradoxically validates and unveils the 
Son’s joy of unity and intimacy with the Father; the extremity of pain and agony in the Son 
paradoxically manifests the sublimity of his unity, love, and faithfulness in relation to God and its 
radical joy and delight. “Only one who has known the genuine intimacy of love, can be genuinely 
abandoned,”220 and only one who endures the suffering of abandonment “can guarantee the unity of 
essence. . . . Only in this context can true love, and its suffering, prove fruitful.”221 His quotations 
from Adrienne von Speyr articulates that paradox of abandonment and unity: “Abandonment by the 
Father attests his nearness. . . . In his nearness the Father shows that he has forsaken the Son, and by 
forsaking him he shows that he is near to him.”222 For Balthasar, therefore, “the deepest experience of 
abandonment by God, which is to be vicariously real in the Passion presupposes an equally deep 
experience of being united to God and of life derived from the Father.”223  The most profound 
theological paradox of Williams as well as Balthasar are generated from the most striking head-on 
collision of something extremely positive and something extremely negative. “We have, then, no 
concrete language for the unity of God but this story of risk and consummation, of unity forged 
through absence and death between God as source (Father) and the created life of Jesus of Nazareth 
(as son).”224 It is a tragic paradox that underlies Williams’ christology, discipleship, and spirituality on 
the basis of Balthasar’s theology of dereliction. 
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One cannot help here but raise questions which may concern the logic of the tragic paradox. 
Giles Emery has a misgiving about Balthasar: “Only sin separates one from God. How, then, could 
the supreme act of the charity of Christ effectuate such a separation?”225 Interestingly, a similar 
question is raised against Williams as to “why the Father’s love for the world in the Son has to 
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intimately (in his human knowing) knows God, and therefore knows exactly what we sinners are rejecting and 
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manifest as abandonment.” 226  John Yocum offers a detailed criticism of the dereliction-centred 
descriptions of the Father and the Son and our adoptive relations. 
 
If, however, the gospel is an invitation to share in the life of the Trinity, an adoption by 
the Spirit to a share in the Son’s relationship with the Father, how does one express that 
to someone who has known the wrath of a father against an innocent child? How does 
one convincingly portray rejection as a form of love? If the gospel is the announcement 
that we are made children of God in Christ, such a picture of the relation between Father 
and Son hardly makes this good news: we are made the children of a Father prepared to 
abandon his Son—though perhaps only temporarily—even as he suffers innocently and 
obediently. Perhaps the message of the death and resurrection of Christ might more 
effectively and faithfully be cast as the triumph of the unshakeable and invincible union 
of Father, Son and Spirit, even in the face of death, a triune love that is “stronger than 
death” and stronger than human sin.227 
 
With regard to this issue, it is worth paying attention to the fact that Williams has endorsed Dorothee 
Sölle’s critique of the Son’s abandonment by the Father as a “theological sadism.”228  Williams 
contends that the non-intervention of Father in the crucifixion of Jesus does not necessarily mean “the 
Father’s desertion or even annihilation of the Son”229 or “the Father’s giving-up of the Son.”230 He 
rather subscribes to Sölle’s vigilance that, in her own words, “any attempt to look upon suffering as 
caused directly or indirectly by God stands in danger of regarding him as sadistic.”231 And it seems 
hard safely to distinguish the Son’s abandonment by the Father in Williams’s (as well as in 
Balthasar’s) portrayal from the “theological sadism” that depicts “suffering as caused directly or 
indirectly by God.”  
 
Unfaded Love and Unbroken Unity in the Gospel of John 
Balthasar insists that Jesus’s cry of dereliction in the Gospel of Mark takes priority over the cries in 
other Gospels. He asserts, “The great word on the Cross, which is the only word narrated in Mark and 
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Matthew, is the cry to the lost God”232; “Primacy must go to the cry of abandonment—in Mark the 
single cry from the Cross. . . . Besides this fundamental word, the other words from the Cross could, 
without any essential narrowing of their bearing, be understood as interpretations of that actual 
situation of judgment (both objective and subjective) which the events render distinct enough.”233 It 
can be therefore said that that Balthasar strongly evinces, as Walter Moberly articulates, “a 
pronounced contemporary tendency to take only the cry of dereliction in Matthew and Mark with full 
imaginative and theological seriousness (a tendency which in effect restricts and inhibits the full 
canonical witness to the death and resurrection of Jesus).”234 Having said that, one may not want to be 
content merely with the acknowledgement that what I have argued above—Balthasar’s extreme 
paradox and “theological sadism” (perhaps as well as masochism)—results from his opting for 
Mark’s cry of abandonment at the expense of John’s cry of accomplishment in constructing his 
trinitarian–christology. If we endorse Williams’s way of reading Balthasar’s Jesus as “the ultimate 
tragic hero” in the Gospel of John, it is in fact that Balthasar reads dereliction and abandonment into 
the Gospel of John which textually and theologically lacks it. And Williams has no reservations about 
Balthasar’s illicit exegesis and rather draws upon his reading in reconciling the passion narrative of 
Christ with tragedy. 
There are a plenty of studies to tell what theologically distinctive imports the textual lack of 
the cry of dereliction in John’s narrative does have. It can show us that to envisage Jesus as “the 
ultimate tragic hero” does not simply exhaust the Johannine christology but rather jeopardizes it. 
George Parsenios highlights “the transformation of the tragic” in John’s transformation of the 
meaning of cross: “We must expect the Fourth Gospel to ‘bend’ its tragic models, much as it has done 
in depicting the death of Jesus. For, while tragic characters endure a slow process of dying into death, 
the Johannine Jesus gradually rises into his glorification and ascends into the ascension.”235 In other 
words, “the tragic is transformed in the Fourth Gospel.”236 For instance, the Jesus whom John depicts 
is, according to John Behr, an “exalted vision of Christ,” such that there is no record of the event of 
transfiguration in the Gospel of John, “in a manner indeed very different than the other Gospels . . . , 
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for on every page we see the transfigured Lord” from the beginning to the end. Hence, “we hear the 
crucified one crying out not, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ (Matt. 27:46; Mark 
15:34), but, rather, with stately majesty, affirming” the accomplishment of his life and the handing 
over of the Spirit.237 In other words, John’s Jesus remains in divine glory, unity, knowledge, and 
sovereignty (not agony, anguish, powerlessness, and forsakenness) throughout the violent revolt 
against him. As many Johannine scholars acknowledge, in the Fourth Evangelist’s passion narrative 
of Jesus, he does not dispossess or renounce his power, dignity, or freedom; rather Jesus 
“sublimely”238 presents himself in a “literally majestic”239 way, in “autonomy” and “initiative,”240 in 
divine “sovereignty”241 in the court of trial and the site of execution (as in his public ministry) by his 
unshrinking power, undisturbed knowledge, and undisrupted union in relation to God the Father. The 
sovereign glory of Jesus, without dreadful intensity of agony and distress, in his arrest, trial, and death 
reveals his identity in John’s Gospel. “Jesus remains serenely confident and totally dominates the 
proceedings from his arrest right through to his final cry of triumph from the cross, ‘It is finished’ 
(19:30).”242 Therefore, “there is no agony in the garden or cry of abandonment from the cross. Rather, 
Jesus is in full control of himself.”243 Seen in this light, it makes sense that the Fourth Evangelist 
“never once uses paschō, ‘suffer’, of Jesus”244 in the passion narrative. Although Johannine passion 
narrative lacks Jesus’s cry of dereliction, it may not necessarily mean that it runs the risk of 
encouraging a euphoric piety, a triumphalist vindication, or a facile optimism; rather, it narrates a 
christological–trinitarian manifestation of undisturbed love and uninterrupted unity between the 
heavenly Father and the incarnate Son. 
This Johannine narration of passion requires extraordinary discretion from theologians such 
as Balthasar and Williams who are inclined to lavish emphasis upon God-abandonment and its 
paradoxical fertility of unity and joy and build upon it a unified New Testament theology of cross. 
While Balthasar insists that Jesus’s absolute love for the Father takes the risk of bringing about a 
fracture and rupture in his unity with the Father, which is expressive of and grounded in an infinite 
inner-trinitarian distance, this tragic form of love as enduring suffering does not square with a 
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Johannine vision of an unbroken relation of love and unity between the Father and the Son. As 
Raymond Brown notes, John’s Jesus does not cry out of dereliction precisely “because the Father is 
always with him (16:32).”245 The Johannine absence of the disintegrated identity of Jesus and its lack 
of “spiritual death” depend upon the uninterrupted unity of the Father and the incarnate Son which 
reflects the eternal unity within the Trinity—in stark opposition to Balthasar’s speculation of the 
Son’s abandonment by the Father, which in turn reflects the eternal abandonment within the Trinity. 
Matthew Levering finds a good example of interpreting Johannine christology from Thomas 
Aquinas. Thomas’s depiction of John’s Christ as “absolute gift,” according to Levering, differs 
markedly from the Christ that Balthasar, one of the paschal mystery theologians who “see the cross as 
a sign of intra-divine abandonment,” 246  envisages as absolute giving-away with the agony of 
dereliction. “Christ, whose Paschal Mystery is God’s gift of himself to us, thus reveals that ‘eternal 
life’ (God himself) is absolute self-giving—a self-giving that is, unlike human self-giving, without 
risk, suffering, or loss, in other words a self-giving that is glory.”247 Perhaps a trinitarian theory 
constructed upon a Johannine paschal mystery, if any, fails to generate a christological trinitarianism 
suggesting that “all external scenes of Jesus’ life and sufferings [silence, mocking, nailing, 
piercing] . . . [are] a direct portrayal and exegesis of God (John 1:18).”248 
No less significantly, in John, the Spirit is not akin to a Balthasarian Spirit who mends the 
separation between the Father and the Son into unity. Rather, the Spirit teaches the unbroken unity 
and shared glory of the Father and the Son throughout towards the post-Easter Johannine community, 
and empowers the community to bear witness to the truth of the unity by the gift of the power of the 
Easter Spirit.249 “Jesus has asked his Father to preserve the unity of his own, and all those who will 
hear his word through their ministry, so that the world might know that God has sent his Son, and that 
God loves the world, just as he loves his Son.”250 The manifestation of the primordial unity in God 
and between God manifests to the world an unfailing divine love for the world. In John, christology, 
ecclesiology, and missiology are inherently interrelated in terms of love and unity. 
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The Cry of Dereliction in the Divine Identity 
Let me now attract critical attention to how Williams presses home the cry of dereliction in 
constructing his Christian tragic imagination. He intends to accommodate Balthasar’s tragic 
speculations into the heart of his own tragic vision of theological truths. Williams thinks that 
Balthasar’s tragic exposition of Johannine christology serves to identify two anti-tragic perspectives 
that he seeks to avoid. Christian theology, on the one hand, neither encourages us to see that 
“suffering is cancelled or even compensated by the hope of ultimate reconciliation,”251 and, on the 
other hand, nor enervates us in “absolute tragedy.” Rather, “it affirms the possibility of mourning—
the articulation of loss, the ‘telling’ of pain.”252  For Williams to reckon with loss without absolutizing 
it is, in fact, by no means new to his readers. For instance, the following statement has already 
anticipated (though not absolutely) his tragic imagination: “Christian language states that failure is 
both real and not final, and offers the possibility of a corporate or individual self-perception that can 
cope with honesty about the past and thus imagine a future in which all of that past can be held 
together.”253 
Steering between the equally false anti-tragic conceptions, Williams suggests that the tragic 
presentation turns out to be a tragic imagination enclosed by a comic affirmation. “The tragic 
imagination is always framed and informed by the comic,”254 and, he maintains, the comic enables us 
to “imagine the dismantling of self-perception without total disaster,”255 without “the terror that loss is 
necessarily the end of meaning or of hope.”256 Not to absolutize loss by virtue of the comic, for 
Williams, of course, should not give any indication of diminishing or alleviating the weight of 
suffering and loss in an impatient anticipation of triumph and reconciliation. The comedy is not a 
countervailing force against the tragedy so that comedy and tragedy do not cancel out each other. It 
rather solidifies the reason “why loss is terrible,”257 because to say that suffering and loss is not final 
implies that it has unavoidably to be thought, spoken, and endured in the meantime. One might want 
to say this is a kind of tragic comedy, the comedy only through a tragedy, and the other might rather 
say a comic tragedy, the tragedy within a comedy. In either case, what is decisively important is, for 
Williams, to face the ineradicable importance of suffering and loss in the recognition of the hope and 
possibility of transformation and reconstruction. To put it briefly, the tragic imagination challenges us 
neither to terminate at “dyscatastrophe” in melancholy, nor to pass over to “eucatastrophe” in 
euphoria. It is to dwell in the “broken middle” with hope without optimism. 
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In Williams’s discourse on tragic representation, the relation and roles of tragedy and comedy 
are interconnected with Jesus’s death and resurrection. He attends to a metaphor of the body of Christ, 
a broken and recovered body, in order to unfold a deeper implication of the death and resurrection of 
Christ. For Williams, “Tragedy points towards a comedy that imagines a restored body where the 
wounds are not ignored or belittled or explained away, healed rather than cured.”258 To think and 
speak of suffering and loss in full measure is accompanied with imagining a broken body because the 
metaphor of body indicates a concrete reality of relation. “Damage matters; . . . damage matters 
because what is damaged or lost or wounded matters, and matters lastingly and ineradicably.”259 The 
metaphor of body offers “a way of imagining a body whose wounds we both contemplate and 
recognize, the gravity of whose wounds we are forced to acknowledge.”260 However, for Williams, 
the reason why it is important to imagine a wounded body does not merely lie in its vulnerability but 
also in its capacity for restoration, a restored body, with ineffaceable marks of the wounds. The body 
with its vulnerability and capacity “will never be other than fragile, threatened by the ignorance of the 
watching ego, yet never emptied of possibility.”261 
As Williams explicitly notes, to talk about the broken and restored body is “a nakedly 
theological metaphor, evoking the wounded and resurrected body of Jesus in the Christian gospels.”262 
The injured body is risen as a restored body, yet still bearing the marks of suffering and memories of 
loss. A body stands, in the Jewish community around Torah, for “an order of relation grounded in the 
divine,” and the body of Christ reveals “the intense mutual dependency and mutual recognition 
ascribed to the Christian community.”263 Therefore, to imagine a wounded and healed body is to think 
of the most wretched rupture of the communal relation and of a possibility of its final reintegration. 
The Christian narratives of Jesus’s broken and restored body enable us to see, without absolutizing 
and essentializing the tragic, a possibility of restoration, retaining a deep concern for an enduring, 
grievous process of self-reformulation. 
And the loss and recovery of the body of Christ also has significant communal, political 
implications. Individual and civic identities are disintegrated and reconstructed by the public 
performance of tragedy in the cities of ancient Greece. This pattern of Attic tragedy holds true for 
Christian narrative and performance. The identities of Christians and their communities are 
questioned and reshaped on the most profound level by communal practice of the Eucharist. “As 
‘Athens’ emerges from tragic narrative in the Greek theatre, so ‘the Church’ emerges from the 
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narrative enacted in the Christian sacrament.”264 Williams draws a significant parallel between the 
dissolution and reconstruction of the Christian “church” and the disintegration and reintegration of the 
Attic “city.” In this sense, for Williams, Athens has certainly to do with Jerusalem. 
Finally, Williams advances his speculation about Jesus’s cry of dereliction further in his 
treatment of the broken body of Christ. In the conclusion of the final chapter of The Tragic 
Imagination, perhaps one of the most explicitly theological parts of the whole, he offers a more 
comprehensive and fuller account of the cry of dereliction. Williams argues that Christ’s cry of 
dereliction on the cross represents not only the catastrophic breaking of the created world but also a 
schism and fracture in divine identity or apparently so. The Son’s abandonment by the Father 
maximizes the importance of loss and disintegration in the tragic presentation of the Eucharist: 
 
The structure of the Eucharist echoes what has been said about the tragic liturgy of the 
ancient city. It represents a story of extreme rupture and dissolution in the common 
life. . . . What is represented is an apparent rupture in the divine action—the 
abandonment by God of God’s human embodiment (“My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?”), and so the apparent schism in divine self-consistency or fidelity. . . . 
Like classical tragedy, this is a narrative which presses to the extreme the possibility of 
a radical fragmentation of “lawful” common life.265 
 
Williams draws upon the Father’s abandonment of the Son for achieving his primary purpose of 
reconciling tragic imagination with the Christian narrative. Tragic schism in the world does not end at 
“the most dramatic possible schism between self and truth” in human misunderstanding, but goes so 
far  as to entail “an apparent rupture in the divine action”266 and “the apparent schism in divine self-
consistency or fidelity.” For Williams, “the dereliction of Christ on the cross” 267  exhibits the 
vulnerability of the divine identity. And the apparent loss of and fracture in the divine identity 
indicates that the divine identity enters the human realm of tragic representation. 
 
The divine itself [is] in some way wounded, emptied, evacuated of power or evident 
meaning, in the face of human atrocity. Divine identity no less than human, in this 
context, comes into our speech and imagining as entailing the enduring of loss.268 
 
Derived from the cry of dereliction¾the abandonment of the Son by the Father—is the vulnerability 
and loss of divine identity. The divine identity, divine action, divine self-consistency is spoken of as 
being wounded “in the face of human atrocity.” 
 
 
264 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 126. 
265 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 125–26. 
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268 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 158. 
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This inevitably mythic projection of loss into the divine is explored, in Jewish and 
Christian speculative thinking, as a way of clarifying that the divine is not an inflated 
version of routine human ego-identity but exists simply as “bestowal”, as an 
unconstrained giving.269 
 
Although he is not keen on elaborating on what this puzzling sentence means, it seems quite clear that 
he purports to envisage a picture of God that can foreclose any possibility of a self-promoting attempt 
to project an egoistic self to the divine life: the divine should not be manipulated as a false projection 
of the egoistic human self. This picture of the fractured divine who endures loss establishes the solid 
theological foundation for ethical truth: “the character of divine self-dispossession as the human 
vocation.”270 The broken body of Jesus in the cry of loss, absence, and abandonment indicates the 
wounded divine, and this tragic vulnerability of divine identity in the fallen world makes us aware 
that divine self-dispossession is revealed in the death of Jesus, and that our human vocation is 
transformed into the self-dispossession of the divine life in recognition of the inevitable failure and 
loss in the world. It can be said then that at the end of Williams’s tragic imagination a trinitarian 
ethics of self-dispossession emerges. And an examination of how Williams elaborates the ethics of 
self-dispossession based on divine self-dispossession, I believe, may shed new light on what he 
intends to achieve by establishing a tragic imagination, namely, the ethics of self-dispossession. 
 
The Freudian Projection of Self-Interest onto God 
Rowan Williams has long raised a critical issue behind all our theology and practice: “If we believe in 
a source of energy, forgiveness and love independent of ourselves, how exactly do we prevent it from 
becoming a belief that weakens our responsibility and imprisons us in fantasy?”271 As Myers indicates, 
“a dread of self-deceptive fantasy is, in fact, the secret engine of Williams’ work.”272 Williams is 
intent on protecting the essence of Christian theology and practice from a post-modern suspicion of 
‘infantile’ Christianity, in particular, “the Freudian charge that Christianity is an inflation of infantile 
beliefs about the omnipotent father who can solve all problems and heal all wounds.”273 In this sense, 
a concern to make a serious response to the Freudian charge—“a post-Freudian apologetic”274—
underlies Williams’s theology. 
Let me elaborate on Williams’s understanding of the Freudian suspicion and his theological 
response to it. Robert Jenson has once passingly—but revealingly—remarked that Rowan Williams is 
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“far too obsessive to be truly helpful in the life of faith” and thereby “concerned to enforce theology’s 
function as critique, and especially as self-critique.”275 We are always tempted, according to Williams, 
to self-consolation, -fortification and -gratification, “deeply dangerous for anyone who wants to grow 
up as a human being.”276 The self-aggrandizing tendency has, of course, for Williams, nothing to do 
with genuine Christian understandings of God, self, and the world. It is rather an opposite of Christian 
faith, as it were, an egoistic tendency.277  Such a self-serving desire may be grounded in particular, 
according to Williams, by fabricating a self-legitimizing image of God as an almighty Father. “The 
 
275  Robert Jenson, review of On Christian Theology, by Rowan Williams, Pro Ecclesia: A Journal of Catholic and 
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risky, costly, and difficult acts of self-diminishment and self-dispossession make it possible to be transformed and 
converted into a responsible self who attends to others. 
 If this is the case, Williams’s tendency greatly to emphasize the inflated self and its dispossession gives the 
impression that he is oblivious to another aspect of human misdirection which is no less significant than self-
promotion. As Oliver O’Donovan notes, “a false self-humiliation” does not differ from “a false self-promotion” in 
the degree of sin: “There is truth in the suggestion that the two faults meet up behind the curtain, that modest 
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reveals not only self-humility but also self-affirmation. To anticipate the non-competitive gift of divine goodness and its 
coincidence with created goodness, which will be elaborated on in “The Non-Competitive Relation of Divine Gift and 
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redirection of the human freedom of will and act into God, i.e., renouncing self-promoting desire or disapproving 
self-humiliating tendency.  
In the light of O’Donovan’s reflection, one may say, whilst Williams makes too much of false self-promotion and 
correspondingly requires the corrective rebuke of self-diminishment, he thinks too little of false self-belittlement and 
leaves too little room for a corresponding corrective kindness of self-affirmation. There might be a case, in certain 
circumstances, in which it is a difficult, risky (yet delightful instead of painful) business to determine to protect, 
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renounce oneself. For instance, Kathryn Tanner puts a particular emphasis on Christian grounds for “non-
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God who, as ‘omnipotent Father’ in the Freudian sense, can intervene to save and console from 
without,” Williams avers, “is illusory, a mask of God.”278 As the idea of a suffering God is, as 
discussed earlier, a “projection” of human experience of suffering into God, this idea of God as an all-
powerful father is a “projection about some all-powerful character who can just do what he decides 
and get what he wants straight away.”279 It is “the phantasm projected by ‘la toute-puissance du desir’: 
the omnipotent father, that is to say, is the substitute for the failed omnipotence of the self.”280 The 
fantasized image of God who “has a psychology like ours, only bigger”281 only serves to give me a 
complete assurance of “unconditioned space or time to develop and discover what I am to be.”282 This 
is nothing but fabricating a self-inflating image of God, that is, a God who “has no ‘resistance’, and is, 
ultimately, only at the service of my development,”283 my self-interest. 
 
The Triune Metaphysics of Self-Dispossession and the Human Ethics of Self-Dispossession 
For Williams, “‘what constitutes an adult human relationship to God’”284 is, then, first and foremost, 
to dispossess oneself of such an infantilized image of God onto which self-fortifying desire is 
projected. Williams emphatically stresses that to be responsible in the tragic world entails, above all 
things, a practice of self-dispossession, the dispossession of selfish interest, including the 
relinquishment of a distorted idea of all-powerful God as “an authority figure who could sort out all 
our problems, who is always there on hand to help us out of situations where we would otherwise 
have to take responsibility.”285 The act of self-dispossession is a human horizon where the freedom of 
God acts and works. The freedom of God “becomes transforming for human beings and human 
communities in their readiness for dispossession, for the loss of the God who is defined as belonging 
to us and our interests,”286 for “surrendering various comforting falsehoods that might let me think 
myself strong and safe.”287 The human action of self-dispossession thus “makes room” for the divine 
action of grace.288 
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Williams’s understanding of the dispossession of self-interest does not stop at renouncing a 
perverted image of God but goes so far as to constitute a governing tenet of Christian ethics and 
politics. He suggests that Christian imagination of humankind promotes a deepened understanding of 
political practice and public life of human mutuality. “Central to what Christian theology sets before 
us is mutuality.”289 It goes deeper than a secular polity that “simply” seeks an administration “in the 
name of self-interest,” “maximal security and prosperity,” “mutually beneficial arrangements of any 
specific state,” and “the negotiation of practical goods and balanced self-interests.”290 Williams’s 
Augustinian understanding of politics notes that a deeper moral vision of Christian discourse offers “a 
redefinition of the public itself.”291 For Williams, the value which the public sphere should seek does 
not lie simply in how to enhance mutual benefit or to negotiate a settlement between mutual self-
interests. The way Christianity can make a transformative contribution to the public sphere is to 
critically remind us of “some fundamental truth about what humanity is for”292 : human public 
““wellbeing” involves the capacity to deepen “questions of all sorts of emotional and self-directed 
impulses” and “developing habits of honest self-examination.”293 The religious enactment makes it 
possible to throw a robust question to the contemporary secular society. In continual self-questioning 
and self-suspicion, the self, individual and corporate, is called to patiently recognize mutual 
dependence and responsibility for the other and to venture the dispossession of a satisfied self-identity 
towards the renewal and transformation of the self. The calibration, arrangement, calculation and 
negotiation of self-interest in the public sphere can be made only after the establishment of authentic 
human mutuality based on continual self-criticism. Significantly, this Christian vision of self-
dispossession throws an important challenge to secular politics which is prone to rely too much on 
false self-autonomy and sufficiency: “How does secularism ‘dispossess’ itself?”294 
The dispossession of self-gratifying selfhood plays a crucial role in constructing theological 
ethics as well as politics. A true Christian ethics is predicated upon divine dispossession, as is so a 
genuine Christian politics. As to the question of how “ethics ceases to be about securing claims,” 
 
occupy space and compete with us for space, however, why does the created being have to renounce its space so as 
to allow God to occupy the withdrawn space? As Williams rightly emphasizes, if God is ontologically different from 
the world, “miraculously” outpours the goodness of grace in gratuity, plenitude, generosity, and initiative, if God is 
fundamentally understood as “the noncompetitive other whose freedom makes us free” rather than a competitive 
inhabitant like us whose freedom can be wielded only insofar as the other’s freedom is yielded in advance, then the spatial language 
of “making room” makes little sense. The non-competition and goodness in relation to the relationship of divine and 
human agency will be dealt with in detail in “The Non-Competitive Relation of Divine Gift and Human Reception” 
in the next chapter. 
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Williams suggests that the critical question that should be asked is “does it speak of the God whose 
nature is self-dispossession for the sake of the life of the other? . . . of the divine relinquishment of 
‘interest’ and claim as embodied in the life and death of Jesus?”295 In the tragic finitude of the 
competition and conflict of the world, Christians are forced to make a moral decision and able to learn 
“the candid knowledge of powerlessness, in grief, not in complacency” when they act on the tragic 
horizon. For Williams, the knowledge of powerlessness in grief “models the divine dispossession”296 
so that it gives glory to God. Thus, an ethics of self-dispossession “makes place” and “gives space” 
for the other, rather than possessing the other and securing its own claims. 
Geoffrey Wainwright rightly observes that Rowan Williams’s trinitarian thought is 
“noetically based on, and ontologically grounded in, the kenotic ‘self-dispossession’ of the 
persons . . . .”297 And, according to Williams, the ground for the self-dispossession in Christian 
politics and ethics is found in divine self-dispossession—in relation to the triune life of God as well as 
God’s relation to the history of the world. Williams’ appreciative accounts, following Rose, of 
Hegel’s philosophy of divine self-dispossession gives a good example of this. Williams writes, for 
Hegel, history recognizes itself as the dispossession and recovery only if it contains “the narrative of 
divine dispossession.”298 Williams suggests that the logic of the divine dispossession in relation to the 
world history is found in “a history of God-in-relation to a historical community,”299 “a history that 
can be told as the narrative of the absolute’s self-loss and self-recovery.”300 In other words, “the 
supreme disinterestedness of the divine, which, by definition, has no ‘positional’ corner to defend, 
articulates itself in the interest of a human community.”301 
Hegel’s genius lies, Williams tells us, in his reading the Judaeo-Christian narratives in the 
framework of the divine self-dispossession. In other words, “the concrete articulation of divine 
(founding, creating) action is in what is other to the divine,” that is, in the life of Israel as the 
historical nation that bears the divine covenant and in the life of Jesus as the historical being who 
carries the divine meaning. And the divine action is articulated in creating the Church. The non-
interest of God is embodied in the divine self-dispossession for the sake of the Church. If the Church 
is created out of history in the articulation of the divine self-dispossession, what remains is the 
question of how it can avoid the danger of “sectional interest and proprietorial models of power or 
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knowledge.”302 The answer lies in the Church’s willingness and capability of embodying the non-
interest of God, that is, “the ‘interest’ of a God without interest or favouritism.”303 It is the interest of a 
disinterested God for the sake of the other. 
Here Williams speaks of a theological politics with the help of Rose’s theo-political insights. 
For Williams, Rose sees the non-interest of God, or the interest of God for the sake of the other, as 
“the universal saving generosity of divine action,” as “surrendering the no-place of an abstract 
absolute being, enacting the indiscriminate love or inclusive compassion that eventuates from divine 
life in a historical process.”304 Although God’s people are a human community who is prone to 
violence and conflict in favour of self-interest, nonetheless, they endeavour to understand “their 
fundamental task as embodying the ‘non-interest’ of God,” as “dispossessed of its own self-definition, 
as an ‘interested’ or sectional presence in the world.”305 It leads us to see why the identities of Israel, 
Jesus and the Church are tied up with dispossession that is envisaged as “exile,” “the cross” and “the 
‘resident alien’” respectively. Those narratives about “God and God’s people” hold out for “speaking 
of divine displacement” and create “a discourse about fundamental ontology and a discourse about 
politics” at the same time.306 In other words, the theological integration of metaphysics and politics 
comes from self-displacement of God “realising its ‘interest’ in its other.”307 Therefore, “the most 
fundamental reality that is (in some sense) thinkable requires to be spoken of in terms of 
dispossession or, to use the overtly theological word, kenosis.”308 
To sum up, Williams makes a theologically inextricable connection of divine self-
dispossession and human self-dispossession. Divine self-dispossession is a transcendent, ontological 
ground and model for human self-dispossession as individuals and collectives; the human self-
dispossession is reflective of and predicated upon the divine self-dispossession and its historical 
embodiment in the limit of the created world. 
 
Yet one may want to raise a question as to whether the inextricable connection of divine self-
dispossession and human self-dispossession trivializes the profound difference between the divine self 
and the human self. It is, of course, entirely legitimate for Williams to construe God as the 
transcendent source of the world and to urge us to be rightly dependent upon and receptive to God’s 
transforming and purifying transcendence. As he sums up an Augustinian understanding of divine 
action and human action, “the work of grace is to make us dependent in the right way, dissatisfied 
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with anything less than the horizon of God’s own selflessness and seeking to remain open to that 
selfless agency as it transforms our relation with the world and each other.”309 However, when he 
repeatedly speaks of the trinitarian relation in terms of the dispossession of self-interest, so as to make 
it into a divine archetype of human ethics and politics, it seems to strain the concept of divine 
selflessness to breaking point. It is precisely because, as Williams is aware, the divine self is radically 
different from the human self in that it has no correlation with selfishness in the first place. 
 Let me elaborate upon my argument. The sinful error of indulging self-interest looms large in 
human selfhood and it makes self-dispossession inevitable whilst the divine self, according to 
Williams, has no self-interest that is meant to be dispossessed. If the divine self is devoid of self-
interest in the first place, it would be reasonable to say that in God’s selfhood there is no self-interest 
to be dispossessed, thus there is no drama of repentance and no risk of purgation of self. It is 
questionable, therefore, to draw an inherent link between the divine and the human in terms of self-
dispossession. Whilst the human “un-selfing” is the repentant effacement of “the superficial interests 
of the ego,” the divine gift-giving—within the Trinity and in relation to the world—has nothing to do 
with such an egoistic interest and its dispossession. When human receptiveness and gift-giving to 
others is to be defined readily as the dispossession of a sinful self-interest, the divine reception and 
gift-giving is to be defined as completely devoid of such a painful relinquishment of false selfhood. In 
other words, if the ultimate non-interest of God means that, “by definition,” God has no interest and 
claim to defend against the other, if “God’s nature as one who is beyond all partisanship, all self-
interest, whose whole being is selflessness,’”310  it would be a misconception to say that such a 
disinterested God relinquishes or dispossesses something for the sake of the other. If there is nothing 
at all to relinquish in God from the outset, it does not make sense of speaking of God’s loss of interest. 
Rather, it may be more reasonable to say that the act of divine gift-giving, or, in Williams’ terms, the 
overpouring of the universal generosity and indiscriminate love of God is given to the other without 
the mediation of a negative movement of relinquishment and abrogation of self-interest.  
 
My argument may be substantiated by a critical examination of Williams’s understanding of the 
Church’s mission as dispossession. In a lecture on mission and spirituality, he brings the importance 
of dispossession into focus in his discussion of mission. Williams attempts to understand mission as 
building communion in the finite world from the perspectives of the ministry of Jesus and the divine 
life of the Trinity. He argues that the mission of Jesus is shaped in and directed towards “the divine 
act of living in communion.”311 The presence of Jesus as communion embodies “the presence of the 
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trinitarian life” as communion and thus undercuts the human struggle for possession in the hostile 
reality of competition and contention. The mission of the Church is therefore to live and communicate 
the mission of Jesus perfectly revealing the triune communion. “If we want to speak adequately of 
mission, we have to speak of the trinity, of God’s life as communion. To engage in mission is to be 
touched by the life of the trinity.”312 The mission of the Church is “to embody God’s longing for life 
in communion here as a reflection of the perfect mutuality of the divine life in eternity.”313 Williams 
writes “Nikolai Fyodorov in nineteenth-century Russia famously said that ‘the doctrine of the Trinity 
is our social programme’; we could equally well say that the bare fact of the Church is our social 
programme. The divine life moves towards communion, and it rules and judges the entirety of our 
lives, soul and body.”314 Here he seems to understand mission as an ecclesial practice to embody the 
idea of a social Trinity.  
As the mission of Jesus undermines a sinful reality of competitive possession, according to 
Williams, the life of the Trinity challenges rapacious hostility and sectional division. To live and 
embody the trinitarian life as communion requires the practice of a spirituality. It is a spirituality of 
dispossession that is required to be transformed as “radically oriented towards and involved in the life 
of others.”315 It involves a refusal of self-protection, mutual hostility, self-achievement and possession, 
doctrinal and institutional possession, ecclesial egotism and self-interest to the exclusion of the other. 
We can properly understand the languages about the communion of the Trinity only in “the practice 
of dispossession, an authentically self-forgetting practice that allows and nourishes the otherness of 
others.”316 Thus, for Williams, “mission does indeed involve a particular sort of dispossession.”317  
In another lecture on mission, Williams also relates dispossession to mission: “Mission says: 
we have been given a way of living together, sharing a common purpose or project as human beings, 
that centres upon the imperative of dispossession: each part of the corporate whole has to let go of any 
definition of its interest or welfare that is exclusive to it alone.”318 Mission has, first and foremost, 
something to do with the act of dispossession, “letting go of egoistic self-interest.” Williams goes so 
far as to seek to speculate on the divine giving-away in the Son’s procession from God and the 
Father’s missio of the Son and then to connect the divine self-gift with the Church’s mission in the 
framework of dispossession: “Mission is thus also fundamentally a matter of dispossession: God’s 
sending of Jesus, like the eternal coming-forth of the Word, is a giving-away, a holding nothing back: 
all the Father has is given to Jesus (John 16:10), all the divine authority is shared with Jesus (Matthew 
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28:18);”319 In the response to the Father’s self-gift Jesus gives back to the Father and puts himself at 
the disposal of the Father’s will for communion; and the mission of the Church is to embody Jesus’ 
giving-away-back to the Father in order to channel God’s life to the world. 
However, taking into consideration that the divine life “by definition” has non-interest, if the 
practice of dispossession is understood as a refusal against and a subversion of competitive hostility 
and rapacious possession in the world of a sectional economy, it seems illegitimate to portray the 
divine mutual self-gift engendered in the life without competition and rivalry as a divine self-
dispossession. The mutual self-giving of the Father and the Son does not involve dispossession 
because every person of the Trinity has no definition of exclusive self-interest in the first place. 
Human self-dispossession may be to do with expulsion and banishment of something false without 
exception whilst the mutual self-gift in the trinitarian life and the Father’s missio of the Son to the 
world is to do with donation and bestowal of something good without reservation. The divine relation 
within the Trinity does not entail “‘the labour, the patience and the pain of the negative’”320 of 
dispossessing self-interest, giving up self-justification, emptying self-promotion, effacing self-
gratification, which a failed Petrine being may entail in the course of his growth. The self-
dispossession of God thus makes little sense insofar as dispossession is intrinsically conceived as 
associated with the loss and renunciation of sinful misdirected desire. God is, of course, able to purify 
us to deconstruct self-gratifying identity, transform us to dispossess self-interest, and commands us 
not to make inroads into other for self-aggrandizement. However, God’s inner life in itself does not 
present an idealized pattern of human self-dispossession; rather, the divine gift-giving act within the 
Trinity is the pure donation that has nothing to do with the language of self-diminishment such as 
self-dispossession and self-renunciation understood as emptying human self-interest. Even if one 
insists on using the language of dispossession, it should be only conceived as the divine action of 
giving the gift of love and life without remainder, without self-loss; otherwise, it errs on the side of 
correlating the divine and the human in suggesting that divine self-dispossession is akin to a self-
negating act of human self-dispossession—in exchange for acquiring an unshakable intra-trinitarian 
ground for the robust, confident ethics of self-dispossession. 
 
To speak of divine self-loss and self-dispossession, in effect, carries another unfortunate implication. 
Williams’s repeated emphasis on divine self-dispossession runs the risk of slipping into a kind of 
implicit theological projection and retrojection: to project the human problem of self-interest onto the 
triune relations in order to conceive of the triune relation as an idealized relation to overcome the 
creaturely predicament, and then to retroject the divine self-dispossession back onto the human 
 
319 Williams, “Doing the Works of God,” 257. 
320 Williams, “Theological Integrity,” 11. 
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predicament.321 The triune life of God is portrayed back from the reflections and critiques of human 
finitude, sin, risk, and need, and then the God portrayed in such a way is again offered to the human 
world of finitude and sin as a divine “correction”322 and resolution. And, if this sort of projection and 
retrojection is implicitly operative in Williams himself, it does not only diminish the weights of 
Williams’s critiques of both pathological Freudian projection and Moltmann’s theological projection 
but is also tantamount to somehow mythologizing the triune relation of self-giving into something like 
painful human labour—for the benefit of making human self-dispossession something intrinsically 
reflective of the divine life, something divinely significant. 
Williams himself then may perhaps give ammunition to the error of conflating the pattern of 
God’s life with the human pattern of growth through loss. For if his implicit projection is the case, it 
may allude to a tragic pattern of loss and recovery even in the divine life. For instance, Devon Abts 
summarizes Williams’s spirituality of contemplation as follows: “contemplation is a kind of kenotic 
imitation of the divine ethic: through self-forgetting and self-emptying prayer, the creature enters into 
the pattern of God’s life, “a pattern moving through loss and disorder to life.””323 She perceives that in 
Williams’s thought the pattern of divine life is no less than a pattern of loss and recovery. However, if 
we enter into “a pattern moving through loss and disorder to life,” we, in fact, practice a pattern of 
human transformation rather than participate in a pattern of God’s life. The pattern of growth moving 
through loss to recovery is actually epitomized by Peter’s pattern of failure and rehabilitation. 
It would be worth noticing that Williams actually believes there is an unavoidable place of 
mythological language of loss in God because of a profound entanglement of the incarnate Son in the 
tragic reality of the world. Although Williams is repeatedly antipathetic to a Moltmannian mythic 
inclination towards aligning God with and in the tragedy of the world and is reticent about endorsing 
 
321 This is a mere repetition of what Karen Kilby has already articulated—the logic of double movement of initial-
upward projection and reverse-downward projection: “we first project our best ideas about human community onto 
the Trinity, and then claim to have discovered in the Trinity a new map for structuring human communities” in 
“Trinity, Tradition, and Politics,” in Recent Developments in Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, ed. 
Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014), 73–86 (75). And, then, she argues, “what is 
projected onto God is immediately reflected back onto the world, and this reverse projection is said to be what is in 
fact important about the doctrine” in “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” 
New Blackfriars 81 (November 2000): 432–45 (442). See also Karen Kilby, “Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 12:1 (January 2010): 65–77 (66). 
322  Linn Tonstad has coined the term “corrective projectionism” in God and Difference, 13. “Corrective 
projectionism identifies,” she argues, “certain problems of human existence (e.g., delusions of autonomy, selfishness, 
self-possession, consumerism) and then generates a trinitarian theology that shows how the constitutive 
relationships of the trinity uniquely critique and overcome such human problems. In this way, corrective 
projectionism imports the very problems of human existence it intends to overcome.” It is worth noting that 
Tonstad mentions that Rowan Williams and Sarah Coakley share a tendency towards the corrective projectionism. 
She maintains that, for Williams, like “Coakley,” “divine relations must exhibit (in order to overcome) the same 
potential problems as human relationships do” (124, n. 39). 
323 Devon Abts, “The Repentance of Language: Geoffrey Hill, Gerard Manley Hopkins, and Poetic Integrity,” in 
Innocence Uncovered: Literary and Theological Perspective, ed. Elizabeth S. Dodd and Carl E. Findley III (London: 
Routledge, 2017), 76–95 (84–85). She quotes this phrase of Williams from “Theological Integrity,” 11.  
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an overtly mythological projection of tragedy into the divine life,324 nonetheless he is sympathetic to 
Bulgakov’s “potent mythology” in which “the potential tragedy of mutual annihilation [of the Father 
and the Son]” is “overcome in the joy of the Spirit.”325  And he admits “covert mythology” in 
theological speech as long as it does not transgress “limitation-terms” vis-à-vis God such as God’s 
“coming to know, having the ability to do or not to do, remembering, forgetting, failing or 
succeeding.”326 In this connection, to return to my earlier discussion of Williams’s maximization of 
tragic imagination by means of Jesus’ cry of dereliction, his depictions of the wounded and broken 
divine itself seem to come close to exceeding the “limitation-terms.” It is important to note that what 
Williams makes clear there is that “the divine is not an inflated version of routine human ego-
identity.”327 Here his insistent concern to safeguard against the Freudian charge of infantile projection 
of egoistic desire into the divine becomes clear. It seems that a “virtuous” mythic projection is 
allowed to foreclose an idolatrous projection of an egoistic self-interest to the divine life. And its 
ethical import is accentuated in that the divine who bears loss and endures suffering lays the solid 
theological foundation for robust ethical truth: “the character of divine self-dispossession as the 
human vocation.”328 
 
The Eternal Deflections of Divine Desire as Divine Self-Dispossession 
I have argued above that an implicit projection is at work in the concept of divine self-dispossession. 
In what follows I will seek to show that such a theological–ethical concept of divine self-
dispossession is illustrated in his doctrine of divine desire in the Trinity. 
In “The Deflections of Desire: Negative Theology in Trinitarian Disclosure” (2002), Williams 
presents an apophatic–ascetic trinitarianism which interweaves Vladimir Lossky and John of the 
Cross: “a negative theology of the trinitarian life that derives its negative character … from the 
character of the relations enacted in the story of Jesus and thus also in the lives and life-patterns of 
believers.”329 He interprets Lossky’s apophatic vision of the Trinity against the backdrop of John’s 
ascetic vision of the cry of dereliction, and then sets out to build Christian spirituality and discipleship 
 
324 Williams, “Metropolitan Anthony,” 292–93. 
325 Rowan Williams, A Margin of Silence: The Holy Spirit in Russian Orthodox Theology (Québec: Éditions de Lys Vert, 
2008), 23. 
326 Rowan Williams, “The Christian Experience and the Christian God,” The Furrow 35, no. 11 (November 1984): 
675–82 (681). 
327 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 158. 
328 Williams, The Tragic Imagination, 158. 
329 Rowan Williams, “The Deflections of Desire: Negative Theology in Trinitarian Disclosure,” in Silence and the 
Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation, ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 115–35 (133). 
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upon a dereliction-centred trinitarian life.330 According to Williams, Lossky’s vision of the inner life 
of the Trinity can be construed as a ceaseless movement of divine desire eternally deflected, eternally 
ecstatic love, without termination and thereby without consolation and satisfaction.331 “In the life of 
God, love is always deflected from the ‘object’ that would close or satisfy, that would simply be the 
absent other imagined as the goal of desire; the other is always engaged beyond, engaged with another 
otherness.” 332  The trinitarian life of “the radicality of divine difference” is no less than “the 
endlessness of self-bestowal, which never reaches a terminus, never exhausts the otherness of the 
other.”333 And he concludes the essay with a robust trinitarian anthropology that the Christian life is 
defined as a ceaseless journey towards the transformation of human life into triune life such that we 
are invited to “live coherently in the pattern of divine life.”334 Christian life is “the process of ‘finding 
our way’ within the life of the three divine agencies or subsistents.”335 
 
330 Lossky may unauthorize Williams’s direct alignment of himself with John of the Cross. Lossky in fact puts 
substantial difference between the Western spirituality of “the dark night of the Soul” and his own Eastern 
spirituality in chapter 11 of his The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke, 1957), which is the 
very part that Williams interweaves with John of the Cross’s ascetic in “The Deflections of Desire.” Whilst Williams 
is keen on emphasizing the state of agony, aridity, and darkness as a point of encounter with divine love, Lossky 
avers that “grace will make itself known as joy, peace, inner warmth and light,” and that “dryness is a state of illness 
which must not last; it is never thought of by the mystical and ascetical writers of the Eastern tradition as a 
necessary and a normal stage in the way of union” (225–26). He continues to note that “both the heroic attitude of 
the great saints of Western Christendom, a prey to the sorrow of a tragic separation from God, and the dark night 
of the soul considered as a way, as a spiritual necessity, are unknown in the spirituality of the Eastern Church. The 
two traditions have separated on a mysterious doctrinal point, relating to the Holy Spirit, who is the source of 
holiness. Two different dogmatic conceptions correspond to two different experiences, to two ways of sanctification 
which scarcely resemble one another. Since the separation, the ways which lead to sanctity are not the same in the 
West as in the East. The one proves its fidelity to Christ in the solitude and abandonment of the night of 
Gethsemane, the other gains certainty of union with God in the light of the Transfiguration” (226–27).  
 It is worth noting that Andrew Louth makes reference to the remark of Lossky in his The Origins of the 
Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; first edition 1981), 
174–85 (182–85). Louth quotes Mme Myrrha Lot-Borodine’s “contrast between a passionate, tortured devotion to 
the sufferings of our Lord’s sacred humanity in the West and a more austere, serene devotion to the royal Victor in 
the Byzantine East—the contrast between the crucified Christ in Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece and the 
figures in an icon by Andrei Rublyov” (182). Louth then seeks to give nuance to the contrast. Although I do not 
intend to contribute to the evaluation of the contrast in the present thesis, a refinement of the contrast may be 
possible if the ascetical mysticism of John of the Cross is reinterpreted not from the darkness of dereliction (Rowan 
Williams and Sarah Coakley) but from the faith in the gift of creator, as David Burrell, to whom I will be returning 
in the next chapter, suggests. 
331  It is worth noting that Aristotle Papanikolaou argues that the primary role of apophaticism in Lossky’s 
trinitarian thought actually hinders from properly speaking of the trinitarian persons as ekstasis, freedom and love”: 
“How can one know that God exists as trinitarian persons as freedom and love if God in Godself is shrouded in the 
apophaticism of the hyper-essence?” Papanikolaou’s question may call into question Williams’s attempt to describe 
Lossky’s apophatic Trinity as ecstatic freedom and love. Moreover, “To affirm, as Lossky does, that one cannot 
speak of God on the realm of theologia, that God in Godself is shrouded in apophaticism is,” Papanikoloau 
observes, “ironically, to continue to make primary “essence” language in God-talk.” Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Divine 
Energies or Divine Personhood: Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas on Conceiving the Transcendent and 
Immanent God,” Modern Theology 19, no. 3 (July 2003): 357–85 (375, 376, 377). 
332 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 121. 
333 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 134. 
334 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 135. 
335 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 134. 
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Whilst Williams’s depiction of the trinitarian relation as interminable deflections of divine 
desire has a virtue of trinitarianly ruling out “a simple terminus of piety,”336 this divine life of the 
trinitarian desire bears resemblance to that which Williams portrays as a genuine human attitude in 
the face of the tragedy of the world—risk-taking life with patient endurance without counting cost and 
seeking consolation. “If tragedy means a total lack of completion and consolation” in the thought of 
Williams, as Benjamin Myers highlights, “then it is hard to avoid concluding that there is something 
very like a tragedy going on forever between the persons of the Trinity” in his “doctrine of divine 
desire—the doctrine of the Trinity.”337 (It is interesting to see that Myer’s misgiving about Williams 
resonates with Kevin Taylor’s critique of Balthasar’s trinitarianism of kenotic distance that “there is 
even something like tragedy and tragic risk within the spaces between the Triune Persons.”338) In 
other words, Williams’s portrayal of the nature of the trinitarian relation looks very much like human 
relation that comes to grips with its tragic finitude and sinfulness. And it seems to me that, as in what 
I have argued with regard to divine self-dispossession, Williams’s robust trinitarian asceticism 
proposes a vision with profound relevance for human life in the tragic world—yet at the cost of 
projecting the human tragic predicament onto the intra-trinitarian life, that is to say, coming close to 
ontologizing the tragic as that which the triune persons grapple with. 
 It is helpful here to recall the conclusion that I have reached in the first section of the present 
chapter. I have argued there that Williams’s tragic reading of the Gospel of John comes close to 
ontologically radicalizing the tragic by making the ontological worth of created goodness nihil, by 
allowing the tragic antagonism to drive out the potentiality of the created goodness. I have argued 
here in the second section that Williams’s trinitarian anthropology of self-dispossession leaves the 
strong impression of ontologizing the tragic by elevating the human tragic predicament of self-interest 
and self-gratification to the backdrop of divine relation which the triune persons must reckon with. To 
conclude, he is inclined to ontologize the tragic in the realms of the creation as well as of the Trinity.
 
336 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 128; italics mine. 
337 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 112. 
338 Taylor, “Hans Urs von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,” 137–38, n. 16. 
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Chapter 3. Vulnerability and Competition in the Ascetic Theology of Sarah Coakley 
 
 
 
I have discussed in the first chapter that Sarah Coakley levels the charges against Balthasar that his 
kenotic theo-dramatics assumes competitive accounts of the intra–trinitarian relation as well as the 
God–world relation, and incorporates vulnerability into the life of the Trinity.1 What I shall do in the 
present chapter is to critically examine the ascetic theology of Coakley in the light of the competition 
and vulnerability. In doing so, I hope to complete a triangulated examination and establish that the 
three prominent figures are inclined to put divinely positive light on the darkness of suffering, tragedy, 
and vulnerability respectively in the complicated relations of Williams and Coakley with Balthasar. 
In this chapter I will engage first with the spiritual paradox of human vulnerability and divine 
omnipotence/empowerment—human vulnerability to divine omnipotence is paradoxically productive 
of divine empowerment—and then with the translation of created dependence on God into ascetical 
vulnerability to God. I will argue, with the help of John Barclay, that Coakley’s paradox of power-in-
vulnerability is inclined to give undue priority and fertility to human practices of vulnerability to God 
coloured with painful darkness while paying little attention to the prior empowerment of the divine 
gift that produces human transformation; and that such an ascetical paradox of power-in-vulnerability 
ends up exhibiting a competitive implication for the divine–human relation—something which 
Coakley herself argues against. 
Then I will try to shed light on Linn Tonstad’s pioneering question of why Coakley considers 
“created dependence on God” as “ascetic vulnerability to God” in the first place. I will call into 
question the fact that she dispenses with creation ex nihilo and instead taps into “mystical dereliction” 
in order to understand what created dependence on God means. Finally, I will offer, with the help of 
David Burrell, a creation-centred account of John of the Cross’s ascetical programme as an alternative 
to Coakley’s dereliction-centred account. 
Before going on to examine the paradox of power-in-vulnerability, however, I believe it is 
helpful to situate her theological appropriation of “vulnerability” in a wider contemporary academic 
context by comparing it with Judith Butler’s concept of vulnerability and in a theological scene by 
referring to her evaluations of Balthasar and feminist theology.  
 
 
 
 
1 See “Kenosis, Otherness, and Competition: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley” in the first chapter. 
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Introduction: Situating Coakley’s Idea of Vulnerability 
 
In Comparison with Judith Butler 
As many scholars note, the concept of vulnerability has played a crucial role across a variety of 
disciplines in recent years. It is extraordinarily “elastic”—“it refers to the corporeal, emotional, 
psychological and affective. It is both universal and particular, constant and yet temporally and 
contextually varied. The term readily accepts all variety of adjectival modifiers.”2 The concept of 
vulnerability comes to acquire a theologically heightened meaning and import in the thought of Sarah 
Coakley. She makes a theological contribution to the rich elasticity of “this—already polyform—
‘vulnerable turn’”3 made in wider contemporary academia by adding creature’s vulnerability to God 
in prayer. Even so, Coakley’s theological notion of vulnerability differs markedly from other 
disciplines, which we are required to heed. I would like to shed preliminary light on the significant, 
yet little attended feature of vulnerability in Coakley in a very brief comparison with, for instance, the 
concept of vulnerability in the ethics of Judith Butler, which has recently kindled fierce interest in 
how vulnerability calls forth ethical obligation in human relations.4 
Coakley’s spiritual paradox bears a striking resemblance to Butler’s ethical paradox: power 
emerges from within powerlessness. And, like Coakley, Butler also deems it very unsatisfactory that 
certain movements of feminist theories have harboured “skepticism about vulnerability,”5 and argued 
that “there is no clear way to derive an ethics, much less a politics, from that notion.”6 It may be thus 
hardly a surprise to see people succumbing to the temptation to muddle Coakley and Butler up and to 
treat both concepts as interchangeable.7  In fact, however, the two ideas occur on fundamentally 
different levels which are not supposed to be mixed up. 
According to Butler, the aforementioned types of feminist thinkers fail to consider what 
human dependency means to the most radical degree. The human body is, according to Butler, from 
beginning to end, open to and dependent on the world of unknown and unpredictable others—
 
2 Alyson Cole, “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others: The Political Ambiguity 
of Vulnerability Studies, an Ambivalent Critique,” in The Politics of Vulnerability, ed. Estelle Ferrarese (New York: 
Routledge, 2018), 110–27 (113). 
3 Estelle Ferrarese, “Vulnerability and Critical Theory,” Brill Research Perspectives in Critical Theory 1, no. 2 (2016): 1–
88 (3). 
4 Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, “Introduction: What Is Vulnerability, and Why Does It 
Matter for Moral Theory?,” in Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, ed. Catriona Mackenzie, 
Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1–29 (2–3). 
5 Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 123. 
6 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 123. 
7 For instance, Eleonora Hof, “Towards a Theology of Vulnerability: An Analysis and Critique of White Strategies 
of Ignorance and Invulnerability,” in Salvation in the World: The Crossroads of Public Theology, ed. Stephan van Erp, 
Christopher Cimorelli, and Christiane Alpers (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 242–55. 
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individuals and collectives, plus the seen and unseen infrastructures of the world. And “there is no 
way to dissociate dependency from aggression once and for all.”8 What we share is, for Butler, the 
general, ontological condition of our bodies’ fragility and vulnerability. This condition is intrinsically 
embedded within human life itself: “common human vulnerability . . . emerges with life itself”9 and 
entails “a primary vulnerability to others . . . that one cannot will away without ceasing to be 
human.”10 “Given over from the start to the world of others” is “a primary and unwilled physical 
proximity with others,”11 a “fundamental dependency on anonymous others” 12 which thus cannot be 
“argued against” or “willed away” in the “name of autonomy.”13 Butler’s conception of vulnerability 
thus has to do with inter-human relations and is to be understood in the assumption of shared 
corporeality, in its vulnerability to violence, and in ethical and political possibilities that arise from 
the corporeal vulnerability of universal human interdependence. 
In contrast at a fundamental level, however, the theological vulnerability that Coakley 
proposes is associated with a created relation of human dependence on the divine gift, a human 
relation with God who does not share the human finitude of vulnerability, corporeality, and mortality 
by any means. To put it differently, while Butler’s conceptualization of vulnerability occurs within the 
inter-human relations of corporeal interdependence embedded in the risk of domination and violence, 
thereby assuming bodily vulnerability to pain and suffering in the world, Coakley conceives of 
vulnerability in the relation of human dependence on divine gift. This incommensurable difference 
makes all the difference to subsequent discussions. It is thus natural to see that the paradoxes of 
vulnerability and power in Butler and Coakley differ markedly at a decisive point. 
According to Butler, the universal, mutual corporeal vulnerability is an ineradicable 
“givenness” of human life and existence which together are recognized as an “ongoing normative 
dimension of our social and political lives.”14 The human condition of vulnerability can offer a 
transformative vision for self-dispossession, and a global vision for ethical and political practices. 
 
I find that my very formation implicates the other in me, that my own foreignness to 
myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. . . . I am 
wounded, and I find that the wound itself testifies to the fact that I am impressionable, 
given over to the Other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. I cannot think the 
 
8 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 151. 
9 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York; London: Verso, 2004), 31. 
10 Butler, Precarious Life, xiv. 
11 Butler, Precarious Life, 26. An almost verbatim repetition is in Undoing Gender, 21. 
12 Butler, Precarious Life, xii. 
13 Butler, Precarious Life, 26. 
14 Butler, Precarious Life, 27. 
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question of responsibility alone, in isolation from the Other; if I do, I have taken myself 
out of the relational bind that frames the problem of responsibility from the start.15 
 
In recognition that “the social conditions of our very formation”16 are “not only constituted by our 
relations but also dispossessed by them as well,”17 “the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia can 
be moved into a consideration of the vulnerability of others.”18 And human ethical responsibility 
emerges from “staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability itself.” 19  To recognize the 
precariousness of life that “we can be injured, that others can be injured, that we are subject to death 
at the whim of another” 20  engenders an ethical demand and responsibility—“to risk ourselves 
precisely . . . when our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of 
becoming human.”21 We are able to “think vulnerability and agency together.”22 In other words, 
recognition of common corporeal vulnerability leads to creating an ethical agency. It is because we 
are invited to cross over from self-enclosed vulnerability into “the vulnerability that others suffer 
through military incursions, occupations, suddenly declared wars, and police brutality,”23 that we 
begin “the slow process by which we develop a point of identification with suffering itself.”24 For 
Butler, the ontology of vulnerability concerns “theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical 
responsibility,”25 which leads not to melancholia or powerlessness, but to a genuine basis of ethical 
demand and political responsibility. 
From this insight into the human condition, Butler contends that “sometimes deliberately 
exposing the body to possible harm is part of the very meaning of political resistance.”26 As she 
makes clear in the recent essay “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance,” her formulation of 
vulnerability and resistance indicates that to gather and assemble in the public domain unavoidably 
runs the risk of detention, arrest, and even death.27 “Vulnerability can emerge within resistance,” 
 
15 Butler, Precarious Life, 46. An almost verbatim repetition is found in Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 84. 
16 Butler, Precarious Life, 23. 
17 Butler, Precarious Life, 24. An almost verbatim repetition is in Undoing Gender, 19. 
18 Butler, Precarious Life, 30. 
19 Butler, Precarious Life, 29. 
20 Butler, Precarious Life, xii. 
21 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 136. 
22 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 139. 
23 Butler, Undoing Gender, 23. 
24 Butler, Precarious Life, 30. 
25 Butler, Precarious Life, 22. 
26 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 126. 
27 Judith Butler, “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance,” in Vulnerability in Resistance, ed. Judith Butler, Zeynep 
Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 12–27 (26). She states that “for trans 
people in many places in the world and women who seek to walk the street at night in safety, the moment of actively 
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Butler notes, because we are “neither fully passive nor fully active, but operating in a middle 
region” 28  of human interdependence in which human receptivity, being acted upon, human 
responsiveness, and acting or affecting are inseparable and indistinguishable from one another. When 
we act upon what is not us, we cannot avoid being acted upon by it. Therefore, rejecting an ordinary 
notion that “vulnerability is the opposite of resistance,” Butler affirms that vulnerability understood as 
“a deliberate exposure to power” and to the violence of injustice is inextricably connected with 
“political resistance as an embodied enactment.”29 
It is clear that Butler’s conception of vulnerability shares a good amount of vocabulary with 
and strikingly resembles Coakley’s. However, what they mean are markedly at odds with each other. 
Human vulnerability is, for Coakley, put into practice towards the divine power, and the right practice 
of vulnerability paradoxically produces divine empowerment for resistance against injustice, whereas 
Butler’s vulnerability is related to the human condition of corporeal vulnerability and an exercise of 
public power. If there is a paradox in Butler’s ethics of vulnerability, it is that vulnerability to 
violence unavoidably emerges within resistance against it, and that the recognition of ineradicable 
human vulnerability leads to practices that can bring about a politically responsible community. 
One may call into question if Butler envisages corporeal human interdependence and ethical 
obligation only in the situation of violence. If one may take into consideration that Butler’s ethical–
political conceptualization of vulnerability faces criticism such as “emphasizing shared vulnerability 
puts human existence always on the brink of loss and always under threat,”30 it may be hardly strange 
to ask what risk Coakley runs in the spiritual–ethical affirmation of vulnerability to God. This 
question is magnified in recognition of the fact that she renders dependence on God as vulnerability to 
God. Vulnerability is not merely affirmed but essentialized as the most fundamental reality of the 
creature’s relation with the creator, I will argue, at the cost of dismissing the created goodness and its 
relationship with divine goodness. 
 
In the Context of Balthasar and Feminism 
When it comes to the contemporary theological scene, Sarah Coakley’s theological conceptualization 
of vulnerability as towards God can be evaluated as a robust attempt to salvage both divine 
omnipotence and human vulnerability, two controverted concepts which have called forth important 
debates. Coakley makes critical points of departure from Hans Urs von Balthasar and some feminist 
strands in order to achieve the twofold task. According to her, on the one hand, Balthasar mistakenly 
 
appearing on the street involves a deliberate risk of exposure to force. Under certain conditions, continuing to exist, 
to move, and to breathe are forms of resistance.” 
28 Butler, “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance,” 25–26. 
29 Butler, “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance,” 22. 
30  Rosalyn Diprose, “Corporeal Interdependence: From Vulnerability to Dwelling in Ethical Community,” 
SubStance 42, no. 3 (2013): 185–204 (189). 
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equates vulnerability with divine omnipotence itself; on the other, contemporary feminism errs on the 
side of safeguarding female autonomy in making vulnerability essentially antithetical to Christian 
virtue. She contends that a special kind of human vulnerability to divine omnipotence generates divine 
empowerment, and it thereby proves itself to be a genuine conceptualization of both vulnerability and 
omnipotence without falling into false attempts to divinize and exorcise vulnerability respectively. 
On the one hand, interestingly, in contrast to Rowan Williams who is enthusiastic to spare 
Balthasar from the critique of importing vulnerability and suffering into the triune life of God, 
Coakley expresses a deep reservation about the trinitarian thought of Balthasar in favour of the 
classical idea of divine omnipotence. It is helpful to be reminded that she impugns the view of divine 
kenosis as the loss of divine freedom and power, that is, divine sacrifice, divine self-limitation, and 
divine self-emptying in order to give space for human freedom and power, for such a view is likely to 
fall into a competitive account of divine–human relations as if the more the creator gives up freedom, 
the more the creature occupies freedom. 31  Coakley further criticizes that Balthasar’s post-war 
theology tends to “embrace human weakness into the trinitarian heart of God” and “incorporate 
vulnerability into the trinitarian understanding of God,” to “identify submission with divine power.”32 
On the ground of biblical and theological exposition of the Christ Hymn in Philippians 2:5–
11, thus, in contrast to Balthasar’s trinitarian kenosis, Coakley aligns herself with the view of kenosis 
that “the whole matter of kenosis is, from the start, not a matter of speculating about divine 
characteristics and the effect on them of the incarnation, but rather a moral matter of Jesus’ ‘self-
sacrifice’ en route to the cross.” 33  After drawing this clear distinction, Coakley places the 
christological vulnerability at the heart of spirituality precisely because “Jesus’ ‘vulnerability’ is a 
primary narrative given” 34  to us. And “the frailty, vulnerability and ‘self-effacement’ of these 
 
31 See “Kenosis, Otherness, and Competition: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley” in the first chapter. 
32 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xiv–xv, xix–xx. 
33 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 194. However, this position is somewhat 
compromised when the matter of kenosis becomes closer to a kind of “speculating about divine characteristics.” 
She places emphasis on “a movement of divine reflexivity, a sort of answering of God to God in and through the 
one who prays” (Sarah Coakley, “Can God be Experienced as Trinity?,” The Modern Churchman 28 [1986]: 11−23 
[21]); this kenotic reflexivity plays a fundamental role in establishing the prayer-based model of the Trinity. Even she 
alludes to “kenotic reflexivity between the divine persons,” that is, between the “mutual relations of submission and 
response that might subliminally summon gender associations” that establish difference within the triune relations. 
This “kenotic reflexivity” serves as a starting point for her criticism of Kathryn Tanner’s non-competitive model of 
the Trinity, that it sanitises, erases, and obliterates differences of mutuality—the exchange of give and return. Sarah 
Coakley, “Why Gift? Gift, Gender and Trinitarian Relations in Milbank and Tanner,” Scottish Journal of Theology 61, 
no. 2 (May 2008): 224–35 (232). 
Tonstad makes a similar point: “Coakley makes clear that divinity is not kenotic, although it is gentle (Powers and 
Submission, 38). However, in ‘Providence and the Evolutionary Phenomenon of “Cooperation”: A Systematic 
Proposal,’ in The Providence of God: Deus Habet Consilium, ed. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler  
(London: T&T Clark, 2009), 187, Coakley equates divine kenosis with ‘effusive pouring out’ and with ‘self-hid[ing],’ 
which she considers peculiarly appropriate to divinity.” Tonstad, God and Difference, 125, n. 52. 
34 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 25. 
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narratives [Gethsemane and Golgotha] is what shows us ‘perfect humanity’.”35 His perfect humanity 
is revealed in his vulnerability on the way to and on the cross. As the passion narratives of Jesus 
unfolds to us “the pattern of cross and resurrection,” human vulnerability to God is fertile of divine 
empowerment rather than ending up endorsing vulnerability itself. The right kind of spiritual 
vulnerability to God is not vulnerable to leaking into condoning abusive kinds of vulnerability but 
rather creates divine empowerment that encourages resistance against injustice. This paradox of 
vulnerability and power shows the profoundly deep understanding of the interconnection between 
spirituality and ethics because the ethics of empowerment for resistance does not support self-
autonomy but comes from the deepest space in the human soul where a genuine divine–human 
encounter takes place. 
As regards feminist theologians, on the other hand, Coakley is content to uphold the notions 
of human vulnerability and divine omnipotence, which many feminist theologians found problematic. 
She notes that human vulnerability to God is completely different from any vulnerability to other 
human individuals and social powers. “Submission to God and silence before God—being unlike any 
other submission or any other silence—was that which empowered one to speak against injustice and 
abuse and was the ground of true freedom (in God) rather than its suppression.”36 She thus attempts to 
add correction to feminists who are vigilant about a possibility of the abuse of vulnerability to fall 
victim to patriarchal ideology. She underscores that kenosis is “vital to a distinctively Christian 
manifestation of it [feminism], a manifestation which does not eschew, but embraces, the spiritual 
paradoxes of ‘losing one’s life in order to save it’.”37 She insists that human vulnerability to God not 
only forecloses “the possibility of the mimetic feminist abuse of power”38  (which Coakley may 
observe in “earlier second-wave feminist theologies” with “self-assertion and activist moral zeal, not 
receptive surrender”39), but is also “fully compatible with the rightful goals of a distinctively Christian 
feminism.”40 As Janice Rees encapsulates, for Coakley, “the potential for Christian feminism may lie 
precisely in the rediscovery of vulnerability – in the paradoxical power of the emptied Christ who 
overcomes the world.”41 Sarah Brubaker states that for Coakley 
 
 
35 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 30. 
36 Sarah Coakley, “How My Mind Has Changed: Prayer as Crucible,” The Christian Century 128, no. 6 (March 2011): 
32–40 (36). 
37 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 4, 33. 
38 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xvii.  
39 Amy Carr, “Divine Grace and the Question of Free Will: A Feminist ‘Stumbling Block’?,” in Christian Doctrines 
for Global Gender Justice, ed. Jenny Daggers and Grace Ji-Sun Kim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 135–53 
(139–40). 
40 Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 343. 
41 Janice Rees, “Sarah Coakley: Systematic Theology and the Future of Feminism,” Pacifica 24, no. 3 (2011): 300–
14 (313). 
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feminism is not unfiltered liberal feminism. For Coakley the desideratum of theology is 
not autonomy or self-mastery, even for those to whom it has been unjustly denied. 
Rather, theology’s desire, and humanity’s desire, is for God. And desiring God means 
practicing unmastery, relinquishing control, and emptying oneself—all theological 
themes that, Coakley acknowledges, can make other feminist scholars nervous.42 
 
Even for those who have been already displaced and rendered defenceless within the human world, 
such as refugees and minorities, the virtues of dispossession and vulnerability remain intact at the 
level of the divine–human relation; even if they are suffering as the most dispossessed in the realm of 
inter-human politics, it does not alter the theological truth of the human dependence on God, namely, 
human vulnerability to God.43 And she is convinced that self-effacement and self-renunciation before 
divine power eventually proves fruitful and productive of divine empowerment; this is a central 
spiritual paradox of power-in-vulnerability embedded in the christological paradox of resurrection-in-
death of Jesus. Therefore, Coakley contends that “the profound paradox of an inalienable surrender 
(‘submission’) to God . . . must remain the secret ground of even feminist ‘empowerment’.”44 
 
 
 
42 Sarah Morice Brubaker, “The Indispensable Sarah Coakley: Theology through Prayer,” The Christian Century 133, 
no. 24 (November 2016): 24–27 (25). Kathryn Tanner seems to achieve a similar aim without “making other 
feminist scholar nervous.” “Especially instructive in Tanner’s vision of God is that she cuts the knot that feminists 
usually tie between a radically transcendent God and a divine economy of domination. Since God’s agency operates 
on a different plane of causality than that of humankind, dependence on this transcendent God does not undermine 
the creature’s agency; rather, in the divine economy of grace, the more the creature depends on God, the more 
empowerment she receives for her good. While this divine–human relationship certainly has a hierarchical structure, 
it is one founded entirely on God’s gracious and ceaseless self–giving, so that dependence on God becomes a source 
of abundant life.” Joy Ann McDougall, “Feminist Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. 
Kathryn Tanner, John Webster, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 671–88 (682). 
43 If one fails to pay sufficient heed to the fact that Coakley situates the notion of kenotic vulnerability not in 
inter-human relationship but divine–human relation, it leads to a too straightforward or flat critique of that notion 
such as “a highly problematic notion given that women are already diminished of personhood to sacrifice.” Ally 
Moder, “Women, Personhood, and the Male God: A Feminist Critique of Patriarchal Concepts of God in View of 
Domestic Abuse,” Feminist Theology 28, no. 1 (2019): 85–103 (90). 
It is possible, however, to call into question Coakley’s tendency towards individualizing and interiorizing the notion 
of kenosis. For instance, Janice McRandal is concerned that Coakley’s “appeals to transformative spiritual practices 
nearly always give the impression of an isolated self.” Janice McRandal, Christian Doctrine and the Grammar of Difference: 
A Contribution to Feminist Systematic Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2015), 170. Joann Wolski Conn would take 
exception to Coakley’s spiritualizing of kenosis. She contends that “ascetical kenosis (self-emptying) is not that 
associated with contemplative prayer (stilling of mental faculties), but kenosis is of loving service, emptying the ego 
before the other.” Joann Wolski Conn, “Spiritual Darkness in Women’s Lives,” in Light Burdens, Heavy Blessings: 
Challenges of Church and Culture in the Post Vatican II Era, ed. Mary Heather MacKinnon, Moni McIntyre, and Mary 
Ellen Sheehan (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 2000), 165–70 (168). In relation to a broader context of Coakley’s 
formulation of power-in-vulnerability based on Christ’s resurrection-in-death, it would be also worthwhile noting 
that Ched Myers calls into question that “the true antecedent to “taking up the cross” is “self-denial.”” He asks, “Is 
this, as often argued by bourgeois exegesis, indication of a spiritualizing tendency already within the text, as if Mark 
defines the cross as personal asceticism? Emphatically not . . . .” Ched Myers, Binding the Strong Man: A Political 
Reading of Mark’s Story of Jesus, 20th anniversary ed. (New York: Orbis Books, 2008), 246. 
44 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” x. 
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The Paradox of Human Vulnerability and Divine Omnipotence/Empowerment 
 
The Prioritization and Fertilization of Human Vulnerability to God 
Sarah Coakley, upon the basis of kenotic paradox of vulnerability and power, seeks to establish a 
“kneeling theology,” namely, “a theology founded in intentional practices of ‘un-mastery’.”45 The 
kneeling theology that she pursues purports to present a new direction for contemporary systematic 
theology in that it attempts to intersect theologizing and praying through “theological insights 
available only through practices”46 of prayerful vulnerability to God, “the very act of contemplation—
repeated, lived, embodied, suffered.”47 The validity of her kneeling theology as a discourse and a 
practice towards transformation and resistance thus lies in the validity of the spiritual paradox of 
vulnerability and power/empowerment—our vulnerability to God’s power produces God’s 
empowerment of us. In this section I will contest the logic of this spiritual paradox. I will first show 
that the paradox is inclined to give precedence and assigns a productive role to human vulnerability to 
God which is characterized as pain, darkness, and suffering; and then I will argue that this formulation 
makes it hard fully to acknowledge the priority and efficacy of divine grace, which John Barclay 
elucidates in his Pauline scholarship. And I will finally argue that Coakley’s paradox of vulnerability 
and power gives the strong impression of making a competitive account of the divine–human relation. 
 
The central christological premise that underpins a great deal of Coakley’s argument is that Jesus 
underwent despair and agony on the cross; that his weakness and defencelessness reveals a perfect 
humanity of self-emptying; and that his kenotic self-renunciation produces divine empowerment. This 
“vision of Christological kenōsis uniting human ‘vulnerability’ with authentic divine power,”48 which 
is based on theological exegesis of Philippians 2, carries “imitative spiritual significance” for the 
“spiritual flourishing”49 of believers. They are invited to imitate the kenotic life of the incarnate Son 
by “the ‘spiritual’ extension of Christic kenōsis.”50 Coakley sees kenosis as grounding the life of 
Christ as well as Christian life as its extension. Here the relation of christology and anthropology is 
understood as an archetype of kenosis and its spiritual extension respectively.51 
 
45 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 66. 
46 Sarah Coakley, “‘Deepening Practices’: Perspectives from Ascetical Theology on Belief and Practice, Desire and 
Gender” (2002), in The New Asceticism: Sexuality, Gender and the Quest for God (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 101–27 
(117). 
47 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 43. 
48 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 18. 
49 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 18. 
50 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 34. See also Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 56. 
51  The relation of christology and discipleship in terms of the extension of kenosis seems quite evident and 
indisputable at first glance. Yet a critical question comes into view in the recognition that the directions of kenosis in 
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  And she is determined to argue that the human willingness to embrace kenotic vulnerability to 
God, which is primarily enacted in contemplative prayer, neither cultivates false submissiveness nor 
condones false servility to the sinful structure of human oppression; rather it produces divine 
empowerment for the resistance against false human power to coerce submission and vulnerability. 
Therefore, there is no need to be astonished by the fact that the logic of the kenotic paradox of 
vulnerability and power gives the impression to prioritize human vulnerability because, for Coakley, 
it is believed to lay a foundation for “a productive ‘theology of the cross’.”52 Human vulnerability can 
be encouragingly prioritized insomuch as it is fertile of empowerment. “The expansion and 
‘empowerment’ of the self (cognitively, affectively, spirituality, politically, and sexually) are,” as 
Linn Tonstad points out, “the result of such sacrificial submission.”53 To be vulnerable to divine 
power, in effect, proves itself as empowering: Christ’s “posture of human vulnerability and 
defencelessness” is “a defencelessness which is supremely powerful: both demanding submission, and 
representing it in perfect form.”54 And, for Coakley, this kenotic paradox is a theological formulation 
of the christological paradox of “‘losing one’s life in order to save it’”55 revealed in the central 
narrative of the death and resurrection of Jesus. In this pattern of loss and gain, loss is presented as the 
condition of producing gain, and gain as the result of the quality of the loss. This pattern, which has 
great affinity with the tragic pattern of Rowan Williams which I articulated in the foregoing chapter, 
for Coakley makes the case both for the life of Christ and Christian life. It is truly a genuine spiritual 
paradox in the sense that, according to Coakley, as Christ’s kenosis clearly unfolds in us, the pain of 
human vulnerability to God produces the gain of divine empowerment.56 
 
Christ and us are discrepant with each other. A relation of “extension” cannot be established unless Christ’s and our 
kenosis are oriented in the same direction. However, while the kenosis of Christ is not something required by his sin 
at all, in contrast, human kenosis is always the self-purgative renunciation of the sinful human self. Linn Tonstad has 
already put her finger on this mistake that Coakley makes about intertwining christology and anthropology in terms 
of kenosis: “Christ did not suffer his own idolatries and sins from which he had to be purged; as Coakley recognizes, 
he suffered the consequences of the idolatries and sins of others. So his human kenosis cannot be the kenosis into 
which the pray-er is shaped.” Tonstad, God and Difference, 110–11. And as Karen Kilby observes, human action of 
redirecting “misdirected desire” is to be called “repentance” rather than an embodiment of christological kenosis. 
Karen E. Kilby, “The Seductions of Kenosis,” in Suffering and the Christian Life, ed. Karen E. Kilby and Rachel Davies 
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, forthcoming). 
52 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 37; italics mine. 
53 Tonstad, God and Difference, 113–14.  
54 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 258. 
55 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 4, 33. 
56  One may find interesting some parallels between “vulnerability” and “sacrifice” in Coakley’s theological–
spiritual anthropology of cultivating a vision of kenotic selfhood: 1) human dependence on God translates into 
vulnerability to God and sacrifice for God because divine gift intersects with the radicality of human sin; 2) vulnerability 
and sacrifice are strictly separated as to and for God and to and for the world, and the former is endorsed and encouraged 
(as a wilful and purposeful kenotic enactment of the cross of Christ and the binding of Isaac respectively) while the 
latter is rejected and rebuked; 3) some forms of contemporary feminist theology are taken to fail to recognize the 
profound difference between the right type of vulnerability and sacrifice and the wrong ones. 
The following paragraph encapsulates Coakley’s spiritualized understanding of sacrifice: “sacrifice is the necessary 
purgation of false desire (leading to life, not death) that occurs when the divine gift hits the timeline of human sin 
and asks of us nothing less than complete and ecstatic commitment to the divine. . . . sacrifice is as much a feminist 
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To elaborate on the paradox of power and vulnerability, it is first helpful to make clear that 
there is a double movement of power and vulnerability: the gentle entry of divine “omnipotence” into 
the human dependent through her receptive “vulnerability” and its reproductive exit as divine 
“empowerment” of the recipient towards “resistance” against false powers; divine omnipotence is 
power to be conceived inwardly and divine empowerment is power to be born outwardly; the former 
has more to do with the spirituality of the human reception, the latter more with the ethics of the 
human action. In the in-and-out movement of the reception and procreation of divine power, human 
prayer submissively and vulnerably strips oneself in order to receive or conceive the non-coercive 
divine omnipotence, and make the divine power unreservedly and gently penetrate the human soul in 
the hope that the divine omnipotence creates or procreates the empowerment of the human soul 
towards protest against false forceful human submission and vulnerability. 
For Coakley, as Tonstad points out, “the human being’s free practice of contemplation also 
conditions the movement of God in significant ways. The self-erasing human being in this way comes 
to stand at the very center of her theological project.”57 The human recipient is so nakedly and 
defencelessly open to divine omnipotence in order to “make space” for divine power that the space of 
nakedness and defencelessness accommodates divine omnipotence; or the human being “vulnerably” 
receives the divine gift of power so that divine power manifests itself in the already renounced space 
of human vulnerability and thereby empowers the human being from within the emptied space. In 
other words, Coakley proposes a profound transition of power–submission relation from divine–
human relations to human–human relations—at the cost of depending on the spatial, competitive 
language of “making room”: human submission to divine power is flipped over to divine 
empowerment against human power to enforce submission. Vulnerability is anticipatively affirmed, 
encouraged, and practised in contemplation as a cardinal—spiritual and ethical—virtue on the basis of 
the hope of its future outcome of empowerment. 
Spirituality and ethics intersect with each other in her spiritual paradox. And the intersection 
relies on the claim that human vulnerability in effect is fertile. For Coakley, prayerful vulnerability to 
the divine omnipotence paradoxically brings about divine empowerment that enables the prayer to act 
rightly for the world—and thus eliminates many different kinds of concerns and suspicions such as a 
primary emphasis on human vulnerability which can leak across into condoning or even glamorizing 
 
mode of transformation as it is a death knell to patriarchy; yet patriarchal sacrifice, its dark mimic, ever hovers as a 
seductive and demonic alternative. The one, sacrifice-for-God, brings freedom, union, and peace; the other, 
sacrifice-for-the-world, re-establishes the law of patriarchal violence, possessiveness, and abuse. Again, the one, 
sacrifice-for-God, “interrupts” the fixed repressive gender binary of patriarchy; the other, sacrifice-for-the-world, re-
establishes the violence of mandatory “hetero-normativity” and male dominance. The problem of continuing 
political vigilance, not to say of intense spiritual discernment, is clearly not to be gainsaid. But the rejection of 
“sacrifice,” tout court, is too high a price to pay.” Sarah Coakley, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood, and the 
Binding of Isaac,” in Feminism, Sexuality, and the Return of Religion, ed. Linda Martín Alcoff and John D. Caputo 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 17–38 (31; 23). 
57 Tonstad, God and Difference, 99. 
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“societal ‘submissiveness’, disassociated introversion, apolitical anaesthesia, or the silencing of 
‘woman’,”58  as well as “enforced female submission to priestly authority, or to undeserved and 
unnecessary physical and mental suffering,”59 and “an invitation to be battered.”60 In contrast to this 
false vulnerability, she insists that there is good vulnerability that is paradoxically “profoundly 
transformative, ‘empowering’ in a mysterious ‘Christic’ sense”;61 in other words, it creates “the place 
of the self’s transformation and expansion into God”62 and ultimately produces divine empowerment 
that makes possible “personal empowerment, prophetic resistance, courage in the face of oppression, 
and the destruction of false idolatry.”63 “The silence of contemplation is of a particular, sui generis, 
form: it is not the silence of being silenced. Rather, it is the voluntary silence of attention, 
transformation, mysterious interconnection, and (in violent, abusive, or oppressive contexts) rightful 
and divinely empowered resistance: it is a special ‘power-in-vulnerability.’ . . . Contemplation 
engenders courage to give voice, but in a changed, prophetic key.”64 She later calls what divine 
empowerment produces, I suggest, as “the extraordinary ripple effect of prayer in the Spirit” that 
carries “social and cosmic significance” and “political import” as well as personal significance.65 The 
spiritual, ascetical practice of prayerful vulnerability to God promises a wider societal, communal 
contribution by producing divine empowerment. It is the practised kenotic vulnerability of human 
agency that is fruitful of the divine empowerment that carries such spreading effects of resistance and 
transformation. 
What should be noted is that the vulnerability to God is, quite naturally, characterized as pain 
and suffering. She thus puts great weight on the fertility and productivity of pain and suffering by 
making them the condition and means of producing power and its transformative potential. Human 
vulnerability to God, for Coakley, as Tonstad remarks, “continually, inextricably, and intrinsically 
involves suffering.”66  Coakley goes so far as to say that it is “the productive suffering of self-
disclosure”67 or “a productive or empowering form of ‘pain’.”68 And the productive result of spiritual 
pain and suffering is affirmed in anticipation and proven in retrospect. What John of the Cross 
acquaints us with is that, according to Coakley, “physical and spiritual pain are inexorably welded 
 
58 Coakley, “Prologue: Powers and Submissions,” xvii. 
59 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 36. 
60 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 35. 
61 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 35. 
62 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 36. 
63 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 38; italics mine. 
64 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 84–85. 
65 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 114. 
66 Tonstad, God and Difference, 114. 
67 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 36. 
68 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 37. 
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together” and the “subjective experience,” whatever happens to him “neurologically or 
physiologically,” is of “a progressive transformation into God, even if only retrospectively 
understood.”69 For Coakley, therefore, diagnosing the process of suffering and pain is suspended until 
the bitter end. It is unknown to us till the very end whether it turns out to be a spiritual fruit with a 
neurological/physiological pain or ends up with a merely pathological disorder. 
In sum, Coakley’s kneeling theology of the spiritual paradox is built on the priority and 
fertility of painful vulnerability to divine power. In contrast to her tendency towards prioritizing the 
human practice of vulnerability to God, I will attempt to show that Paul’s theology of the divine–
human relation firmly underlines the priority and efficacy of the empowering divine gift. 
 
The Priority and Efficacy of the Divine Gift in Philippians 2: John Barclay on Pauline Divine 
Gift 
In contrast to Coakley’s great appropriation of kenosis and its paradox in Philippians 2, John Barclay 
seems invertedly to emphasize the divine grace that precedes and empowers human labour in the 
theology of Paul’s Philippians 2. In other words, it is not that divine empowerment is something 
produced by and after human practice, but that the former precedes and produces the latter. Barclay 
offers a surprisingly decisive theological exegesis of Philippians 2:12–14: “With fear and trembling 
work out your own salvation, for God is the one who works in you, both to will and to work for what 
is pleasing.” Interestingly, these revealing verses follow right from the Christ Hymn of Philippians 
2:5–11, which Coakley draws upon in establishing her paradox of power-in-vulnerability. According 
to Barclay, these significant verses show that Paul understands the relationship between God and 
believers as always and already graced; and what it means to be graced is that human will and action 
are empowered by the divine grace that has a priority over it. He claims that this understanding of 
grace as empowerment dominates Pauline literature beyond Philippians. 
  John Barclay makes plain that in the context of the whole letter of Philippians, “‘salvation’ is 
a phenomenon which begins and ends with the initiative of God.”70 And then he asks the following 
question regarding the importance of the initiative of divine grace: “Does God’s work ‘in you’ merely 
provoke or also empower or even constitute their ‘working out’ of their own salvation?”71 Despite 
acknowledging a difficulty to leave no ambiguity in establishing absolute clarity between divine and 
human agency in the verses, Barclay is convinced that divine grace does not simply provoke, invite, 
 
69  Sarah Coakley, “Palliative or Intensification? Pain and Christian Contemplation in the Spirituality of the 
Sixteenth-Century Carmelites,” in Pain and Its Transformations: The Interface of Biology and Culture, ed. Sarah Coakley and 
Kay Kaufman Shelemay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 77–100 (91). 
70 John M. G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in Divine 
and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment, ed. John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (London: 
T&T Clark, 2006), 140–57 (152). 
71 Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’,” 152. 
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or attract human will and action towards God, but that it even empowers, energizes, and enables the 
human relationship with God at its utmost centre or depth.   
  According to Barclay, Paul understands grace as “toward me,” “with me,” “through me,” and 
“in me.”72 And Barclay notes that, echoing Käsemann, “it is inadequate to think of grace as ‘gift’ 
unless we also recognize its character as divine power.”73 In other words, divine grace pervasively 
and penetratingly works as divine empowerment in relation to a believer. Barclay notes that in 
Philippians 2:12–14, alongside many verses in other Pauline texts, Paul “places divine grace anterior 
to human action, while affirming the continuation of that grace in human activity.”74 Pauline literature 
shows that divine grace not only creates and initiates the human will and action from the start, but 
also sustains and perfects human agency by the priority and efficacy of grace.75 “The notion of divine 
energy or empowerment is,” he goes so far as to say, “a common motif in Pauline theology”76 in 
Philippians and beyond. He suggests that, what is of “potentially huge significance” in Philippians 
2:12–14 is that “strikingly the divine work affects both the will and the action of believers: if even the 
will to act is attributed to God . . . , human agency is entangled with divine agency from the roots 
up.”77 He notes that Paul’s “theology concerns the subversive and redemptive power of divine grace 
in Christ, which creates and empowers new communities of social (and therefore broadly political) 
significance.”78 
 
72 John M. G. Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” in Redefining First-Century Jewish and 
Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders, ed. Fabian E. Udoh et al. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2008), 372–89 (383). 
73 John M. G. Barclay, “Under Grace: The Christ-Gift and the Construction of a Christian Habitus,” in Apocalyptic 
Paul: Cosmos and Anthropos in Romans 5–8, ed. Beverly Roberts Gaventa (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013), 
59–76 (62). 
74 Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” 383. 
75 It is interesting to see that the divine grace creating, sustaining, and perfecting human agency bears resemblance 
to the divine power of God the creator to create (ex nihilo), sustain, and perfect the world. 
76 Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” 379. 
77 Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’,” 152; and “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in 
Christ,” 379. It is worth noting that Thomas Aquinas shows a similar understanding of divine agency as 
“noncompetitive causality”—“principal agent” in his exposition of Philippians 2:13: “man is moved by God to will 
[inwardly] and to perform outwardly in a manner consistent with free will. Therefore, willing and performing 
depends on man as freely acting; but on God not on man, as initial mover” (In ad Rom., 777). Michael Waldstein, 
“The Trinitarian Spousal and Ecclesial Logic of Justification,” in Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. 
Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 
274–87 (284–85). Paul Murray as well points out that Aquinas’s exposition of Philippians 2:13 shares much with 
Barclay’s in his paper “St Thomas Aquinas and the Potential Catholic Integration of a Dynamic Occasionalist 
Understanding into the Theology of Grace” given at “Reading Paul Today: Grace and Gift for Protestant and 
Catholic Theology—A Research Symposium in Conversation with John M. G. Barclay’s Paul and the Gift,” held at 
Ushaw College, Durham on June 22, 2018. 
78 John M. G. Barclay, “Why Roman Empire Was Insignificant to Paul,” in Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 363–87 (383). 
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  The vocabulary that best grasps the priority and efficacy 79  of divine grace and its 
consequential divine–human relationship in Paul is, for Barclay, revealingly, “empowerment.” In 
Paul and the Gift Barclay calls the divine–human relation marked by this divine empowerment as 
“energism”:80 the divine gift and the Christ-gift empower, energize, and enable human agency in the 
most radical manner; there is “a pattern of ‘energism’ in Pauline agency” 81  that suggests a 
thoroughgoing entanglement of divine–human agency: “Believers are energized by the Spirit to work, 
actively and strenuously, recognizing that whatever real ‘good’ ensues can be credited only to God.”82 
It is thus natural to see that Barclay, as well as Kathryn Tanner, acknowledges that, theologically 
speaking, what is “generative”83 of all good things is the Christ-gift, and what is “productive”84 of all 
good things is divine gift. In short, divine grace empowers or energizes human will and action in the 
most profound and radical way. 
The Pauline pattern of energism is, for Barclay, admitted to the category of non-competitive 
relation. He maintains that, in a non-competitive conception of divine and human agency, surprisingly 
and properly quoting Kathryn Tanner, God is conceived of as “non-contrastive transcendence” which 
radically guarantees “an extreme of divine involvement with the world—a divine involvement in the 
form of a productive agency extending to everything that is in an equally direct manner.” 85 
Accordingly, human agency lies in “absolute dependence on divine agency”—dependence not as 
vulnerability but empowerment. In this relationship “God’s sovereignty . . . grounds and enables” 
human will; “it is God who effects it, who constitutes its effectiveness as an agent.”86 In other words, 
the divine and human agencies thus stand “in direct, and not inverse proportion”87 in stark contrast to 
a competitive relationship. 
The radical priority and efficacy of divine grace in Paul, for Barclay, creates and enables the 
possibility and importance of human effort, practice, or askesis rather than obscures and diminishes 
human agency. In Paul’s mind, for Barclay, “divine grace calls forth, or takes effect in, human 
 
79 When Barclay speaks about “the efficacy of grace in the will and work of believers” in Philippians 2:12–13, the 
efficacy means “the present, causative agency of God within the agency of believers.” John M. G. Barclay, Paul and 
the Gift (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 569. 
80 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 442. The new nomenclature has already appeared in his previous articles such as “‘By 
the Grace of God’,” 156, n. 39; and “Grace and the Transformation of Agency,” 388, n. 38. Nathan Eubank also 
pays special attention to the “energism” in his paper “Divine Generosity as the Condition of Human Merit” 
presented at “Reading Paul Today—A Research Symposium in Conversation with John M. G. Barclay’s Paul and the 
Gift.” 
81 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 442 
82 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 129. 
83 Barclay, “Under Grace,” 73. 
84 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 46. 
85 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 46, cited in John M. G. Barclay, “Introduction,” in Divine and 
Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment, 1–8 (7). 
86 Barclay, “Introduction,” 7. 
87 Barclay, “Introduction,” 7. 
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labour.”88 The practice of the body to attend to God and live the newness of life lies “only ever in a 
responsive mode”89 to the Christ-gift, the power of the resurrection life of Christ. The divine grace 
demands and requires believers under grace to live the newness of life: “The new habitus of the 
believer—the new perceptions, goals, dispositions, and values—can become effective only in 
practice”;90 ethics of practice and the theology of the Christ-gift are inextricably connected to each 
other.91 But divine empowerment is given as a gift to enable the new habitus, not a reward for 
achieving it, and human practice is elicited as a response to the divine gift, and not as a precondition 
of receiving it. In other words, this responsive aspect, not necessarily painfully vulnerable, to the 
divine gift creates a responsible self who is created and empowered by the resurrection life of Christ 
without making divine empowerment conditional on human reception. 
 
Viewed in the light of the Pauline emphasis on the priority and productivity of divine grace which 
John Barclay highlights, Sarah Coakley’s formulation of the spiritual paradox of vulnerability and 
empowerment leaves the strong impression of giving precedence and productivity to human practice 
of cultivating vulnerability and perfecting self-renunciation. The focused attention on the prioritized 
and fertilized suffering of self-dispossession is inclined to imply that human agency operates in 
advance of divine grace, as an ascetic self who possesses a fair amount of power enough to activate 
self-dispossession in advance of and in the quest for divine empowerment. And the self who proves 
already to be fairly capable of renouncing oneself ironically operates outside the economy of divine 
gift, insofar as human action of self-dispossession takes precedence over divine grace.  
Conversely, Barclay underscores Paul’s emphasis on the priority and efficacy of divine grace, 
revealing that divine empowerment of the divine gift and the resurrection life of the Christ-gift 
precedes and empowers human will and action. “The self who participates in Christ is,” Barclay notes, 
“not merely relocated but reconstituted by its absorption within the noncoercive power of grace,”92 
within (quoting Tanner again) the “context of God’s superabundant gift-giving.”93 Divine agency 
works as the gift-giving of all goodness to unveil, elicit, empower, and intensify created goodness 
from within its primordial origination from and correspondence to divine goodness. The true human 
freedom as created dependence on divine power then does not necessarily translate into a receptive 
submissiveness and vulnerability to the divine giver. If one would take into serious and full 
 
88 Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’,” 151; “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” 
377.  
89 Barclay, “Under Grace,” 76. 
90 Barclay, “Under Grace,” 75. 
91 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 439–41. 
92 Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’,” 156 (italics mine); “Grace and the Transformation of 
Agency in Christ,” 384. 
93 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 71, cited in Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” 
389, n. 39. 
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consideration the non-competitively empowering nature of divine gift-giving and human dependence 
on it, it would not at all be necessary and convincing to render created dependence on divine gift as 
dark vulnerability and painful submission. 
 
The Competition between Divine Coerciveness and Human Vulnerability 
The non-competitive divine–human relation which Barclay emphasizes with the help of Kathryn 
Tanner offers us grounds further to critically engage with Sarah Coakley’s propensity for emphasizing 
the human practice of vulnerability to God. I will argue below that the paradoxical formulation of 
vulnerable human receptivity to gentle divine omnipotence carries a competitive implication for the 
divine–human relation. 
I have shown in the first chapter that Coakley, on the classical theistic basis of the non–
competitive divine–human relation, subjects Hans Urs von Balthasar to a serious criticism that his 
understanding of divine kenosis implies a competitive relation within God and between God and the 
world. She explicitly takes up classical theistic views of non-contrastive divine transcendence and 
immanence as meaning God’s non-competitive involvement with the world. She claims herself to be 
committed to “the so called ‘classical’ vision of divine interaction with the world.”94 She therefore 
stipulates that she agrees with “theistic compatibilists”95 and subscribes to non-competitive accounts 
of the divine–human relation. Her commitment to the classical idea of a non-competitive divine–
human relation has been consistently expressed, including in her recent work on a theistic theory of 
evolution. Her critical repudiation of a competitive account of God in relation to the world enables her 
to reject a competitive account of divine providence and evolutionary process that wrongly suggests 
that “God competes with the evolutionary process as a (very big) bit player in the temporal unfolding 
of ‘natural selection.” 96  In contrast, Coakley avers, God is “‘that-without-which-there-would-be-
nothing-at-all’.”97 Accordingly, “God is that-without-which-there-would-be-no-evolution-at-all; God 
is the atemporal undergirder and sustainer of the whole process of apparent contingency or 
‘randomness’.”98 
 
For God, by definition, cannot be an extra item in the universe (a very big one) to be 
known, and so controlled, by human intellect, will, or imagination. God is, rather, that 
without which there would be nothing at all; God is the source and sustainer of all being 
. . .99 
 
94 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 206. 
95 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 206. 
96 Coakley, “Providence and the Evolutionary Phenomenon of ‘Cooperation’,” 186. 
97 Sarah Coakley, “Creaturehood before God: Male and Female” (1990), in Powers and Submissions, 55–68 (56). 
98 Coakley, “Providence and the Evolutionary Phenomenon of ‘Cooperation’,” 186. 
99 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 44–45. She continues to say that God is, “as such, the dizzying mystery 
encountered in the act of contemplation as precisely the ‘blanking’ of the human ambition to knowledge, control, 
 146 
According to Coakley, in tune with such a classical idea of non-competitive divine–human relation, 
the false competitive construal of divine agency in relation to created agency gives rise to a fatal 
misunderstanding of human freedom “to think falsely of God as making human autonomy 
competitively constrained by divine action.”100 According to the non-competitive or compatibilist 
view for which Coakley herself signs up, we are invited to think rightly that “I am most truly ‘free’ 
when I am aligned with God’s providential and determining will for me.”101 In other words, divine 
agency non-competitively works in relation to human agency, and, in effect, divine agency operates in 
a way of increasing and intensifying, not decreasing and diminishing, human agency—insofar as the 
human will is “aligned with” the divine will.  
A God who accounts for non-competition is thus not “a God who must get out of the way in 
order that ‘freedom’ be enacted,” but “God as nurturing and sustaining us into freedom”102 or “God as 
matrix—as sustaining conditioner of all that we are and do,”103  as the creator and giver of the 
economy of freedom on which we are utterly dependent. She quotes, interestingly, Kathryn Tanner: 
“[Human] relations with God are utterly non-competitive because God, from beyond this created 
plane of reality, brings about the whole plane of creaturely being and activity in its goodness”104 in an 
asymmetrical relation of our utter dependence on divine gift. Finite beings are created, nurtured, and 
sustained in the goodness of the economy of divine power and freedom. Therefore, divine power and 
freedom do not have to be emptied in order for human power and freedom to increase, for divine 
agency initiates, nurtures, and fulfils human agency utterly dependence on the divine gift of goodness. 
It is clear that Coakley’s “‘classical’ vision of divine interaction with the world”105 implies a non-
competitive divine–human relation. And I believe that here she offers a right picture of a non-
competitive relation between God and the world. 
 
However, Coakley, in fact, as Linn Tonstad aptly points out, “construes the God–world relation in 
dangerously competitive ways for someone committed to classical transcendence.”106 In other words, 
although Coakley claims to sign up for a classical account of a non-competitive divine–human 
 
and mastery. To know God is unlike any other knowledge; indeed, it is more truly to be known, and so transformed” 
(45). I concur with Coakley’s understanding of theism with “appropriately apophatic sensibilities” (45), but she gives 
the impression of paying undue heed to a distinction between such apophatic sensibilities and “affliction and 
torment” “because of the soul’s baseness and impurity” (The Dark Night 2.5.2), and of thereby conflating them. 
100 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 188. 
101 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 206. 
102 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 206. 
103 Coakley, “Analytic Philosophy of Religion,” 100. 
104 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 4, cited in Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?,” 262. 
105 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” 206. 
106 Tonstad, God and Difference, 99; italics mine. “Coakley fails to recognize that the difference between God and 
creation is not a binary difference. Binaries entail the definition of one term by the exclusion of the other” (107). 
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relation, I will corroborate below, her actual description of this relation in fact ends up undermining 
this in practice. 
The paradoxical pairing of human vulnerability and divine omnipotence/empowerment is, for 
Coakley, given as an answer to the following question: “How can we best approach the healing 
resources of a non-abusive divine power?”107 How can, for Coakley, divine omnipotence cooperate 
with human receptivity non-coercively? The coupling of human vulnerability and divine omnipotence 
is, for Coakley, intended not only to salvage a virtue of human vulnerability, unlike many feminist 
theologians, as an authentic mode of human receptivity to God, but also simultaneously to retrieve an 
idea of divine omnipotence, unlike many post-war, feminist, process, and new kenoticist theologians, 
as a genuine mode of divine power rather than a “forceful obliteration,”108 a coercive masculinist 
power dominating the created realm. In other words, the genuine richness and benefits of a non-
abusive, non-bullying, and non-coercive divine power is best approached by human vulnerability, by 
patiently enduring the pain of allowing room for the divine power, “by creating the ‘space’ in which 
non-coercive divine power manifests itself.”109 It is in “the special ‘self-effacement’ of this gentle 
space-making”110 that the divine power manifests to us tenderly and gently. And the christological 
unity of “non-bullying divine ‘power’ with ‘self-effaced’ humanity,”111 “the unique intersection of 
vulnerable, ‘non-grasping’ humanity and authentic divine power”112 brings about the paradoxical 
outcome of divine empowerment. In other words, on the one hand, divine omnipotence is affirmed 
insofar as the power non-coercively and non-abusively penetrates the human recipient through her 
vulnerable openness in painful endurance, and, on the other hand, human vulnerability is affirmed in 
the anticipation that vulnerability actually ends up producing divine empowerment rather than 
valorizing weakness and suffering. It is the human vulnerability that can “invite and channel”113 non-
abusive divine omnipotence into the human soul. Divine omnipotence and human vulnerability 
interdependently affirm each other in terms of non-coerciveness and vulnerability. 
 
It is worth first pointing out that Coakley, like Rowan Williams, on the one hand, is committed to the 
ontological difference of God and the world, and, on the other, is keen on making use of the 
spatializing language of “making room” for God in the divine–human relation. 114  Taking into 
 
107 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 34. 
108 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 16. 
109 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 5; italics mine. 
110 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 35; italics mine. 
111 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 31. 
112 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 38. 
113 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 34. 
114  See “Kenosis, Otherness, and Competition: Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley” in the first chapter and 
“Ontologizing the Tragic” in the second chapter. 
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consideration Williams’s concern that that the ontological difference rules out spatializing talk about 
God that slips into a danger of conceiving of God as a competitive item of the world, however, the 
language of “making room” for and “giving space” to God creates the strong impression of speaking 
of God as an agent who meets, at a psychic, noetic or spiritual level, in competition with human 
beings for space.115 If God the creator is ontologically different from the created world and thus does 
not occupy space and compete with us for space at any level, if God outpours the goodness of grace in 
superabundance and gratuity, however, why does the created being have to renounce its space so as to 
allow God to occupy the withdrawn space? If the created being is supposed to dispossess space for 
God in order to allow God in, such a self-dispossession is endlessly unachievable precisely because, I 
suggest, the space that is to be dispossessed is as infinite as God in a spatial sense. The Coakleyan 
ascetic self’s relentless pursuit of perfection of purgation and purification thus endlessly falls short of 
the infinite degree of self-withdrawal and the indwelling of God is indefinitely prolonged. It may 
account for the reason why the Christin life of transformation and purification in Coakley (as well as 
Williams) sometimes looks agonizing, perhaps demanding “Promethean submissiveness,”116 or why 
the two Anglian theologians are inclined to identify the moment of pain and suffering itself as the 
presence of divine grace rather than to cultivate the wisdom to discern the two things that should not 
be conflated. 
Such a spirituality of self-effacement, which is not only prioritized and fertilized but also 
endlessly repeated and agonized, carries a significant implication. If a Coakleyan ascetic self should 
interminably persist in such a painstaking work of “learned, and embodied, strategies of dispossession 
to the divine,”117 ironically, it lapses back into what she intends to overcome, the self-empowering self, 
by negatively returning to and fortifying herself. Consequently, although Coakley proleptically 
defends her own ascetic self-renunciation by saying that it falls into neither “a Pelagian ‘works 
righteousness’”118 nor “narcissistic self-cultivation,”119 the rhetoric of self-dispossession turns out to 
assume a pre-possession of self-renouncing power from the beginning. An image of a potent self is 
thereby, ironically, smuggled into Christian life through the rhetoric of self-impotence.120 
 
115 The reservation about the language of “making room for God” is dotted through Tonstad’s God and Difference, 
esp. 13, 37, 84–86, 111, 150, 159–61, 170–71, 222–24, 232–33. 
116 Tonstad, God and Difference, 109. 
117 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 66. 
118 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 92. 
119 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 19, n. 6. 
120 This critique may resonate with Hegel’s critique of a self-willed ethical action which Judith Butler articulates as 
follows: “The renunciation of the self as the origin of its own actions must be performed repeatedly and can never 
finally be achieved, if only because the demonstration of renunciation is itself a self-willed action. This self-willed 
action thus rhetorically confounds precisely what it is supposed to show. The self becomes an incessant performer 
of renunciation, whereby the performance, as an action, contradicts the postulation of inaction that it is meant to 
signify. Paradoxically, performance becomes the occasion for a grand and endless action that effectively augments and 
individuates the self it seeks to deny. . . . This intermingling of pleasure and pain results from a renunciation of the 
self which can never quite accomplish that renunciation, which, as an incessant accomplishing, carries with it the 
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The smuggling of an image of an already powerful ascetic self into Christian life is closely 
related to her construal of the relationship of the (non)coerciveness of divine gift and the vulnerability 
of human receptivity. It seems at first glance that Coakley understands divine power itself as non-
coercive in relation to the human recipient: the omnipotence of God is already and always there as 
gentle and tender, but we can only allow it in if we vulnerably strip ourselves towards God precisely 
because of our already and always radically sinful misdirection of desire. Yet she creates the strong 
impression that what makes divine omnipotence appear as gentle is, in effect, human vulnerability to 
God—rather than the inherent goodness of the divine power, its correspondence to and coincidence 
with created goodness in the human recipient, and thereby its nourishment and empowerment of the 
human capacity to respond to and be cultivated into the divine life. 
What profoundly obfuscates Coakley’s description of the divine–human encounter is, I argue, 
that she nearly always gives special attention to the sinfulness of radically misdirected human desire 
and the imperative of vulnerable, submissive receptivity to God without giving due explanation as to 
how such a fundamentally misdirected desire is able to recognize divine goodness, to participate in 
the life of God, and to redirect desire for God in the first place. If one is inspired to enter into a 
relation with God, it is the prior work of the divine gift of grace to facilitate and actualize created 
goodness, and to empower and initiate human desire, or will and action into intending to align herself 
with God, that now should be recognized, discussed, and appreciated as breaking through and cutting 
across the radicality of human sinfulness. Such an understanding of divine gift as working in advance 
of and positively energizing human agency may serve to conceive of the divine–human encounter 
non-competitively, without necessarily translating created dependence on and receptivity to God into 
vulnerability and submission to God. 
Coakley gives the recurring impression that it is human vulnerability to God that makes 
divine omnipotence appear as non-coercive; the manifestation of divine power as non-coercive is 
reliant upon whether a human recipient is wilfully vulnerable to it; it is the practice of vulnerability to 
God that “engenders divine power not as [coercive] ‘force’ but as [non-coercive] Christo-form 
‘authority’” 121 ; the created receiver is first required to be vulnerably receptive so that the 
manifestation of divine power is received as gentle. In other words, the non-coerciveness of the divine 
power-gift is indispensably, if not intrinsically, married to the vulnerability of human reception; 
divine omnipotence is unknown as gentle to us unless we are perfectly naked and defenceless before 
 
pleasurable assertion of self. [It] does not translate into self-congratulation or simple narcissism. Rather, it appears as 
negative narcissism, an engaged preoccupation with what is most debased and defiled about it.” Judith Butler, 
“Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection: Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness,” in The Psychic Life of 
Power: Theories in Subjection (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 31–62 (49–50). Without looking 
into Hegel’s meticulous critique of a self-willed ethical action, Molly Farneth questionably claims that Hegel’s idea of 
Entäußerung (“self-emptying”) exhibits “a similar valence” to Coakley’s idea of sacrificial kenosis because they 
converge on the emphasis on “the power to empty (die Kraft der Entäußerung).” Molly Farneth, “‘The Power to 
Empty Oneself’: Hegel, Kenosis, and Intellectual Virtue,” Political Theology 18, no. 2 (2017): 157–71 (159, 168–69). 
121 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 343. 
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God. It thus comes close to implying that the relation of human reception and divine omnipotence 
exhibits a competitive characteristic in terms of coerciveness and submissiveness, abusiveness and 
defencelessness, and bullying and vulnerability respectively on the divine and the human sides: the 
more human reception to God is submissive, defenceless, and vulnerable, the more the divine gift of 
power is non-bullyingly present; the more the human reception is relinquishing, renouncing, and 
dispossessing, the more divine gift is gently, tenderly, and lovingly given; created dependence or 
human receptivity ought to take on nakedness and defencelessness so that the creator’s gift of power 
is non-coercively conceived. The divine gift is non-coercive, -assaultive, and -suppressive “insofar 
as”122 the human reception is all-submissive, -dispossessive, and -vulnerable, only in the condition of 
which divine omnipotence is experienced as empowerment. 
An implication of this competitive account of the divine–human encounter in terms of 
vulnerability and coerciveness may also be reflective of her gradual increase of hospitability to the 
language of divine battering. As one commentator acutely points out, for Coakley’s account of gentle 
divine omnipotence, “the adjective ‘gentle’ is key, for the encounter which takes place here is ‘not an 
invitation to be battered; . . . [God] neither shouts nor forces.’”123 Yet, elsewhere and later, the 
gentleness or non-force of divine power is somewhat withdrawn from her description of the divine–
human encounter. She is gradually inclined to gloss over the gentleness of the divine–human 
encounter and accordingly accentuates something forceful and coercive. She ends up endorsing the 
need of “being battered” as per John Donne’s sonnet, “Batter My Heart, Three-Person’d God.” In 
defence of Donne against a critique that his trinitarian theology of love narrates “the blatantly violent 
interpretation of transcendence”124—“the [male] transcendent God battering from the outside, invited 
to take the poet by force: this is the model of Christian love—which uses the language of rape and 
seduction”125—Coakley espouses Donne’s “battering human desire” by divine desire on the basis of 
his “tragic sense of disjunction between human and divine loves.”126 She seems to jettison her original 
view that the dark contemplation of divine love poetically portrayed in that sonnet is “willed delight, 
not rape or battery.”127 She rather later turns to assert that “the ‘battering’ needed is precisely to 
‘divorce’ him from his ‘enemy’. ‘Chastity’ is thus impossible without drastic divine intervention”128 
 
122 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 56. 
123  Travis Ryan Pickell, “Gentle Space-Making: Christian Silent Prayer, Mindfulness, and Kenotic Identity 
Formation,” Studies in Christian Ethics 32, no. 2 (2019): 66–77 (71, n. 22). He quotes Coakley from “Kenōsis and 
Subversion,” 35; italics mine. 
124 Mary Grey, “The Core of Our Desire: Re-Imaging the Trinity,” Theology 93 (1990): 363–72 (365). 
125 Grey, “The Core of Our Desire,” 365, cited in Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 297. 
126 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 295. 
127 Sarah Coakley, “‘Batter My Heart . . . ’? On Sexuality, Spirituality, and the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity” 
(1994), Graven Images 2 (1995): 74−83 (83). 
128 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 298; italics mine. 
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in the light of Donne’s “truly Augustinian sense of his own bondage of the will,”129 his Augustinian 
“tragic sense of sinful disjunction between human and divine desires,” 130  or, more simply, his 
Augustinian sense of “the radicality of sin.”131 “Only divine force will overthrow that force,”132 
Coakley highlights, so as to realign the perverted human desire with divine desire. The purgation of 
sinful desire, the resetting of misalignment owing to sinful misdirection of human desire, is only 
engendered by the battering force of “drastic divine intervention.” As she reveals her theology of 
grace based upon a strong hamartiology, “to bring different desires into true ‘alignment’ in God 
cannot be done without painful spiritual purgation and transformation, without the power of grace, 
without a dizzying adventure into the ecstasy of divine unknowing.”133 
Here divine grace and its giving becomes grim and even gruesome. The power of divine 
grace invested with the pain of human purgation is bitterly intervening, a battering “force” exerted 
over sinful human desire. Here she even goes so far as to overturn a significant understanding of 
“divine power not as ‘force’.”134  This account of the divine grace of power as force is deeply 
reminiscent of a parenting force inflicting punishment on an aberrant juvenile body, connoting an 
abusive parent and an abused child: a parent who does not spare the whipping to discipline a child 
who was recalcitrantly misdirected, and a child who tamely submits to and joyfully suffers the pain of 
battering until the perfect completion of the redirection, realignment, and transformation of desire. 
Seen in this light, the paradox of power-in-vulnerability comes dangerously close to suggesting that 
vulnerable human submission to the violent divine force is little more than masochism—although she 
claims to deny any implication of “masochism”135 in her asceticism. To conclude, Coakley rightly 
puts divine agency and human agency in a non-competitive relation in terms of human freedom at a 
formal level, but she construes the freedom as self-vulnerability, -diminishment, and -loss of the 
human recipient. Discourse about a non-competitive divine–human relation consequently ends up 
suggesting a competitive relation which severely undermines her professed classical theistic 
understanding of a non-competitive God–world relation.  
 
The Non-Competitive Relation of Divine and Created Goodness: A Preliminary Reflection 
The intrinsic goodness of the divine gift of grace and its resonance with created goodness is 
underplayed in the name of ascetic vulnerability and submission to God in the asceticism of Sarah 
 
129 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 298. 
130 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 299. 
131 Coakley, “‘Batter My Heart . . . ’?,” 82–83. 
132 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 298. 
133 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 300. 
134 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 343. 
135 Coakley, The Cross and the Transformation of Desire, 25. 
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Coakley. This Sisyphean picture of the ascetic self who is forcefully chastened and broken down until 
perfection may account for why Coakley’s spirituality of kenotic vulnerability to God often comes 
across as inexorably anguished or inextricably purgatorial. 
What is of critical importance is that, in the process of developing “a contemporary trinitarian 
ontology of desire”—“a vision of God’s trinitarian nature as both the source and goal of human 
desires” that concerns “how God the ‘Father’, in and through the Spirit, both stirs up, and 
progressively chastens and purges, the frailer and often misdirected desires of humans, and so forges 
them, by stages of sometimes painful growth, into the likeness of his Son”136—she is left reticent 
about the question of how a crucial difference can be spoken of between “misdirected desire (sin and 
blindness)”137—“the fallen and flawed capacity for idolatry, the tragic misdirecting of desire”138—and 
the primordial goodness of desire in created beings. She puts forth little effort to make a due 
distinction between the sinful desire that is to be purged and the created goodness that God “sources” 
and “builds up” in the primordial and ultimate correspondence and resonance of divine goodness and 
created goodness. Instead she remains devoted to the perpetual practice of self-renunciation while 
being almost oblivious to the divine–human interaction of goodness—the infinite goodness that non-
competitively creates and empowers, redeems and heals, and fulfils and restores finite goodness in the 
fundamental relationship of creator and creature. She conceives of human desire as almost only 
tragically misdirected and thus deems it to be only vulnerably chastened into the perfection of 
purgation in the suffering of darkness whilst paying virtually no attention to the created goodness that 
appreciates God’s gift of the all-exceeding divine goodness that echoes, elicits, and energizes the 
created capacity to recognize God as the fountain of every goodness, which is created in the creative 
gift of God the Father, restored in the redeeming gift of God the Son, and rekindled in the 
empowering gift of God the Spirit. 
To put it differently, viewed from a classical perspective of creator-creature relation, while 
Coakley’s trinitarian ontology of desire is so concerned with the tragic epistemic disjunction of human 
desire from divine desire, it does not justice to ontological affirmations of created goodness which 
participates in the absolute goodness of God, affirmations such as: the “positive ontological value and 
sense” of “what things are in themselves and what they are capable of by nature”139; and the creator’s 
creative and perfective donation of gift, “God’s initial donation of being,”140 and “God’s maintaining 
 
136 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 6. 
137 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 26. 
138 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 20. She promises that “the basic view of sin in this systematics is of 
misdirected desire—desire missing its goal (hamartanein in the Greek). The implications of this view of sin will be 
given fuller attention in volumes II and III of this systematics” (59, n. 10). 
139 Rudi Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The “Divine Science” of the Summa Theologiae (London: Routledge, 2006), 123. 
140 Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’,” 111. 
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and governing presence to the creature”141—the affirmations which may safeguard her from not losing 
sight of the divine providential guidance that “preserves things in the good they have (conservatio in 
bono), and it moves things towards the good (motio ad bonum).”142 As John Webster underscores: 
 
God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, things created by him obtain perfection from 
him. . . . Indeed, it is part of the fullness of perfection to be able to communicate to 
another being the perfection which one possesses. . . . Omnipotent power creates and 
perfects creaturely capacity and movement. . . . As the highest good God makes “what 
is best”; the creatures of such a God therefore share in the self-communicative, active 
goodness of their creator. “God so communicates his goodness to created beings that 
one thing which receives it can transfer it to another.”143 
 
Therefore, divine “perfect power communicates perfection.”144 If one is intent on making a focused 
discourse on the ascetical perfection of a creature’s misdirected desire, it is to justify the divine 
goodness and its fundamental resonance with created goodness. 
 
 
Created Dependence on God as Ascetic Vulnerability to God  
 
I have examined so far Sarah Coakley’s spiritual–ethical paradox of human vulnerability and divine 
omnipotence/empowerment. A fundamental question, however, has been left unraised so far. It is 
whether there is an inevitable rationale for Coakley to construe human dependence on divine power as 
painful vulnerability to divine power in the first place, especially if, as Kathryn Tanner states, 
“omnipotence is not viewed as a coercive power to begin with.”145 Although an overarching concept 
of kenotic vulnerability in her kneeling theology has attracted a fair amount of critical attention, this 
fundamental question about translating created dependence on God to ascetic vulnerability to God 
has been left almost untouched until Linn Tonstad put a finger on it.146 Although many scholars have 
 
141 Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’,” 111. 
142 Velde, Aquinas on God, 128. 
143 Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’,” 112. He draws upon Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles 3.69.15–16. 
144 Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’,” 112. 
145 Kathryn Tanner, “David Brown’s Divine Humanity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 68, no. 1 (February 2015): 106–
13 (109). 
146 Anne-Louise Eriksson’s study is an exception. She argues from a feminist perspective that Coakley should have 
understood kenosis as dependence rather than as vulnerability: “Must kenōsis necessarily be understood as a 
relinquishing of power that leads to submission; could it be seen instead as an acceptance of dependency?” Yet 
Eriksson understands Coakley’s notion of kenosis at a directly societal level and fails to recognize that Coakley 
speaks of kenosis as that which takes place in an interiorized and individualized fashion. Anne-Louise Eriksson, 
““Behold, I am the Lord’s handmaiden, not the lords’!” On Sarah Coakley’s Powers and Submissions,” Svensk 
Teologisk Kvartalskrift 85 (2009): 70–74 (73). This issue contains the papers given at the Sarah Coakley symposium 
held at the Centre for Theology and Religious Studies, Lund University on April 15 2009. She  reiterates the same 
point in “The Other on the Cross,” in Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity. A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond, 
ed. Ulrich Schmiedel and James M. Matarazzo, Jr. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 173–80 (176). 
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engaged with Coakley’s notion of vulnerability, as Tonstad rightly observes, “the theologically 
dubious character of construing dependence on God as vulnerability”147 to God has not come into 
sight so far in the debate.148 
 
The Departure from Creation ex nihilo towards the Cry of Dereliction  
Sarah Coakley translates creaturely dependence on God the creator into contemplative vulnerability to 
God. However, what should be noted is that, as Tonstad acutely indicates, she “never explains her 
decision partially to conflate dependence with vulnerability in the divine–human relation.”149 While 
Coakley is strangely reticent about the rationale of the conflation, she is consistently keen on 
construing created dependence on God as dark, painful vulnerability to God. In spite of the reticence, 
I believe a significant hint is dropped in the essay “Creaturehood before God: Male and Female” 
(1990). Coakley rightly maintains that “at the heart of any Christian doctrine of creaturehood must 
surely lie . . . the notion of a radical, and qualitatively distinct, dependence of the creature on God.”150 
Yet she is immediately frustrated at the observation that “the Christian tradition presents no single 
normative understanding of what it means to be a creature; indeed it is not even clear to me that there 
exists a uniquely ‘Christian’ standpoint on creatureliness.”151  Her frustration is magnified in the 
evaluation that “even creation ex nihilo is difficult to justify from Scripture alone.”152 This rigid (and, 
as I will argue, questionable) evaluation explains to those who are perplexed as to why, to begin with, 
she sweeps aside the doctrine of creation—which teaches how the creature is ontologically different 
from the creator and is thus radically dependent on the divine economy of overflowing, gratuitous 
gift—while she is seeking to work out what created dependence on God means. 
 
147 Tonstad, God and Difference, 122, n. 9; 99, 109–10. 
148 In chronological order: Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse”; Michelle A. Gonzalez, “Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar and Contemporary Feminist Theology,” Theological Studies 65 (2004): 566–95; Ruth Groenhout, “Kenosis 
and Feminist Theory,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology, 291–312; Mark L. Yenson, “Battered Hearts and the Trinity of 
Compassion: Women, the Cross and Kenōsis,” The Way 45, no. 1 (January 2006): 51–66; Anna Mercedes, “A 
Christian Politics of Vulnerability,” in The Sleeping Giant Has Awoken: The New Politics of Religion in the United States, ed. 
Jeffrey W. Robbins and Neal Magee (London: Continuum, 2008), 41–54; Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and Christ’s 
Self-Giving; Carolyn A. Chau, “‘What Could Possibly be Given?’: Towards an Exploration of Kenosis as 
Forgiveness—Continuing the Conversation between Coakley, Hampson, and Papanikolaou,” Modern Theology 28, no. 
1 (January 2012): 1–24; Martin, “The ‘Whence’ and the ‘Whither’ of Balthasar’s Gendered Theology”; Annie Selak, 
“Orthodoxy, Orthopraxis, and Orthopathy: Evaluating the Feminist Kenosis Debate,” Modern Theology 33, no. 4 
(October 2017): 529–48; Shelli M. Poe, “Locating Prayerful Submission for Feminist Ecumenism: Holy Saturday or 
Incarnate Life?,” Feminist Theology 26, no. 2 (2018): 171–84; and Michelle Voss Roberts, “Kenotic Gestures: 
Comparative Aesthetics and the Feminist Debate on Kenōsis,” Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology 3, nos. 1–2 
(2019): 198–218. 
149 Tonstad, God and Difference, 110; italics mine. 
150 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 55. 
151 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 55. 
152 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 55. 
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Where does she turn, then, after putting aside the doctrine of creation ex nihilo? When she 
notes that “an ‘absolute dependence’ is indeed at the heart of true human creatureliness and the 
contemplative quest,”153 created dependence on God is defined as “the dark night of the soul” in 
contemplative prayer, a “radical, absolute—and so intellectually ungraspable—creaturely 
dependence”154; it is “the unique sense of creaturely dependence that silent prayer inculcates.”155 For 
Coakley, radical created dependence on the God who creates what God is not, namely, “that without 
which they would not be in being at all,”156 is no less than the epistemic or spiritual vulnerability of 
painful darkness that results from the ungraspability of divine transcendence. She notes that “what is 
experienced as noetic blankness is theologically explained as ‘that-without-which-there-would-be-
nothing-at-all.’”157 In other words, she equates the dark experiential vulnerability of contemplative 
practice with what it means to be a creature absolutely dependent upon the creator’s all-encompassing 
gift. 
She thus detours from tapping into the tradition of creation ex nihilo and instead makes an 
ascetic–christological turn to a vulnerable experience of the darkness of Christ’s cry of dereliction in 
the pursuit of uncovering what absolute created dependence on God means. She sees “Christ’s agony 
in the garden, or his submission to divine will on the cross” as “the hallmark and pattern of achieved 
human freedom.”158 The agony and anguish of Christ epitomizes created dependence on God. 
 
Through prayer God can be recognised both as the creative power on whom all depend 
for their existence, and also as the one who in the dereliction of Christ’s cross is 
disclosed as enduring in patient weakness, and coming perilously close to defeat. The 
Spirit who prays in us and is known in prayer is indeed Lord and Lifegiver, but also one 
who cries “Abba, Father” with us in doubt and darkness and in the sharing of Christ’s 
sufferings.159 
 
Surprisingly, she seems to venture to portray a ‘suffering God’ “enduring in patient weakness, and 
coming perilously close to defeat,” which is also reminiscent of a mythic image of God in Williams’s 
tragic imagination of Jesus’s cry of dereliction. At least, for Coakley, the image of God the creator 
who gives an economy of divine gift of power to initiate, uphold, and fulfil the created order quite 
bluntly squares with “the haunting image of a God exposed in Christ crucified, of divine presence 
 
153 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 68. 
154 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 56. 
155 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 56. 
156 Sarah Coakley, “God as Trinity: An Approach through Prayer,” in We Believe in God: A Report by The Doctrine 
Commission of the General Synod of the Church of England (London: Church House, 1987), 104–21 (107–8). 
157 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 56. 
158 Coakley, “Providence and the Evolutionary Phenomenon of ‘Cooperation’,” 188. 
159 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 121. 
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mediated precisely through weakness and dereliction.”160 It is the ascetical suffering of the darkness 
of Christlike dereliction that is bound up with the divine gift of God the creator. She thus renders 
created dependence on God as a kind of cruciform dependence on God in the vulnerability of 
dereliction, the darkness of agony such as 
 
a profound sense of the mind’s darkening, and of a disconcerting reorientation of the 
senses. . . . The willingness to endure a form of naked dispossession before God; the 
willingness to surrender control (not to any human power, but solely to God’s power); 
the willingness to accept the arid vacancy of a simple waiting on God in prayer; the 
willingness at the same time to accept disconcerting bombardments from the realm of 
the “unconscious”: all these are the ascetic tests of contemplation without which no 
epistemic or spiritual deepening can start to occur.161 
 
It should be noted that she is not speaking simply about a cruciform spirituality but a spirituality of 
dereliction,162 as do Williams and Balthasar. She highlights that Christ’s experience of “darkness, 
obscurity and distraction” under “the all-too-human states of anxiety, weakness and ignorance 
occasionally displayed by Jesus in the gospel narratives”163 is our “experiential basis for trinitarian 
reflection.”164 Coakley suggests that genuine contemplative prayer is anticipated to be extended into 
“genuinely Christlike dereliction.”165 And the spirituality of dereliction is, as a universal feature of 
created dependence on God, for “anyone who regularly spends even a very short time in a quiet 
 
160 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 119. 
161 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 19. 
162 According to Bernard McGinn, there are “three forms of negation in Christian mysticism: the negativity of 
apophasis, that is, the ‘unsaying’ of all forms of human speech in relation to God; the negativity of detachment, i.e., 
the cutting away of attachments to self and world in order to be open to God; and the negativity of dereliction and 
suffering in which anguish and even damnation become the way to God” (100); and he goes on to articulate the 
mystical dereliction as follows: “For those who then and now have dedicated their lives to seeking the unknown and 
hidden God, no trial may seem worse than the loss of God, save possibly the conviction that the hidden God has 
from all eternity decided to forbid his presence to those who most love him. . . . Many students of mysticism have 
been acquainted with this aspect of mystical consciousness [mystical dereliction] through John of the Cross’s 
powerful descriptions of the ‘Dark Night of the Spirit’” (114). Bernard McGinn, “Vere tu es Deus absconditus: The 
Hidden God in Luther and Some Mystics,” in Silence and the Word, 94–114. For further historical and theological 
analysis of the mystical dereliction along with the three forms of negativity, see McGinn’s other works: The Presence of 
God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, Volume 4: The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (New York: 
Crossroad, 2005), 286–89; “The Venture of Mysticism in the New Millennium,” New Theology Review (May 2008): 70–
79 (75–76); “Three Forms of Negativity in Christian Mysticism,” in Knowing the Unknowable: Science and Religions on 
God and the Universe, 99–121 (esp. 102, 111–16); and “Suffering, Dereliction, and Affliction in Christian Mysticism,” 
in Suffering and the Christian Life (forthcoming). 
 Sarah Coakley seeks to expand McGinn’s threefold typology of the meanings of negative theology by 
adding a fourth one: “the distinctively modern expression of God’s presence-as-absence” or “radical divine absence” as observable 
in Simone Weil and R. S. Thomas. Sarah Coakley, “Dark Contemplation and Epistemic Transformation: The 
Analytic Theologian Re-Meets Teresa of Avila,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver 
D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 280−312 (281, n. 3); and Sarah Coakley, 
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163 Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 14. 
164 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 107. 
165 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 179.  
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waiting upon God,” as well beyond the contemplative elite as it is for Christ.166 Here she is very keen 
to radically democratize the experience of dereliction of the cross, in accordance with the principle of 
the “spiritual extension of christological kenosis.” She therefore excavates from the experiential 
perspective of the darkness and pain of Christlike dereliction what it means to be a created being who 
is radically and absolutely dependent on God. 
Thus it might be hardly a surprise to find out that Coakley significantly draws upon John of 
the Cross’ reflection on Christ’s cry of dereliction on the cross in The Dark Night (especially 2.10.7). 
Coakley makes frequent reference to “the dark night of the soul” of John of the Cross when she 
establishes the ascetical christology of the dark cruciform vulnerability of dereliction. The more we 
become vulnerable and submissive to divine omnipotence, the more divine power is gently present 
and operative in us, according to Coakley’s paradox of vulnerability and empowerment. And the 
degree of agony of the human vulnerability and submission to God is to be nothing but Christlike 
dereliction. 
 
The God whom Christians meet in this prayer is also one who appears, sometimes for 
very long periods, to desert us; or worse still (as in St John of the Cross’s “Night of the 
Spirit”) to press upon us with apparently negative pressure, causing disturbance, deep 
uneasiness, the highlighting of sin and even the fear of insanity. Such are the death-
throes of the domineering ego. But only in the light thrown on the activity of the Trinity 
by the story of Christ is this endurable. If we are being “conformed to the image of (the) 
Son” (Rom. 8.29), it is precisely aridity and disturbance that we should expect. Only 
through suffering comes glorification (Rom. 8.17). If we take our cue from the agony in 
the garden, or from the dereliction of the cross, the authentic cry of “Abba” (Mark 
14.33–6) indicates that the most powerful and active presence of God is mysteriously 
compatible with all too human experiences of anxiety and desolation.167 
 
God is, mysteriously, most powerfully and actively present in the agony and dereliction of Christ so 
that divine omnipotence is, paradoxically, most profoundly operative in our vulnerability of Christlike 
dereliction to God. I will propose David Burrell’s creation-centred exposition of John as an alternative 
reading to Coakley’s. 
 
Ascetic Cruciformity to the Suffering of Christ in Romans 8 
Before elaborating upon what Coakley neglects—namely, how creation ex nihilo envisages the divine 
economy of the creator’s gift and created dependence on it—it is worth examining, briefly, Coakley’s 
ascetical spin on christology and trinitarianism in the theological exegesis of, again, Paul. 
One of the main characteristics of Coakley’s kneeling theology is that theological exegeses of 
Pauline texts, in particular Philippians 2 and Romans 8, play crucial roles. As noted, she develops the 
 
166 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 107–8. 
167 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 109–10; italics mine. 
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spiritual paradox of power-in-vulnerability drawing upon the kenotic christology of Philippians 2. 
And she proposes “a contemporary trinitarian ontology of desire”168 on the basis of the prayer-based, 
Spirit-prioritizing, incorporative model of the Trinity in heavy reliance on Romans 8. As she 
confesses, the contemplative model of prayer’s incorporation into the Trinity through lifelong 
purgation “owes its first allegiance to Paul, and supremely to Romans 8”169—although one may 
complain that her contemplation-centred interpretation of Romans 8 “may seemingly arise from 
Coakley’s anachronistic reading of Paul through her own contemplative practices projected back from 
later periods of the church’s life or by valorizing distinct subgroups in the church (e.g. mystics).”170 
To encapsulate “the gracious logic of the prayer of incorporation à la Romans 8,”171 according 
to Coakley, human prayer is put under “the pressure towards a truer and deeper perception of the 
unity of Spirit, Father, and (cruciform) Son.”172 She is incorporated into the divine life—God the 
Father invites and attracts human desire, chastens and purges it; God the Spirit prompts and interrupts 
human desire, conforms it into the image or likeness of God the Son by “means of unleashing divine 
power in human vulnerability.”173 In Coakley’s reading of Roman 8, therefore, “what the ‘Trinity’ is 
is the graced ways of God with the creation, alluring and conforming that creation into the life of the 
‘Son’.”174 
Coakley in fact has laid ascetical weight on the theme of “being conformed to the likeness of 
the Son” in Romans 8 and its association with a dereliction-centred interpretation of John of the 
Cross. For instance, she avers, if I may repeat, “the God whom Christians meet in this prayer is also 
one who appears, sometimes for very long periods, to desert us; . . . (as in St John of the Cross’s 
“Night of the Spirit”). . . . If we are being “conformed to the image of (the) Son’ (Rom. 8.29), it is 
precisely aridity and disturbance that we should expect. Only through suffering comes glorification 
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170 James Kay, “The Place of Prayer in Theological Method: A Conversation with Sarah Coakley,” in Schools of 
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174 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 112. 
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(Rom. 8.17).”175 Coakley highlights that this trinitarian incorporation of a prayer involves patient 
endurance of progressive purgation in painful darkness and vulnerability, for the prayerful 
incorporation is engendered “in and through the passion of Christ”176 towards being “‘conformed to 
the likeness of his Son’, to use Paul’s memorable phrase in Romans 8.29.”177 She understands “being 
conformed to Christ” as spiritual conformity made “progressively into the life of crucified and 
resurrected ‘Sonship’.” 178  (In this sense, she finds problematic contemporary strands of social 
trinitarianism which attempt directly to “imitate” the life of the Trinity “without Christ’s 
mediation.”179) The ascetical conformity to the passion of Christ involves the painful endurance of 
“darkening” the spirit; the “disconcerting reorientation of the senses”; “a form of naked dispossession 
before God”; “the arid vacancy of a simple waiting on God”; “disconcerting bombardments from the 
realm of the ‘unconscious’”;180  and so on. Human prayer is incorporated into the divine life in 
conformity to “genuinely Christlike dereliction.” 181  In short, the spiritual suffering as being 
conformed to the image of the Son with the pain of dereliction undergirds her trinitarian ontology of 
desire and prayer-based incorporative trinitarianism. The ascetical emphasis of John of the Cross 
converges on Paul’s emphasis on cruciformity to the likeness of the Son, according to Coakley’s 
trinitarian ontology of desire based on the prayer-based incorporative model of the Trinity of Romans 
8.  
 
Although her thoughts here are heavily reliant upon Romans 8, surprisingly, one may be bewildered 
by the fact that Coakley dedicates little to “an interpretation of this text, let alone its author” such that 
it leads one to take a dim view as to “whether such an impressive theological construction has been 
placed upon an exegetical foundation that may be unable to support its weight.”182 The credibility of 
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Coakley’s ascetic exposition of Romans 8 could be significantly undermined, for example, by Haley 
Jacob’s recent exegesis of Romans 8 which thus deserves a brief introduction, although I intend 
neither to approve a definitive exegesis of Romans 8, nor to refute Coakley’s exegesis wholesale. 
According to Haley Jacob’s categorization, Coakley’s ascetical exposition of the “conformity 
to the likeness of the Son” in Romans 8 may be categorized as “a spiritual or moral conformity” or “a 
sacrificial conformity,” which is the most fashionable interpretation in popular Christian devotional 
writing.183 According to this interpretation, to be conformed to the image of Christ is a narrative of 
suffering and glory with a prioritized focus on suffering. Michael Gorman encapsulates this type of 
understanding: “Conformity, for Paul, is narrative in character, a two-part drama of suffering/death 
followed by resurrection/exaltation. . . . Conformity to Christ—‘to the image of [God’s] Son’—in 
resurrection is the logical and guaranteed sequel to a life of death to self and of suffering for the 
gospel that corresponds to the narrative of Christ’s dying and rising.”184 This suffering-prioritizing 
“cruciformity” (Michael Gorman’s nomenclature185) is “primarily dependent on Romans 8:17, where 
suffering with Christ (συμπάσχω) is deemed a prerequisite for being glorified with Christ 
(συνδοξάζω).” 186  Haley Jacob observes that in this framework of spiritual, moral, or sacrificial 
conformity, “suffering takes precedence” 187  in the chronology of “present suffering and future 
glory,”188 which holds true for Coakley’s understanding of conformity to the passion of Christ, as well 
as in her paradox of power-in-vulnerability. 
However, Jacob emphatically notes that although it is true that “suffering with Christ is part 
of the life of the believer this side of eternity,” nonetheless, “this does not mean that suffering with 
Christ is part of the telos of salvation.”189 Sympathizing with the interpretations of James Dunn and N. 
T. Wright, Jacob rather contends that “σύμμορφος [conformed to] is not linked with the suffering but 
with the glory. In fact, conformity to the image of the Son is the exact opposite of suffering with 
Christ.”190 The conformity to Christ is rather linked with the resurrection life and glory of Christ. It 
follows that believers’ conformity to the likeness of the Son indicates “believers’ participation with 
 
183 Haley Goranson Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son: Reconsidering Paul’s Theology of Glory in Romans, foreword 
by N. T. Wright (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2019), 3–7. 
184 Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 327, 
cited in Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 8. 
185 Gorman, Cruciformity, 4–5, n. 10. 
186 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 8. 
187 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 8. 
188 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 9. 
189 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 253. 
190 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 253–54. Jacob underlines that to interpret conformity to Christ as a 
spiritual or sacrificial conformity to Christ’s suffering is “to deny the much stronger semantic structure of the 
passage linking Romans 8:29b to glorified in Romans 8:30, which is linked to coglorified and coheirs in Romans 8:17” 
(254). 
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the Son in his unique role as sovereign over creation:”191 “when believers are conformed to the image 
of the Son, they are conformed to his status and function as the Son of God who rules over 
creation.”192 On the basis of Pauline “dual motifs of union and participation with or in Christ”193 as 
“believers’ active share in the resurrection life and glory of Christ as redeemed humans in him,”194 
Jacob maintains that “in being conformed to the Son, believers participate with the Son in his rule 
over creation as people renewed in the image of God.”195 This “vocational” conformity to Christ is “at 
the heart of Paul’s meaning behind ‘conformed to the image of his Son’ in Romans 8:29b.”196 
It is quite clear that Jacob’s exposition seems to move in a very different—if not the 
opposite—direction to Coakley’s ascetical exegesis on conformity to the crucified Son. While 
Coakley is intent on construing human conformity to the Son as a dark progressive purgation “in via” 
or “en route” in and through the dereliction of Christ, Jacob quotes: “Paul is spelling out here the goal 
of the divine prosthesis—the end God has in view for us . . . rather than the stages on the way”197 (“in 
via” or “en route”). Likewise, regarding the theme of “adoption” into God, Coakley considers the 
“Romans 8 approach, . . . an incorporative ‘adoption’ into Sonship by the Spirit”198 as the painful life-
long process, even enduring dereliction, of progressive purgation.199 
In contrast, Jacob understands conformity to Christ as the restored creature’s vocational 
participation in the resurrection life and glory of Christ, and this makes a further difference to the 
understanding of adoption: “Paul articulates that God’s children are called with a purpose. This 
purpose is their glorification—a future reality, no doubt, but also a present reality;”200 “God’s children 
are called to function as vicegerents of God, not only in the eschaton but, however paradoxically, also 
in the present.”201 Whereas Coakley establishes a strict ascetical chronology of the painful endurance 
of suffering in the present, and of the joyful delight of glory in the future from reading Romans 8 in 
accordance with the chronological understanding of cross and resurrection, Jacob shows that the 
children of God are conformed to the resurrection life and glory of Christ in the present without 
 
191 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 16. 
192 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 10. 
193 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 3. 
194 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 15. 
195 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 16. 
196 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 11. 
197 Brendan Byrne, Romans, ed. Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007; originally published 
1996), 272–73, n. 29, cited in Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 254. 
198 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 136. 
199 I have discussed in the previous chapter, Rowan Williams is also keen to understand that being adopted 
children of the Father unavoidably involves the cruciform absence of the Father. 
200 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 16. 
201 Jacob, Conformed to the Image of His Son, 17. 
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denying its aspects of gradual transformation or of eschatological fulfilment.202 To sum up, Jacob’s 
biblical scholarship on Romans 8 poses a non-negligible question to Coakley’s ascetical reading of 
Romans 8 that undergirds her trinitarian ontology of desire and incorporative model of the Trinity. 
 
 
Created Dependence on God: From the View of Creation ex nihilo 
 
The critical, yet brief, examination of Coakley’s ascetical reading above may throw further critical 
light on Coakley’s ascetical propensity itself. She has a strong proclivity for beginning her theological 
arguments from epistemic disjunction and breach in the divine–human relation and lavishing attention 
on how to endure and repair it without paying due regard to divine gift and human receptivity in 
terms of ontological goodness. In other words, it is a trinitarian ontology of broken desire which 
constitutes the fundamental basis of her own kneeling theology. 
In order to delve deeper into Sarah Coakley’s trinitarian ontology of desire, it is important to 
be reminded of the fact that she turns away from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo which provides a 
set of fundamental ontological grounds for Christian theology. She makes a critical decision to avert 
her gaze from creation ex nihilo, because, although she aims to articulate what it means to be created, 
it is difficult (for her) to justify creation ex nihilo from sola scriptura. She avers, there is not “a 
uniquely ‘Christian’ standpoint on creatureliness”203 in the Christian tradition; there is “no single 
normative understanding of what it means to be a creature.” Instead she attends to the darkness of 
dereliction in ascetical practice in order to figure out what created dependence on God means. It gives 
an impression that she thinks it less difficult and more proper to construe created dependence on God 
from the darkness of dereliction than to “justify from Scripture alone”204 (a disassociation which is 
deeply evocative of Balthasar’s separation of divine immutability from biblical imagination) the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo which mainly concerns the fundamental characteristics of the creator–
creature relation. And she runs the risk of overemphasizing the extremely painful experiences of 
dereliction and then jumbling up or even equating them with absolute created dependence on the 
divine gift of the creator. 
 
202 One may wonder how some of the early Christian thinkers understood the themes in Romans 8 as illustrations 
of the Pauline concept of deification. Here it would be sufficient to mention Norman Russell’s conclusion that 
adoption in Romans 8 means that “the sonship of believers is therefore both a present reality and a future hope,” 
neither denying the need of ascetic life nor disregarding the present reality of adoption. Russell, The Doctrine of 
Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 82. 
203 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 55. 
204 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 55. 
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Creation ex nihilo and Scripture 
Coakley’s negative observations of creation ex nihilo, in fact, not only show why Coakley taps into 
the darkness of dereliction at the expense of creation ex nihilo, but also explain why she fails to do 
justice to the doctrine of creation from nothing. Markus Bockmeuhl seems at first glance to be 
sympathetic with Coakley in admitting that “creatio ex nihilo is a doctrine that cannot be 
straightforwardly established by a sola scriptura approach.” 205  However, his meticulous 
understanding of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo shows what she falls short of in making a decision 
to abandon it. 
 
What scripture and its earliest Jewish and Christian interpretation do confirm, however, 
is the central concern which that doctrine seeks to safeguard. . . . The doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo in its origin states the creation’s comprehensive and absolute contingency on 
the Creator while at the same time affirming his unlimited sovereignty and freedom. . . . 
The meaning and substance of the doctrine, though not the terminology, is firmly rooted 
in scripture and pre-Christian Jewish literature.206 
 
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo teaches the absolute dependence of the creature on the creator as the 
infinite source which is deeply rooted in and solidly confirmed by Jewish and Christian literature. In a 
similar spirit with Bockmeuhl, Janet Soskice and David Fergusson highlight that the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo presents, not an exclusively and purely biblical concept though, a biblically 
grounded articulation of creator–creature relation. Soskice underlines that the doctrine of creation is to 
be considered as “a biblically compelled piece of metaphysical theology,” 207  and Fergusson 
enunciates that it is the doctrine that “adequately articulate[s] the relation of God to God’s creation as 
it is understood throughout the Bible.”208  
 
205 Markus Bockmuehl, “Creatio ex nihilo in Palestinian Judaism and Early Christianity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 65, 
no. 3 (August 2012): 253–70 (268). See also Markus Bockmuehl, “The Idea of Creation out of Nothing: From 
Qumran to Genesis Rabbah,” in Visualising Jews through the Ages: Literary and Material Representations of Jewishness and 
Judaism, ed. Hannah Ewence and Helen Spurling (New York: Routledge, 2015), 17–31. 
206 Bockmuehl, “Creatio ex nihilo in Palestinian Judaism and Early Christianity,” 268–70. Matthew Levering concurs 
with Bockmuehl’s remark. Mathew Levering, The Doctrine of  Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and Good Creator 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 36–37. See also Nathan Chambers, “Divine and Creaturely Agency in 
Genesis 1,” Scottish Journal of Theology 72, no. 1 (2019): 1–19. 
207 Janet Martin Soskice, “Creatio ex nihilo: Its Jewish and Christian Foundations,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, 
24–39 (25). 
208 David Fergusson, “Loved by the Other: Creatio ex nihilo as an Act of Divine Love,” in Dynamics of Difference: 
Christianity and Alterity, 265–73 (266). 
It is well acknowledged that in Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought, 
trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994) Gerhard May notes that creation ex nihilo was formulated as an 
alternative against the Greek model, yet was still interpreted within the latter’s framework and terms. In response to 
May, Paul Copan concludes that “we have good reason to believe that the doctrine of creation out of nothing is 
rooted in biblical passages indicating that God is the ontological Originator of all that exists.” Paul Copan, “Is 
Creatio Ex Nihilo a Post-Biblical Invention? An Examination of Gerhard May’s Proposal,” Trinity Journal 17, no. 
1 (1996): 77–93 (93). 
Young claims that creation ex nihilo is “from the beginning, at the heart of what was distinctive of Christianity in 
the Graeco-Roman world.” Frances M. Young, “Creation: A Catalyst Shaping Early Christian Life and Thought,” in 
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It is also worth noting that the doctrine of creation is “a first-order teaching (fundamental in 
that sense)”209 and “a cardinal doctrine”210 in the sense that it opens the way for all subsequent 
theological assertions about the beginning, flourishing, and fulfilment of the created world in relation 
to its creator. Frances Young maintains that creation from nothing characterizes Christian 
doctrines as well as practices: 
 
‘Creation out of nothing’ was the first Christian ‘doctrine’ to be established through 
debate; . . . it subsequently had a determinative effect on the shape of later doctrinal 
conclusions [such as the resurrection, the Trinity, and the Eucharist].211 
 
Given that the doctrine of creation out of nothing is the first doctrine, one might want 
critically to ask whether Coakley contributes to the “ample evidence in modern systematic 
theology of the unfortunate consequences of a rush to link different areas of Christian 
doctrine [in her case, asceticism, christology, and trinitarianism] without first clarifying the 
fundamental doctrines of God and creation.”212 If what created dependence on God means is 
one of the central concerns that creation ex nihilo seeks to maintain, it would stand to reason to draw 
upon creation ex nihilo to uncover how created beings are radically and absolutely dependent upon 
the divine gift of power. Yet Coakley franchises the created dependence on God out to the experience 
of darkness in vulnerability. 
 
The Non-Competition and the Goodness of Divine Gift and the Gratitude of Human Reception 
It would be enlightening, then, to examine what absolute dependence on God would look like in the 
light of creation ex nihilo, which Coakley sidelines, in order to make clear what her exposition of 
ascetical theology falls short of. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo seeks to articulate what it means to 
 
Schools of Faith, 23–33 (23). She enunciates that it was “affirmed in the face of Greek assumptions: ‘nothing comes 
from nothing’ . . . , [and] self-consciously in confrontation with [the] ancient culture” of Greek philosophy as a 
second-century Hellenistic challenge. Creation ex nihilo thus, for Young, gives a good example of the falsity of the 
fashionable suspicion that “Hebraic understanding lost out in the assimilation of the Bible to Greek philosophy, but 
increasingly this seems to be a false estimate of what was going on in the formation of Christian doctrine. The 
development of the distinctively Christian doctrine of creation is a clear sign that Christian intellectuals were not 
‘captured’ by Greek philosophy.” Young, “‘Creatio ex Nihilo’: A Context for the Emergence of the Christian 
Doctrine of Creation,” 139. David Fergusson also approves creation ex nihilo “as the only adequate Christian 
alternative against Greek accounts of matter [as eternal] and Gnostic myths of emanation.” Fergusson, “Loved by 
the Other,” 266. See also “Divine Immutability and Scripture” in the first chapter of the present thesis. Andrew 
Davison affirms that the doctrine of creation is “part of the revolutionary difference that the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
made to the thinking of the ancient world” rather than being held in captivity. Andrew Davison, Participation in God: 
A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 67; italics mine. 
209 Janet Martin Soskice, “Why Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” in Creation ex nihilo: Origins, Developments, 
Contemporary Challenges, 37–54 (41). 
210 Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’,” 99. 
211 Young, “Creation: A Catalyst Shaping Early Christian Life and Thought,” 23. 
212 Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 5. 
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say that God creates what is not God out of nothing. On the one hand, God the creator is utterly 
transcendent as the source and cause of everything other than God; on the other hand, God the creator 
is profoundly immanent as the created world is thoroughly dependent on the divine giver. “All 
creatures share the fact of otherness from God and unilateral dependence on God, who is the sole 
source of the various forms of existence, movement, and place that creatures enjoy.”213 It indicates 
that the doctrine of creation forecloses the possibility of a contrastive account of divine 
transcendence–immanence as if the more God is transcendent, the less immanent, which is 
discernible, as I have argued, in Balthasar’s theo-dramatics. As Susannah Ticciati makes clear, “God’s 
utter transcendence is complemented by God’s utter immanence. . . . True transcendence does not 
foreclose the possibilities of creation, but is their liberating context.” 214  As Andrew Louth 
encapsulates, the seemingly contrasting pair of commitments to the divine transcendence and 
immanence in fact discloses the truth that God’s being “is utterly unlike ours, but also infinitely close, 
for the same reason.”215 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo enunciates that God is “interior intimo meo 
et superior summon meo, ‘more inward than my inmost self and higher than my highest self’.”216 In 
other words, God is transcendent and immanent in relation to the world at the same time in a non-
contrastive way. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo is understood from a non-contrastive perspective to 
mean that the transcendent sovereignty and power of God, and the immanent love and care of God, 
are not in opposition but rather make each other possible. David Fergusson articulates this non-
contrastive meaning of divine sovereignty and love as follows: “The ontological otherness of God is a 
necessary condition for the particular forms that the love of God takes for creation. Hence, the story 
of divine love requires as its accompaniment the theoretical shape supplied by the ex nihilo doctrine; 
it is a fitting testimony to the love of God as the divine Other.”217 
The non-contrastive account further is able to prevent a competitive account of the divine–
human relationship as “if God is elevated, then man is denigrated.”218 A competitive relationship of 
rivalry and conflict is likely to be engendered between created agencies in a hostile environment of 
 
213 Ian A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2014), 67. 
214 Susannah Ticciati, “Anachronism or Illumination? Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo,” Anglican Theological Review 
99, no. 4 (2017): 691–712 (703–4). Both Soskice and Ticciati seek to validate and confirm the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo over against Catherine Keller’s revisionst notion of creation. Alongside Keller, John Caputo is one of the 
fiercest opponents of creation ex nihilo, which he calls the “dream of metaphysical theology” attached to the idea of 
divine omnipotent dominion over creation. See also David Fergusson, The Cosmos and the Creator: An Introduction to the 
Theology of Creation (London: SPCK, 1998), 2–3, 31–33. For a defence of creation ex nihilo, in reliance on Kathryn 
Tanner and against Caputo’s divine power as a “weak force,” see Brian Robinette, “The Difference Nothing Makes: 
Creatio Ex Nihilo, Resurrection, and Divine Gratuity,” Theological Studies 72, no. 3 (2011): 525–57. 
215 Andrew Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology (London: SPCK, 2013), 39; italics mine. 
216 Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology, 39. 
217 Fergusson, “Loved by the Other,” 273. He argues, in line with Kathryn Tanner, that the ontological difference 
between God and the world makes divine love for the world radically personal. See Tanner, “Creation Ex Nihilo as 
Mixed Metaphor.” 
218 Soskice, “Why Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” 52. 
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lack and loss. One may find it quite counterintuitive to appreciate the non-competitiveness of the 
divine–human relation because it is beyond inter-human relations which are often conditioned by an 
apparent environment of scarcity and deficiency and its accompanying violence and vulnerability.219 
However, the divine–human relationship should not be conceived as a competition because it is a 
relation of superabundant divine gift and absolute human dependence. It is a non-competitive relation.  
 
A radical appreciation of divine non-competitiveness carries a particularly significant theological 
implication. The non-competitive relation does not just negatively mean a relation without 
competition or rivalry between God and the world, but a radically positive relation of divine 
empowerment for human flourishing in the most profound sense. This creator–creature relation is 
nothing but the relation of divine gift and fundamental human dependence on it, namely, “the ultimate 
ontological dependence of the existence of all things upon God as its cause, of all that which is 
created out of nothing upon the Creator.”220 The divine non-competitiveness “grounds the creature’s 
action in divine action, such that the divine act empowers the act of the creature, rather than occluding 
it.”221 Here one may find it crucial that a significant convergence comes into view on non-competitive 
divine empowerment both in Paul’s understanding of divine grace that John Barclay underlines, and 
in the understanding of creation ex nihilo of divine–human relation which particularly Kathryn Tanner 
brings into focus. I find it interesting to see that Gary Anderson222 and Christopher Insole223 also take 
note, though in passing, of the convergence of Barclay and Tanner in terms of the non-competitive 
relation of divine and human agency. 
And the profound import of non-competitive divine empowerment acquires exhaustive 
expression in the recognition that the created agency’s dependence on and reception of divine gift is 
already embraced in the economy of divine gift. As Simon Oliver remarks, “Creation’s ability to 
receive the gifts of God is itself a gift.”224 He perceptively expands on this as follows: 
 
Creation’s fundamental character is gift. Creation ex nihilo implies that nothing stands 
outside the divine economy of the gift, for even creation’s otherness from God—its 
 
219 Christopher Insole notes that “the relationship between God and the creature, between the creator ex nihilo and 
the created, is utterly unlike any relationship between creature and creature.” Insole, The Intolerable God, 121. 
220 Carlo Cogliati, “Introduction,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, 1–10 (8). 
221 Andrew Davison, “Looking Back toward the Origin: Scientific Cosmology as Creation ex nihilo Considered 
‘from the Inside’,” in Creation ex nihilo: Origins, Developments, Contemporary Challenges, 367–89 (376, 385–86, n. 22, 387, 
n. 28). 
222 Gary A. Anderson, “Creation: Creatio ex Nihilo and the Bible,” in Christian Doctrine and the Old Testament: Theology 
in the Service of Biblical Exegesis (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 41–58 (50); and “Creatio ex nihilo and the 
Bible,” in Creation ex nihilo: Origins, Developments, Contemporary Challenges, 15–35 (24). He adds that the significant 
convergence of the divine grace in creation and resurrection “makes us better readers of the biblical text.” 
223 Christopher J. Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 197–200. 
224 Oliver, Creation, 146. 
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ability to be the recipient of God’s good gifts—is itself a gift of God. This implies that 
the first mode of creaturely existence is receptivity—the receipt of being and life—
which elicits in creatures the return gift of thankfulness and praise to God.225 
 
Thus it is not that created being is dependent on God outside of God as if the creator cooperates with 
the creature on ontologically the same level.226 The creature is dependent on the divine gift within the 
divine economy of gift. Created dependence is already graced into reception of the divine gift. This is 
what it means to say that the created world is absolutely and radically dependent upon God who 
creates ex nihilo. And this non-competitive gift–dependence divine–human relation is more properly 
characterized, on the side of human agency, by “gratitude and praise to God” than “vulnerability and 
submission to God.” 
The non-competitive nature of divine empowerment is given fuller account when taking into 
consideration the gift–dependence relation of divine and created goodness, which I believe shows that 
dependence on God does not necessarily translate into vulnerability to God. To be in a relation of 
created dependence upon God means, first and foremost, to be in divine goodness; for what is not 
God to come into existence must be created and so is intrinsically linked with the goodness of God. 
As Kathryn Tanner articulates, “To be created is to be in a relation of dependence upon God that holds 
whenever and for however long one exists.”227 She continues to claim, “This relation of dependence 
upon God is . . . always and in every aspect a direct or immediate relation of dependence upon 
God,”228 and “God is by definition a supremely good God who brings forth, therefore, only the good 
as creator.”229  Janet Soskice also highlights that the doctrine of creation from nothing primarily 
 
225 Simon Oliver, “Every Good and Perfect Gift is from Above: Creation Ex Nihilo before Nature and Culture,” 
in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, ed. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 27–45 (44). Oliver makes a reference to John Milbank’s statement, “the act 
of creation is at one and the same time ‘a gift of a gift to a gift’,” which is found in John Milbank, The Suspended 
Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 96. 
Oliver unravels what it means elsewhere. “God’s creation establishes a threefold order of gratuity: the recipient of 
the gift, the gift itself and the donation of one to the other. This seems to establish, however, a radically unilateral 
gift: God simply gives everything.” Simon Oliver, “Henri de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy,” in The T&T Clark 
Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 393–417 (404). 
226 Coakley makes occasional references to the “graced” aspect of the human practice of vulnerability such as “the 
energizing prompting of the Holy Spirit” (God, Sexuality, and the Self, 112) and “the necessity of God’s own prior 
activity” (God, Sexuality, and the Self, 55) alongside its “willed” aspect. She calls contemplative practice of vulnerability 
as, for instance, “the willed (and graced) response to God” (“Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender 
Connotations,” 192). And she conceives of the relation of divine grace and human will as a “two-way relationship” 
of “cooperation” between divine and human agency. However, as John Barclay emphasizes, “cooperation” between 
divine and human agency is more fitting for the category of competitive relation, which falls far behind the non-
competitive feature of divine empowerment “from the roots up” in Paul. In such a cooperative divine–human 
relation, the “willed” nakedness to God is spoken of as prioritized and productive, and that grace is only recognized 
in retrospective. What she falls short of will be enunciated in the following paragraphs. 
227 Tanner, “Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator,” 113. 
228 Tanner, “Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator,” 113. 
229 Tanner, “Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator,” 113. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
helpfully corroborate the convertibility of being and goodness: “the terms ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ are the same in reference, 
differing only in sense. . . . What is desired solely for its own sake is what the desirer perceives as the desirer’s final 
good. . . . Every action is ordered towards being, towards perceiving or enhancing being in some respect either in 
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concerns “the power, goodness, and freedom of God, and the dependence of ‘all that is’ . . . on 
God.”230 “At the heart of the doctrine are God’s power and loving-kindness”;231 “the dependence of 
‘all that is’”232 lies on God’s “grace and gift.”233 Created beings are radically dependent upon divine 
grace as the loving and kind gift of power, freedom, and goodness for its initiation, growth, and 
perfection. The non-competitive relationship of divine empowerment and human reception then 
makes the case only when divine gift is spoken of as empowering the human recipient by renewing 
and reviving the goodness of joy, peace, and rest in the journey of transformation and purgation. 
The non-competitive divine–human relation of goodness still remains valid as the relation of 
the invariable divine donation of goodness and of created dependence on it even in the human 
struggling to receive the divine gift. Even when human sinfulness so tenaciously disrupts and 
painfully frustrates intentional reception to the divine gift that a human recipient is failing to 
recognize and receive this divine gift, which is Coakley’s undergirding concern, divine agency works 
as a gift-giver to enlighten her to recognize the goodness of the divine gift, energize her more clearly 
to realize her receptive capability and thereby to more fully receive divine gifts by recreating and 
revitalizing her created goodness which coincides with the divine goodness. God gives all good gifts 
to finite and sinful beings, enables them to acknowledge the gifts, and empowers them to redirect their 
misdirected desires so that they can pass through darkness and pain, caused not by divine gift but by 
human fallibility, and attune themselves into the divine life. God’s resuscitation and revitalization of 
the inherent created goodness from within energizes created agency to realize the darkness of 
misdirected desire and to turn towards God (metanoia), who works to facilitate, actualize, and 
invigorate the created goodness in the infinite process of journey towards the creator (epektasis). God 
radically nurtures and empowers the human self, created by divine gift and recreated by the Christ-gift, 
to recognize, perceive, and appreciate more fully the divine gift of all goodness in delight and 
gratitude. To put it differently, created dependence on the non-competitive divine gift-giving is more 
justifiably translated into receptive appreciation, joy, and gratitude to God than painful vulnerability, 
darkness, and submission to God. 
 
 
 
the individual or in its species: in acting all things aim at being. Therefore, again, being is what all desire; and so 
being is goodness. . . . Generally, then, ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ have the same referent: the actualization of specifying 
potentialities.” Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Being and Goodness,” in Divine and Human Action: Essays 
in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 281–312 (282–84). 
230 Soskice, “Why Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” 38. 
231 Soskice, “Why Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” 41. 
232 Soskice, “Creatio ex nihilo: Its Jewish and Christian Foundations,” 24. 
233 Soskice, “Why Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” 40. 
 169 
Dependence as Vulnerability or Union: Interpretations of John of the Cross 
 
Dependence as Vulnerability in Darkness: Coakley and Williams 
I have sought to show that in the kneeling theology of Coakley, created dependence on God is 
illegitimately hived off from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo into an ascetical experience of 
dereliction. And then I have attempted to show that the non-competitive relation of absolute created 
dependence on radical divine grace viewed from the perspective of creation ex nihilo makes it 
possible to portray a genuinely non-competitive divine–human relation in terms of the goodness of 
divine gift and the gratitude of human dependence. And the gift and gratitude of goodness also gives a 
robust account of human purgation and transformation without necessarily translating created 
dependence on God into ascetic vulnerability to God. Now I would like to show that what I have 
argued above may offer a possibility to shed light on Coakley’s as well as Williams’s appropriations 
of John of the Cross. In this final section of this chapter, as well as of this thesis, I will seek to show 
how the perspective of creation ex nihilo, which Coakley hastily dispenses with from the beginning, 
leads to a markedly differing appropriation of John’s mystical theology from hers. 
Coakley’s dereliction-centred account of “the dark night of the soul” of John of the Cross sets 
the tone for her ascetical paradox of power-in-vulnerability: divine omnipotence is most gently and 
tenderly present in the suffering of the darkest vulnerability of dereliction which most profoundly 
engenders divine empowerment.234 The darkness of “genuinely Christlike dereliction”235 is thus not 
only essentialized but also glamorized. The darkness of suffering becomes perilously far too 
proximate to the joy of divine presence and gift. It is worth noting that Rowan Williams’s exposition 
of John’s mysticism shares much with Coakley’s ascetical emphasis on the cry of dereliction in her 
interpretation of John.236 I believe that to devote a series of paragraphs to discuss Williams’s account 
of John serves to instantiate Williams’s tendency towards ontologically radicalizing the tragic, which 
I have argued in the foregoing chapter. And I am discussing it here, rather than in the previous chapter, 
because David Burrell’s creation-centred exposition of John can accentuate a dereliction-centred 
focus on John’s ascetical programme that the two prominent contemporary Anglican theologians 
emphatically share. 
 
234 Sarah Coakley, “Divine Hiddenness or Dark Intimacy? How John of the Cross Dissolves a Contemporary 
Philosophical Dilemma,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, ed. Adam Green and Eleonore Stump 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 229–45; Coakley, “Redeeming Human Nature according to John of 
the Cross,” 1–13; and Coakley, “Palliative or Intensification? Pain and Christian Contemplation in the Spirituality of 
the Sixteenth-Century Carmelites,” in Pain and Its Transformation, 77–100. 
235 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 179.  
236 See also “Eternal Deflections of Desire as Divine Self-Dispossession” in the previous chapter.  
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Rowan Williams places great emphasis on the centrality of Christ in John’s spirituality: 
“Christ himself, then, is for John ‘the ultimate touchstone of spiritual authenticity’.” 237  And he 
encapsulates the spiritual authenticity in the teaching of John (in particular, his exhortation in The 
Ascent of Mount Carmel 2.7, which features Jesus’s cry of dereliction) as follows: “We cannot expect 
that the discipleship of the crucified Christ will be without cost to us; we cannot pray to be spared 
what Christ was not spared”238 on the cross. For Williams, above all, “the model for this [the dark 
night of the soul] is the dereliction of Jesus on the cross: if Jesus is the way to the Father, our way 
involves the same death he endured.”239 
Yet Williams seems too audaciously to understand the darkness and anguish of dereliction, 
not simply as that which Jesus experiences by “the privation of specific, determinate goods,” 240 but 
also by the agonizingly deflective nature of the Father’s love itself. 
 
To share Christ’s relation to the Father is not to enjoy a supreme experience of 
emotional intimacy, but to be drawn into the profoundly elusive and alarming 
“deflections” of love that constitute the life of the Trinity; it is to share in Jesus’ 
confrontation of the divine absence.241 
 
Even for the human subjectivity of Jesus, the non aliud of the Father’s reality, the 
excess and elusiveness of the Father’s love, appears concretely as the black void of 
Gethsemane and Calvary, the “annihilation” of the dereliction on the cross.242 
 
Williams contends that Christ’s painful agony of abandonment is associated with the anguished 
apophatic nature of the divine love itself. It enables him to establish a paradox of love and pain, 
intimacy and abandonment—which is akin to Balthasar’s and Williams’s paradox of the negative and 
positive extremes which I discussed earlier.243 He associates the agony of Christ with the divine love 
itself such that the most negative sinful extremes (pain, agony, darkness, abandonment, loss, and so 
on) can be paradoxically and internally related to the most positive divine extremes (joy, love, 
intimacy, union, grace, and so on). By associating the human darkness of dereliction intrinsically with 
the inner nature of the triune love itself—not simply with human finite encounter with the divine 
transcendence and with human sinfulness—244 he puts a divinely positive light on the agony of 
 
237 Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 180. 
238 Rowan Williams, “Teresa, the Eucharist and the Reformation,” in Teresa of Avila: Mystical Theology and Spirituality 
in the Carmelite Tradition, ed. Peter Tyler and Edward Howells (New York: Routledge, 2017), 67–76 (71). 
239 Williams, “The Deflection of Desire,” 121. 
240 Williams, “The Deflection of Desire,” 120–121. 
241 Williams, “The Deflection of Desire,” 128. 
242 Williams, “The Deflection of Desire,” 121. 
243 See “The Paradox of Dereliction and Intimacy in the Gospel of John” in the previous chapter. 
244 John of course states that the darkness happens when the divine transcendent light goes over the limit of finite 
human faculties. But the agony and anguish within the darkness of loss and privation are caused by the human soul, 
not by divine transcendent light. “Why, if it is a divine light (for it illumines souls and purges them of their 
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darkness. The tragic paradox of abandonment and unity in christology and asceticism245 acquires a 
good deal of expression in Williams’s multifarious references to John of the Cross. 
 
Jesus is presented to us as the one human being who enjoys unconditional intimacy with 
God, who in some sense shares God’s own authority, but this intimacy presses him to 
go to his death, a death of agony and senselessness—“Why hast thou forsaken me?” It 
is this very closeness to God that sends him into this hell of suffering.246 
 
Christ’s destitution calls forth our setting out on the path of risk and loss, our journey 
into darkness; only in the heart of the darkness is the union consummated that brings us 
into the active life of God.247 
 
And this tragically “difficult” paradox of abandonment and unity is inclined to further create an 
impression of making a competitive relation with regard to the most profound relationship of the 
Father and the incarnate Son, which in turn defines and characterizes the adoptive relationship of God 
and his children. 
 
On the cross, Jesus is left without any perceptible consolation or sense of support from 
the Father; the Father, we might say, has ceased to be in any way a graspable other for 
the subjectivity of Jesus. . . . When the negation of all determinate consolation is 
arrived at, what is “left” is the purpose and act of God.248 
 
The more Jesus is willing to be entirely dispossessed of the divine presence, fully annihilated of the 
sense of intimacy, and completely vulnerable to the divine absence, the more the Father–Son unity is 
 
ignorance), does the soul call it a dark night? In answer to this, there are two reasons this divine wisdom is not only 
night and darkness for the soul but also affliction and torment. First, because of the height of the divine wisdom 
that exceeds the abilities of the soul; and on this account the wisdom is dark for the soul. Second, because of the 
soul’s baseness and impurity; and on this account the wisdom is painful, afflictive, and also dark for the soul” (Night 
2.5.2). In this regard, as Colin Thompson points out, “San Juan explains that the experience of darkness is soul-
engendered and not inherent in the light.” Colin Thompson, St John of the Cross: Songs in the Night (London: SPCK, 
2002), 219. See also Colin Thompson, “The Spanish Mystics,” in An Introduction to Christian Spirituality, ed. Ralph 
Waller and Benedicta Ward (London: SPCK, 1999), 65–90. 
245 It is important to underline that Williams as well as Coakley are quite clear in the first place about how darkness 
in human spiritual transformation is conjoined with Christ’s tormented consciousness of dereliction in John’s 
mysticism. On the contrary, according to Edward Howells’s interpretation of John of the Cross in John of the Cross 
and Teresa of Avila: Mystical Knowing and Selfhood (New York: Crossroad, 2002), it remains unclear how exactly John 
relates Christ’s cry of dereliction with the dark night of the human soul: “Certain difficulties of interpretation arise 
over precisely how far John thinks that we can identify with the humanity of Christ in our own dark night, given 
that Christ’s humanity was in some respects unique” (133–34); “The difficulty arises over the sense in which Christ’s 
spiritual suffering was like our own” (196–97, n. 36). See also Edward Ingram Watkin, The Philosophy of Mysticism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 297–98. 
246 Rowan Williams, “‘The Dark Night’,” in Open to Judgement, 95–100 (98). See also Rowan Williams, “A History 
of Faith in Jesus,” in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus, ed. Markus Bockmuehl (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 220–36 (228); Rowan Williams, “Religious Experience in the Era of Reform,” in The Companion 
Encyclopedia of Theology, ed. Peter Byrne and Leslie Houlden (London: Routledge, 1995), 576–93 (589); Rowan 
Williams, “To Stand where Christ Stands,” in An Introduction to Christian Spirituality, 1–13 (10–11); Williams, “Word 
and Spirit,” 125; and Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 170–71. 
247 Williams, “Against Anxiety, Beyond Triumphalism,” 275. 
248 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 121; italics mine. 
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fully unveiled and revealed. The intimacy with the Father is fully validated and manifested insofar as 
the Son is utterly abandoned by the Father and fully embraces the agony of abandonment. Similarly, 
he also comes close to associating the darkness of dereliction with the divine will: “If God is to work 
in us as he wills, we must become Christlike; and that is to bear the ‘living death’ of inward and 
outward darkness and lack of consolation.”249 
In putting a divinely positive light on the anguish of the dereliction, Rowan Williams 
encourages us to see the divine presence in our agony and anticipate the divine joy in our pain. “For 
John, it was fundamentally important to be able to interpret his mental anguish as itself ‘grace,’ the 
mark of God’s intimacy.”250 Human agony of abandonment by the divine absence in effect proves the 
divine intimacy. When the one who prays experiences unbearable agony by God’s absence, he or she 
is urged to see this agony as “the mark of God’s intimacy.” Likewise, Williams suggests, in a 
radically trinitarian apophaticism of John of the Cross, “the facing and negotiating of need and lack as 
they are experienced in specific lives and specific relations” within history are given “the joy or 
fruition of the other,”251 “the radical delight in the otherness of the other’s desire that is rooted in the 
love of the Trinity.” 252  Here the horizon of the divine–human relation and the intra–trinitarian 
relations is retracted into nothing other than seeing the endless reckoning with interminable pain as 
joy, agony as delight, and darkness as light. It harks back to part of what I have agreed in the previous 
chapter that God simply echoes the moment of brokenness and mourning. 
Such a tragic paradox is only possible on the premise that the darkness and agony of 
dereliction has an internal relevance to the nature of the intra-trinitarian love in John’s mysticism. It is, 
of course, hardly disputable that the ascetic programme of John of the Cross is uncomfortably, in 
greater or lesser degree, agonized: “The journey, then, does not consist in consolations, delights, and 
spiritual feelings, but in the living death of the cross, sensory and spiritual, exterior and interior” (The 
Ascent of Mount Carmel 2.7.11).253 Yet it seems that John associates the anguish of Christ on the 
cross primarily with “a death to our natural selves” (Ascent 2.7.9) rather than death to the elusive 
nature of the triune love or vulnerability to God. In this light, Williams’s mooring of the ascetical 
darkness of agony in the intra-trinitarian nature of divine love in John’s mysticism may perhaps be 
able to lay an intra-trinitarian foundation for a “difficult” spirituality and ethics of endless human 
self-dispossession, but only at the cost of internally associating the human darkness with the divine 
love and thereby sacralizing and divinizing it. And if we are reminded that the tragic finitude and 
sinfulness of human life is, as I have argued, projected onto the trinitarian life so that “there is 
 
249 Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 171. 
250 Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 164. 
251 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 132. 
252 Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 133. 
253  I refer to The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, trans. by Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Carmelite Studies, 1991). 
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something very like a tragedy going on forever between the persons of the Trinity”254 in Williams’s 
apophatic exposition of John of the Cross, it could be said that the christological darkness of 
dereliction corresponds to the intra-trinitarian dereliction-like darkness within the tragically 
interminable absence of consolation and satisfaction, analogously with his tragic imagination of the 
cry of dereliction with regards to the intra-trinitarian difference and otherness. 
In one way or another, Sarah Coakley and Rowan Williams are inclined to elevate the 
darkness of dereliction into something essential, meaningful, even something divine, as internally 
associated with the divine life. Yet one may want, rightly, to attract attention to the Carmelite’s 
principle: 
 
There can be no concordance between light and darkness; as St. John says: Tenebrae 
eam non comprehenderunt (The darkness could not receive the light) [Jn. 1:5]. . . . Two 
contraries cannot coexist in the same subject. Darkness, an attachment to creatures, and 
light, which is God, are contraries and bear no likeness toward each other, as St. Paul 
teaches in his letter to the Corinthians: Quae conventio lucis ad tenebras? (What 
conformity is there between light and darkness?) [2 Cor. 6:14] (Ascent 1.4.1–2). 
 
John’s principle may cohere well with a thoughtful insight that Edward Howells offers as regards the 
vexing matter of human suffering and divine presence in John’s writings: 
 
John’s teaching becomes complex, however, when he asserts that these two opposites, 
the destruction of the soul in abandonment, and the direct presence of God which fulfils 
the soul, are to be found together in human experience. The task of spiritual growth 
becomes one of learning how to distinguish them, so that the direct presence of God can 
be pursued and the destruction of the soul rejected. Why they are found together 
remains a mystery: it is a fact of life. But he is clear that they do not belong together, 
and his efforts go into providing means to separate them.255 
 
The interpreters of John are thus required to bear a fundamental principle in mind: there is no likeness 
between darkness and God, whereas there is an essential likeness between light and God. John of the 
Cross neither invites us into putting a positive light on darkness, nor acquaints us with any kind of 
fertility of suffering itself, as does Coakley. In spite of a really knotty reality of painful darkness and 
human transformation in the world, for John of the Cross, “darkness is nothing and less than nothing 
since it is a privation of light” (Ascent 1.4.3). John’s understanding of darkness as “nothing” coheres 
well with the idea of evil as nonsubstance that is implied in the teaching of creation ex nihilo. A 
careful reading of John thus does not necessarily intensify a fascination with a paradox of darkness 
and presence, vulnerability and empowerment, “the destruction of the soul in abandonment” and “the 
 
254 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 112. See “The Eternal Deflections of Divine Desire as Divine Self-Dispossession” in 
the foregoing chapter. 
255 Edward Howells, “Suffering and the Desire for God in John of the Cross,” in Suffering and the Christian Life 
(forthcoming). 
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direct presence of God which fulfils the soul”—however attractive it looks, however distressingly 
suffering and pain are woven into the fabric of the reality of vulnerable, frail, and precarious human 
life.256 And such a meticulous reading of John of the Cross is, I believe, aptly epitomized by David 
Burrell’s creation-centred exposition. 
 
Dependence as Union with the Creator: David Burrell 
In a fascinating parallel to Sarah Coakley (as well as to Rowan Williams), David Burrell offers a 
robust exposition of the mysticism of John of the Cross on the basis of creation ex nihilo. His case is 
of particular interest and importance for the purpose of this chapter as well as of this thesis in that it 
offers an exposition of John of the Cross that contrasts significantly with Coakley’s which draws upon 
a kind of mystical dereliction while averting her gaze from creation ex nihilo. Burrell explains the 
ascetic mysticism of John in light of the creature’s fundamental dependence on the creator’s 
unceasing gift rather than the darkness of dereliction. Whereas Coakley’s ascetical theology seems to 
begin from epistemic disjunction between God and us, Burrell starts with contemplation of the 
intrinsic ontological intimacy of creator and creature and proceeds to excavate and disclose its 
theological implications. In this regard, I hope that Burrell’s understanding of John’s spirituality 
serves as a counterexample to show how a more comprehensive picture of the teaching of John is 
portrayed with due regard to the Carmelite’s fundamental commitment to creation; and that it 
subsequently shows that a theological and spiritual commitment to dependence on God does not 
necessarily conceive of a kneeling theology as vulnerability to God. 
 
It would be helpful to begin with an examination of how Burrell appreciates the meaning of the 
creational relation of God and the world. It is also beneficial in that it reminds us of how I have 
discussed the divine–human relation so far in terms of non-reciprocity, non-contrast, non-competition, 
and so on. In Faith and Freedom (2004) and elsewhere, Burrell regularly endorses a pair of axioms: 
the “non-reciprocal relation of dependence” of creature on creator,257 and a “non-contrastive relation 
of creator and creature”258 (Kathryn Tanner), articulating the conception of God as a free creator and 
an intentional cause of being in Thomas Aquinas, along with al-Ghazali in Muslim, and Moses 
 
256 Whereas Brian Robinette rightly takes the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as the richest source of Christian 
contemplation, he acquires rationales for an “ascetic–contemplative” mode of theology from Sarah Coakley without 
noticing that, as I have delineated, she dispensed with creation ex nihilo and gravitates toward dereliction. Brian 
Robinette, “Undergoing Something from Nothing: The Doctrine of Creation as Contemplative Insight,” in The 
Practice of the Presence of God, 17–28. 
257 Sara Grant, Toward an Alternative Theology: Confessions of a Nondualist Christian (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002; originally published 1991), 40. See David Burrell, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 120, 134, 139, 154. 
258 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology. See Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 134, 139. 
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Maimonides in Jewish, traditions.259 Burrell maintains that the doctrine of creation in each tradition 
brings into sharp focus that, as Stanley Hauerwas encapsulates, “as creatures we are necessarily 
related to our creator in a manner that makes possible the living of our lives as gift.”260 Aquinas as 
well as al-Ghazali and Maimonides, for Burrell, are content to insist that “the creator who is the cause 
of being is also an intentional cause”;261 first, as the cause of being, “the First or the One as the free 
source of all” does not compete with the creature at all and is “the source of all perfections”; second, 
as intentional cause, “the creator is open to a personal relationship with created persons,”262 and the 
focus of the creature’s gratitude to the creator lies in the creature’s recognition of the creator as the 
“source of their being and well-being.”263 In other words, the creature is dependent on the creator for 
its existence and perfection in gratitude, which squares with Tanner’s remark: “The more full the 
creature is with gifts the more the creature should look in gratitude to the fullness of the gift-giver.”264 
The primary contribution of Aquinas’s exploration of creation, for Burrell, lies in 
characterizing “the singularity of the relation of creator to creation”265 and locating “the paradigmatic 
meaning of creation as dependence in existing.”266 All creatures, “all-that-is is freely originated and 
exists in dependence on the One.”267 In this sense, “the creator’s primary effect is the existence of 
things,”268 and creation itself is “the unique founding relation,”269 the one between the creator who 
freely bestows the gift of being, and the creature who is non-reciprocally dependent on the divine gift. 
Burrell cites Aquinas: “This [the creator’s activity of bestowing the very existence of things] is how 
things receiving existence from God resemble [God]; for precisely as things possessing existence they 
resemble the primary and universal source of all existence (Summa Theologiae 1.4.3).”270 For Burrell, 
Aquinas, denying a reciprocal relation in the relation between creator and creature (the “unreal” 
relation of the world to God, which is, I have argued, obscured in Balthasar’s theo-dramatics),271 he 
intends to claim the full force of the fact that “creatures have their very being from the One who is, 
 
259 David Burrell, “The Act of Creation with Its Theological Consequences,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, 
40–52. 
260 Stanley Hauerwas, “The End of Religious Pluralism: A Tribute to David Burrell,” in Democracy and the New 
Religious Pluralism, ed. Thomas Banchoff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 283–300 (293). 
261 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 153. 
262 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 153. 
263 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 153. 
264 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 2–3. 
265 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 134. 
266 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 153. 
267 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 78. 
268 David Burrell, “Divine Action and Human Freedom in the Context of Creation,” in The God who Acts, 103–9 
(106). 
269 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 171. 
270 Burrell, “Divine Action and Human Freedom in the Context of Creation,” 106. 
271 See “Locating Sin and Evil in God: The “Real” Relation of the World to God” in the first chapter of the 
present thesis. 
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while that One’s being in no way depends on creating.”272 This is what the “ontological distinction”273 
of creator as source, and the creature whose being it causes, means.  
Burrell also regularly underscores that “the inexpressible relation of creator to creatures,”274 
namely, the non-reciprocal relation of the creator’s gift and created dependence, presumes the non-
contrastive or non-competitive relation as dubbed by Kathryn Tanner,275 to whom Burrell’s non-
competitive “mode of thinking”276 owes much: “Non-divine being must be talked about as always and 
in every respect constituted by, and therefore nothing apart from, an immediate relation with the 
founding agency of God.”277  
 
Once we grasp the implications of the doctrine of free creation, we will not be tempted 
to conceive God over against the world, so that we will then be constrained to make 
such a one “more accessible;” rather, understanding God as the freely originating source 
of all-that-is, we will find in that gracious “transcendence” all the “immanence” we 
might need.278 
 
The free creator is the source that originates and sustains the creature’s being and the cause that 
initiates and perfects the creature’s well-being; the creature is entirely dependent on the divine gift 
from the very beginning to the end. At this most fundamental, metaphysical level, a crucial question is 
given an answer: 
 
Why must the divine agent be seen as the only proper agent? Because all-that-is is 
always dependent upon the divine power, of course. Yet that same power empowers 
creatures to act in their own right; that is precisely how we distinguish a creator from 
agents acting within the universe.279 
 
There is a radical acknowledgement of the priority and gratuity of the divine gift-giving of 
empowerment towards the creature. The creature is created and embraced within the divine economy 
of gift from the beginning to the end. It is what absolute created dependence on the creator means, to 
which little regard is paid by Coakley’s paradox of practising vulnerability to divine power and 
producing divine empowerment. 
 
272 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 134.  
273 Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1995; originally published 1982). See also Bernard McGinn, “Do Christian Platonists Really Believe in Creation?,” in 
God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium, ed. David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 197–219 (209). 
274 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 233. 
275 See also David Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1993), 185, n. 2, 201, n. 16. 
276 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi. 
277 Tanner, God and Creation, 84, cited in Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 237. 
278 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 209. 
279 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 229. 
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What is of particular relevance is that the connection between creation and Christ sheds light 
on the sheer difference of theological paradigms between Coakley and Burrell. The connection of the 
doctrine of creation with christological themes carries a significant theological implication. Coakley 
sees that “through prayer God can be recognized both as the creative power on whom all depend for 
their existence, and also as the one who in the dereliction of Christ’s cross is disclosed as enduring in 
patient weakness, and coming perilously close to defeat.”280 Burrell views that “the One who comes to 
us in Jesus is the same One through whom we are all created, and so is that One ‘in whom we live, 
move, and have our being’.”281 In other words, while Coakley intends to contemplate the creating and 
sustaining power of God with and from God enduring the cross of Christ with the cry of dereliction, 
Burrell views God the creator with the incarnation—rather than dereliction—and makes “the intrinsic 
connection of redemption with creation.”282 It is thus hardly a surprise that Coakley translates created 
dependence on God into created vulnerability to God as she is intent on contemplating creation almost 
always from the perspective of darkness, death, or decreation. This is the difference between seeing 
the God of creation as the God of suffering and death, and seeing the God of creation as the God of 
incarnation and redemption—an underlying difference which makes a difference to a good deal of 
subsequent discussion. 
 
Burrell’s creation-centred view makes a difference even to a recent trend of interpreting the ascetic 
ascent of John of the Cross as dereliction-driven, a trend to which Rowan Williams and Sarah 
Coakley contribute, and which has dominated for a long time. Burrell lays a foundation for 
understanding the dark night of the soul in John of the Cross on the ground of the creature’s absolute 
dependence on the creator’s gift in its existence and perfection. He notes that “a proper articulation of 
the mystery of creation undergirds any robust account of human freedom, as well as any attempt to 
articulate our intentional relations to our creator, any ‘spiritual’ discourse.”283 For Burrell, God, the 
source of all that is, is an “intentional” creator who is the source of “all perfections” or the “well-
being” of the creature, as well as of its being; the divine activity of the source of all is “thoroughly 
‘intentional’ in character, relating to itself and its creation with an understanding love which is the 
quintessence of responsiveness,” 284  as Aquinas articulates; the divine activity is an “intentional 
activity whereby the creator of all ‘knows each particular thing, not only as they are in their causes, 
but even as each one of them is itself in act’.”285 It means that Christians as well as Jews and Muslims 
 
280 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 121. 
281 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 239. 
282 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 239. 
283 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi; italics mine. 
284 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 18. 
285 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 63. 
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pray to “the One who is the very source of their being,”286 the most profound, fundamental, and 
radical sense of source, in “the unique character of the relation called ‘creation’.”287 In other words, 
for Burrell, a Christian understanding of human intentional practice or ascetic discipline bears closest 
relation to human contemplation on the mystery of creation, our deepest dependence on the source of 
our being and well-being. As Aquinas underscores, the word “creation” is “an expression of a faithful 
experience of the world as a whole in the light of God’s revelation,”288 and thus “to speak of the world 
as created by God is primarily a statement of faith.”289 “For once we appreciate how radical is our act 
of faith in a free creator,” therefore, Burrell highlights, “then it becomes clear that we cannot be 
separate from God.”290  
Burrell extends the question of how faith in the creator’s gift and the creature’s absolute 
dependence on it undergirds mystical theology in Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology 
(2011) and “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered” (2013). In the latter, he reiterates the aforementioned 
commitment verbatim: “Once we appreciate how radical is our act of faith in a free creator, then it 
becomes clear that we cannot be separate from God.”291 In the article, Burrell is convinced that a 
theological articulation of creation as the most profound and fundamental relation of creator and 
creature properly and profoundly upholds the spiritual practice of kneeling to God. What is of 
particular interest and relevance is that, according to Burrell, this interconnection of faith in the 
creator and ascetical practice is epitomized by no less a person than John of the Cross,292 which is the 
fact that enables us to place him in counterpoint to Coakley’s construal of John’s mysticism. 
Burrell makes a significant point about the theme of union in the spirituality of John by 
pointing out that John’s “dark night of the soul” presumes a uniquely metaphysical, primordial 
relation of all creatures to their source from the perspective of creation that is examined above. And 
he uncovers a specifically theological and spiritual dimension of creation ex nihilo. Burrell suggests 
 
286 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi. 
287 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi. 
288 Velde, Aquinas on God, 124. 
289 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi; italics mine. Burrell delineates what Aquinas means by faith in connection with 
John of the Cross as follows: “Aquinas will characterize faith as ‘an act of mental assent commanded by the will, [so] 
to believe perfectly our mind must tend unfailingly towards the perfection of truth, in unfailing service of that 
ultimate goal for the sake of which our will is commanding our mind’s assent’ (Summa Theologiae 2.2.4.5). Unlike 
ordinary belief, then, faith must be an act of the whole person, involving a personal and critical quest for a truth 
which outreaches our proper expression. John will focus critically on our concepts: ‘nothing which could possibly be 
imagined or comprehended in this life can be a proximate means of union with God’ (Ascent, 2.8.4), since ‘nothing 
created or imagined can serve the intellect as a proper means for union with God; [rather], all that can be grasped by 
the intellect would serve as an obstacle rather than a means, if a person were to become attached to it’ (Ascent 2.8.1).” 
Burrell, Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology, 104–5. 
290 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, xxi. 
291 David Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” Modern Theology 29, no. 2 (April 2013): 5–21 (14). 
292 He has conducted preliminary research on John of the Cross from the perspective of the creator–creature 
relation, and of the creature’s faith in it, in Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
103–6. 
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that John of the Cross, as one of great mystics and “distinctive followers” of Aquinas, along with 
Meister Eckhart, 293  is concerned to uphold and advance the primordial and fundamental union 
between creator and creature together with the recognition of the distinction between the transcendent 
God and the world dependent on that God. According to Burrell, John distinguishes metaphysical 
union and intentional union: the metaphysical union means the “union between God and creatures 
[which] always exists [and by which] God sustains every soul and dwells in it substantially. . . . ‘By it 
He conserves their being so that if the union would end they would immediately be annihilated and 
cease to exist’ (Ascent 2.5.3).”294 This underlying fact of “essential or substantial union” concerns and 
attends all creatures, thus it is “found in everything,”295 even in “the greatest sinner in the world” 
(Ascent 2.5.3); the intentional union indicates the union only exists “‘where there is a likeness of love 
[such that] God’s will and the [person’s] are in conformity’ (Ascent 2.5.3),”296 that is, only found in 
the soul’s right purgation and purification into divine life which Coakley is greatly concerned about. 
Burrell argues, however, there is no indication of “heteronomy” between the essential union and the 
intentional union in Living Flame of Love, in which John poetically describes the joy of the 
intentional union because “John presumes that unique metaphysical relation of person (‘soul’) to its 
source.”297 Burrell notes that, consequently, 
 
all of this culminates in the realization that “relating to God”, as in “praying to God”, 
should take no effort, as there can be no “gap” to be bridged. For if our very being is a 
“being to the creator”, then the interior path to one’s own self will lead us invariably to 
the One who sustains us in existence. There will of course be many obstacles blocking 
the way to one’s own self, as we know very well and as John of the Cross will 
 
293 As I have introduced earlier, Lossky emphasizes that a tradition of “mystical dereliction” has little or no 
influence in the Eastern spirituality. It is also interesting to note that that tradition also admits of notable exceptions 
even in the Western tradition as well, most notably, according to Bernard McGinn, in Meister Eckhart. McGinn 
underlines that Eckhart’s mystical theology teaches us to take note of “the difference between the negativity of apophasis and 
the negativity of dereliction” (McGinn, “Vere tu es Deus absconditus,” 103; italics mine). It is related to McGinn’s 
observation that “Meister Eckhart emphasized divine hiddenness, but not the anguish of the believer in the face of 
the mystery of God who seems to draw away and abandon his lovers” (McGinn, The Presence of God, 286). According 
to McGinn, “The German Dominican is the premier exponent of divine nothingness; his entire mysticism is 
founded on the teaching that there is no ‘God’, at least as humans could ever conceive him. . . . Nevertheless, 
Eckhart’s view of God’s hiddenness has nothing of the tortuous character of Luther’s Deus absconditus, or of what we 
find in some of Eckhart’s mystical contemporaries. The divine nothing (niht) that Eckhart preaches, unlike the God 
attained in Gregory’s contemplative ascent, or the predestinating God of Luther, does not induce fear and anxiety in 
the mystic. For the Dominican, sinking into the indistinct nothingness of God (sink all mîn iht in gotes nît, as the 
Granum sinapis poem puts it) does not result in anything like Luther’s Anfechtung, or mystical dereliction. . . . This is a 
powerful statement of the darkness of God, but not of the torture of the believer in the face of the divine mystery. 
Though many of the thirteenth-century women mystics [such as Angela of Foligno, Mechthild of Magdeburg, 
Marguerite Porete, and Catherine of Bologna], like Eckhart, aspired to a unitive goal beyond distinction and all 
human modes of knowing and willing, their accounts of how the unknown God is encountered often contain strong 
doses of a mystical dereliction not found in Eckhart” (McGinn, “Vere tu es Deus absconditus,” 103–104). I have 
pointed out that a kind of mystical dereliction sets the tone for Coakley’s ascetical theology. 
294 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
295 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
296 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
297 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 16; Burrell, Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology, 106. 
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abundantly delineate, but there can be no “distance” from that created self to its 
creator.298 
 
What is distinctive in Burrell’s account of John’s ascetical programme is that “‘relating to God’ . . . 
should take no effort” as “praying to God” should do. His account is grounded on John’s 
acknowledgement of the exhaustive importance of a radical relation of the creator’s gift and the 
creature’s dependence on the divine gift. According to Burrell, this theological commitment performs 
a culminating role in constructing John’s ascetic programme. It suggests that the union with God can 
be rightly understood first and foremost within the essential creator–creature relation and in the 
creature’s faith in its source, without creating the need to prioritize vulnerability and darkness. Sarah 
Coakley’s understanding of “relating to God” and “praying to God” differs markedly from Burrell’s. 
The following paragraph encapsulates, in a striking contrast with the citation above from Burrell, 
Coakley’s strong emphasis on epistemic darkness and the sheer lack of ontological goodness in the 
account of the divine–human relation: 
 
It must be admitted, what will be encountered [in contemplative prayer] is darkness, 
obscurity and distraction. It is no wonder that the experience has such a strange lack of 
obvious content, for the relationship is one unlike any other, one that relates those who 
pray to that without which they would not be in being at all.299 
 
Thus, on the contrary to Burrell, to have a “right dependence”300 on God is, for Coakley, “an elusive 
goal”301 and “hard work”302 achieved through enduring the painful suffering of vulnerability to God. 
Burrell nominates faith as the most profound factor of the soul’s union with God in stark 
contrast to Coakley who consistently underscores the painstaking lifelong endurance of darkness in 
purgation. He maintains that the profound recognition of the underlying dependence of creature on 
creator is, for John, faith in the creator. The spiritual discourse of John has to do with a faith in the 
fundamental truth of divine gift and created dependence, that our being is nothing other than being 
from the creator to begin with.303 Following Aquinas’s understanding of faith, Burrell argues that John 
is concerned to reveal “how it [faith] alone can be the proper way by which human beings can activate 
that sui generis relation which is their very ‘being to the creator’.”⁠304  Burrell emphatically notes that 
in the ascetical mysticism of John of the Cross 
 
298 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 14. 
299 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 108 
300 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 68. 
301 Coakley, “Creaturehood before God,” 68. 
302 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 92. 
303 See Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 87: “The One from which all-that-is comes to be exists in and by itself. What it 
bestows in creating will be a share in that perfection of existing, so that the very existence of the creature will consist 
in ‘a relation to the creator as the origin of its existence’ [Summa Theologiae 1.45.3].” 
304 Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
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no apperception—other than the activity of faith—can be an adequate means of 
effecting our goal: union with God. . . . The only possible agent would be a spiritual 
power able to mold our very spirit—although other individuals may well catalyse the 
process. The creator emerges as the only candidate, for nothing or no one else would be 
able to come closer to us than we are to ourselves and hence alter our most 
characteristic attitudes.305 
 
Burrell makes a significant correlation between the soul’s union with God as goal and faith as its 
means in John: the “goal” of the journey of faith which activates that sui generis relation is “the union 
and transformation of the [person] in God” (Ascent 2.5.3), and the means is “faith alone, which is the 
only proximate and proportionate means to union with God” (Ascent 2.9.1).”⁠ 306  Colin Thompson 
offers expositions that appear supportive of Burrell’s emphasis on faith: he notes, in the works of 
John, that “the work of faith is to propose to us the very nature of God. It teaches that he is infinite, 
Three and One. Therefore faith and only faith possesses that essential likeness which can make it the 
immediate means to the end”;307 therefore, for John, “the spiritual life is mercifully not all a matter of 
human effort” when taking into consideration “San Juan’s insistence on faith as the only way to 
union.”308 From the perspective of “the internal connection between faith and union which John 
confidently asserts,”309 then, it may make sense to realize that “‘relating to God’, as in ‘praying to 
God’, should take no effort”—which sounds absurd at first. It enables us to comprehend the rationale 
that David Burrell maintains; that even in John’s emphasis on the dark night of the soul, the most 
profound relation of the creator’s gift and the creature’s dependence on it lays a foundation for a non-
competitive divine–human relation. 
When John calls the soul’s union with and transformation in God “the union of likeness” 
(Ascent 2.5.3), it corresponds to his statement that “for the likeness between faith and God is so close 
that no other difference exists than that between believing in God and seeing him” (Night 2.9.1). 
Regarding the attainment of union with God, John lays a greater emphasis on faith, not on the 
darkness and diminishment in the journey of purgation, and thus firmly holds a non-competitive 
account of the divine–human relation: “Only by means of faith, in divine light exceeding all 
understanding, does God manifest himself to the soul. The greater one’s faith the closer is one’s union 
with God” (Night 2.9.1).310 
 
 
 
305 David Burrell, “Contemplation and Action: Personal Spirituality/World Reality,” in Dimensions of Contemporary 
Spirituality, ed. Francis A. Eigo (Philadelphia, PA: Villanova University Press, 1982), 143–62 (158). 
306 Burrell, Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology, 103; Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
307 Thompson, St John of the Cross, 193. 
308 Thompson, St John of the Cross, 218. 
309 Burrell, Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology, 104; Burrell, “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” 15. 
310 Burrell, Towards a Jewish–Christian–Muslim Theology, 177. 
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Conclusion 
 
To address the life of the Trinity, the life of Christ, and the Christian life in the light of Jesus’s cry of 
dereliction is a governing tenet in and beyond the Anglo-European post-war theologies. Their close 
attention to the cry of dereliction, on the one hand, seems to terrorize the Christian life: the state of 
dereliction is normalized as a necessary moment in the course of spiritual flourishing, sacralized as a 
genuine mark of imitating Christ, glamorized as a penultimate stage of final ecstatic delight and 
illumination, and sanctified as reflective of the condition of the intra-trinitarian relation. On the other 
hand, insofar as it is possible to have an insight into the most inscrutably collapsed, tragically 
tormented consciousness of a particular individual, and thereby (adequately and beautifully) to 
verbalize it, their attention to the cry of dereliction seems to mollify human tragedy at the deepest 
level of the human mind. In short, to be able to see through and draw upon the cry of dereliction may 
be comfortingly terrifying or relievingly petrifying. The kenotic theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
the tragic theology of Rowan Williams, and the ascetic theology of Sarah Coakley take on this feature 
in one way or another. While I have not intended to reconsider such a tenet as such, I have paid 
critical attention to their respective focuses on suffering, tragedy, and vulnerability. 
I have chosen to triangulate the three the scholar–priests are neither just because these three 
are profoundly influential figures in the contemporary theological scene who purvey the wisdom of 
Christian life, nor just because Williams and Coakley show interesting engagements with Balthasar. It 
is also because an examination of these three prominent figures sheds light on a current tendency 
towards putting a theologically positive light on the darkness of negatives such as suffering, tragedy, 
and vulnerability in the manner of unduly associating them with the divine attributes and gifts, and the 
divine–human or the creator–creature relationship. By putting the three thinkers into conversation, I 
have tried to make a contribution to mapping one aspect of the contemporary theological scene. To 
summarize briefly the three points that I have made about the three theologians in common: they are, 
first, inclined to portray the divine–human relationship as competitive such that divine agency can 
work and operate in direct proportion to how much human agency renounces and dispossesses; 
second, homogenize every kind of suffering in christological terms and presents it as teleologically 
meaningful; and, third, heavily draw upon the cry of dereliction so as to create an absolute Christic 
and Christian paradox of suffering and love, and abandonment and unity.  
Apart from what these three share, I have intended that each of the chapters makes a 
contribution to, respectively, the debate over whether Balthasar’s theo-dramatic theology represents 
suffering and death as real in the Trinity; the dispute over whether Williams’s tragic imagination 
brings into focus the tragic truth without falling into the error of ontologically radicalizing the tragic; 
and the question that Linn Marie Tonstad has raised, but still not answered, as to why Coakley 
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translates created dependence on God into dark vulnerability to God, the question that has been 
overlooked by most of her opponents as well as proponents. 
 More particularly, I have argued in the first chapter, against Williams’s espousal of Balthasar, 
that suffering and death, sin and evil of both Christ and the world are elevated into the heart of the 
Trinity at the same ontological level as the unity, love, and life of the Trinity, and that the intra-
trinitarian theo-dramatic event of divine gift, reception, and redemption is thus portrayed as an eternal 
event of the negativity of abandonment negated into unity, death into life, and tragedy into comedy. I 
have argued in the second chapter that Williams comes close to ending up ontologically radicalizing 
the tragic vis-à-vis the world and the Trinity. He does so in relation to the world by making the 
ontological value of created goodness insubstantial and the privative power of shadowy evil 
substantial; and in relation to the Trinity by projecting the tragic human predicament of self-interest 
onto the trinitarian relation so as to establish a trinitarian ground for the ethics of self-dispossession. I 
have argued in the last chapter that the created dependence on God is hived off from the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo, on the once prevalent yet now dubious suspicion of the doctrine’s lack of scriptural 
basis, and franchised out to the experience of dereliction in the ascetic theology of Coakley. 
Alongside the main arguments above, I have shown that how these prominent theologians combine 
biblical understanding with theological thought—Balthasar in relation to the Gospel of John and the 
Book of Revelation, Williams in relation to the Gospel of John, and Sarah Coakley in relation to the 
Letter to the Romans. In sum, the thoughts of Balthasar, Williams, and Coakley are inclined to 
characterize the divine life and the divine–human relationship in terms of the pain and darkness of 
suffering, tragedy, and vulnerability. 
What I have argued in the present thesis encourages us to consider a direction of 
contemporary kneeling theology that is not caught up in a tendency towards sacralizing suffering, 
tragedy, and vulnerability. We may glimpse such a path by unthinking a contemporary propensity for 
projecting human finitude and sinfulness onto the divine life, substantializing the privative power of 
evil, or essentializing the suffering of vulnerability in the life of contemplation. I believe what I have 
argued in the present thesis makes a contribution to doing so by shedding light on such a tendency. 
Accordingly, I believe, as I have intimated throughout the thesis, we can tread such a path by 
not losing the sight of and paying due attention to the ideas of God as the unconditioned source of 
being and goodness and evil as the privation of goodness: divine agency acts priorly and non-
competitively vis-à-vis human agency as the infinite fountain of every goodness at an ontologically 
distinct level; and it is where God as the source of goodness implants goodness in the created world 
that a teleological meaning lies, and there is accordingly no telos where goodness is absent. 
These patristic teachings thus invite us to cultivate the wisdom to disentangle the knotty 
realities of suffering and love, the wisdom to distinguish between the darkness of human vulnerability 
and the light of divine goodness, though we find them entangled in our existence. And this wisdom of 
discernment finally enables us to practice a kneeling theology that intends to perceive and appreciate 
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“the source of the economy [of the divine gift] by contemplating the transcendent being of God in 
itself,”311 God who creates, nurtures, and fulfils the world in benevolence and superabundance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311 Emery, “The Immutability of the God of Love,” 71. This statement is presented as an alternative to Balthasar’s 
competitive picture of God and the world. 
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